

European University Institute

Department of Political and Social Sciences

The Educational Attainment of Second Generation Immigrants from different Countries of Origin in the EU member-states

J. Dronkers & F. Fleischmann

An older version of this paper was presented at the Workshop of the EDUC Research Group of the EQUALSOC Network of Excellence, Dijon (France) 22. - 24. November 2007.

The Educational Attainment of Second Generation Immigrants from different Countries of Origin in the EU member-states[1]

J. Dronkers & F. Fleischmann

Version 12 January 2008

Abstract

Drawing on the second wave of the European Social Survey, we analyse the educational attainment of 1039 second generation immigrants from different countries of origin in 13 EU countries, relative to that of the natives of these EU countries. In addition to testing the effects of individual factors, such as parental education and religion, we estimate the effects of macro characteristics of both origin and destination countries. Next to parental educational level, the average educational level of the natives of the countries of destination and the generosity of the naturalization laws have positive effects on the educational level of both male and female second generation immigrants. Other macro-characteristics of countries of origin and destination have no significant effects on educational outcomes of these immigrants. Moreover, Muslim men of the second generation are found to have lower levels of education. Among female members of the second generation, we find a positive effect of speaking the national language of the destination country at home for those with highly educated parents, whereas the children of lowly educated parents profit from speaking a minority language at home.

Key words: second generation immigrants, educational attainment, European Union, country of destination, country of origin

1. Introduction

Immigrant integration has received lots of attention in social scientific research, but this has been concentrated on the 'classical' immigration countries, most notably the U.S. There, starting with the work of the Chicago School, a theory of assimilation developed according to which it was expected that immigrants would become more like natives over time socio-economically, spatially, socio-culturally and politically. This process of linear assimilation was perceived to occur over the life-course of fist generation immigrants and reach near perfection in the second generation, thought to experience largely the same living conditions as their peers born of native parents. However, later waves of immigration from more diverse regions of origin led to a challenge to assimilation theory. Research among different ethnic groups in different urban settings in the U.S. revealed that not all immigrant groups experience upward social mobility after arrival. While this still holds true for some immigrant groups, others were found to face downward assimilation into a socio-economic, but also racially or ethnically defined, underclass, while still other groups were neither incorporated into the middle-class nor into the underclass, instead remaining concentrated in ethnic niches or enclaves. The debate as to whether there is still a general trend of assimilation for all groups or whether there is a process of segmented assimilation at work is still ongoing in the U.S. (Alba & Nee, 1997; Perlmann & Waldinger, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Zhou, 1997).

In Europe, the debate about and research into the integration of immigrants is still much more recent, due to the fact that despite continuous population movements throughout the history of the continent and its shifting borders, most Western European countries have just started to acknowledge that they are currently immigration societies. Most Southern European countries, on the other hand, have shifted from being primarily emigrant sending to immigrant receiving societies over the past 30 years. In addition, many European countries are characterized by strong regional divides, which sometimes go together with linguistic and/or ethnic cleavages within states, a factor that renders the integration of immigrants more complex since it is not always clear who the reference category for these newcomers is (Phalet & Kosic, 2005). Moreover, policy approaches to immigrant integration vary greatly between European societies which continue to define themselves as nation-states with heavy ethnic connotations. Germany, for instance, has only recently shifted its naturalization policy from a *jus sanguinis* to a *jus solis* principle, thus hoping to improve the chances of a successful integration of second generation immigrants who, before the reform, were still legally considered non-nationals. France has followed the opposite approach with its policy of non-registration of ethnicity and its comparatively generous granting of citizenship to both foreign- and native-born populations. However, both countries and most of their fellow EU member-states are currently discussing, with the image of the youth riots in the French suburbs still fresh on their minds, whether, and if so, to what extent, the integration of immigrants has been successful in the past and how it can become more successful in the future.

In light of this public debate and the European Union's goal of defining a common immigration policy, there is a need for comparative research on the integration of immigrants across European societies in order to establish in which countries this integration has been most successful and to identify the policies or other macro-characteristics that enable such successful integration. To be more precise, we want to find out which characteristics, of both the countries of destination and the countries of origin, promote or hamper the integration of immigrants, taking into account their individual characteristics. In this study, we focus on the educational level of immigrants, thus limiting our scope to only one dimension of integration. We do this not only for practical reasons, but also in agreement with a number of scholars who have argued that the socio-economic integration of immigrants is the first step and a precondition for their spatial, socio-cultural and political integration (Geddes et al., 2004; Waldenrauch, 2001). In European societies, educational attainment, in turn, is one of the most important predictors of further socio-economic integration, such as participation on the labour market and occupational status. We have analyzed the latter dimensions of integration of male and female immigrants and have reported the results elsewhere (Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2007). With regard to educational attainment, we understand integration to be successful if there are no significant gaps between second generation immigrants and natives.

In addition to the differences in policies and other characteristics between the countries of destination, it is expected that the countries of origin also affect immigrants' socio-economic integration. As Kao and Thompson (2003) have argued, differences in religion and cultural values of immigrants lead to different evaluations of educational achievement, which can partly explain differential outcomes of immigrants coming from different regions of the world. Furthermore, the levels of expected and experienced discrimination in society differ between immigrant groups from different origins, which might partly be due to different levels of 'visibility' of these immigrant groups. However, discrimination does not affect all immigrants in the

same way: research into school performance in the U.S. has found that expected discrimination has a discouraging effect on African-Americans (Ogbu, 1991), while providing an incentive for South-Asian Americans to perform even better (Sue & Okazaki, 1990).

While research on immigrant integration in Europe is still limited in comparison to studies conducted in the classical immigrant receiving societies, there are already numerous studies comparing the processes and outcomes of integration between European countries. However, many of them are limited either to a small number of countries of destination or to a small number of immigrant groups (for a recent example, see Böcker & Thränhardt, 2007). Others try to incorporate a larger number of countries of destination, either by analyzing more countries separately (e.g. Heath & Cheung, 2007) or by comparing national statistics (e.g. Werner, 2003). There are several problems with this type of research. Obviously, separate analyses of different countries of destination do not allow for statistical testing across countries, so that the comparison remains on a more abstract, theoretical level. Moreover, the definition of who is an immigrant (and, to make things even more complicated, also the terminology, cf. Entzinger, 2006) differs between countries, leaving some doubts as to the usefulness of comparing national statistical data from these various countries. A more serious problem, however, is that comparisons taking into account only one immigrant group in multiple destinations or multiple immigrant groups in one destination do not allow one to disentangle the effects of the country of destination and those of the country of origin on the integration of immigrants. This is a serious drawback, since the composition of immigrant populations varies greatly between European countries. Tables 1 and 2 clearly show the variation in the composition of immigrants, both in terms of their individual characteristics and their distribution across the various countries of origin, across the destination countries under study and in their educational outcomes. In contrast to the cross-classified multilevel analysis that we perform, a single comparative approach or a study including only a small number of countries of destination cannot establish whether these differential outcomes are due to factors at the individual level or due to macro-characteristics of the country of destination or the country of origin.

Only few studies using such a double comparative multilevel approach with educational outcomes as dependent variable have been published (Levels & Dronkers, in press; Dronkers & Levels, in press; Levels, Dronkers & Kraaykamp, 2006). Using the PISA 2003 data, these studies made clear that both the sending and the receiving contexts affect immigrants' educational achievement in the countries of destination, and they identified a number of macro-characteristics of both the countries of origin and the countries of destination, such as GDP per capita and religious composition, which affect pupils' achievement. Ethnic school segregation was also relevant factor, although less important than socio-economic school segregation, and it did not explain the effect of country of origin. A disadvantage of these studies is that only information about test scores of 15-year old pupils was available, while the educational level attained by these pupils could not be assessed.

The second wave of the European Social Survey allows us to analyse the highest educational level achieved by immigrants, and, in addition, it provides information about the country of birth of the respondent and of both of his or her parents, thus allowing second generations of immigrants to be distinguished and the country of origin to be specified in each case.[2] In the following section, we elaborate on the micro-characteristics of individual immigrants and the macro-characteristics of

the countries of origin and destination that we take into account in analyzing educational level of second generation immigrants across 13 EU countries.

2. Data and Measures

We use the second wave of the European Social Survey (Jowell et al., 2005) which contains data, gathered in 2004 and 2005, from more than 45.000 respondents in 23 countries. The main aim of our chapter is to assess the impact of a number of social policies of destination countries on the educational attainment of immigrants. We measure the inclusiveness of social policies with the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index and, unfortunately, at the time of writing this index was only available for the EU-15 countries. Since data from Italy was not yet available when we performed the analysis, we could only include 14 countries of destination. This number further decreased to 13 because we excluded data from Finland given the low number of immigrant respondents in this country.[3] Furthermore, we selected only respondents between the ages of 25 and 60 since these respondents will most likely have completed their education. Our final sample of 14068 respondents contains 1039 second immigrants (504 male and 535 female) from 132 different countries of origin.[4]

We classified second generation respondents as immigrants if one or both parents were born outside the country of destination and the respondent is born in the country of destination. Every respondent who is born outside the country of destination is classified as a first generation immigrant and thus not considered in this analysis. However, respondents who were born abroad but to two native parents are not classified as immigrants because we assume that these children of expats will be more like the native population than children of mixed marriages and children of first generation immigrants. In all other cases we classified respondents as native if both parents were born inside the survey country and the respondent is also born in the survey country. For immigrants, we used the following decision rules to establish the country of origin: if both parents were born in the same country, this country was classified as the country of origin. If both parents were born in different countries, we looked at the language spoken at home. If this corresponded to any of the two possible countries, this country was used. If not, we used the country of birth of the mother, arguing that 'motherhood is a fact, whereas fatherhood is an opinion'. With this procedure, we can distinguish 88 countries of origin, but many of them contain only few cases. We therefore aggregated countries into regions of origin using a slightly adapted version of the United Nations classification of geographical regions (United Nations Statistical Office). In the end, we distinguish 27 countries of origin and an additional 21 regions of origin, varying in numbers of immigrants from 1 (French Speaking Caribbean) to 141 (Germany). We maintained for comparison reasons the same categorisation as in Fleischmann & Dronkers (2007), but the selection of only second generation immigrants decreases the numbers of migrants strongly.[5] Tables 1 and 2, which provide information about the dependent and independent variables per country/region of origin list these countries and regions.

On the one hand, our measurement of immigrant status, which is based on information about the country of birth respondents and of both of their parents, is much more accurate than taking only nationality into account. This is problematic especially for the second generation due to differences in access to citizenship between European countries. On the other hand, our classification gives rise to a number of problems, which can be solved neither with the data sets used here, nor with other available cross-national data. A first definitional problem is related to

changing national boundaries and is particularly relevant to Europe. Due to the changes in the political frontiers after 1945 (the annexation by Poland of some formerly German territory; the extension of Russia at the expense of Polish territory) and due to the subsequent displacement of large populations, an unknown number of 'indigenous' persons are measured as being born outside their country, e.g. a German respondent or his/her parents born in Königsberg (East Prussia) and now living in Germany or a Polish respondent or his/her parents born in Lvov (Ukraine) and now living in Poland. One can argue that by failing to make the distinction between genuine migrants and border changes, we overestimate the number of better-integrated immigrants. At the same time, this failure highlights a conceptual problem in defining an immigrant: for how many generations must a Polish family live in Germany before he/she is no longer considered Polish? This issue also extends to the large number of third country immigrants originating in former European colonies whose grandparents migrated to Europe. Their grandchildren, born in these immigrant receiving countries, are measured as native born. However, typically in these countries this third generation will continue to be considered "immigrants", especially if they are a 'visible minority'. Therefore they might still have lower levels of education and labour market outcomes than natives within these countries (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001).

An additional weakness of the European Social Survey as a data source is that immigrants are not oversampled in this survey which leads, first of all, to a low N and, secondly, introduces a potential bias towards the better integrated immigrants For instance, second generation immigrants who have a low proficiency in the national language of the survey country are less likely to be included in the survey, since the ESS takes no special measures to reach this group which often differs in their response rates to surveys from the native population.

When using the term immigrant in the remainder of this chapter, we mean a second generation immigrant, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

2.1. Dependent variables

The European Social Survey provides an internationally comparable measure of educational attainment, by assessing the highest level of education reached by respondents with the 7-point ISCED-97 (UNESCO, 1997) scale which ranges from 0 (not completed primary education) to 6 (second stage of tertiary education). However, due to a different measurement in the UK, we had to collapse the categories 'upper secondary' and 'post-secondary, non-tertiary' and the categories 'first stage of tertiary' and 'second stage of tertiary'. This recoding restricts us to a less precise 5-point scale, but is considered the lesser evil by the authors. The alternative would have been to exclude all data from the United Kingdom, which is not desirable given the importance of this country for comparative research on immigration in Europe and, in addition, because of the resulting reduction in the N at the highest level.[6] Table 1 gives the average educational level of first and second generation immigrants per country of destination and origin and the average educational level of the natives of each country of destination.

2.2. Independent variables: individual characteristics

Table 2a gives the average values of the independent variables per country of destination for natives and second generation immigrants separately, while table 2b does the same but per country of origin.

The effect of parental education on the educational attainment of their offspring is a well-established fact in sociology (see e.g. Boudon, 1974; Davies, Heinesen & Holm, 2002; Gambetta, 1987). There is mixed evidence concerning the question whether this effect works the same for immigrants as for native students (Hustinx, 2002; Van Ours & Veenman, 2003). However, despite the interactions that may occur, a considerable main effect of parental education is still expected to occur among second generation immigrants. *We expect that the higher the education of their parents, the higher the educational attainment of second generation immigrants will be.*[7]

We use dummies that indicate the religious group the respondent belongs to.[8] In addition, we assess religiosity with a self-classification measure where respondents indicated their degree of religiosity on a 10-point scale ranging from 'not religious at all' to 'very religious'. Lastly, we control for the intensity of religious practice which we assess with a composite measure that includes the answers to the questions 'How often do you attend religious services, apart from special occasions?' and 'How often do you pray apart from during services?'. Both questions were answered on a 7-point scale that we reversed so that higher values indicate a higher intensity of religious practice. Including individual religion is not common in the analysis of socio-economic integration of immigrants, but we have two reasons to expect effects in this respect: firstly, the cultural habitus of a religious group might affect educational outcomes, for example through the differential evaluation of achievement (Kao & Thompson, 2003). Secondly, European societies react differently to different religious groups, the primary example being the approach towards Muslims after 9/11. *We therefore hypothesize that religious affiliation and the extent to which individuals follow the practices of their religious community will affect their educational attainment*, but we do not have clear expectations with regard to the signs of the effects for different religious groups.[9]

In the multilevel analyses, which are based exclusively on the immigrant sample, we additionally take into account whether respondents speak a minority language at home, whether they hold the citizenship of the country of destination and whether they are born to one native and one immigrant parent. Based on earlier findings (Levels & Dronkers, 2005), *we hypothesize that immigrants who speak a minority language at home will have lower educational levels*. On the contrary, *we expect immigrants who are citizens of their destination country and those 2nd generation migrants who are born to one native and one immigrant parent to have higher educational levels*.

We argue that immigrants from certain countries of origin are likely to have higher educational levels than immigrants from other countries or regions of origin. Therefore, we coded the information according to whether the country of origin is a neighbouring country of the country of destination[10], whether the country of origin is one of the EU-15 member states (plus the largely comparable countries and silent EU member-states, Switzerland and Norway) and whether the country of origin is a former colony or territory of the country of destination.[11] *We expect immigrants from countries which are part of any of these categories to have higher educational levels than immigrants who come from countries which are less historically and culturally connected to the countries of destination in our analysis*.

2.3. Independent variables: macro-characteristics of destination

The main focus of our paper is the question whether, and if so how, indicators on the macro-level, both of the countries of destination and the countries of origin, affect

immigrants' educational levels in the 13 EU countries under study. With regard to the countries of destination, we use indicators of the policies geared towards immigrant integration, the type of welfare regime, the presence of left-wing parties in government and the net migration rate.

As a measure of immigrant integration policies, we use the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index (Geddes et al., 2004) which has recently been developed for the EU-15 member states. This index contains five dimensions: labour market inclusion, long term residence rights, family reunion, naturalisation and anti-discrimination measures. We recoded index scores so that values between -1 and 0 represent less favourable policies on these dimensions, while values between 0 and 1 stand for more favourable policies, i.e. policies that are more inclusive of immigrants. The assessment of each country's policies in these areas is based on an ideal, not real, legal framework, which means that the creators of the index made a judgement as to how close certain national policies came to what they consider to be ideal for the integration of immigrants. Next to the five separate dimensions, we include the (unweighted) mean score across these dimensions. *We test the hypothesis that the gap in educational attainment between second generation immigrants and the native population is smaller in countries that score high on this Index than in countries that score lower on the EII.*

Furthermore, we test the effects of different types of welfare regimes of the countries of destination. Based on the classic typology of Esping-Andersen (1990) and the work of other authors (Kogan, 2007), we distinguish between the liberal welfare regime, represented by the United Kingdom and Ireland in our data, which is characterized by market approach to social institutions such as the labour market and the educational system. The social-democratic welfare regime (represented by Sweden and Denmark in our analysis), on the contrary, is characterized by a high standard of universal social insurance for citizens with a strong equalizing objective that is to be reached for a large part through the educational system. In conservative welfare regimes, social insurance is state-based instead of market-based, but, in contrast to the social-democratic welfare regime, there is no aim of equalization of status and class differentials which finds its expression in a more stratified educational system with early selection into different tracks. We classify Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands as countries with conservative welfare regimes. We furthermore distinguish the Southern or Mediterranean welfare regime which is found in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and which shares some commonalities with the conservative welfare regime, but additionally knows rather low levels of welfare benefits and expenditure for public goods, such as education (for a more detailed description of the different types of welfare regimes, we refer to Kogan, 2007 and Esping-Andersen, 1990).[12] *Because of its equalizing objective which is pursued through the comprehensive school system, differences in the educational attainment between second generation immigrants and their native peers are expected to be lowest in the social-democratic welfare regime.*

We additionally control for the presence of left-wing parties in the government during the past 30 years. Based on the data provided by Beck et al. (2001), we compute a total score for every country assigning a 1 for every year in which the government is exclusively made up of left-wing parties and 0.5 for every year in which a left-wing party takes part in a coalition with one or more centre or right-wing parties. This measure has been used in previous cross-country research on immigrant integration (Tubergen, 2004; Tubergen et al., 2004), based on the assumption that left-wing governments will develop policies that are more favourable to immigrant

integration. However, the problem with this indicator is that it is merely a proxy for concrete policies. In the presence of the policy indicators described above, we expect little additional explanatory power of the presence of left-wing parties in the government. *The general expectation is that the presence of left-wing parties in the government promotes the equality between the educational level of second generation immigrants and their native peers*.

Our last macro-indicator with respect to destination countries is the net migration rate. This indicator is taken from the CIA World Factbook (2007). Countries with higher net migration rates can be expected to be better able to deal with immigrant integration. *We therefore expect a negative relation between the net migration rate of a destination country and the gap in educational attainment between second generation immigrants and natives.*

2.4. Independent variables: macro-characteristics of origin

We also want to analyse whether indicators on the macro-level of the countries of origin affect the educational levels of second generation immigrants in the 13 EU countries under study. It is important to find out whether the characteristics of the countries of origin of the immigrant generation continue to affect their children. Such effects are not straightforward and they raise the question of how these origin effects are transmitted to the second generation. The 'exposure' of the second generation to effects of the country of origin can work through media and transnational contacts, such as frequent travel to the parents' home country. However, the most effective transmission of characteristics of origin countries to the second generation is likely to occur through the socialization processes within families and immigrant communities. This partly blurs the distinction between effects at the individual level and effects at the macro-level of the country of origin. For instance, affiliation with a certain religion occurs at the individual level and is usually passed on from parents to children. At the same time, immigrants' affiliation to a religion that is not commonly found in the destination country, such as Islam in Europe, is also to a large part a consequence of the country of origin, especially in cases where such origin countries are very homogeneous in terms of religion. This situation applies to important immigrant groups in Europe, such as Turks and North-Africans who come from countries in which more than 90% of the population are Muslims (Brown, 2000). A similar argument can be made for parental education, which, for the second generation, is also largely a function of the average level of education in the country of destination. As a consequence, a part of the macro-effects of the country of origin will already be present in our model through controls for individual level effects, which makes it less likely for indicators of macro-characteristics of origin countries to reach significance. We therefore limit the list of these indicators to a few comprehensive measures.

Firstly, we use the scale of the 2006 Human Development Index as a comprehensive measure of the economic and social development of countries of origin. This index combines information on GDP per capita, education, life expectancy and gender inequality and ranks countries according to these indicators. *We expect immigrants from less developed countries (i.e. those with a higher Index-score) to have lower individual educational levels due to the larger economic and cultural differences between their countries of origin and of destination.*

We also take into account the net migration rate of the origin countries, which we again took from the CIA World Factbook (2007). A negative score on this indicator identifies countries with large degrees of emigration. These are mostly the

typical source countries of labour migration, such as Turkey, the Maghreb countries and, more recently, the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The net migration rate of origin countries is, however, not only associated with the characteristics of labour migration. It also influences the feasibility of the emergence of ethnic communities in the destination countries. If the net migration rate of a specific country of origin is lower, immigrants from this country are more likely to encounter fellow country(wo)men in their destination countries, which, in turn, increases the exposure of the second generation to the culture of the origin country and therefore enhances the continued effects of the characteristics of origin countries in the second generation.

Lastly, we include a dummy variable for the prevalent religion in the country of origin. A religion was classified to prevail in one country if at least 50% of the population belonged to this religious group (based again on information from the CIA World Factbook); if necessary, different Christian denominations were aggregated in this procedure and a country was classified 'prevalently Christian' if more than 50% of the population belonged to any Christian denomination. If less than 50% of the population belonged to a single religious group, the country was classified as having no prevalent religion. The prevalent religion in the country of origin is an indicator of the cultural distance between the country of origin and the country of destination which has been used in comparable research (Tubergen, 2004, Tubergen et al., 2004). *Due to the larger cultural distance, we expect immigrants from non-Christian countries to have lower educational levels in EU countries.*

3. Individual characteristics and educational attainment of immigrants and natives

Table 1 provides an overview of the uncontrolled mean scores on educational attainment of natives and second generation immigrants. Figures 1 and 2 summarize and differentiate these scores of table 1. Figure 1 shows the educational levels of males and females separately per country of destination and Figure 2 per country of origin. They make clear that there is considerable variation across the 13 countries of destination in terms of the size and direction of the gaps between natives and immigrants. In addition, we can note clear gender differences. Moreover, the figures illuminate that there is also considerable variation in educational level between second generation immigrants from the most important countries of origins, which are in most cases European countries. However, since the mean scores depicted in these tables and figures are not controlled for individual characteristics, it is not clear whether the between-country differences are due to the differential composition of immigrants and natives in the various destination countries or whether they result from processes at the macro-level such as different policy approaches towards the integration of immigrants.

3.1 Comparing the educational levels of male immigrants and natives

In Table 3 we use OLS-regression to compare directly the educational level of male natives and second generation immigrants in the 13 EU countries.

In the first model we observe considerable differences in the average educational levels between the 13 EU countries. But the second model shows that there is no significant difference between the educational level of natives and second generation immigrants. In model 3 we control also for age and parental educational level and these variables have the expected effects, but there is still no difference

between the average educational levels of male immigrants and natives. Neither is there a significant interaction between parental educational level and second generation, indicating that the positive effect of parental background is equal for second generation male immigrants and natives.[13] In the last model we add more control variables to the equation. We find a negative effect of having a missing value on parental education, suggesting that the information on parental education is not missing at random, but occurs more frequently in cases of respondents with a low educational level. In addition, we find significant effects of the individual religion on educational achievement. Islamic and Eastern Orthodox respondents, most of which will be second generation immigrants instead of natives, have a lower educational level than comparable respondents (including the other immigrants). We have tested a large number of possible interactions between the immigration variables and other independent variables, but none of them are significant.

We find no significant effects of the macro-characteristics of origin countries. This is not surprising in the light of the finding that the second generation does not differ significantly from natives in the highest educational level achieved. However, the negative and significant effects of some religious affiliations (Islam, Eastern Orthodox) can be interpreted as origin effects, which, however, operate at the individual instead of the macro-level as described above.

3.2. Comparing the educational level of female immigrants and natives

In Table 4 we use OLS-regression to directly compare the educational level of female natives and second generation immigrants in the 13 EU countries.

Table 4 shows that the level of education of both native and immigrant women differs greatly between the 13 EU countries, but we find no significant differences in educational outcomes between the 2nd generation and natives. Not surprisingly, we find that parental education has a positive effect on the highest educational level achieved, and having a missing value for parental education has a negative effect on educational achievement. More interesting are the effects of religious affiliation: while Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern non-Christian, and Jewish women are more educated than their non-religious peers, Eastern Orthodox women have much lower levels of education, while Islamic women have an educational level equal to their non-religious peers. We have tested a large number of possible interactions between the immigration variables and other independent variables, but none of them are significant.

Furthermore, we find one significant origin effect: women from former colonies or territories have higher educational levels than their peers. But the positive and significant effects of some religious affiliation (Eastern non-Christian, Jewish) and the negative of Eastern Orthodoxy can also be interpreted as origins effect, although not of certain counties of origin but of certain cultures of origin.

In conclusion, we want to draw the attention to the fact that especially the effect of religion varies between men and women. While affiliation with Islam has a negative effect on the educational attainment of males, it is insignificant for women. Moreover other religious affiliations positively affect the educational levels of women (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern non-Christian, Jewish), but not those of males. However the intensity of religious practice has a positive, but modest, influence on the educational level of both genders.

4. The effects of social policies on immigrants' educational achievement

The OLS regression analyses presented in section 3 do not take the nested structure of the data into account. However, they make clear that the educational levels of immigrants are influenced by indicators that refer to the culture of origin, more specifically religion. Furthermore, the previous analyses did not allow us to identify and correctly model all micro and macro factors that might lead to differential educational achievement levels. In order to reach an accurate estimation of the effects of these micro and macro indicators, a multilevel analysis is needed. We use a cross-classified multilevel model, since the individual immigrants in our data are nested both within countries of origin and within countries of destination, but these two levels crosscut each other instead of being nested within each other. We specified the country of origin as the second level and the country of destination as the third, i.e. variance terms indicated by the letter *v* refer to the country of destination and those with the letter *u* to the country of origin. Since these two levels are only relevant to immigrants and not to natives, we restrict our multilevel analyses to the immigrant population in our data. This has the advantage that we can now include a number of micro characteristics of immigrants, such as the language spoken at home, whether an immigrant holds the citizenship of the destination country and whether he/she is the child of a mixed marriage between a native and an immigrant. In the joint analyses with natives, these indicators could not be included since their estimation would be dominated by the much larger group of natives for whom they are not applicable. Although we use only immigrants in the multilevel analysis, we include the average educational level of the native population in every model as an independent variable, so that we can assess the difference between second generation immigrants and natives.

We build our multilevel models in table 6 (males) and table 7 (females) in the same way. Model 0 contains only the variance components. The variance components of the higher levels indicate the relevance of including these levels in the analysis. Although, in general, most variation occurs between individuals, a substantive part might also occur between countries of origin and countries of destination. Model 1 contains three characteristics of individual immigrants (having one native and one immigrant parent, speaking a minority language at home and holding the citizenship of the country of destination) and the mean educational level of the male or female natives of the country of destination. As a consequence of including the latter independent variable, the constant can be interpreted as the difference in the dependent variable of second generation immigrants in comparison to the average outcomes of natives. In model 2 we add the human capital variables and individual religious affiliation, religiosity and the intensity of religious practice. Model 3 further adds interactions between parental education and three relevant immigrant characteristics (minority language at home; citizenship of country of destination; Islam). Models 4 and 5 are not displayed in tables 6 and 7, since in these series of models, we add, one by one, the macro-characteristics to Model 3 of these tables 6 and 7. The effects, their standard errors and the change in –Log Likelihood that results from including these variables are displayed in table 5 for the analysis of male and female immigrants. On the basis of these tests, we include the significant macro-characteristics of country of destination and of country of origin in Model 6. In Model 7, we add dummies for specific regions of origin. Finally, Model 8 is a reduced model which shows only the significant explanatory variables. In the analyses displayed in the tables, all effects are fixed.

4.1. Multilevel analysis of the highest level of education of male immigrants

Table 6 presents the results of the multilevel analysis of the highest level of education of male immigrants.

Model 0 shows that the vast majority of the variance in the educational achievement of second generation male immigrants is at the individual level (more than 80%), while the rest of the variance is mostly at the country of destination level and hardly at the country of origin level. This result (which is not exceptional: in cross-national comparisons of educational achievement of natives students the vast majority of the variance is also at the individual level; cf. Dronkers & Robert, 2008) underlines the overriding importance of individual differences between immigrants in comparison with their origins and destinations. But at the same time this large importance of individual differences does not mean that characteristics of the country of destination are irrelevant. With the analyses of table 5 and the last models of table 6 we try to find these relevant characteristics of country of destination.

Model 1 contains three immigration characteristics and the average educational level of the male natives in the countries of destination. By including the latter variable the variance at the country of destination becomes insignificant. But the positive effect of this macro-variable is interesting in itself. It tells us that second generation male immigrants achieve a higher education level in those countries where their native counterparts also have higher educational levels on average. This positive effect cannot be explained by a higher educational level of their immigrating parents (either by the selectivity of the parents themselves, or the immigration authorities), because also after inclusion of parental education in model 2 (which should take care of this selectivity effect) the positive effect of this macro-variable remains significant and positive. Thus remains a more optimistic interpretation of this positive effect as well: countries of destination in which natives have a high educational level promote also the educational level of their immigrants, suggesting that educational systems work similarly for children of native and of immigrant parents. The three immigration characteristics have no significant effects on educational achievement. Citizenship of country of destination comes closest to a significant positive effect, and having mixed parents (one native, one immigrant) closest to a significant negative effect.

Model 2 has no surprises and resembles the final model of the OLS regression of table 3 a lot. Only the significant positive effect of Roman Catholicism found previously is now insignificant, probably because the multilevel analyses takes better care of the nested structure of the data. Eastern Orthodox and Islamic religious affiliation still negatively influence the educational attainment of second generation male immigrants, despite control for parental educational background and immigration history. The significance of the effect of Eastern Orthodoxy dwindles after further controls (especially of Naturalisation policies of the EU countries), but the negative effect of Islam remains strong and negative.

In model 3 we test some interactions between parental educational level and immigration or religious characteristics, in order to see whether the effect of the latter is influenced by the social position of the immigrating parents. None of them are significant. The interaction of parental educational level and citizenship almost reaches significance in our most economical model 7. The citizenship of the country of destination affects the educational level of second generation male immigrants more if they have higher educated parents.

In Model 4 (not displayed in Table 6) we add, one by one, the macro-characteristics to model 3 of table 6. The parameters of these added macro-characteristics are given in table 5. We find only one significant macro-effect for the male education: the naturalization dimension of the European Civic Citizenship and

Inclusion Index (Geddes et al., 2004). None of the other macro-characteristics comes even close to a significant effect. Hence, our hypotheses on the possible effects of types of welfare state regimes, the presence of left-wing parties in the government and the net migration rate are rejected.

In Model 5 of Table 6 we see a further small improvement of the fit of the model by adding the macro-variable naturalisation policy (decreases in individual variance and Log likelihood), but the addition hardly change the strength or direction of the other individual variables. This suggests that this macro-variable is not directly related to the other independent variables. More favourable naturalisation policies are found to be positively associated with the educational attainment of second generation immigrants. In model 6 characteristics of the relation between the country of destination and origin are added (neighbours; colony; post-socialist), but these variables have no significant effects.

In the final model 7 all insignificant variables are deleted one by one, starting with those which had the smallest effect, but we kept those few insignificant variables which were necessary for a good fit of the equation. The final equation can be summarized as follows: 1. There are no significant gaps in educational attainment between second generation female immigrants and their native peers in the 13 EU countries studied; 2. Second generation male immigrants in the EU with higher educated parents achieve higher educational levels, especially if they have the citizenship of their country of destination; 3. Second generation male immigrants in the EU who do not know the educational level of their parents achieve lower educational levels; 4. Second generation male immigrants in the EU with Islamic religion achieve lower educational levels than comparable male immigrants with other religious affiliation; 5. Second generation male immigrants in the EU who are in a country of destination with a high average educational level of male natives achieve higher educational levels; 6. Second generation male immigrants in the EU who are in a country of destination with more favourable naturalisation laws and policies achieve higher educational levels.

4.2. Multilevel analysis of the highest level of education of female immigrants

Table 7 presents the results of the multilevel analysis of the highest level of education of female immigrants.

Model 0 shows that the vast majority of the variance in the educational achievement of second generation female immigrants is at the individual level (nearly 90%, more than for male immigrants), while the rest of the variance is mostly at the country of destination level and hardly at the country of origin level. Again, this large importance of individual differences does not mean that characteristics of the country of destination are irrelevant. With the analyses of table 5 and the last models of table 7 we try to find these relevant characteristics of country of destination.

Model 1 contains three immigration characteristics and the average educational level of the female natives in the countries of destination. By including the later variable the variance at the country of destination becomes insignificant. But the positive effect of this macro-variable tells us that second generation female immigrants achieve a higher education level in those countries in which the native counterparts also have on average higher educational levels, although the effect is smaller than the analogous one for the male immigrants. This positive effect can not be explained by a higher educational level of their immigrating parents (either by the selectivity of the parents themselves, or the immigration authorities), because also

after inclusion of parental education in model 2 (which should take care of this selectivity effect) the positive effect of this macro-variable remains significant and positive. Thus remains the more optimistic interpretation of this positive effect as well for female immigrants: countries of destination in which natives have a high educational level promote also the educational level of their immigrants. The three immigration characteristics have no significant effects on educational achievement, but in model 3 two of them become significant together with the introduction of their interactions with parental educational background. Female immigrants who speak a minority language at home are not affected by their parental education, since the interaction cancels out the positive influence of parental education. Figure 3 shows the two slopes of parental education for immigrants who speak a national language at home and those who speak a minority language. Since the cut-point of both lines is to the left of the parental education scale, the penalty of speaking a minority language at home is largest among female immigrants with the most highly educated parents. However, among immigrants whose parents have maximally completed primary education, those who do not speak the national language at home achieve a higher level of education.

Citizenship of country of destination has a significant positive effect on educational achievement of second generation female immigrants with lowly educated parents. On the other hand, female immigrants whose parents have completed tertiary education are slightly negatively affected by holding the citizenship of the survey country. Figure 4 shows the two slopes of parental education for second generation females immigrants who hold the citizenship of the survey country and those who do not.

Model 2 again resembles the final model of the OLS regression of Table 3a lot. Only the significant effect of the Jewish religion affiliation has remained significant, probably because the multilevel analyses takes better care of the nested structure of the data, making the effects of the other religions insignificant.[14]

In Model 4 (not displayed in Table 7) we add, one by one, the macro-characteristics to Model 3 of Table 7. The parameters of these added macro-characteristics are given in Table 5. We find two significant macro-effects for female education: the naturalization dimension of the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index and the summary score of all dimensions of this Index (Geddes et al., 2004). None of the other macro-characteristics comes even close to a significant effect. Hence, our hypotheses on the possible effect of types of welfare regimes, inclusion and labour-market policies, the presence of left-wing parties in the government and the net migration rate of the origin and destination countries are rejected, with one exception (naturalisation).

In Model 5 we see that only the naturalisation dimension has a significant effect if introduced together with the summary score of that dimension. There is a further small improvement of the fit of the equation by this addition (decreases in individual variance and Log likelihood), but the addition hardly changes the strength or direction of the other individual variables. This suggests that this macro-variable is not directly related to the other independent variables. In Model 6 characteristics of the relation between the country of destination and origin are added (neighbours; colony; post-socialist), but these variables do not reach significance.

In the final Model 7 all insignificant variables are deleted one by one, starting with those which had the smallest effect, but we kept those few insignificant variables which were necessary for a good fit of the equation. The final equation can be summarized as follows: 1. There are no significant gaps in educational attainment

between second generation female immigrants and their native peers in the 13 EU countries studied. 2. Second generation female immigrants in the EU with higher educated parents achieve higher individual levels, although this effect is somewhat attenuated if they have the citizenship of their country of destination; 3. Speaking a minority language at home decresases educational attainment among immigrants with highly educated parents, but has a positive effect among those whose parents have maximally completed primary education; 4. Citizenship of the EU country of destination has a significant positive effect on educational achievement of second generation female immigrants with lowly educated parents, but the effect becomes negative for those with higher educated parents; 5. Second generation female immigrants with the Jewish religious affiliation achieve higher educational levels than other comparable female immigrants in the EU. 4. Second generation female immigrants in the EU who are in a country of destination with high educational level of female natives achieve higher individual levels; 6. Second generation female immigrants in the EU who are in a country of destination with more flexible naturalisation laws and policies achieve higher individual levels.

5. Discussion and conclusion

The aim of this paper was to analyse the educational attainment of second generation immigrants from different countries of origin in 13 EU countries, relative to that of the natives of these EU countries. We focussed on second generation immigrants, who are born in the country of destination, because they have received their education in the country of destination.[15] Differences between their educational attainment processes and that of the natives cannot be explained by differences in the educational systems of the country of destination. The consequence of using the European Social Survey for this analysis is that our selection of second generation immigrants will be biased towards the better-integrated immigrants, instead of the illegal first generation immigrant which dominates the popular view on immigrants in Europe. That means that our estimates are conservative ones that underrate the 'real' effects of immigration. In other words, the significant effects found in this analysis with established immigrants, cannot be generalized to all immigrants in the EU. The problem of generalisability applies also to our finding of the absence of gaps in educational attainment between second generation immigrants and their native peers. Finally, our operationalisation of the concept of 'immigrant' is sensitive to the changes in the state borders after both World Wars and the accompanying replacement of large groups of persons (Greeks from the current Turkey to Greece; Poles from the current Ukraine to Poland; Germans from the current Poland to Germany; Frenchmen from the current Algeria to France). These displaced persons are a part of our immigration operationalisation, which highlights the conceptual problems in defining immigrants in Europe. Although our findings might, at face value, tell an optimistic story about the integration of second generation immigrants into European educational systems, we want to caution the readers about drawing too strong conclusions and especially of extrapolating from our findings to immigrant groups that are not well represented in our data.

5.1. Individual effects

Our first hypothesis on the effect of parental education of the educational level of second generation immigrants is supported for male second generation immigrants:

the higher the parental education, the higher the respondents' education. For female immigrants, however, this positive effect only occurs if they do not speak a minority language at home. On the other hand, if they do speak a minority language, they are not affected by parental education.

Our third hypothesis about the importance of citizenship of the country of destination was partly correct for female immigrants, but not for male immigrants. We found that citizenship of the EU country of destination has a significant positive effect on educational achievement of second generation female immigrants whose parents have maximally completed upper secondary education. Among female immigrants with more highly educated parents, the effect of citizenship is negative, but rather small. We conclude that, at least among the female second generation, citizenship is more important for respondents from lower social origins. Although it is sowewhat surprising that citizenship actually has a negative effect for women with tertiary educated parents, these female immigrants still achieve significantly higher levels of education than those with more lowly educated parents. Citizenship has no effect for male immigrants.

Our third hypothesis about the importance of speaking a minority language at home was contradicted for female immigrants. We found that speaking a minority language at home increases the educational attainment of second generation female immigrants in the EU for those female immigrants whose parents maximally completed primary education. Speaking a minority language at home, however, decreases the educational attainment for second generation female immigrants with parents with secondary education and even more so for those with tertiary educated parents. Speaking a minority language at home has no effect for male immigrants. The fact that, for female immigrants, the effect of language use depends on the level of parental education shows that speaking the national language at home has a different meaning for those with highly educated parents compared to those with more lowly educated parents. Lowly educated first generation immigrants will have much more problems in learning a new language. For immigrants with highly educated parents, on the other hand, the language spoken at home can be considered as a valid indicator of the degree of cultural integration. It is therefore not surprising that immigrants who do not speak the national language at home, although their favourable parental background provides them with the capacities to do so, have lower outcomes in terms of education. That speaking a minority language at home is an asset for female second generation immigrants with lowly educated parents might be explained along the same lines. Since lowly educated parents are likely to have a low level of proficiency in the host country language, they might also have less authority over their children who are better equipped to communicate in the national language of their country of residence. The intergenerational gap is especially large in cases where the children of lowly educated parents (who are unlikely to be proficient in the national language of the destination country) speak the national language at home. As a consequence, parental influence on their children might be lower in these cases, which also applies to the rather negative influence of low parental education on the educational attainment of the second generation. Another potential explanation might be that second generation immigrants who speak the national language at home and have lowly educated parents who are unlikely to be fluent in this language, have acquired limited proficiency in two languages (that of the host country and that of the parents' origin country) which results in lower educational attainment. It might have been more beneficial for them to gain a high level of proficiency in their parents' mother tongue first, which could then make it easier to learn the host country language and to

attain a higher level of education. However, since the respondents in our sample in general do not live with their parents anymore, we do not know whether the language they speak at home corresponds to the language spoken in their parental home when they grew up.[16]

5.2. Religion

We assumed with our second hypothesis that religious affiliation of immigrants affects their educational outcomes. This hypothesis is partly correct. Second generation male immigrants in the EU with the Islamic religion achieve lower educational levels than comparable male immigrants with other religious affiliations. Second generation female immigrants with Jewish religious affiliation achieve higher educational levels than comparable female immigrants in the EU. We found comparable negative effects of Islamic religion on the four dimensions of labour market participation of immigrants (Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2007). We suggested three possible explanations for this Islam effect, which are also relevant for the negative effect on male educational attainment. Firstly, it is possible that Muslims have a different religious habitus from non-Muslims that makes them less likely to succeed in modern schooling, for instance if one of their religious values partly contradicts one of the conditions of success in these institutions. However, before drawing any strong conclusions based on a possible religious explanation, it deserves more detailed investigation, for instance with the help of religious variation within Islam (e.g. between Sunnites and Shiites).[17] A second explanation of our result might be discrimination against Muslims, be it direct or indirect, in the 13 EU countries. We are aware that this is a strong claim, but the persistence of the negative effect of being a Muslim after controlling for parental education makes this second explanation plausible. A third explanation is the deviant selectivity of the 'guest workers' who were imported from three Islamic countries (Morocco, Algeria, Turkey). The selection of these 'guest workers' deviated from that of other immigrants from different countries of origin: they came from the poorest and most underdeveloped regions of these countries and were specifically selected on low skills in order to avoid competition for native skilled workers in a number of European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands). Due to this extra large distance between origin and destination of these 'guest workers', their children have more problems in the educational systems than other migrants to Europe (also because they maintain family and marriage links with their regions of origin). The Muslim religion variable picks up this 'guest worker' background, which we cannot measure directly with our data.[18] With the data at hand we cannot exclude any of these three possible explanations, but whatever explanation will be correct this negative effect of being a Muslim on male educational achievement is a serious problem for European societies and their ability to integrate the most important part of the non-European immigrants, which adheres to the Islamic religion.

We do not find a negative effect of Islam on female educational attainment. The absence of this negative effect might reflect the liberating effect of immigration to Europe for Muslim women, because they have more opportunities for educational success in Europe than in their country of origin.

We found that second generation female immigrants with the Jewish religious affiliation achieve higher educational levels than comparable female immigrants in the EU. This positive effect of the Jewish religion could be explained by the high value of education within Judaism. But we have no good explanation why we find this positive effect only for women.

5.3. Macro effects

The average educational level of the natives of the countries of destination is the most important macro-characteristic of the country of destination affecting individual educational achievement of both male and female second generation immigrants. This means that the more opportunities an educational system of a country of destination offers to the natives, the more second generation immigrants will profit from these opportunities as well.

The second significant macro-characteristic of the country of destination is its naturalisation policy. The more generous the naturalization laws are of a country of destination, the higher the educational level of both male and female second generation immigrants. A possible explanation of this positive relation is that the generosity of the naturalisation laws of a country of destination indicates the relative openness of that society towards outsiders like immigrants. In contrast to findings from Switzerland, where a very strict naturalisation policy leads to selectivity in naturalisation so that higher educated second generation immigrants become Swiss citizens more often than their lower educated counterparts (Fibbi, Lerch & Wanner, 2007), our results indicate that relative openness in terms of naturalisation policy might encourage the second generation immigrants to achieve more in education.

Other macro-characteristics of countries of origin and destination have no significant effects on educational outcomes of these immigrants, so all our hypotheses on their possible effects must be rejected.

Acknowledgements
Both authors contributed equally to this chapter; the ordering of author names therefore follows the alphabetic order of their surnames and does not express hierarchy in contribution.

Notes

[1]Fenella Fleischmann is a PhD student at the Universities of Utrecht (the Netherlands) and Leuven (Belgium). Jaap Dronkers holds a chair in the study of social stratification and inequality in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the European University Institute near Florence (Italy). This article is the result of a traineeship of the Fenella Fleischmann at the latter institute and is written within the context of the European Forum 2006/7 of the Robert Schumann Centre of Advanced Studies of the EUI, directed by the Jaap Dronkers. Correspondence by e-mail may be directed to both authors: f.fleischmann@uu.nl and jaap.dronkers@eui.eu. Please direct all other correspondence to Prof. Jaap Dronkers, SPS Department, EUI, Via dei Roccettini 9, I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy.

[2] The first wave of the European Social Survey did not allow for the precise coding of the countries of origin of the second generation of immigrants.

[3] There are only 25 respondents in the Finnish sample who can be properly classified as first or second immigrants and can be assigned a country of origin. However, the refusal rate of the question in which country the respondent was born is significantly higher in Finland than in other survey countries, resulting in a large number of persons for whom we do not know whether they are immigrants or natives. Given the limited information about these respondents, we decided to exclude them from the sample which lowered the number of immigrants in Finland to an unacceptably small number.

[4] We have conducted the same analyses together with first immigrant generation (Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2007). However, in most cases this first generation received their education in their countries of origin, which makes it misleading to estimate the effects of the country of destination on their educational level, because these effects rather reflect the selectivity of the migration towards these countries of destination and not the effects of the educational systems of these destination countries. We also tried to distinguish a so-called '1.5-generation', which consists of individuals who were born outside the country of destination, but who migrated at such a young age that they received most or all of their education in the destination country. A problem in the construction of this category is that the European Social Survey does not provide exact information about the time since migration, since this is measured categorically. Using the maximum of the categories in the survey (which systematically underestimates the age at migration) and selecting all immigrants who had migrated before the age of 14 based on this calculation resulted in a share of 10.8% of all immigrants constituting the 1.5 generation. In light of this small share despite very generous definition, we refrained from analyzing this group of immigrants separately and included them in the deleted first generation.

[5] Adding the third wave of the European Social Survey to the second wave is a way to increase the numbers second generation immigrants. In a next version we hope to make this pooled analysis.

[6] We imputed missing values for the highest level of education of the respondent (27 cases among natives, 2 among second generation immigrants), using the mean of groups sorted according to gender, immigrant status, immigrant generation and country of origin in the case of respondent's education. We did this in order to keep in the analysis the maximum number of immigrants.

[7] We imputed missing values for the highest level of parental education (364 missing values, 64 of which among immigrants), using the mean of groups sorted according to gender, immigrant status, immigrant generation and country of origin in the case of respondent's education and immigrant status, country of origin and respondent's education.

[8] In the multilevel analysis, we contrast Muslims and those who are not affiliated with any religion with all others. This residual category mainly consists of Christians (Catholics, Protestants and Eastern Orthodox) plus very few affiliates of Judaism, Eastern and other religions. The latter groups were, however, too small to be separated in the analysis.

[9] Respondents in France did not indicate the religion they belonged to if they classified themselves as being religious (which 58.7% of natives and 60.1% of the immigrants in France did). For natives, we assume that if they are religious, they will belong to a Christian religion, hence the percentage of French natives who belong to a non-Christian religion is estimated to be 0. For immigrants who indicated that they belong to a religion, we imputed this religion using information about the country of origin, religiosity, the intensity of religious practice and the educational level.

[10] We use a liberal definition of neighbouring countries which also includes countries who share sea borders with the country of destination. A list of the matches of neighbouring countries is provided in the appendix.

[11] These are, in the first place, countries that have been or still are colonies (for instance India for the UK, the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America for Spain, and Brazil for Portugal). But in the case of Austria, Germany, the UK and Sweden they also included those countries that were a part of their former territories (for example Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the former Yugoslavia for Austria; Norway for Sweden).

[12] Kogan (2007) found a positive effect of the liberal welfare state on immigrants' labour market integration, in the form of higher labour market participation and lower unemployment. However, it is difficult to derive hypothesis on educational outcomes from this finding. On the one hand, the prospect of easy access to the labour market might increase second generation immigrants' incentives to invest in education in order to reach a high occupational status. On the other hand, easy access to the labour market and low unemployment rates can still go together with low occupational status for immigrants. Furthermore, an abundance of job opportunities might actually lower the educational attainment of the second generation, since staying longer in education increases its short-term costs in the form of foregone earnings, while the long-term benefits of higher education are less secure.

[13] This non-significant interaction is not shown in the table, since the interaction was entered stepwise into the regression model. For reasons of readability, we only present significant interactions.

[14] Islam has no significant effect in the multilevel analysis for the female immigrants, again replicating the results of the OLS regression for the female immigrants.

[15] This is, however, an assumption that needs to be qualified by the findings of other research on educational careers of immigrants where it is frequently found that second generation immigrants, although being born in the country of destination, spend a part of their childhood in the country of origin, often in the care of members of the extended family. Hence, they might complete a part of their education, most likely at the primary level, in the country of origin,

[16] Our findings about the effect of speaking a minority language at home partly contradict earlier findings in this respect that usually find a negative overall effect on educational attainment. This discrepancy of research results might be attributed to our immigrant sample which differs from many other studies on immigrants in its more diverse composition, including many immigrants from EU-countries instead of focussing on the children of labour migrants. In order to investigate this potential selection effect, we tested whether the effect of speaking a minority language at home and its interaction with parental education was the same for immigrants from the 15 EU countries (plus Norway and Switzerland) and those from Eastern European and non-European countries. No significant interactions were found, indicating that the effect of minority language and its interaction with parental education operate independently of specific contexts of origin.

[17] Unfortunately, we cannot take this large variation into account since it is not measured in the European Social Survey.

[18] An additional question, related to this last point, is whether this negative 'Islam effect' is a consequence of individual religious affiliation or rather of coming from a prevalently Islamic country. In order to test this, we removed individual Islamic affiliation from the model and instead included the dichotomous variable that indicated whether the country of origin is prevalently Islamic. The latter variable had no significant effect and it is only weakly correlated with individual Islamic religion (+ .40). We therefore conclude that the 'Islam effect' operates at the individual rather than at the aggregate level of origin countries.

References

Alba, R. and V. Nee (1997). Rethinking assimilation in a new era of immigration. *International Migration Review*, 31 (4), 826-874.

Beck, T. et al. (2000). New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2283.

Bakker, B.F.M. and A. Blees-Booij (1995). Verklaren twee meer dan een? pp.247-265 in J. Dronkers and W.C. Ultee, *Verschuivende Ongelijkheid in Nederland: Sociale Gelaagdheid en Mobiliteit*, Assen: Van Gorcum.

Böcker, A. and D. Thränhardt (2007). Erfolge und Misserfolge der Integration. Deutschland und die Niederlande im Vergleich. *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung* (http://www.bpb.de/publikationen)

Boudon, R. (1974). *Education. Opportunity, and Social Inequality. Changing Perspectives in Western Society*. New York: Wiley.

Brown, L.C. (2000). *Religion and State. The Muslim approach to politics.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Central Intelligence Agency. *World Factbook*. [online]. Retrieved February 2007 (https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html)

Davies, R., Heinesen. E. & A. Holm (2002). The relative risk aversion hypothesis of educational choice. *Journal of Population Economics*, 15, 683-713.

Deininger, K. W. and L. Squire (2007). Measuring Income Inequality Database. World Bank, [online]. Retrieved February 2007. (http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20699070~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html).

Dronkers, J. and P.Robert (2008). Differences in Scholastic Achievement of Public, Private Government-Dependent, and Private Independent schools: a Cross-National Analysis. *Educational Policy*. (in press) http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Dronkers/articles/Educationalpolicy2008.pdf .

Dronkers, J. and R.A. Wanner (2006). Waarom verdienen immigranten minder? Effecten van immigratiebeleid en arbeidsmarktkenmerken. [Why do immigrants earn less? Effects of immigration policies and labour market characteristics] *Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsmarktvraagstukken*, 22:379-394. An earlier English version is available on http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Dronkers/English/Wanner2005.PDF

Entzinger, H. (2006). Boekbespreking: Migratie en integratie in internationaal vergelijkend perspectief. *Sociologie*, 2 (3), 355-358.

Erikson, R., J.H. Goldthorpe and L. Portocarero (1979). Intergenerational class mobility in three Western societies: England, France and Sweden. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 30 (40), 415-441.

Esping-Andersen (1990). *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Fibbi, R., Lerch, M. & P. Wanner (2007). Naturalisation and socio-economic characteristics of youth of immigrant descent in Switzerland. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33 (7), 1121-1144.

Fleischmann, F. and J. Dronkers (2007). *The Effects of Social and Labour Market Policies of EU-countries on the Socio-Economic Integration of First and Second Generation Immigrants from Different Countries of Origin*. EUI-RSCAS Working paper 2007/19 (European Forum Series) (http://hdl.handle.net/1814/6849)

Freedom House (2006). Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972-2006. [online]. Retrieved March 2007. (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15)

Gambetta, D. (1987). *Were they pushed or did they jump? Individual decision mechanisms in education*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ganzeboom, H. B.G., P. de Graaf, D. J. Treiman and J. De Leeuw (1992). A standard international socio-economic index of occupational status. *Social Science Research* 21: 1-56.

Geddes, A. et al. (2004), *European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index 2004*. British Council Brussels. [online]. Retrieved February 2007. (http://www.britishcouncil.org/brussels-europe-inclusion-index.htm).

Heath, A. and S. Cheung (eds.) (2007). *Unequal chances. Ethnic Minorities in Western Labour Markets.* Oxford: OUP.

Human Development Index (2006). [online]. Retrieved February 2007. (http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics).

Huntington, S. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Hustinx, P. W. J. (2002). School careers of pupils of ethnic minority background after the transition to secondary education: is the ethnic factor always negative? *Educational Research and Evaluation*, 8 (2), 169-195.

Jowell, R. and the Central Coordinating Team (2005), European Social Survey 2004/2005: Technical Report, London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University.

Kao, G. and J.S. Thompson (2003). Racial and ethnic stratification in educational achievement and attainment. *Annual Review of Education*, 29, 417-442.

Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2005). Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3630.

Kogan, I. (2007). *Working Through Barriers: Host Country Institutions and Immigrant Labour Market Performance in Europe*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Levels, M. and J. Dronkers (2008). Educational Performance of Native and Immigrant children from Various Countries of Origin. *Ethnic and Racial Studies.* (in press) http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Dronkers/articles/ethnicRacialStudies2008.pdf

Levels, M., J. Dronkers and G. Kraaykamp (2007). *Educational achievement of immigrants in Western countries: origin, destination, and community effects on mathematical performance*. EUI Working paper SPS 2007/05: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/6776

Ogbu, J.U. (1991). Immigrants and involuntary minorities in comparative perspective. In M.A. Gibson and J.U. Ogbu (eds.), *Minority Status and Schooling*. New York: Garland. Pp. 3-33.

OECD, (2006) [online]. Retrieved March 2007. (http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?DatasetCode=EPL_1).

Phalet, K. and A. Kosic (2005). Acculturation in European societies. Sam, D. and J. Berry (eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Acculturation Psychology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 331-348.

Portes, A. and R. G. Rumbaut (2001). *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tesser, P. and J. Dronkers (2007). Equal opportunities or social closure in the Netherlands? In A. Heath & S. Cheung (eds.) *Unequal chances. Ethnic Minorities in Western Labour Markets.* Oxford: OUP.

Tubergen, F. van (2004). *The Integration of Immigrants in Cross-National Perspective: Origin, Destination and Community Effects.* PhD thesis Utrecht University.

Tubergen, F. van, I. Maas and H. Flap (2004). The Economic Incorporation of Immigrants in 18 Western Societies: Origin, Destination, and Community Effects. *American Sociological Review*, (69), 704-727.

Sue, S. and S. Okazaki (1990). Asian-American educational achievements: a phenomenon in search of an explanation. *American Psychologist*, 45, 913-920.

UNESCO (1997). *International Standard Classification of Education* (ISCED). Paris: UNESCO.

United Nations Statistical Office [online]. Retrieved January-February 2007. (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm).

Van Ours, J.C. & J. Veenman (2003). The educational attainment of second generation immigrants in the Netherlands, *Journal of Population Economics*, 16, 739-753.

Waldrauch, H. (2001). *Die Integration von Einwanderern. Ein Index der rechtlichen Diskriminierung.* Wien: Campus.

Werner, H. (2003). The integration of immigrants into the labour markets of the EU. IAB topics Nr. 52.

Zhou, M. (1997). Segmented assimilation: Issues, controversies and recent research on the new second generation. *International Migration Review*, 31 (4), 975-1008.

Table 1. The average educational level of natives and second generation immigrants per country of destination and country of origin

		Country of Destination	AUS	BEL	DEN	FR	GER	GR	IRE	LUX	NL	POR	ESP	SW	UK	Total
Natives	**Country of**	**N**	1155	883	854	903	1422	1174	1277	486	1029	1066	910	968	904	**13030**
	Origin	**Mean**	2.36	3.06	3.19	2.69	3.22	2.51	2.61	2.73	2.91	1.64	2.30	2.80	2.73	**2.67**
Immigrant : Country/ Region of Origin	**Germany**	**N**	26	6	17	6	n.a.	-	2	39	28	-	-	14	4	**141**
		Mean	2.52	3.17	3.24	2.83			3.00	2.56	2.71			3.36	2.75	**2.79**
	Portugal	**N**	-	-	-	4	1	-	-	17	-	n.r.	2	-	-	**24**
		Mean				2.75	3.00			1.45			1.50			**2.71**
	Italy (+ San	**N**	19	24	-	32	2	-	-	36	3	-	-	-	3	**119**
	Marino)	**Mean**	2.32	2.50		2.47	3.00			2.64	2.67				3	**2.53**
	France	**N**	-	22	-	n.r.	3	-	-	27	1	1	1	-	1	**56**
		Mean		2.91			3.67			2.78	2.00	1.00	2.00		4.00	**2.84**
	Turkey	**N**	2	2	1	1	5	38	-	1	2	-	-	1	-	**53**
		Mean	2.00	2.50	2.00	3.00	2.80	2.08		3.00	2.50			3.00		**2.23**
	Former	**N**	19	-	-	3	4	-	-	1	1	-	-	3	-	**30**
	Yugoslavia	**Mean**	2.11			2.67	3.50			3.00	1.00			4.00		**2.57**
	(- Slovenia)															
	United	**N**	2	4	2	2	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	2	n.r.	**43**
	Kingdom	**Mean**	3.50	3.75	3.00	2.50			3.00		2.00			3.00		**3.12**
	Poland	**N**	-	3	3	6	26	-	-	2	2	-	-	1	1	**44**
		Mean		2.67	2.67	1.67	3.46			3.50	3.00			2.00	4.00	**3.07**
	USSR (-	**N**	-	-	-	-	2	3	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	**8**
	Ukraine &	**Mean**					4.00	1.00			1.00			2.00	4.00	**2.25**
	Baltic															
	countries)															
	Finland	**N**	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	-	**40**
		Mean			3.00									3.05		**3.05**
	Belgium	**N**	1	n.r.	-	2	-	-	-	22	6	-	-	-	-	**31**
		Mean	2.00			4.00				2.82	3.50					**3.00**
	Morocco	**N**	-	10	-	13	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	**25**
		Mean		2.80		3.15					2.00		3.00			**2.96**
	Albania	**N**	-		-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**1**
		Mean		-				.00								**.00**
	Netherlands	**N**	4	17	-	1	2	-	-	7	n.r.	-	-	1	-	**34**
		Mean	2.50	3.18		3.00	3.50			3.14				4.00		**3.18**
	Spanish	**N**	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	2	**8**
	Caribbean	**Mean**			3.00								3.67	3.50	3.00	**3.38**
	& South															
	America															
	Western	**N**	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	5	**11**
	Africa	**Mean**				3.00						2.00			3.40	**2.91**
	Czech	**N**	16	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	**33**
	Republic	**Mean**	2.38				3.31								3.00	**2.85**
	Spain	**N**	-	4	-	15	-	-	-	3	1	2	n.r.	2	2	**29**
		Mean		3.00		2.47				3.00	2.00	1.62		3.50	2.00	**2.52**
	Romania	**N**	7	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**17**
		Mean	2.00				2.89									**2.47**
	Ireland	**N**	-	-	-	-	-	-	n.r.	-	-	-	-	-	29	**30**
		Mean													2.83	**2.87**
	Remaining	**N**	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	6	-	-	-	3	**11**
	Southern	**Mean**							3.50		2.50				3.67	**3.60**
	Asia															
	Remaining		2	-	6	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	10	1	**22**
	Northern	**N**	3.00		3.33		3.50			4.00				2.90	4.00	**3.18**
	Europe	**Mean**														
	Algeria	**N**	-	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**19**
		Mean				3.00										**3.00**
	Hungary	**N**	4	2	1	-	8	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	**26**
		Mean	2.50	2.00	3.00		3.25			3.00				2.00		**2.54**
	Remaining	**N**	-	2	-	12	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	**17**
	Northern	**Mean**		2.50		3.00		3.50							4.00	**2.94**
	Africa															
	Western	**N**	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	**7**
	Asia	**Mean**		4.00				3.00						3.00	2.75	**3.00**
	India	**N**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	15	**16**
		Mean												4.00	3.27	**3.31**
	Remaining	**N**	4	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**8**
	Eastern	**Mean**	2.50					2.33								**2.50**
	Europe															
	Indonesia	**N**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	-	**18**

		Mean									3.12					**3.17**
	Norway	**N**	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	**18**
		Mean			3.50									2.50		**2.83**
	Eastern	**N**	-	1	-	2	-	-		-	-	2	-	-	2	**7**
	Africa	**Mean**		4.00		4.00						1.50			1.50	**2.33**
	South-East	**N**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	**2**
	Asia	**Mean**											2.00		4.00	**3.35**
	United	**N**	-	-	1	-	4	1	2	2	1	-	-	-	1	**12**
	States	**Mean**			3.00		3.00	2.00	3.00	3.50	4.00				2.00	**3.00**
	Dutch	**N**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	**9**
	Caribbean	**Mean**									2.67					**2.67**
	& South															
	America															
	Remaining	**N**	3	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	**10**
	Southern	**Mean**	3.33	3.00			3.00								3.00	**3.10**
	Europe															
	Brazil	**N**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	**1**
		Mean											4.00			**4.00**
	Switzerland	**N**	4	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	**7**
		Mean	2.00			3.50								3.00		**3.00**
	Angola	**N**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	**2**
		Mean										.50				**.50**
	East Asia	**N**	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	**6**
		Mean	2.50								3.00				3.00	**2.83**
	Pakistan	**N**	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	**3**
		Mean						2.00							2.00	**2.00**
	Ukraine	**N**	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	**5**
		Mean					3.00			2.00						**2.40**
	Remaining	**N**	1	7	-	1	7		-	1	-	-	-	3	-	**12**
	Western	**Mean**	-	2.86		1.00	2.86			2.00				3.33		**2.75**
	Europe															
	Middle	**N**	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**3**
	Africa	**Mean**		4.00												**4.00**
	English	**N**	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	**12**
	Caribbean	**Mean**			3.00										2.64	**2.67**
	& South															
	America															
	Australia &	**N**	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	**3**
	New	**Mean**							4.00		3.00					**3.00**
	Zealand															
	Remaining	**N**	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	**3**
	Northern	**Mean**			2.00										3.50	**3.00**
	America															
	Southern	**N**	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	**2**
	Africa	**Mean**		4.00											2.00	**3.00**
	French	**N**	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**1**
	Caribbean	**Mean**				4.00										**4.00**
	Total	**N**	**123**	**96**	**42**	**124**	**96**	**50**	**38**	**164**	**77**	**10**	**10**	**98**	**101**	**1039**
		Mean	**2.37**	**3.25**	**3.17**	**2.73**	**3.25**	**2.08**	**3.16**	**2.75**	**2.83**	**1.30**	**2.90**	**3.04**	**2.96**	**2.80**

Source: European Social Survey 2004 (unweighted data)

Table 2.a. Independent variables per country of destination (natives vs. second generation immigrants)

Country		Age	Parents' highest educational level	% belong to a non-Christian religion*	How religious are you **	Intensity Religious practice ***	% speaking minority language at home	% Immigrant with 1 native parent	% Immigrant from neighbouring countries	% Immigrants from EU-15 countries	% Citizenship of the country of destination	% Immigrant from former colonies/ territories
Austria	immigrant	42.8	2.25	7.3	4.91	4.80	0.81	80.50	67.48	45.53	96.78	43.90
	natives	42.8	2.05	2.4	5.20	4.77	0.43	0	0	0	99.91	0
Belgium	immigrant	39.9	2.31	12.5	4.84	5.78	2.88	56.73	47.12	75.00	86.54	2.88
	natives	42.8	2.69	1.59	4.40	5.87	0.11	0	0	0	100.00	0
Denmark	immigrant	38.7	4.00	4.8	4.71	5.74	0.00	95.24	69.05	71.43	95.24	7.14
	natives	43.6	3.19	1.4	4.09	5.81	0.12	0	0	0	99.88	0
France	immigrant	42.7	1.88	28.2	3.51	6.08	4.03	67.74	48.39	52.42	98.39	38.71
	natives	43.3	2.05	0.0	3.34	6.02	4.99	0	0	0	100.00	0
Germany	immigrant	42.4	3.50	4.2	3.40	5.65	2.08	75.00	40.63	17.71	95.83	27.08
	natives	43.7	3.40	1.1	3.56	5.69	0.14	0	0	0	99.93	0
Greece	immigrant	51.1	1.08	2.0	7.63	3.34	2.00	54.00	86.00	0	100.00	0
	natives	42.1	1.45	1.2	6.89	3.77	1.02	0	0	0	99.91	0
Ireland	immigrant	40.6	2.97	0.0	4.61	4.04	2.63	94.74	78.95	86.84	100.00	0
	natives	43.5	1.87	0.3	5.75	3.33	3.92	0	0	0	99.69	0
Luxembourg	immigrant	39.6	2.07	3.0	3.82	5.53	9.09	68.48	53.94	93.94	80.00	0
	natives	43.9	2.38	1.4	4.01	5.39	0.00	0	0	0	100.00	0
Netherlands	immigrant	42.8	2.49	3.9	4.39	6.03	1.30	81.82	45.45	53.25	97.40	33.77
	natives	43.7	2.36	1.0	4.65	5.51	1.75	0	0	0	99.81	0
Portugal	immigrant	41.3	1.80	10.0	4.00	5.05	0.10	60.00	20.00	30.00	90.00	50.00
	natives	42.0	1.07	0.2	4.95	4.47	1.69	0	0	0	99.53	0
Spain	immigrant	47.2	1.27	9.1	3.82	4.45	27.27	81.82	36.36	36.36	90.91	27.27
	natives	41.2	1.37	1.0	4.03	5.39	14.58	0	0	0	97.41	0
Sweden	immigrant	39.4	2.74	2.0	3.01	6.11	5.10	74.49	63.27	84.69	93.88	52.04
	natives	43.2	2.27	0.8	3.35	6.06	0.10	0	0	0	100.00	0
United Kingdom	immigrant	37.9	3.07	8.9	4.69	5.19	3.00	65.35	34.66	42.57	99.01	76.24
	natives	42.2	2.61	1.2	3.84	5.65	0.88	0	0	0	99.67	0
Total	immigrant	41.3	2.47	8.2	4.27	5.44	3.95	71.90	53.90	58.52	93.26	28.49
	natives	42.9	2.21	1.0	4.55	5.13	2.27	0	0	0	99.68	0

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data

* This percentage does not include non-religious respondents, but only those who rate themselves as belonging to a non-Christian religion (Islam, Judaism, Eastern religions, other non-Christian religion).

** 0= Not at all until 10 = Very religious

*** How often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions and how often do you pray apart from religious services? 1= Never until 7= Every day

Table 2.b Independent Variables by Main Country of Origin of Second Generation Migrants (N>10)

Country/region of origin	N	Age	Parents' highest Educational level	% belonging to Non-Christian religion *	How Religious are you**	Intensity of Religious practice* * *	% speaking minority language at home	% Immigrants with one native parent	% Immigrant from neighbouring country	% Citizenship of country of destination	Immigrant from colony/territory to (colonial) centre
Germany	141	43,2	2,8	1.4	4,2	5,5	0.7	92.2	88.6	96.5	0.0
Italy	119	43,6	1,4	1.7	4,5	5,6	4.2	54.6	42.9	79.0	0.0
France	57	42,2	2,4	1.8	3,6	6,0	0.0	87.7	96.5	98.2	0.0
Remaining Western Europe	54	40,1	3,2	0.0	4,4	5,4	1.9	85.2	81.5	100.0	53.7
Turkey	53	46,1	1,2	20.8	7,1	3,8	9.4	43.2	71.7	92.5	0.0
Poland	44	43,0	3,1	9.1	3,4	6,1	0.0	77.3	61.4	100.0	59.1
United Kingdom	43	39,7	3,1	0.0	4,8	4,4	2.3	93.0	90.7	97.7	0.0
Finland	40	38,1	2,4	2.5	2,7	6,0	7.5	67.5	97.5	95.0	97.5
Remaining Northern Europe	40	42,4	3,1	2.5	3,5	5,8	2.5	85.0	80.0	92.5	35.0
Remaining Eastern Europe	39	43,8	2,4	2.6	4,6	5,0	0.0	82.1	48.7	100.0	41.0
Remaining Northern Africa	36	39,6	2,4	55.6	3,6	5,8	2.8	66.7	0.0	97.2	86.1
The Netherlands	34	41,4	2,9	0.0	3,8	5,7	0.0	91.2	58.8	91.2	0.0
Czech Republic	33	45,4	3,1	3.0	3,5	5,5	0.0	72.7	48.5	97.0	48.5
Belgium	31	42,9	2,8	0.0	4,4	5,7	0.0	87.1	96.8	93.6	0.0
Former Yugoslavia	30	37,8	1,7	6.7	4,4	5,1	3.3	50.0	0.0	100.0	63.3
Spain	29	40,9	1,7	0.0	3,9	6,2	3.4	69.0	58.6	96.6	0.0
Morocco	25	34,0	2,2	88.0	4,7	5,4	16.0	48.0	4.0	100.0	52.0
Portugal	24	31,9	1,3	8.3	5.0	5,2	50.0	12.5	8.3	33.3	0.0
Southern Asia	24	37,4	2,8	37.5	4,1	5,1	4.2	58.3	0.0	100.0	83.3
South-East Asia	20	41,6	3,5	0.0	4,5	5,9	0.0	75.0	0.0	95.0	85.0
Romania	17	44,1	2,4	0.0	4.0	5,3	0.0	70.6	0.0	94.1	0.0
Northern America	15	41,3	3,5	0.0	3,7	5,8	0.0	100.0	0.0	93.3	26.7
English Caribbean and South America	12	37,2	2,6	0.0	5,8	4,5	0.0	33.3	0.0	100.0	91.7
Western Africa	11	35,5	3,0	18.2	4,9	4,7	0.0	45.5	0.0	90.9	100.0
Remaining Southern Europe	10	33,1	2,6	0.0	5,1	4,5	0.0	90.0	30.0	100.0	60.0
Total		41,3	2,5	8.2	4,3	5,4	3.9	71.9	53.9	93.3	28.5

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data

* This percentage does not include non-religious respondents, but only those who rate themselves as belonging to a non-Christian religion (Islam, Judaism, Eastern religions, other non-Christian religion).

** 0= Not at all to 10 = Very religious; *** How often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions and how often do you pray apart from religious services? 1= Never to 7= Every day

Table 3: Regression coefficients of the effects on education of male second generation immigrants and natives N=6475

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Austria	-.162**	-.161**	-.248**	-.386**
Belgium	.380**	.380**	.203**	.114 (n.s.)
Germany	.678**	.679**	.324**	.219**
Denmark	.533**	.535**	.217**	.110 (n.s.)
UK	.186**	.186**	.020 (n.s.)	-.067 (n.s.)
Greece	-.034 (n.s.)	-.032 (n.s.)	.049 (n.s.)	.286**
Ireland	-.103 (n.s.)	-.100 (n.s.)	-.091 (n.s.)	-.231**
Luxembourg	.246**	.242**	.147*	-.014 (n.s.)
Netherlands	.381**	.382**	.252**	.158*
Portugal	-.977**	-.974**	-.809**	-.970**
Sweden	.105 (n.s.)	.106 (n.s.)	-.007 (n.s.)	-.076 (n.s.)
Spain	-.322**	-.319**	-.229 **	-.391**
Second generation		.028 (n.s.)	.024 (n.s.)	.051 (n.s.)
Parents' educational level			.236**	.232**
Age			.021*	.018*
Age2			.000**	.000**
Parental education missing			-.348**	-.338**
Roman Catholic				.206**
Eastern Orthodox				-.439**
Islam				-.522**
Intensity of religious practice				.019*
Constant	2.639**	2.635**	1.967**	1.930**
R2 adjusted	.144	.144	.263	.270

Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data)

Note: Significant coefficients are marked with * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 and *** = p < .001.

The effect of the dummy for missing values on education is not included since it is not significant.

Table 4: Regression coefficients of the effects on education of female second generation immigrants and natives N=7593

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Austria	-.476**	-.476**	-.463**	-.602**
Belgium	.313**	.314**	.161**	.075 (n.s.)
Germany	.379**	.381**	.013 (n.s.)	-.128*
Denmark	.449**	.451**	.135**	-.043 (n.s.)
UK	-.059 (n.s.)	-.059 (n.s.)	-.240**	-.367**
Greece	-.350**	-.347**	-.190**	.018 (n.s.)
Ireland	-.059 (n.s.)	-.056 (n.s.)	-.006 (n.s.)	-.123*
Luxembourg	-.180**	-.184**	-.224**	-.349**
Netherlands	.078 (n.s.)	.080 (n.s.)	.024 (n.s.)	-.094 (n.s.)
Portugal	-1.133**	-1.129**	-.873**	-1.007**
Sweden	.160**	.161**	.108*	.003 (n.s.)
Spain	-.452**	-.448**	-.284**	-.422**
Second generation		.035 (n.s.)	-.034 (n.s.)	-.076 (n.s.)
Parents' educational level			.263**	.261**
Age			.027**	.025**
Age2			.000**	.000**
parental education missing			-.239**	-.226**
Intensity of religious practice				.017*
Eastern Orthodox				-.360**
Roman Catholic				.179**
Protestant				.104**
Eastern religions				.419*
Jewish				.836*
Origin: former colony/territory destination country				.184*
Constant	2.748**	2.744**	2.006**	1.959**
R2 adjusted	.155	.155	.303	.309

Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data)
Note: Significant coefficients are marked with * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 and *** = p < .001.
The effect of the dummy for missing values on education is not included since it is not significant.

Table 5 Macro-characteristics in the multi-level regressions of the educational attainment of male and female second generation immigrants: Coefficients, standard errors and improvement in model fit, based on the addition of the macro-variable to model 3 of tables 6 and 7.

		Male Education	Female Education
Destination Effects	**EII: Labour market inclusion**	.130 (.132) .970	.178 (.172) .960
	EII: Long-term residence rights	.047 (.164) .077	.295 (.187) 2.300
	EII: Family reunification	.307 (.169) 3.292	.350 (.187) 3.040
	EII: Naturalization	.580 (.225)* 6.572	.675 (.213)* 8.294
	EII: Anti-Discrimination	.097 (.080) 1.451	.147 (.101) 2.000
	EII: Total index score	.241 (.161) 2.229	.368 (.187)* 3.540
	Liberal welfare regime	.173 (.122) 2.015	-.007 (.142) .003
	Social-democratic welfare regime	.033 (.113) .086	.027 (.924) .024
	Conservative welfare regime	.098 (.092) 1.132	-.040 (.109) .137
	Southern welfare regime	-.181 (.256) 1.001	.206 (.275) .557
	Presence of Left-wing parties in government	-.009 (.015) .108	.012 (.014) .764
	Net migration rate	.010 (.015) .108	-.015 (.021) .486
Origin Effects	**Net migration rate**	.001 (.019) .001	-.012 (.018) .459
	Human Development Index	.000 (.001) .174	.001 (.001) 1.079
	Prevalently Christian country	.091 (.098) .870	-.124 (.095) 1.698
	Prevalently Eastern-Orthodox country	.194 (.191) 1.037	-.075 (0.181) .170
	Prevalently Islamic country	.074 (.130) .320	.101 (.124) .663

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data

Note: Every cell contains the following information: the size of the coefficient is printed in bold letters; standard errors are given in brackets, while the gain in -2 LogLikelihood that results from including the specific indicator is given in italics. Significant coefficients are marked with * = $p < .05$,

Table 6 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level regression of highest level of education of male second generation immigrants, N=500

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Mean education of male natives		**1.130** (.213)	**.775** (.150)	**.777** (.150)	**.912** (.158)	**.919** (.164)	**.936** (.151)
One native, one immigrant parent		.041 (.096)	-.160 (.93)	-.159 (.093)	-.144 (.093)	-.172 (.094)	-.145 (.089)
Speaking minority language at home		.006 (.206)	.082 (.189)	.184 (.283)	.142 (.281)	.142 (.281)	
Citizenship of destination country		.298 (.165)	.236 (.147)	.101 (.215)	.147 (.214)	.112 (.220)	
Age			-.004 (.033)	-.002 (.033)	-.006 (.033)	.002 (.033)	
Age2			.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	
Parental education			**.217** (.025)	.130 (.104)	.151 (.104)	.128 (.105)	**.133** (.068)
Parental education missing			**-.518** (.183)	**-.518** (.183)	**-.554** (.182)	**-.559** (.182)	**-.558** (.182)
Number of children			.030 (.031)	.028 (.032)	.024 (.031)	.025 (.032)	
Roman Catholic			.034 (.086)	.034 (.086)	.060 (.086)	.059 (.087)	
Eastern Orthodox			**-.381** (.193)	-.366 (.195)	-.178 (.207)	-.318 (.239)	
Islam			**-.491** (.230)	**-.734** (.293)	**-.705** (.291)	**-.816** (.310)	**-.435** (.216)
Intensity of religious practice			.004 (.027)	.007 (.027)	.005 (.027)	.003 (.027)	
Parental education * Citizenship of destination country				.089 (.105)	.075 (.1059	.093 (.105)	.112 (.066)
Parental education * Speaking Minority language at home				-.039 (.127)	-.039 (.127)	-.038 (.126)	
Parental education * Islam				.185 (.144)	.176 (.144)	.186 (.143)	
EII: Naturalization policies					**.573** (.225)	**.489** (.246)	**.668** (.202)
Origin: EU15+						-.116 (.150)	
Origin: Neighbouring countries						.115 (.105)	
Origin: Former colony/territory						-.079 (.1049	
Origin: Post-socialist countries						-.182 (.143)	
Constant	**2.813** (.131)	-.636 (634)	.263 (.791)	.319 (.799)	-.089 (.810)	-.102 (.819)	-.257 (.430)
Vokl (destination variance)	**.176** (.085)	.023 (.020)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Uojkl (origin variance)	.028 (.030)	.012 (.025)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
E0ijkl (individual variance)	**.832** (.057)	**.840** (.057)	**.699** (.044)	**.695** (.044)	**.686** (.043)	**.682** (.043)	**.694** (.044)
-2LogLikelihood	1365.377	1346.843	1239.550	1236.812	1230.389	1227.296	1236.095

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data.

Table 7 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level regression of highest level of education of female second generation immigrants, N=523

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Mean education of female natives		**.803** (.153)	**.554** (.177)	**.479** (1.72)	**.542** (1.36)	**.569** (1.50)	**.489** (.125)
One native, one immigrant parent		.019 (.102)	-.094 (.092)	-.068 (.092)	-.035 (.092)	-.016 (.094)	
Speaking minority language at home		.051 (.254)	.216 (.225)	**.840** (.318)	**.862** (.317)	**.876** (.319)	**.907** (.314)
Citizenship of the destination country		.229 (.205)	**.376** (.186)	**.749** (.286)	**.778** (.284)	**.791** (.285)	**.711** (.283)
Age			**.079** (.036)	**.075** (.036)	**.070** (.035)	**.071** (.035)	**-.013** (.004)
Age2			**-.001** (.000)	**-.001** (.000)	**-.001** (.000)	**-.001** (.000)	
Parental education			**.247** (.024)	**.434** (.091)	**.453** (.091)	**.453** (.091)	**.426** (.091)
Parental education missing			-.127 (.162)	-.117 (.160)	-.151 (.160)	-.166 (.160)	
Number of children			-.040 (.034)	-.038 (.033)	-.033 (.033)	-.033 (.033)	
Roman Catholic			.025 (.100)	.030 (.098)	.007 (.092)	.005 (.092)	
Protestant			.088 (.138)	.092 (.136)	.188 (.135)	.154 (.137)	
Eastern Orthodox			-.110 (.219)	-.123 (.212)	.123 (.195)	.120 (.239)	
Jewish			**2.189** (.861)	**2.573** (.878)	**2.546** (.874)	**2.684** (.875)	**2.495** (.880)
Non-Christian eastern religions			**.755** (.353)	**.758** (.350)	**.769** (.349)	**.782** (.349)	**.803** (.345)
Intensity of religious practice			-.033 (.026)	-.032 (.026)	-.035 (.026)	-.032 (.026)	
Parental education * Speaking minority language at home				**-.376** (.136)	**-.394** (.135)	**-.394** (.135)	**-.425** (.135)
Parental education * Citizenship of the destination country				**-.187** (.093)	**-.203** (.093)	**-.203** (.093)	**-.183** (.093)
EII: Naturalization policies					**.675** (.213)	**.616** (.244)	**.504** (.185)
Origin: EU15+						-.021 (.147)	
Origin: Neighbouring countries						-.075 (.105)	
Origin: Former colony/territory						.113 (.105)	
Origin: Post-socialist countries						-.124 (.130)	
Constant	**2.746** (.097)	.351 (.459)	-.746 (.901)	-.873 (.918)	-1.047 (.877)	-1.191 (.890)	.607 (.466)
Vokl (destination variance)	**.085** (.047)	.000 (.000)	.015 (.013)	.013 (.012)	.000 (.000)	.003 (.007)	.000 (.000)
Uojkl (origin variance)	.029 (.032)	.043 (.030)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.001 (.016)
E0ijkl (individual variance)	**.889** (.060)	**.873** (.059)	**.697** (.044)	**.684** (.043)	**.682** (.042)	**.675** (.042)	**.697** (.046)
-2LogLikelihood	1454.801	1346.843	1302.952	1292.543	1284.251	1281.089	1295.905

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data.

Figure 1 Differences in highest educational level between male and female natives and second generation immigrants in the 13 EU countries



Figure 2: Differences in highest educational level for male and female second generation migrants from the most important countries of origin in the EU (N>20)



Figure 3 The effects of parental education and language spoken at home on the educational attainment of female second generation immigrants



Figure 4 The effects of parental education and citizenship of the survey country on the educational attainment of female second generation immigrants



Appendix

Table I. Countries of Origin classified as Neighbouring Countries per Country of Destination

Country of Destination	Neighbouring Countries
Austria	Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Italy, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia
Belgium	France, The Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, United Kingdom
Germany	Denmark, Poland, Czech Republic, Austria, Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, The Netherlands, United Kingdom
Denmark	Germany, Sweden, Norway, United Kingdom
Spain	Portugal, France, Morocco
Finland	Sweden, Norway, Russian Federation, Estonia
France	Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom
United Kingdom	Ireland, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, France, Denmark, Norway
Greece	Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Cyprus
Ireland	United Kingdom
Luxembourg	Belgium, Germany, France
The Netherlands	Belgium, Germany, United Kingdom
Portugal	Spain
Sweden	Denmark, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland

Table II Correlations (Pearson's R) between the macro-indicators of the countries of origin, N=132

	1	2	3	4	5	6	6
1 Christian	**1**						
2 Islamic	**-.571****	**1**					
3 Eastern Orthodox	**-.278****	**-.169**	**1**				
4 Other non-Christian	**-.373****	**-.226****	**-.110**	**1**			
5 GDP per capita	**.373****	**-.291****	**-.055**	**-.109**	**1**		
6 Net migration rate	**-.025**	**-.049**	**-.060**	**.144**	**.271****	**1**	
7 Human Development Index	**-.378****	**.341****	**-.091**	**.149**	**-.818****	**-.266****	**1**

Table III Correlation (Pearson's R) between the macro-indicators of the countries of destination, N=13

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1 EII: Labour market inclusion	1											
2 EII: Long-term residence	.705**	1										
3 EII: Family reunification	.654*	.842**	1									
4 EII: Naturalization	.551	.555*	.698**	1								
5 EII: Anti-Discrimination	.850**	.577*	.674*	.524	1							
6 EII: Total	.913**	.846**	.875**	.716**	.891**	1						
7 Liberal Welfare Regime	-.030	-.260	-.072	.296	.130	-.001	1					
8 Social-Democratic Welfare Regime	-.171	-.154	-.273	-.441	-.118	-.232	-.182	1				
9 Conservative Welfare Regime	-.056	.248	.244	.095	-.105	.066	-.395	-.395	1			
10 Southern Welfare Regime	.238	.062	.007	.011	.114	.121	-.234	-.234	-.507	1		
11 EPL	.210	.432	.342	-.024	.054	.232	-.840**	-.041	.170	.564	1	
12 Net migration rate	-.493	-.566*	-.354	.045	-.549	-.493	.128	-.164	.279	-.299	-.647*	1
13 Presence of Left-Wing Parties in Government	-.210	.226	-.017	-.196	-.183	-.089	-.433	.398	-.164	.224	.514	-.252