

Coordination for Building Peace – What is at Stake?

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Abstract:

The latest since the Brahimi Report, the lack of coordination between the myriad of actors relevant for peacebuilding is considered to be a major obstacle for the success of peace operations. While coordination has been identified as a major problem, a systematic discussion of the dimensions involved in coordination is missing. The majority of literature remains focussed on one coordination problem, such as inner-agency coordination, or civil-military coordination. This paper provides a systematic discussion of coordination problems. I argue that *problematizations* depend essentially on how the collective of peacebuilders is understood, and what the objects of coordination are. I distinguish between different root metaphors (alliance, community, network, machinery) used to describe the collective of peacebuilders and between five different objects of coordination (functional, spatial, epistemic, principal-agent and public-private). Based on this classificatory scheme we can distinguish at least 15 different kinds of coordination problems. Clarifying the multiple dimensions of coordination is an important step to develop possible solutions for coordination in peacebuilding and to evaluate existing strategies.

Keywords: United Nations, Peacebuilding, Peacekeeping, Coordination,

1. Introduction: Coordination for Peacebuilding

The extension of peace operation mandates and the rise of the concept of peacebuilding has led to the increasing recognition that an extensive number of agencies is involved in the processes of creating peace. Nowadays, many heterogeneous policy issues are bundled under the umbrella of peace and security: Classical military security policies, democracy promotion, state capacity building, economic and social development and the fight against terrorism are combined with the term *building peace*. The concept of peacebuilding – be it post-, in-, or pre-conflict – has at least conceptually been successful in connecting these formerly functionally separated domains. Yet, with agencies increasingly relying on it, the concept has rather led to a new complexity as former dispersed practices need to be integrated and diverse agencies to be coordinated. To acknowledge for the multiple dimensions of a peacebuilding project the need for a different quality of organisational work has emerged.

A main challenge of organization lies in how to coordinate the myriad of agencies to avoid duplication and contradicting practice, to improve the communication between involved agencies and to work more efficiently within existing resources. Coordination work concerns classical questions of how to organize concerted action under conditions of divergent (state) interests, but also how to coordinate new actors: actors, which in the previous functional differentiation have not been considered as immediately relevant for peace processes, for instance development or financial actors. This also includes actors that have strengthened their role in recent years, for instance non-governmental organisations, civil society and activist groups or private military companies.

The UN system has become at least since the Brahimi Report aware of the coordination question, and it is argued that the lack of coordination is a key obstacle for the success of peace

operations.¹ Coordination problems as such are, however, not entirely new – indeed, the UN system can be described as an organizational expression of a massive coordination problem.² However, the multiplicity of actors involved in peace processes has increased, and uncertainty about how peace can be built seems rather growing.³ While coordination has been identified as a significant issue, the different problems of coordination in peacebuilding remain rather unspecified. While the majority of authors see the crucial challenge in how to coordinate between security and development actors, a systematic overview and discussion of what is at stake in coordination for building peace is largely lacking.

In this paper I take up the question of what is at stake in coordination. Given there is more than one coordination problem, I shall address what kind of coordination problems we can identify in peacebuilding. Clarifying the multiple dimensions of coordination is an important step to develop possible solutions for coordination in peacebuilding and to evaluate existing strategies.

In the following, I shall discuss the multiple dimensions of the ‘coordination problem’. I argue that *problematizations* depend essentially on how the collective of peacebuilders is understood, and what the objects of coordination are. I shall distinguish firstly between different root metaphors (alliance, community, network, machinery) used to describe the collective of peacebuilders. These metaphors offer different conceptions of the collective, suggest different coordination problems and propose different solutions. Next, I shall sketch five different objects of coordination, which I grasp as functional, spatial, epistemic, principal-agent and public-private coordination. Based on this classificatory scheme we can distinguish at least 15 different kinds of coordination problems.

2. A Brief Inventory of Coordination Problems

Community, Network or Machinery? Grasping the collective of peacebuilders

To grasp the collective of agencies engaged in peacebuilding we usually rely on one of the following metaphors: we speak of an ‘alliance’ or a ‘coalition’, the ‘international community’, a ‘network’ or sometimes also of a ‘machinery’.⁴ All these metaphors do *not* mean the same, but are terms, which are part of different narrative fields, emphasising differently what agencies have in common and what ‘coordination’ and ‘concerted action’ means.⁵

‘Alliance’ or ‘coalition’ usually refers to a convergence of interests among agencies. That we use in everyday language rarely the connotation of a ‘peacebuilding alliance’, or a ‘peacebuilding

¹ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (known as the “Brahimi Report” after the Panel chair, UN Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi) UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. For other discussions of the Coordination problem see Paris, Roland. "Understanding the 'Coordination Problem' in Postwar State Building." mimeo, 2006; Jones, Bruce D. "The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars." IPA Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation 2001, no. June (2001), and in Herrhausen, Anna. "Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding - a Theory-Guided Approach." WZB Working Paper SP IV 2007, no. 301 (2007).

² See Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. "Political Approaches." In Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, edited by Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

³ Which is signified by the massive increase of academic literature in the field on the one hand, but also ongoing diagnosis of the relative failure of peace operations. For recent reviews of the literature on peacebuilding and peacekeeping see Call, Charles T., and Elizabeth M. Cousens. "Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies." *International Studies Perspectives* 9, no. 1 (2008): 1-21. Doyle, Michael. "War Making and Peace Making: The United Nations' Post-Cold War Record." In *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, ?-?. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001.

⁴ Other metaphors regularly in use in a political context are that of a “peacebuilding architecture”. In an academic context also the metaphors of a “peacebuilding system”, a “peacebuilding culture”, a “peacebuilding discourse” and a “peacebuilding field” have been exploited. Those metaphors are however not further discussed here.

⁵ All four metaphors are core metaphors in social theory, where they have developed to suggest different ontologies of the social. Although peacebuilding actors use some of these terms interchangeably, it is important to keep them at least analytically separated.

coalition' is telling in this regard – it seems the belief is widely shared that there is more or something different to the collective, than shared interests. 'Community' is a term that underlines, in one version or the other, the role of shared knowledge among community members. This can be explicit knowledge, such as outlined norms, rules and procedures, or implicit knowledge, such as shared narratives, problem framings or other forms of tacit knowledge. To speak of a 'network' is to emphasise that, while shared knowledge might exist, pivotal is the relation of actors. They become a collective by being related to each other. Compared to the community metaphor this is a relative weak understanding of commonality. The metaphor of a 'machinery' understands the collective as primarily composed of technical relations, and accentuates what the collective has in common are technologies (or ways of handling things).

Of course, different understandings of these metaphors proliferate pushing them into different directions. For instance, some community concepts argue for a strong role of interests, or some network understandings require a high sense of shared knowledge pushing it closer to a community understanding.⁶ Let us sideline these differentiations for the moment and explore how the core of these metaphors grasps the character of the peacebuilding collective differently and leads to the identification of different coordination problems.⁷

Let us begin on a very basic level: Speaking of a coordination problem in peacebuilding already assumes that actors have something in common – it assumes the existence of some sort of collective. Actors belonging to this collective make some intelligible and consequential contribution to peacebuilding. They contribute, whether for the good or bad, to establishing and maintaining 'peace'. Formulated otherwise they have a stake in if in a given territory there is peace or war. Agencies we would initially count into that collective are the UN bodies and UN member states, NGO's, companies and ('local') actors from the territory in which peace shall be build. On the most basic level, we can hence speak of the collective constituted by those contributing to the development of peace. Contributing, however, depends on recognition – it needs to be a recognized or relevant contribution. To recognize some agency as relevant means to provide a role to it. To give an agency a role in a game requires some sort of background understanding of what the nature of the game is. Hence, seen from a general perspective, the different ideas of coordination and related problems, described in the following, rest on different understandings of the game and the roles different actors have in them.

The understanding of the collective that gives rise to the first coordination problem (the alliance perspective) is to conceive the collective as composed of all actors that share the objective of ending or preventing the outbreak of conflict. Actors not sharing this objective – for instance, 'spoilers', 'war lords' or 'insurgents' – are excluded. Consequently, the problem arises on how to cooperate with those agencies external to the collective. Nonetheless, with the coordination

⁶ For a discussion of different interpretations of the community and network metaphor, see Knox, Hannah, Mike Savage, and Penny Harvey. 2006. Social networks and the study of relations: networks as method, metaphor and form. *Economy and Society* 35 (1):113-140. For policy related discussions see Börzel, Tanja A. 1998. Organizing Babylon - on different conceptions of policy networks. *Public Administration* 76 (2):253-273; and Coe, Neil M., and Timothy G. Bunnell. 2003. 'Spatializing' knowledge communities: towards a conceptualization of transnational innovation networks. *Global Networks* 3 (4):437-456. For discussions from International Relations see Adler, Emanuel. *Communitarian International Relations. The Epistemic Foundation of International Relations*. London/New York: Routledge, 2005.

Discussions out of the context of peace and UN related research can be found in Ricigliano, Robert. 2003. Networks of Effective Action: Implementing an Integrated Approach to Peacebuilding. *Security Dialogue* 34 (4):445-462; and Riles, Anneliese. 2000. *The network inside out*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; and Mosse, David. 2005. Global Governance and the Ethnography of International Aid. In *The Aid Effect. Giving and Governing in International Development*, edited by D. Mosse and D. Lewis. London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press.

⁷ I will not entirely dwell on the notion of alliances, not because such a perspective is useless or would not tell us anything, but I would argue that we need to inquire into where the interests actually stem from. The alliance perspective only gives us a very basic understanding and in this sense, the other perspectives are more valuable, as they give us some idea of the constitution of interests.

problem in peacebuilding we usually refer to the problems arising inside the collective of those sharing the objective. While the commonality of the collective is the long term objective of 'establishing and maintaining peace', in what way a coordination problem arises depends on what other notions of collective are stressed as necessary for the collective to cooperate and act successfully.

A Community of Peacebuilders

Central for the community metaphor is the notion of sharing. From a community perspective the collective is understood as set up on some sort of consent, and the consent of reaching a large term overarching 'peace' – who would disagree? – is not considered sufficient. Hence, coordination from the community perspective means that agencies need to agree on common means, intermediate goals and priority areas (shared knowledge). Then the coordination problem starts with different understandings of the meaning of the terms 'peace' and the means to 'build' it.

As Oliver Richmond has recently pointed out peace can be conceptualized quite differently.⁸ The minimum understanding is that of the absence of interstate war and large scale inner-state violence. While, of course, disagreement exists over the question when a 'war' is a 'war' (e.g. how many dead people we need) and when 'large scale' is 'large scale', this is a negative understanding of peace, understood as the *absence of killing*. Fundamental disagreement usually starts over broader understandings of peace and violence, what is usually termed a 'positive peace'. Positive peace relates to normative concepts, such as democracy, justice and legitimacy and to conceive other forms of violence than death, such as violations of human rights, discrimination, or poverty.

Yet, even for the negative understanding of peace there is no certain knowledge or consent on how violence can or should be stopped in the long term. Although well-equipped military interventions have succeeded to stop killing in the short term, UN peace operations have been a trial and failure.⁹ The concept of peacebuilding has exactly been developed because of the recognition that a negative short-term peace is insufficient and something positive needs to be added. What measures shall be used, in which relation to each other, under which priorities and in which situations is however a contested issue. How force should be used, which civil techniques and methods, how deeply the intervention shall penetrate into a society, and what of a peace process can be 'owned' by the addressed populations all are open questions. As Michael Barnett and his colleagues have recently discussed, several very different understandings of "peacebuilding" can be identified among the major agencies involved in pacification.¹⁰ Similar

⁸ Richmond, Oliver P. 2006. Patterns of Peace. *Global Society* 20 (4):367-394. See also the related discussion of the importance of different concepts of peace for defining operative goals of peacebuilders in Anderson, Mary. 2001. *Peace Strategies and Their Relation to Understanding Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Reflecting on Peace Practices Project, Collaborative for Development Action as well as the discussion of the state of the academic debate in Müller, Harald. "Theories of Peace." In *Peace Studies. Critical Concepts in Political Science*, edited by Matthew Evangelista, 53-87, 2005.

⁹ There is meanwhile a huge body of literature discussing the historical record of UN peace operations. See among many others Ratner, Stephen R. 1995. *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War*. New York: St Martin's Press; Paris, Roland. 2004. *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Findlay, Trevor. 2002. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Doyle, Michael, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. *American Political Science Review* 94 (4):779-801; Diehl, Paul F. 2000. Forks in the Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for 21st Century Peacekeeping. *Global Society* 14:337-360.

¹⁰ Barnett, Michael, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O'Donnell, and Laura Sitea. 2007. Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?. *Global Governance* 13:35-58. Similar arguments that a minimum consensus in peacebuilding politics exists, which is however limited in reach and involves serious disagreements, are made in Gasper, Des. "Securing Humanity: Situating 'Human Security' As Concept and Discourse." *Journal of Human Development* 6, no. 2 (2005): 221-45. Büger, Christian. "Human Security - What's the Use of It? on Boundary Objects and the Constitution of New Global Spaces." Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association. San Francisco, 2008.

Richmond stresses in his discussion of what he calls an emerging “peacebuilding consensus” that there is signification of a general agreement “upon ‘peaceful’ strategies used to respond to conflict involving international organizations, institutions, agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but less so on the issue of the use of force”. But, as he continues to argue this is only a consent in theory, not in practice: it exists “only in theory, and as an assumed ideal type in the context of international organizations, institutions, agencies, NGOs, and liberal states.”¹¹

Coordination in the community perspective means hence to have a consensus of intermediate objectives and a priority of practical means to achieve them. A coordination problem arises if a consensus is not given and the pivotal question is one of how to find consensus. Solutions are hence to be sought in consensus building mechanisms. Pivotal mechanisms discussed are that of deliberative modes of consent finding or the creation of central authorities in which consent can be found by procedure, such as voting.

A Network of Peacebuilders

While a network perspective argues that a minimum consensus is necessary to constitute a network, it foregrounds other aspects. The reliance on the concept of peacebuilding may be sufficient for agencies to relate to each other by using the concept. Dissent between them is rather naturally and might de facto enable and dense relations. As Barnett et al. highlight, one of the concept of peacebuilding “talents is to camouflage divisions over how to handle the postconflict challenge”. They stress that the inbuilt ambiguity of such a concept “can facilitate collective action because different constituencies can support [... the concept] without necessarily achieving consensus on the substance”.¹² What is important for the network is a flow of relations and communications. The more intense agential parts of a network communicate with each other and build up on each others work, the better the network is equipped to take action. Communication means talking to each other, being aware of the intentions and expectations of other agencies and the sharing of data and information. In peacebuilding this means that all agencies involved communicate with each other and inform about their intentions and expectations, their activities taken and share data they may have of a conflict.

Coordination from the network perspective means, hence, pivotally communication, talking to each other, information-sharing and building up on each others work. A coordination problem arises out of a lack of communication. Solutions need consequently to be sought in increasing communication and relations, by, for instance, guaranteeing regular meetings or establishing platforms for information sharing.

A Peacebuilding Machinery

In the machinery perspective the collective is seen as a mean to produce a product efficiently, a product called “long lasting peace”. The collective is centrally organized by means and procedures. Success and failure is defined by standards of rationality and efficiency. Rather than highlighting communication or struggles for consent this perspective foregrounds technology – the role of bureaucracy, specialized agencies and experts, standardized processes, prediction and control. The idea of efficiency follows a logic of minimizing resources and maximizing outcome. Coordination is then an issue of efficient organization. Success and failure is defined by reaching the maximum outcome under the minimum use of resources. Peacebuilding has been frequently characterized by these terms in either offering (rational) strategies of coordination, or in criticizing the overly technological orientation of peacebuilding.

¹¹ Richmond, Oliver P. "The Globalisation of Response to Conflict and the Peacebuilding Consensus." *Cooperation and Conflict* 39, no. 2 (2004): 132.

¹² Barnett, Michael, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O'Donnell, and Laura Sitea. 2007. *Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?*. *Global Governance* 13:44.

A machinery perspective understands coordination as efficient routine work of principles and procedures. A coordination problem arises out of in-efficiency, double work and failures in using resources efficiently. Solutions can be identified in better working procedures and efficient techniques.

Specifying the Problems: Coordination among whom?

We now have a broad understanding of what coordination and coordination problems can mean. Different fundamental understandings of what constitutes the collective of peacebuilders and the game of peacebuilding gives rise to different versions of what coordination is and what a problem of coordination. Yet, for grasping the different kinds of coordination problems, we also have to consider the objects of coordination. Which objects need to be coordinated, between which actors do we need to coordinate? Based on the different agencies with recognized roles in the game, we can further specify problem dimensions. I suggest differentiating between functional, spatial, epistemic, principal-agent and public-private coordination.

1) *Functional coordination* concerns the working together of specialized agencies responsible for different issue areas such as security, development, economy, law or environment. Peacebuilding breaks up with a functional separation and is an idea in which all sectors or issue areas shall be integrated. In what is called an “integrated strategy” specialized agencies shall work with each other and cooperate. This requires for instance coordination between civil and military organizations, or between development and security agencies – what has been termed the “security-development nexus”, or the “merger of security and development”.¹³ Coordination becomes problematic, for instance, when bureaucracies specialized in security and in development do not work smoothly with each other; the civil and military components of a mission need to be integrated; or in cases in which military organizations engage in development work, such as in the case of the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, the military transformative administration in Iraq, or when humanitarian or development aid undermines the strategic goals of security actors.

2) *Spatial coordination* is the coordination between different spatial levels. Conventionally a differentiation is made between a global level, a regional level and a local level. Hence coordination is necessary at least in four forms: Coordination between the actors on each level, and coordination between the levels. Global coordination among the players on this level are mainly interactions taking place at the UN, or in wider multi-lateral settings. Regional coordination is the coordination among the players that matter in a certain region, and local coordination among these that matter in a local context, meaning mainly inside a state territory. Moreover, it is the coordination between these levels. For instance, global agreements need to match the needs on the ground and local knowledge needs to be fed into global coordination. Inter-level coordination is also a question of inner-agency coordination, as many agencies play on all levels. For instance, the UN headquarters need to coordinate with, the regional and the local representatives as well as mission members from different specialized UN agencies.¹⁴

¹³ Functional coordination has made up the main topic of research discussing the coordination problem. Civil-Military relations are discussed by Jones, Bruce D. 2001. *The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars*. *IPA Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation* 2001 (June); and Chesterman, Simon. 2003. *Blue Helmet Blues*. *Security Dialogue* 34 (3):369-379.

The relation of development and security agencies has been formulated as one of the main issues of the peacebuilding agenda. See for instance Duffield, Mark. 2001. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merger of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books; Krause, Keith, and Oliver Jütersonke. 2005. *Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments*. *Security Dialogue* 36 (4):447-462 for critical perspectives on the “merging of security and development”.

¹⁴ For a discussion of the inter-level global-local problem see the study of Pouligny, Béatrice. 2006. *Peace Operations seen from below: UN Missions and Local People*. London: Hurst; and Chopra, Jarat, and T. Hohe. 2004. *Participatory*

3) *Epistemic coordination* is the coordination between different kinds of knowledge sources. Politicians, specialized agencies (e.g. bureaucracies, diplomats or the military), and independent experts rely on very different kinds of knowledge.¹⁵ Politicians rely on general practical knowledge only partially covering the knowledge of the others. Specialists rely pivotally on technical knowledge on which means might be used in a given situation and in a specific subject area. Different functional specialists contribute to peacebuilding, military officers know how to apply military forces and how to train troops, diplomats know how to achieve consensus and draft documents, development specialists know what works on the ground or have knowledge about calculating and monitoring. Experts as a third category rely on abstract, formalized, theoretical knowledge of a specific subject area. For instance, peace researchers provide knowledge about the overall success and failure of peace operations, about the “root causes” of conflict or about causal links, such as the causal claim made between democracy and peace. All three types of agencies participate in peacebuilding, but given they rely on very different kinds of knowledge coordination between them is necessary. If the epistemic coordination problem is addressed in international organizations, actors often speak of learning processes. While the learning metaphor is often understood as a hierarchical notion in which one group of actors (usually the politicians and specialists) has to learn from more knowledgeable actors (usually the expert), it is better used as a general notion of coordination between different kinds of knowledge about building peace.

4) *Principal-agent coordination* concerns the coordination between deciding and implementation agencies. This can be coordination between politicians and bureaucracies, but also between constituent (principal) and sub-contractors. For instance if a security sector reform is outsourced to a private military company, or if the military part of a mission is outsourced to a leading state, which is conventional practice in current UN operations.¹⁶ Problems arise as sub-contractors interpret their mandates according to their own role and goals in the game.

Interventions. *Global Governance* 10 (3):289-305. Inter-agency problems are discussed in Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 2004. *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press and Lipson, Michael. 2007. Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy. *European Journal of International Relations* 13 (1):5-34.

¹⁵ I take the distinction between politicians, specialists and experts from Nullmeier, Frank, Tanja Pritzlaff, and Achim Wiesner. 2003. *Mikro-Policy-Analyse. Ethnographische Politikforschung am Beispiel der Hochschulpolitik*. Frankfurt/M./New York: Campus Verlag. A similar distinction is made in Turner, Stephen. 2003. *Liberal Democracy 3.0 Civil Society in an Age of Experts*. London: Sage Publications. The epistemic coordination problem in international organizations was firstly identified by Ernst Haas, who suggested that one of the roots of failure of international organizations lies in the interactions between specialists and politicians. See Haas, Ernst B. *When Knowledge Is Power. Three Models of Change in International Organizations*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1990.

The epistemic coordination problem is rarely acknowledged in peacebuilding politics, but has made up a major issue in studies of environmental governance. See most prominently Haas, Peter M. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. *International Organization* 46 (1):1-35; Lidskog, Rolf, and Göran Sundqvist. 2002. The Role of Science in Environmental Regimes: The Case of LRTAP. *European Journal of International Relations* 8 (1):77-101; and Litfin, Karen. 1995. Framing Science: Precautionary Discourse and the Ozone Treaties. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 24:251-279.

For the case of peacebuilding some authors arguing from a Foucauldian perspective have stressed the problems a too specialist orientation may cause. See Merlingen, Michael, and Rasa Ostrauskaite. 2005. Power/Knowledge in International Peacebuilding: The Case of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 30:297-323 and Zanotti, Laura. 2006. Taming Chaos: A Foucauldian View of UN Peacekeeping, Democracy and Normalization. *International Peacekeeping* 13 (2):150-167. As well as the criticism against social engineering in Krause, Keith, and Oliver Jütersonke. 2005. Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments. *Security Dialogue* 36 (4):447-462 and Richmond, Oliver P. 2005. *The Transformation of Peace*. London: Palgrave.

¹⁶ The principal agency problem, which extends far beyond the formal presentation of the problem conducted in economic principal agent theory, is rarely discussed in peacebuilding. The problems of private military companies has recently received new attention see e.g. Leander, Anna. 2005. The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33 (3):803-826.

5) *Public-private coordination* concerns the question of how those agencies working under the auspices of the state (public agencies), cooperate with those working under other organizing principles such as the ‘market’ or ‘society’. Hence, what is at stake here is how state-related agencies coordinate with non-governmental organizations and companies.¹⁷ For instance, companies can become crucial local actors in conflict spots, in providing crucial resources to the local population (such as employment, food or health care) or in becoming security actors in the classical sense, by hiring security staff to protect the companies values. The recent case of Afghanistan in which companies contracted for providing food and fuel for the military bases in the South, bribe Taliban rebel to transport goods, and hence finance the ongoing insurgency, highlights the importance of this coordination dimension.

3. Summary The multiplicity of coordination problems

If we differentiate between different types of root metaphors (what does coordination mean?) and different objects of coordination (what is to be coordinated?) we hence are faced with a multiplicity of coordination problems. In sum, *the* coordination problem is constituted of at least 15 types of problems (three understandings multiplied by five dimensions, see table one), or even more, if we consider the subtypes, discussed above.

Table 1: Coordination Problems

	Functional	Spatial	Epistemic	Principal /Agent	Public/Private
Community					
Network					
Machinery					

It is important that agencies talking about ‘the’ coordination problem clarify to what specific problem they refer.

Moreover, we are facing a quite complex issue here. Given the multiplicity of coordination problems it seems doubtful that any organizational body can actually cope with all of them. Nonetheless, it seems important to outline the complexity of the problem and to clarify which of the coordination problems are addressed by an organizational solution and which not.

¹⁷ The question of the relation between private and public actors has become central in studies of Global Governance, for instance in discussing the purpose of UN World Conferences, or in studying new initiatives such as the Global Compact. The importance of the participation of civil society in peacebuilding has been a call centrally brought forward by NGOs themselves. For a telling critique of the role of Civil Society in peacebuilding and the naivety of interveners see Pouligny, Béatrice. 2003. UN Peace Operations, INGOs, NGOs, and Promoting the Rule of Law: Exploring the Intersection of International and Local Norms in Different Post-War Contexts. *Journal of Human Rights* 2 (3):359-377. Pouligny, Béatrice. 2000. Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building 'New' Societies. *Security Dialogue* 36 (4):495-510. For a more positive assessment, see Chopra, Jarat, and T. Hohe. 2004. Participatory Interventions. *Global Governance* 10 (3):289.