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Workshop 5: The Arab Spring and the EU Democracy Promotion Efforts: Between Intentions and Perceptions

MRM 2013

 

 

Nesreen K. El Molla,

Cairo University, Egypt

[email protected]

Dario Cristiani,

King's College, United Kingdom – Global Governance Institute , Belgium

[email protected]

 

Abstract

 

Since the end of the year 2010, political unrest and demands for democratization in the Arab region have been spelled out after years of political and socio-economic stagnation. Such demands have fundamentally altered the socio-economic and political outlook of the region and its relations with the EU.

Since its emergence on the global stage, the EU has been often described as “a normative power" as its political discourse has been focused on promoting norms and values beyond its borders. An empirical look at the patterns of implementation of this normative political discourse has revealed a gap between rhetoric/discourse and practice.

The Arab Spring, in some ways, has been a visible failure of the EU projection in the region, as it did not have any role in shaping, or at least, orienting what happened in that region. It was thus quite understandable why, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the EU has been keen to set the deepening of Arab reforms as a key objective of its development cooperation policy towards the region. This has been reflected in the series of incentive – based policy initiatives proposed by the EU for supporting Arab reforms.

Despite its efforts to foster genuine partnerships with its neighborhood, many voices have called for a paradigm shift in the EU approach to democracy support beyond its bureaucratic frameworks which - in some cases- proved as being ineffectual.

In this respect, the workshop aims at examining two broad research topics; the Arab Spring as a composite phenomenon; main drivers and future implications as well as the EU democracy support approach towards the Arab Spring.

 

Description

 

The Context

Since the end of the year 2010, political unrest and demands for democratization in the Arab region have been marked and spelled out after years of political, economic and social stagnation.

Pro-democracy protests and uprisings have hit - to various degrees - all countries of the region. These protests were a clear result of the rapidly deteriorating living conditions and the prevalence of corruption practices at the majority of these countries.

Popular protests began in Tunisia and expanded to Egypt overthrowing long-standing repressive regimes in these countries, then a spillover effect prevailed; Libya, Yemen, Jordan, Syria and others came on board.

The Arab Spring had been carried out in the first days by the energy of the young, well educated marginalized and unemployed citizens. Afterwards by the energy and expectations of the middle class and later nearly all societal groups came on board.

The pro-democracy uprisings that have swept across the Arab countries have fundamentally altered the social, economic and political outlook of the region and its relations with the EU. For reasons of geographic proximity, historical reasons and strategic interests, the political destiny of this region is inevitably linked with that of Europe.

Since its emergence on the global stage as a more or less unitary actor, the EU has been often described as a “normative power" as its political discourse has been largely focused on promoting norms and values beyond its borders, attempting to shape the concept of “Normality” in the international system. This normative political discourse was at the very roots of the main documents shaping the development of the EU foreign policy in the Mediterranean.

However, a more empirically closer look at the patterns of implementation and development of this political discourse has shown how the gap between rhetoric/discourse and practice was rather strong.

In the immediate aftermath of the eruption of the Arab Spring, the EU recognized, somehow, the existence of this gap, which undermined European soft power and credibility as an actor in the area. In the words of the European Commissioner for Enlargement and the ENP; STEFAN FÜLE;

 ‘Europe has a vital interest in a democratic, stable, prosperous, peaceful North Africa in its immediate neighborhood. Europe must and will rise to the challenge of supporting democratic transition in North Africa, as it did after the revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989… we must show humility about the past. Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and local democratic forces in the region. Too many of us fell prey to the assumption that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region. This was not even Realpolitik. It was, at best, short-termism – and the kind of short-termism that makes the long-term ever more difficult to build.

In the typically “Modernization Theory” and “Democratic Peace” oriented discourses of the EU, the aim to create a prosperous and stable neighborhood, based on liberal democracy pursed through economic reforms, was considered key for the European security.

The Arab Spring, in some ways, has been a main visible failure of the EU projection in the region, as it did not have any role in shaping or, at least, orienting what happened there.

Moreover, the Libya case showed also a partial retreat from the typical post- Westphalian and Soft Power stance of the EU, since European countries were the most vocal in supporting an armed intervention against Qaddafi, going far beyond the legal boundaries established by the UN Security Council resolution 1973; the legal basis for the International intervention in Libya.

Therefore, It was thus quite understandable why, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the EU has been very keen to set the deepening of the Arab reforms as a key objective of its development cooperation policy towards the region, As it was consistent with its typical political discourse and also a way to seize the “democratic momentum”, making the concrete implementation of its foreign policy more coherent with its political discourse. The EU, then, proposed a series of European policy initiatives to offer support for Arab reforms.

In “A new response to a changing Neighborhood” [COM (2011)303], the EU’s first reaction to the Arab Spring, commitment to pursuing good governance in the EU partner countries was strengthened. The notion of “deep democracy” has been also advocated for stressing that democracy is more than elections but is rather a deeply embedded institutional and social idea with primacy given to the "rule of law", in a way an element of continuity with comprehensive EU approach to democratization and democracy promotion.

The experience from Central and Eastern Europe as well as from the Balkans confirms that governance reform in conditions of transition has been problematic and that assistance efforts, methods and approaches could be improved. To this end, the Communication “suggests that similar problems are found in the European Neighborhood Policy region.

Additionally, to put its vision towards democracy into action, the EU has launched the “SPRING Programme”; Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth. Under this initiative, the Commission will provide support for the Southern Neighborhood countries for democratic transformation, institution building and economic growth in the wake of the Arab Spring. Support provided through SPRING will be tailored to the needs of each country as stipulated by the initiative. In such initiatives, the underlying rationale has been a “more-for-more” or an incentive – based democratization approach; the more the Arab Mediterranean governments undertake relevant reforms, the more support they can expect from the EU.

Despite the fact that the EU has been amongst the primary players who reacted swiftly to the Arab Spring, the question of ‘how’ to assist indigenous reform efforts, especially in the Arab world, still constitute an enormous challenge for the latter. There is no doubt that one of the fundamental problems with democratization assistance lies in the overestimation of its impact. Furthermore, development assistance for democratic transformation might be meaningless if not counterproductive if there are no signs of adequate internal change.

Despite the evident efforts of the EU to foster genuine partnerships with its neighborhood and to allow for the flow of indigenous needs from within the Arab region, many voices have been calling for a paradigm shift in the EU approach to democracy support. Some even argued that the EU needs to move beyond its bureaucratic and traditional procedures that respond to emerging contexts through new initiatives and frameworks which may - in many cases- prove as being ineffectual or incapable of dealing with the real needs in a timely manner. There has been a need for an innovative approach that addresses the democratic transformation process depending on the rhythm of reform, the willingness and the capacity of each country.

In many cases, the EU assistance might have increased and has been better targeted recently towards the Southern Mediterranean region specifically for some Arab countries; nevertheless, there has always been room for improvement on all sides of the relationship. There has been continuous calls for greater flexibility and more tailored responses in dealing with rapidly evolving partners and reform needs – whether they are experiencing fast regime change or a prolonged process of reform and democratic consolidation.

Against this background, the workshop aims at examining two main research topics:

 The Arab Spring as a composite phenomenon; main drivers and future implications

 The EU democracy support approach in the aftermath of the Arab Spring; between intentions and perceptions

Workshop Objectives

Participants are invited to submit research papers that examine – but are not restricted – to the following sub – topics under each of the two main research topics:

 

1. The Arab Spring as a composite phenomenon: main drivers and future implications

 Revolution as a composite phenomenon: reasons explaining the political unrest in the region, What roles different domestic and external actors can play in democratization of the Arab Spring?

 Divided societies, internal cleavages and democracy promotion: democratic developments and geographical marginalization; can “Exclusive Countries” be democratic and what this entail for foreign partners? What role religion plays versus secularism in countries of democratic transition in the Arab Spring region?

 Militaries, democracy and foreign support: Can they match?

 The regional context in the aftermath of the Arab Spring: role of partners, spoilers and alliances in democratization of the Arab Spring region.

 Lessons learned in terms of democratization trends:

o   Factors explaining democratization trends in the Arab Spring: internal factors stemming from within the countries in democractic transition Versus external factors stemming from outside such countries while having an effect on their transitional path towards democracy.

o    Main outputs and strategies of democratization trends: short term /immediate outputs and strategies Versus long term outputs and strategies for attaining democracy; Was the aim to achieve immediate outputs focusing more on formal and cosmetic aspects of the democratization process? Or was the aim to let democratic practices and mentality spread within the country? What strategies used in either cases?

2. The EU democracy support approach in the aftermath of the Arab Spring; between intentions and perceptions

 

 Filling the discourse/practice gap: What were the main failures of the EU Mediterranean and Arab Spring policy?

 The primary implications of the EU discourse over democracy promotion in response to the Arab Spring.

 What possible challenges that may confront the EU democracy promotion efforts in the changing political context of the Arab region?

 Policy recommendations to improve the EU democracy promotion efforts and to bridge the existing" intentions-perceptions gap" concerning aid effectiveness.

Cases studies and domestic politics from the Arab Spring region are encouraged to allow for a comparative approach in tackling the topic.

Workshop Participants and Expected Outcomes

The workshop is welcoming contributions from scholars as well as practitioners of work experience and are interested to engage in a network of like-minded peers.

Since the subject matter is a recent one, the main aim is thus to lay grounds for theoretical understanding of the Arab Spring and its implications using a comparative approach depending on the case studies submitted. Additionally a practical approach is also needed with regards to proposing policy recommendations on the means the EU can improve its development assistance approach towards its neighborhood from the Arab Spring region.  

By the end of the meeting, and if a considerable number of participants have papers that are transferring theory into practice, the idea of a special edition to a journal can be subject to discussion among the participants of the workshop.

Workshop Format and Moderation Modality

On the first day of the workshop, all participants are expected to give a brief presentation (15 mins each) on their papers .The directors of the workshop will classify presentations according to sub – topics and case studies. The purpose of the short presentations is to provide for a tour d’horizon of the main issues and arguments that are dealt with in terms of the two main research topics. Moderated Q&A will be allowed between presentations and free discussion during the workshop is encouraged and held under the Chatham House rule.

In order to highlight the interactive element of the workshop, the second day participants will be divided into two working groups in which each group will try to come up with a unified joint paper that synthesizes the main outputs of the individual contributions on both research topics and that addresses further aspects that were raised in the plenary discussions. It is worth noting that all individual papers will be made available to the participants prior to the workshop in order to allow for having a quick screening of the main issues tackled in these individual papers. The idea of a special edition to a journal can be subject to discussion among the participants of the workshop based on the synthesized papers that have been developed during the workshop.

 

Page last updated on 04 September 2018

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