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EDUCATION

- European University Institute, Department of Economics, Florence, Italy
2006-Present
 - PhD Candidate (Degree expected July 2010)
Supervisor: Prof. Giancarlo Corsetti
Thesis Title: Essays in Trade, Finance and Taxation
- New York University, Department of Economics, USA, Fall 2008
 - Exchange student
Supervisor: Jonathan Eaton
- University of Kiel, Department of Economics, Germany, 2006
 - Diploma, Quantitative Economics
Exchanges to University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and
University of Bergen
- University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Germany, 2002
 - Pre-Diploma Economics

RESEARCH INTERESTS

- International Trade, Tax Competition, Financial Crisis, Development

TEACHING INTERESTS

- International Trade
- Microeconomics
- Statistics

AWARDS

- European University Institute Thesis Completion Grant (2009-2010)
- Exchange to New York University (competitive selection)
- DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) PhD Scholarship (2006-2009)
- Erich-Schneider Award for best GPA in Economics, University of Kiel
- DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) study abroad scholarship to North America (2003/2004)

RESEARCH PAPERS

- Towards a theory of trade finance

- Heterogeneous firms, 'Profit Shifting' FDI and International Tax Competition (joint with Sebastian Krautheim, Paris School of Economics)
- Contagious banking crisis: international dimensions of government intervention (joint with Friederike Niepmann, European University Institute)

TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

- Teaching Assistant, IMT Lucca
For Prof. Giammario Impullitti and Prof. Gino Gancia, International Trade, PhD-level, Spring 2010
- Teaching Assistant, European University Institute
For Prof. Pascal Courty, Microeconomics III, PhD-level, Spring 2008
- Student Assistant, Kiel Institute for World Economics
For Prof Dennis Snower (president), academic year 2004/2005
- Student Assistant, Kiel Institute for World Economics
For Prof Horst Siebert (president emeritus), academic year 2002/2003
- Teaching Assistant, University of Heidelberg
Tutor for Mathematics for Economists, Spring 2002

Presentations

- 11th Annual Conference of European Trade Study Group (ETSG), Rome, Italy.
- 24th Congress of the European Economic Association, Barcelona, Spain.
- XIV Workshop on Dynamic Macroeconomics, Vigo, Spain.
- 2009 Annual Meeting of the Scottish Economic Society, Perth, Scotland.
- RIEF, IXth Doctoral Meeting in International Trade and International Finance, Aix-en Provence, France.
- 11th Workshop in International Economic Relations, University of Goettingen, Germany.

SKILLS

- Languages: German (mother tongue), English (fluent), French (advanced), Italian (intermediate), Norwegian (intermediate)
- Computers: LaTeX, Matlab, R, Mathematica, EViews

PERSONAL INFORMATION

- Nationality: German
- Date of birth: 16 February 1981

JOB PREFERENCES

- Available from September 2010

REFERENCES

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Paper Abstracts

Towards a Theory of Trade Finance

Cross border transactions are conducted using different payment contracts, corresponding to Cash in Advance, Open Account, and Letter of Credit. In this paper I build a model in which exporters optimally choose payment contracts trading off differences in enforcement and efficiency between financial markets in different countries. The model explains the coexistence of different forms of contracts and shows implications for trade flows. The choice of payment contracts shapes variable trade costs and affects fob prices. Changes in financial markets – such as movements in interest rates or changes in the degree of enforcement in any of the trading partners – influence trade flows, and are affected by the ability of firms to optimally switch contracts.

Heterogeneous firms, 'Profit Shifting' FDI and International Tax Competition (with Sebastian Krautheim, Paris School of Economics)

Larger firms are more likely to use tax haven operations to exploit international tax differences. We study a tax game between a large country and a tax haven modeling heterogeneous monopolistic firms, which can shift profits abroad. We show that a higher degree of firm heterogeneity (a mean-preserving spread of the cost distribution) increases the degree of tax competition, i.e. it decreases the equilibrium tax rate of the large country, leads to higher outflows of its tax base and thus decreases its equilibrium tax revenue. Similar effects hold for a higher substitutability across varieties. We find that models with homogeneous firms understate the strength of tax competition.

Contagious Banking Crisis: International Dimensions of Government Intervention

(with Friederike Niepmann, European University Institute)

Policy makers try to optimally respond to liquidity problems of banks in the context of international linkages and externalities. Extending Allen and Gale (2000) we provide a model of international contagion allowing for bank bail-outs financed by distortionary taxes. In the sequential game, costs and benefits of intervention differ between the trouble spot and the crisis-importing country leading to potential inefficiencies in the absence of coordination. We identify a new source of inefficiency that is due to the sequential nature of the game. We study the effects of cross-country deposits and different country sizes. The introduction of a central authority improves overall efficiency, but does not always imply Pareto-improvements. In this regard, we show which countries might lose and win given different institutional arrangements.