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EDUCATION:

- 2008 – **Ph.D. Candidate in Economics:** European University Institute, Florence (Italy)
Thesis Title: “Essays in Labor Economics from a Macroeconomic Perspective”
Advisors: Prof. Árpád Ábrahám and Prof. Ramón Marimón
Expected completion: Summer 2012
- June 2008 **M.Res. in Economics:** European University Institute, Florence (Italy)
- 2005 – 2007 **Postgraduate Program in Economics:** Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna (Austria)
- Feb. 2006 **Magistra in Economics:** University of Vienna, Vienna (Austria)
- 2003 – 2004 **Visiting Student:** Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-La-Neuve (Belgium)
- 1999 – 2006 **Diploma Program in Economics:** University of Vienna, Vienna (Austria)
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RESEARCH:

FIELDS OF INTEREST: Quantitative Macroeconomics, Labor Economics, Search Theory,
Computational Methods, Applied Econometrics

RESEARCH PAPERS: (abstracts are included at the end of the document)

“Job-to-Job Mobility and Wage Inequality: A Quantitative Assessment”

(Job Market Paper)

“The Effect of Moral Hazard on Wage Inequality with On-the-Job Search and Employer Competition”

joint with Árpád Ábrahám and Fernando Álvarez-Parra (work in progress)

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS:

“On-the-Job Search, Mobility Costs, and Wage Inequality” presented at:

Workshop on Dynamic Macroeconomics, Vigo (Spain), June 2011

IZA European Summer School in Labor Economics, Buch am Ammersee (Germany), May 2011

Spring Meeting of Young Economists, Groningen (The Netherlands), April 2011

TEACHING:

FIELDS OF INTEREST: Macroeconomics, Labor Economics

EXPERIENCE:

Teaching Assistant for:

Macroeconomics I, Graduate Course (Fall 2009), European University Institute, Florence

Macroeconomics, Graduate Course (Spring 2007), Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna

Applied Econometrics, Undergraduate Course (Fall 2004, Spring 2005), University of Vienna

Introduction to Economics, Undergraduate Course (Fall 2002), Technical University of Vienna

AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS:

Best Paper Award, XVI Workshop on Dynamic Macroeconomics, University of Vigo (2011)

Scholarship from the European University Institute for the fourth academic year (2010–2011)

Postgraduate Scholarship from the Austrian Federal Ministry for Science and Research for the Ph.D. Program at the European University Institute (2007–2010)

Scholarship from the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, for the Postgraduate Program in Economics (2005–2007)

LANGUAGE AND SOFTWARE SKILLS:

LANGUAGES: German (native), English (fluent), French (intermediate), Spanish (basic), Italian (basic)

SOFTWARE: Matlab, Stata, Gauss, R, Mathematica

JOB PREFERENCES:

Academia, other research institutions

Available from September 2012

PERSONAL INFORMATION:

Date of birth: February 21, 1980

Place of birth: Vienna (Austria)

Citizenship: Austrian

REFERENCES:**Árpád Ábrahám**

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PAPER ABSTRACTS:**“Job-to-Job Mobility and Wage Inequality: A Quantitative Assessment”**

(Job Market Paper)

Within the last three decades the U.S. labor market has exhibited a persistent rise in overall as well as residual wage inequality. Over the same time period the rate of job-to-job transitions of U.S. workers has increased too. In the present paper I address the question of how much of the observed increase in residual wage inequality can be associated with increased job-to-job mobility. For this purpose I develop a search model with on-the-job search, anticipated job destruction, and costs to workers when leaving a job. This framework not only features various determinants of job-to-job mobility, but also allows for job-to-job transitions involving wage loss when workers search for new job opportunities during a notice period. First, I calibrate the model so as to match characteristics of the U.S. labor market in the mid-1980s. In a second step I recalibrate selected parameters so as to match changes in worker turnover, in particular, the increase in job-to-job transitions between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s. I find that within this framework changes in job-to-job mobility have a significant quantitative impact on wage inequality. In particular, up to one-half of the observed increase in residual wage inequality between the first and the second time period is accounted for by the composite effect of changes in determinants of job-to-job mobility.

“The Effect of Moral Hazard on Wage Inequality with On-the-Job Search and Employer Competition” (joint with Árpád Ábrahám and Fernando Álvarez-Parra)

We study the impact of moral hazard on wage inequality when employed workers search for alternative job opportunities, and firms compete for these workers through outside offers and counteroffers as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). In our model, firms enter long-term contracts with risk-averse workers in the presence of moral hazard. The latter arises from worker output depending on unobservable effort, and introduces the standard trade-off between incentive and insurance provision within the wage contract. Moreover, employed workers may reveal outside job offers, thereby triggering Bertrand competition between incumbent and potential new employer. In this framework, the presence of moral hazard impacts on wage inequality through two main channels. On the one hand, the need to provide incentives makes workers' wages depend on the history of productivity shocks, leading to higher wage inequality. On the other hand, the presence of moral hazard affects the wage levels associated with outside job offers, reducing the wage gains that workers can obtain by triggering firm competition. This second indirect channel leads to less wage inequality by decreasing the wage differential between workers who obtained outside offers and those who did not, as well as among workers receiving different outside offers. Since the two channels affect the wage distribution in opposite directions, we assess the overall effect of moral hazard on wage inequality through a quantitative analysis of the model. Results from a calibration of the model to characteristics of the U.S. labor market suggest that the indirect effect dominates, that is, the presence of moral hazard actually reduces wage inequality. Moreover, our framework proposes a strong interaction between moral hazard and the dynamics of wage change through on-the-job search. This leads us to evaluate to what extent estimates of the contribution of search frictions to wage inequality are systematically biased when moral hazard is not taken into account. For this purpose, we plan to estimate the model without moral hazard of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), using simulated data from our framework where moral hazard is present.