

AGUSTIN A. CASAS

Via delle Fontanelle 10
I-50014 San Domenico, FI, Italy
Office: +39 055 4685 672

agustin.casas@eui.eu

<https://sites.google.com/site/agustincasas>

Currently I am a Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute.

RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS

Research: Political Economy, Applied Microeconomics, Game Theory
Teaching: Microeconomics, Industrial Organization

DOCTORAL STUDIES

Ph.D.: Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 2011
Dissertation: Essays on Partisan Politics.
Committee Chairperson: Professor David Austen-Smith

PREDOCTORAL STUDIES

B.A.: Economics, Universidad de San Andrés, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2003. *Cum laude*.
M.S.: Economics, Universidad de San Andrés, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2005.
M.A.: Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 2007.

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Dissertation Year Fellowship, Northwestern University, 2010-2011
Summer School Grant, Institute of Advanced Studies, Summer 2010
Graduate Student Grant, APSA, September 2010
Graduate Research Grant, Northwestern University, Spring 2010
Conference Travel Grants, Northwestern University, 2006-2010
Graduate Fellowship (Tuition/Stipend), Northwestern University, 2006-2011
Undergraduate and Graduate Fellowship, Universidad de San Andrés, 1999-2003.
Buenos Aires Government, Fellowship, 1994-1998.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, Kellogg School of Management, 2007-2009
Strategy and Organization (MBA), Strategic Management in Nonmarket Environments (MBA)
Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University, 2006-2010
Money and Banking, Labor Economics, Behavioral Economics, Introduction to Microeconomics, Microeconomics.
Teaching Assistant, Universidad de San Andrés, 2003-2005
International Monetary Economics, Monetary Economics, Advanced Microeconomics, Microeconomics.

WORKING PAPERS

“Strategic campaigning : an empirical approach”.

Abstract: I test the implications of *A note on optimal vote and turnout buying* (Casas 2011) with data from 2 presidential and 2 midterm elections in Argentina, from 2001 to 2007. The voting dataset, disaggregated at the voting booth level, is combined with demographic data and centralized "social spending" through the "Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar", which peaked during the week of the 2003 presidential election. Controlling from expected vote share, the preliminary results show that the voting share increases significantly with social spending measured by the number of plans allocated in a district. Moreover, I confirm anecdotal evidence that claims that (1) poor, uneducated, jobless citizens are more likely to change

their vote as a result of clientelistic practices. It is widely believed that the distribution of goods constitutes a large share of clientelism, in particular, the handouts of building materials (cement, bricks, etc); I confirm this conjecture and show that (2) districts with larger share of precarious houses are more likely to vote for the incumbent.

“Parties, Primaries, and Endogenous Valence.”

Abstract: Parties' candidates are chosen by different nomination rules. Recent empirical evidence shows that these rules influence the attributes of the nominees; for instance, open primaries in the U.S. choose more extreme candidates than closed primaries. Despite this evidence, the literature does not provide an explanation of why appealing to a more moderate electorate results in more extreme candidates. I build a model that shows that open primaries elect “predictable extremists”, while, for instance, party leaders would choose “moderate mavericks”. I obtain these results through a model that puts together 3 pieces of partisan politics: affiliation decisions, nomination rules, and an observed endogenous valence, which (together with party membership) signals the candidates' ideologies. Moreover, I investigate the welfare implications of three methods: nomination by the party leader, by closed primaries, and by open primaries. I show the conditions under which nomination by party leaders leads to higher social welfare than nomination by open primaries. Furthermore, I show that higher screening by parties, leads to more ideologically uncertain candidates. In sum, I argue that party affiliation decisions, and endogenous valence play a large role in understanding the effects of nomination rules on the political equilibria.

OTHER PAPERS AND WORK IN PROGRESS

“A note on optimal vote and turnout buying” APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper.

“Coup d'etats and interest groups in weak democracies: theory and evidence”, in progress.

“Demand of organic food in the US”.

NON-REFEREED PUBLICATIONS

“Modelos de Ajuste Nominal Incompleto” (*Monetary Economics - EU*). AAEP Anales 2004, joint with J.Difiori, A.Olgiati and D.Hofman.

“Condicionalidad de las Instituciones Financieras Internacionales”, (*International Political Economy*). AAEP Anales 2004.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Kellogg Insight, Kellogg School of Management. 2007-2008. *Science writer*.

(“[The value of a cabinet position](#)”, “[Strategic Activism and Nonmarket strategy](#)”, “[Big Fish, Little Fish-Choose Your Pond](#)”)

NERA London, Competition office. Summer 2008. *Intern*.

Antitrust Agency, Economic Ministry, Argentina. 2002/3. *Intern*.

Budget Office, Defense Ministry, Argentina. 2003/2004. *Consultant*.

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Age: 30

Marital status: Single

Citizenship: Argentina

REFERENCES

Professor David Austen-Smith (chairperson)
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
Evanston, IL 60208
Phone: 847-467-6226
E-mail: dasm@northwestern.edu

Professor Tim Feddersen
Kellogg School of Management
Northwestern University
Evanston, IL 60208
Phone: 847-491-5172
E-mail: tfed@kellogg.northwestern.edu

Professor Bard Harstad

Professor Antoine Loeper

Kellogg School of Management
Northwestern University
Evanston, IL 60208
Phone: 847-491-5166
E-mail: harstad@kellogg.northwestern.edu

Kellogg School of Management
Northwestern University
Evanston, IL 60208
Phone: 847-491-5347
E-mail: a-loeper@kellogg.northwestern.edu