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## EMPLOYMENT

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- Tilburg University, Department of Economics, TILEC and CentER, Tilburg, The Netherlands, September 2009-present
    - Postdoctoral Researcher
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## EDUCATION

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- European University Institute, Department of Economics, Florence, Italy 2005-Present
    - PhD Candidate (Degree expected in the Spring of 2010)  
Supervisor: Prof. Massimo Motta  
Thesis Committee: Massimo Motta, Piero Gottardi (second supervisor), Patrick Rey, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden  
Thesis Title: Three Essays on Industrial Organization and Corporate Finance
  - Toulouse School of Economics, Department of Economics, Toulouse, France, September 2007-March 2008.
    - Visiting Research Student  
Local Advisor: Prof. Patrick Rey
  - London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics, London, UK, 2005
    - Master of Science
    - Final Evaluation: Merit
  - University of Salento, Faculty of Economics, Lecce, Italy, 2003
    - Bachelor in Economics  
Final Evaluation: 110/110 *cum laude*  
Supervisor: Prof. Alessandra Chirco
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## RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS

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- Industrial Organization and Competition, Corporate Finance, Law and Economics, Microeconomics
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## TEACHING

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- Economics for business studies, lecturer and coordinator (from January 2010)
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## RESEARCH PAPERS

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- [Bankruptcy Law and Corporate Investment Decisions](#), TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2009-040, CentER Discussion Paper No. 2009-86.

- Inefficient Exclusion in Standard Setting Organizations

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## SELECTED PRESENTATIONS

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- Invited Seminars: University of Mannheim, ECARES, Tilburg University – TILEC
- Conference Presentations: EFA 2008 Doctoral Tutorial, EARIE 2008, Bankruptcy and Distress Resolution 2008, EEA-ESEM 2009, CRESSE 2009, MOOD (La Pietra-Mondragone-Moncalieri) 2009

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## SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS

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- European University Institute, Grant for completion of the Ph.D, 2008-2009.
- Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005-2008.
- Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Turin, Compagnia di San Paolo Scholarship, years 2004 and 2005 (2005 not taken).

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## REFEREEING WORK

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- Journal of International Economics

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## TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

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- Research Assistant, European University Institute  
For Prof. Elena Carletti, 3-4/2009
- Project Assistant, CRA International  
Financial Service Action Plan evaluation project, Summer 2008
- Research Assistant, European University Institute  
For Prof. Massimo Motta, from 12/2006 to 9/2007

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## SKILLS

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- Languages: Italian (mother tongue), English (fluent) and French (basic)
- Computers: LaTeX, Microsoft Office, Mathematica, Stata

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## PERSONAL INFORMATION

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- Nationality: Italian
- Date of birth: 30<sup>th</sup> July 1979

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## JOB PREFERENCES

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- Academia
- Institutions
- Available from September 2010

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## REFERENCES

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Professor Massimo Motta  
Department of Economics  
Universitat Pompeu Fabra  
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27  
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Professor Patrick Rey  
Department of Economics  
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31000 Toulouse, France

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## **JOB MARKET PAPER ABSTRACT**

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### **Bankruptcy Law and Corporate Investment Decisions**

This paper contributes to the debate on optimal bankruptcy reform by providing a set of results that challenge the wisdom that “soft” bankruptcy codes have necessarily positive effects. The model hinges on the key idea that “soft” bankruptcy allows a poor performing entrepreneur to renegotiate the terms of the initial contract with a lender. In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal arrangement requires the hampering of project’s continuation as punishment for poor performance. However, if the lender can increase recovery rates in bankruptcy such punishment is not renegotiation-proof. Clearly, this exacerbates the agency problem and creates a tension between ex-post and ex-ante efficiency that may impede the implementation of long-term projects.

[\(link to full text\)](#)