Conclusions

Even if the definition of modernisation used in this study – as political projects aiming at the reconstruction of the socio-political order on the basis of the idea of human autonomy - is not shared by the reader, and in consequence, my treatment of particular discourses and political projects as inherently modern is contested, the historical-empirical analysis of Romania's experience with modernity should anyhow lead to the questioning of the equation of modernisation with Westernisation or Europeanisation as well as to scepticism towards assumptions of convergence. It should have become evident that, first of all, modernisation and the interpretation of modernity is less of a homogeneous and universal experience than assumed in the notions of convergence and singularity of modernity, and, secondly, that any particular experience with modernity is circumscribed by the historical-situational confrontation between (constellations of) actors, paradigmatic external reference points, and internal traditions, interpretations, and exigencies.

The Romanian experience with modernity

The analysis of the genesis of modernity in the Romanian principalities reveals that the original Romanian modern experience differed significantly from the Western one. Rather than consisting of either a more or less faithful emulation of Western modernity or a complete rejection, the particular constellation of actors that emerged as modernisers combined elements from both the rational, liberal model and the alternative vision of romanticism. The nineteenth-century origins of Romania's experience with modernity are significant and constitutive of later understandings and political projects in two ways.

First, the project of nation-building and state-formation that dominated much of the 19th century institutionalised a modern society in which the autonomy of the cultural-linguistic collectivity was predominant. In other words, independence and autonomy as political concepts evolved around the Romanian nation as a reified, supra-individual entity whose existence and development were the primary objectives of the modern state. The cultural-linguistic collective constituted the main constituent of the political

project for the modernisation of the Romanian Principalities. It informed the idea of independence (independence of the Romanians as a specific *nation*), the idea of unity between two (or three) prior separated territories, and the primary basis for the establishment of the boundaries, membership, and objectives of the new, modern nation-state.

Second, the first political project of modernisation – national-Liberalism – brought forth the crystallisation of the two major understandings of modernity in Romania: universalism or emulationism and particularism or indigenism. Although both perceptions were themselves open for different interpretations and, moreover, never exhausted the discourse of a particular modernising élite, they almost unfailingly constituted the ultimate reference points. During the nineteenth century, one could therefore speak of the institutionalisation of discursive traditions of modernity, which have been embedded in local culture and have been continuously reproduced as well as altered through time.

If the nineteenth-century political project of national-Liberalism is read in a strictly modernist way, its failure to cause an absolute break with the past would have to be understood as a failure to introduce modernisation as such. The absence of a revolution that disrupts the presence from the past and is subsequently institutionalised in structures, which unmistakably inhabit the modern, would preordain such a political project from its very beginning. In contrast, in this study my aim has been to detect the modern in the non-modern, and to juxtapose different understandings of modernisation with the Western archetype. Read in such a way, the origins of Romanian modernisation show a different image. The national–Liberal project was indeed based on a combination of traditional, particularist and universal, Europeanist elements, but this fact neither precluded its modern nature, nor supposed a gradual disappearance of traditional elements under pressure of universal, modern ones. What makes the origins of Romanian modernisation relatively distinct is the fact that its first experience with modernity was based on a collectivist understanding of the subject of modernisation, rather than an individual one. In other words, a cultural-linguistic collectivism was constitutive of its conception of modernisation, rather than Western individualism.

The dual foundations of this understanding – liberalism and romanticism – resulted in a form of particularist universalism in which the archetypal elements of modernisation – rationalisation, civil and political rights, bureaucratisation and state-formation – were subsumed under the primary objective of national unification and independence. Instead of renouncing the past as such, in Romanian Liberalism a reconsideration of tradition took place, in which elements from the past were selected that served as the basis for the construction of a modern society. Thus, '[L]ooking at tradition as at a mere break is tantamount to ignoring major aspects of modernization which appeared precisely as a result of the confrontation between the wish to renovate and the wish not to waste the intellectual experience amassed along the centuries' (Duțu 1981: 180). In other words, rather than to understand the central place of the Daco-Roman nation in the national-Liberal programme as a residual factor of tradition, it should be regarded as both a reaction to the potential engulfment of Romania by either universalistic Western modernity or by surrounding empires, and as a particular understanding of the concept of self-rule and emancipation.

I have argued that two main deviations of the nineteenth-century Romanian project of modernisation with Western modernity can be discerned. First of all, the predominant attention for the emancipation of the denied nation from foreign tyranny instead of the liberation of the oppressed individual from the despotic ruler and the interference of religion. This also entailed that a complete rupture with the old order was a less important preoccupation than the retrieval of earlier existing rights and the bringing to full development of the collectivity. Secondly, instead of promulgating a political order purely based on legal norms and procedural rules against the nefarious influence of arbitrary absolutist rule or religion, the Romanian nation-state was founded on the substantive notion of the nation, thereby creating a state which had as its primary mission the protection and development of the nation. The outlook of the modernising élites in nineteenth-century Romania shows strong affinity with Brubakers' concept of 'nationalising states', i.e., 'states that are conceived by their dominant élites as nation-states, as states of and for particular nations, yet as "incomplete" or "unrealized" nation-states, as insufficiently "national" in a variety of senses' (Brubaker 1996: 79). As elaborated in chapter 4 and 5, the Liberal nationalist project contained important general features of such a 'nationalising state'. In political-institutional terms, the Liberals'

main objective was to assure an internationally recognised, 'constitutionally independent' nation-state, the guarantee of state power and economic resources and activities in Romanian hands (for instance through the denial of citizenship and property rights to non-Romanians), and the creation of a stable internal order which was invulnerable to internal contestation (primarily of the peasantry) and external interference. In terms of socio-economic structures, the Liberal project was to a large extent about the gaining of absolute control over both economic resources and activities by ethnic Romanians. Listian policies and in the 1920s and 30s attempts at autarchy ('prin noi înşine') served the purpose of state control over the key roles and resources in the Romanian economy.

It is important to keep in mind that the Liberal project not merely entailed the instrumental usage of the state for purposes of class interest but that elements in its programme went beyond such considerations in promoting political rights for all Romanians, the unification of all Romanians in one state, and in its visions of amelioration of the common good through education and wide-scale socio-economic development. In addition, the Liberal project promulgated as its most significant objective the emancipation of the Romanian nation as such, an imaginary that not only was widely accepted as an objective, but could also be invoked against liberalism as a project.

From a modernist and in particular an economic determinist perspective, the fascist reaction to liberal modernity can either be understood as a purely anti-modern, reactionary movement in which the main tenets of modernisation – rationalisation, democratisation, and industrialisation – are refuted, or as a partially modern phenomenon, i.e. a project in which some modern aspects are incorporated, in particular regarding industrialisation and economic development, but which overall ran counter to or were in tension with the overall anti-modern intentions of fascists (see Herf 1983). Only recently more balanced accounts of the fascist 'revolt against modernity' have been proposed that go beyond normative and/or economic, determinist interpretations of modernity and indicate modern aspects in fascist movements which reveal a complex relation with and alternative interpretation of modern society rather than an absolute refutation (see, in particular, Eisenstadt 1999; 2000). It is from the latter perspective that

I have considered the emergence of Romanian Fascism and have interpreted its significance for the Romanian pattern of modernisation.

Romanian Fascist ideology was formulated primarily as a critique against two elements of the Romanian interwar political and socio-economic context: the Liberal political project and its institutions, and the alleged threats stemming from the Jews and communists to Romanian society. In spite of Romanian Fascisms' drawing predominantly on internal critical discursive traditions (nationalism, peasantism, Junimist 'critical thought', cf. Volovici 1991; Hitchins 1995), its overall political programme reflected many of the main concerns of German national socialism, Italian fascism, and other European fascisms. The Iron Guard as well as the intellectual movement promulgated a profound contempt for the formal-rational, bureaucratic logic, and parliamentarism or 'institutionalised conflict' of liberal, bourgeois society and rejected any elevation of the atomistic individual to the position of primary unit of society. Romanian Fascists paralleled their counterparts in Western Europe in their proposal for the creation of a State-as-One that reflected the People-as-One (cf. Lefort 1986), thereby eradicating the internal divisions of class society. As in German national-socialism, the Romanian Iron Guard singled out the Jew as the external Other, the embodiment of all the vices of civilisation. From 1933 onwards, the experiences of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy turned into more explicit 'reference societies' while intellectuals became more open in their support for fascism.

In the Romanian interwar context, fascism constituted not merely a systemic critique on the artificial, emulated, and derived liberal structures, but it also provided, even if imprecisely perceived, a vision of an alternative modern order to be realised by a revolutionary reconstruction of existing society. The alternative order explicitly incorporated notions of popular sovereignty (in which the people was equated with the nation and abstracted from any individual volition), national emancipation (not in institutionalist, constitutional terms as in liberalism, but through a cultural-spiritual regeneration), and a new civilisation comprising a new man (both of which would substitute the thoroughly compromised homo economicus of liberalism but still referred to the Enlightenment ideals of the malleability of society and the perfectibility of man, cf. Eisenstadt 1999).

At the same time, many tenets of the Fascists clearly entailed non-modern or pre-modern features. The return to the 'organically developed' rural village community as an alternative to the artificial city, the denial of reason as an instrument of comprehending the world in favour of unreflective traditions and the mystical union of man with nature, the exemplary and messianistic role of the élite to the detriment of autonomous individual thought, all contained strong elements of the negation of human autonomy.

The proposed alternative resonated strongly in the interwar period, because it reconnected with visions that had been counterposed to liberalism from the 1860s onwards and which had promised the representation of the rural population, and seemed to offer a popular alternative to the restricted, elitarian nature of the Romanian Liberal state.

Romanian Fascism entailed a form of radicalist particularism, in that it only accepted native, traditional sources as input for the reconstruction of society. The alleged artificiality and incompatibility of liberal structures with the Romanian character was primarily an outcome of their foreign and derived nature. In this, however, the Romanian Fascists not merely sought discontinuity with the Liberal project of 1848, which was seen as an illegitimate rupture with the authentic Romanian past, but at the same time formulated a radical response to the national question, equally significant in the Liberal project. Romanian Fascism continued the national quest for emancipation, initiated by the Liberals, but moved from a predominantly institutional-constitutional and economic plane to the level of cultural independence. In this way, the Fascists not only formulated an alternative to liberalism, but even more continued the emphasis on the liberation of the Romanian collective by means of a programme of modernisation which explicitly parted from essential Romanian characteristics. The substantive specificity of Romanian Fascism was constituted by a fusion of Eastern Orthodox religion and traditionalist, communal ruralism as the main component of Romanian collective identity (Hitchins 1995). It is significant that religion in this equation seemed not refer to the subjugation of a societal order to transcendental and other-wordly norms (which would be non-modern in its denial of human autonomy), but rather understood religion as the main component of national identity and thus as a marker of membership, a boundary-creating mechanism, and the primary substantive objective

around which to build a new state. In addition, to Orthodox religion characteristics were contributed that distinguished it sharply from Western religion and culture (collectivism and a contemplative nature). Fascism could thus also be understood as a radicalised project for national emancipation rather than merely a reactionary call for the return to the past.

Even though Romanian Fascism proposed an alternative model of modern society, transcending the differentiation and artificial structures of liberal society and offering a more complete integration of the Romanian nation as well as a more meaningful independence and form of collective autonomy, the alternative offered should be understood as only a partial or 'fragmented' form of modernisation. The primacy of political and cultural elements in the project led to the negligence of socio-economic matters. In this sense, the Fascist project lacked any developmentalist strategy and hardly had any response to the question of economic modernisation, apart from an emphasis on asceticism, sacrifice and anti-materialism. Similarly, Codreanu's conviction that 'the country is going to ruins for the lack of men, not for the lack of programs' (1973: 244) indicated the Iron Guard's predisposition for deeds rather than elaborated political programmes. This primacy of action however meant that the Fascists never elaborated detailed programmes for the institutionalisation of the Fascist project and could not offer a coherent and viable alternative order in strategic-institutionalist terms. Its status remained one of a movement rather than a governing party, further attested by the disorder that characterised its four month-rule at the end of 1939. The Romanian Fascists thus never really had to confront their ideas with the reality of constructing a new order. In this sense, the ultimate significance of the Fascist project lay in the profound influence it had on interwar politics and on the demise of the Liberal project, and, more importantly, in its reinforcement of a collectivist interpretation of modernity and in the radicalised imaginary it created of an independent, authentic Romanian nation.

The other main rival of the liberal project of modernity in the twentieth century was without doubt communism. Whether communism has been considered as the 'epitome of modernity' or as a 'failed modernity' (Feher et al. 1983; Janos 1991; Sztompka 1993; cf. Ray 1996; 1997), most theoretical considerations that acknowledge modern aspects

of communism have focused on its continuity with the Enlightenment ideas of rationalisation and mastery of nature in the form of a radical emphasis on the maximisation of resources and a far-reaching bureaucratisation of society (in particular of the economy). Thus, communism has been often perceived as a pathological or deviational interpretation of Western capitalism or as a variation of modernity understood in a particularly technocratic way (von Beyme 1994: 45). Although I do not deny this rationalist, developmentalist dimension to communism, I have suggested that communism has other significant modern aspects, the consideration of which widens the analysis and helps to understand communism as a specific project of modernisation rather than as a distorted interpretation of Western modernity.

Analysing communism as an alternative understanding and project of modernisation brings to the fore various aspects that go beyond its characterisation as merely an attempt to 'catch up' with the West (although communism entailed also that), while it encourages to consider aspects that are normally neglected by understandings of communism as a 'failed modernity' which see its contemporary heritage only in a negative way (as a 'fake modernity', Sztompka 1993). To a significant extent, communism entailed a radical critique of the archetypal institutions of Western modernity, i.e., capitalism, democracy, and the nation-state.

In other words, communism challenged the Western model for its 'non-completion or perversion of the original vision of modernity' (Eisenstadt 1999: 109). Capitalism was criticised for its disintegrating effects on society, its subordination and alienation of human beings, and its unrestrained pursuit of materialist objectives (the primacy of the economy), whereas democracy was seen as the mere extension of the rule of the dominant class and as capable of guaranteeing only formal liberties, without therefore realising a radical and complete form of freedom for all members of society. The alternative proposal of modern society made in communism was a proposal for the supersession of the complications of modern, Western society; in this sense, it can be understood as a different interpretation of modernity. The transcendence of Western society was proposed in a number of ways: by the substitution of fully rational planning for the anarchic and disintegrating effects of the market economy; by the re-appropriation of the economy by the collective (thereby eliminating class antagonisms); by the replacement of individual rationalities by a 'social rationality', putting the

collective before particular interests (Bauman 2001: 262-64); by the reunification of the people in a singular entity; and by the representation and guidance of the singular entity and its singular will by the party-state.

The communist model emerged from a systemic critique on Western liberalism and proposed an alternative and revolutionary way to construct modern society, to transform man and society, and to bring about a collective form of emancipation (cf. Eisenstadt 1999). The most conspicuously modern aspect was constituted by communism's claim to construct a 'carefully designed, rationally managed, and thoroughly industrialized' society (Bauman 2001: 61). The emphasis on accelerated and comprehensive industrialisation by means of central planning of an allegedly superior kind of rationalism was one of the most significant ways of realising collective autonomy. But it was not the only one. The communist project equally emphasised collective well-being and liberation to the detriment of individual interests, therefore claiming to realise a more comprehensive kind of freedom than possible in liberal modernity. Communism thus proposed a way of societal integration and unity as an answer to the destruction of social bonds by modernity (Arnason 1998: 161). Furthermore, the communist party-state was deemed a more direct and full expression of popular sovereignty than possible in Western pluralist democracy. The construction of a 'patronage state' (Bauman 2001: 58-60) which realised a positive, collective kind of freedom by means of strict control and mobilisation of society for the common good was the institutional expression of this.

I have argued (following Shoup 1962) that in the case of the East European satellite states communism was imposed by the Soviet Union, but that the dynamics of the Stalinist model ('socialism in one country') made subsequent retrieval of local autonomy and therefore the re-emergence of local traditions a possible, though not an inevitable development. In addition, I have pointed to the 'elective affinity' of the Stalinist model with local aspirations, which made the emulation of Soviet communism not merely a one-way 'transfer of institutions' but provided local élites with a model which could substitute supposedly failed attempts at mimeting Western democracy and capitalism and forcefully redirect these countries on a course of modernisation. Most significantly in the phase of de-Stalinisation the East European countries could (within

certain limits) formulate an alternative approach towards communism and attempt to construct a locally distinct form of communism, more suited to local traditions.

The Romanian local pattern consisted of a perseverance in a Stalinist approach towards the construction of socialism, legitimised by and embedded in a form of nationalist particularism. Rather than following bloc-wide trends of de-Stalinisation, limited openness and differentiation, and experimenting with reform socialism, the Romanian pathway that eventually crystallised re-emphasised a hypercentralised and dedifferentiating approach, controlled by a singular, ever smaller core élite entrenched in the party-state. I have argued that the Romanian interpretation of national Communism combined the emancipatory components of the overall communist model (the eradication of material scarcity, the liberation and unity of the collective) with the unifying and integrating aspects of local traditions of radical nationalism. In Romanian Communism, the strong emphasis on collective emancipation was maintained, while perceived not only in terms of a transcendence of the complications of Western modernity, but also in terms of the emancipation of the nation and the preservation of its traditions. The latter provided the means for the legitimation of a nationalist course of enduring Stalinism in a moment of bloc-wide pressure for fundamental change (de-Stalinisation) (Jowitt 1971; Shafir 1985). National Communism went beyond the pure instrumental usage of nationalism and isolationism in that it reintroduced a substantive notion of particularism/traditionalism. The reactivation of a tradition of indigenism meant that the Communist project was more and more founded on nativist elements. In this sense, emancipation was allegedly not only realised through the outrunning of the Western model, but even more so through a reconciliation with local traditions, which presupposed a more profound, radical, and authentic form of emancipation than was possible in the original Marxist-Leninist model.

The distinct features of Romanian national Communism consisted of the decisive pursuit of negative collective liberty, i.e., the right to self-determine the national pathway without the sustenance of interference from the outside, blended with the pursuit of collective positive liberty. The latter consisted of two components: 'full social *and* national liberation'. The first entailed the belief in socialist emancipation through the rationalisation of society by means of centrally planned industrialisation, based on the 'scientific' insights of Marxism-Leninism and through a 'dictatorship over needs'.

The second component consisted of particularist nationalism, which promulgated the superior aspects of the homogenous nation based on the traditions of the Romanian 'Daco-Roman' nation. The 'historical mission of the defence of the national interest' and the autonomous pursuit of the 'national will' were amalgamated with the continuous rationalisation of society through 'socialist industrialisation'. Both components could be invoked for the comprehensive mobilisation of the entire population for the dual objectives of social and national emancipation.

In terms of political practice, the Romanian Communists emphasised from the early 1960s onwards the indispensable right to national self-determination of socialist states, which externally entailed the call for formal 'constitutional independence' and internally allowed for the restructuring of the state around the 'national interest'. The pursuit of national sovereignty meant the redirection of socialist industrialisation to purely national objectives, i.e., the comprehensive modernisation of Romania and the steady improvement of its political, socio-economic and cultural autonomy. In structural-institutional terms, the ideological shift from internationalism to particularist nationalism permitted the Communist leadership to insulate Romanian Communism from reformist tendencies in the wider communist bloc, to stave off emerging pluralism in both the technocratic and humanist intellectual fields, and to continue a totalitarian, essentially Stalinist project. Political power remained concentrated in an ever smaller élite around Ceauşescu (while preventing the emergence of autonomous nuclei both inside and outside the party), whereas the state retained the character of a paternalist or 'patronage' state whose control and guidance were reinforced by both a singular, dogmatic reading of Marxism-Leninism-cum-nationalism and the singularity of the power centre. In economic terms, the original Stalinist interpretation of economic industrialisation through the one-sided stimulation of heavy industry and extensive growth to the detriment of both the consumer industry and agriculture was retained, while economic planning stemming from the singular centre remained imperative. Though during the Ceauşescu years the ultimate objective of industrialisation formally changed from socialism to a 'multilaterally developed socialist society', the basic commitment to the radical transformation of the country into a comprehensively industrialised state remained unaltered.

The collapse of the communist systems in 1989 has been predominantly interpreted as evidence of the viability and singularity of Western modernity. The Soviet model is equated with a 'failed modernity' whose premises and heritage are understood as dysfunctional and impediments in the construction of an authentically modern society (cf. Arnason 2000a; Bönker *et al*. 2002). The singular reading of modernity comprises the assumption of an inevitable rapprochement or convergence of the former communist countries towards a Western standard, translated in the institutional constellation of a democratic market economy. The emphasis is therefore not on possible variations and divergence of the former communist countries in their new projects of modernisation, but rather on their ability to reproduce the Western model in their local context. Instead of taking an interpretive and non-normative approach towards (conflicting) projects of modernisation that have been emerging in post-communist Eastern Europe - contrasting different visions of modernity rather than counterposing 'modern' visions with the remnants of 'traditional', communist ones - modernist approaches have been mostly engaged in trying to explain the non-conformation of post-communist realities with assumptions of convergence towards a Western model.

Critique on the modernist approach has taken issue with the uni-linearity, teleology, and normativeness of mainstream 'transitology' (Bönker *et al.* 2002; Eyal *et al.* 1998; Stark and Bruszt 1998), but has not yet sufficiently moved away from an essentially singular reading of modernity. The assumption that a superior (and therefore singular) model exists seems still to be (often implicitly) present in approaches that argue for variety and divergence (see chapter 2). My suggestion for one possible way leading away from modernist argumentation is based on a reading of modernity as possibly comprising a variety of understandings of its meaning (chapter 3).

The case of post-communist Romania seen from this perspective is indeed exemplary. The politics of transformation in Romania were dominated in the 1990s by two different – historically informed - understandings of modernisation (in the post-communist context referred to as transition). The two dominant traditions of dealing with modernity in the Romanian context – particularism and Westernism – constituted the primary ingredients in a polarised political landscape in which post-communists (building on a particularist understanding) were pitted against a coalition of anti-communists (building on the tradition of Europeanism) (cf. Pavel and Huiu 2003).

Conflict over the direction and substance of transformation was grounded in different, conflictive interpretations of the meaning of modernisation in the Romanian post-communist context. These interpretations themselves were constructions that emerged out of the confrontation between historically formed, local traditions of thought and contemporary transnational discursive paradigms (neoliberalism and European integration). The post-communists, who dominated the political landscape in the first half of the 1990s, avoided a systemic critique of communism while restricting their criticism of the immediate past to a political critique of Ceauşescuism. As the post-communists understood the political crisis to be largely a crisis of political authority, they did therefore not see the need for a complete rupture with the past. This meant that the post-communists had no elective affinity with the neoliberal paradigm whatsoever, as neoliberalism in the context of the post-communist transformations entailed a radical anti-communism as its main tenets were the radical opposite of what (post-)communism stood for (the 'patronage' state, collectivism, positive freedom and substantive rationality).

The particular discursive legacy of Romanian national Communism was recreated in two ways. First, by emphasising the need for social cohesion and state intervention in the economy the etatist, paternalist legacy of communism was reproduced. Secondly, by underlining an alternative from the transnational paradigms in the form of a Romanian third way, and unrestrained national sovereignty and independence, the legacy of national particularism was re-articulated. In order to legitimise its rejection of Western models and to prevent a powerful oppositional discourse from arising, the post-communists formulated a local alternative model, based on the notions of 'original democracy', 'national consensus', and the 'social state' and 'social market economy', all notions promulgated against the anti-communist opposition and transnational discursive paradigms.

During the 1990s, partly under influence of the critique of the opposition as well as from international actors, the post-communists modified their isolationist, particularist position by incorporating notions of the oppositional discourse (itself strongly influenced by the transnational paradigms), which articulated more radical change (regarding the nature of the state and international integration). The incorporation of these notions led, however, not to a radical departure from the earlier interpretation of

modernisation of the post-communists, but to the rather successful crystallisation of a discourse of 'social-democracy' which formed a syncretic composition of both the earlier particularist discourse and elements of universalism and reformism. The post-communists were therefore capable of legitimating their position by reference to local traditions (nationalism, uniqueness, as well as social solidarity) and to the reformism as promulgated by international institutions as well as the anti-communist forces. In political-strategic terms, the post-communists institutionalised the undivided 'national unitary state' (in service of the ethnic majority and against demands of the Hungarian national minority for regional autonomy), national consensus around the 'national objective of the modernisation and development of Romania' (showing intolerance towards political pluralism), and state paternalism, as the central state continued to be the guarantor of national unity and social cohesion.

It was the anti-communist opposition – relatively disorganised in the early 1990s but becoming an increasingly important political force from 1992 onwards – that widely adopted the transnational discursive paradigms. The political discourse of the anti-communists consisted of an unyielding critique on communism in both its pre-and post-1989 manifestations and the adoption of the major tenets of neoliberalism. It articulated a systemic critique of communism as not merely an aberration in its excessive form of Ceauşescuism but as an inherently non-viable and oppressive system. The anti-communist programme promulgated the need for legal-based negative, individual liberty, the strong reduction of the size and functions of the state in favour of civil society and economic actors, the need for a legally circumscribed state rather than a paternalist one, and the primacy of the economy in solving societal problems. In addition, the coalition strongly supported a 'return to Europe' and international integration as means to a radical transformation of Romanian society. The unbridled hostility to leftism of the majority of the self-proclaimed democratic coalition, its critique of the state as inherently bureaucratic and 'totalitarian', and the re-evaluation of the individual as the constitutive element of society coincided with the transnationally dominant neoliberal programme for the restructuring of the state. On the one hand, the emphasis on liberal individualism constituted a profound rupture with the collectivisms of the past. On the other, the anti-communist coalition consisted of re-established historical parties that claimed continuity with their interwar predecessors and their

democratic, liberal and Europeanist programmes. In this reading of the Romanian past, communism was an aberration and the return to democracy and capitalism was deemed a re-affirmation of authentically modern trends of Europeanisation and democratisation in Romania.

Despite the actively asserted paradigm of neoliberalism by international institutions, experts, and social scientists (its impact is assessed in a somewhat exaggerated way by, e.g., Burawoy 1992; Gowan 1995), and within Romania by the anti-communist coalition, the post-communists were able to pursue for a prolonged period of time a self-proclaimed alternative to both Western models and the discredited communist system. This was not only due to the absence of organised dissenting forces during national Communism and their complicated (re-)grouping after 1989, but more importantly because of the pronounced discourse of order, stability, and social cohesion in times of profound change and insecurity. The perseverance of the post-communists should then primarily be explained from, first, their capacity to institutionalise significant components of their programme (setting the 'ground rules' of society in the constitution, controlling the privatisation process and general socio-economic reforms), and, second, their ability to 'crowd out' the discursive arena both by control over the means of mass communication and through the articulation of a discourse which built on the strongly embedded notions of collectivism, particularism, and ethno-cultural integration. This discourse successfully discredited the oppositional discourse and transnationally dominant ideas of reform, as liberalism and Europeanism had been thoroughly undermined during both communist and pre-communist times and were easily equated with foreign domination and loss of independence.

The electoral victory of the anti-communist coalition in November 1996 has been widely interpreted as the return of Romania to an authentic path of modernisation, based on the Western understandings of democracy and capitalist society. The anti-communist coalition in this reading performed the role of a 'functional élite'. Nevertheless, the electoral victory of the anti-communist coalition can hardly be read as a decisive rupture with past in terms of a widely shared acceptance of its systemic criticism; rather, the economic mismanagement and corruption identified with the post-communists were the immediate causes of their (temporary) retreat. So, where the programme of the anti-

communist coalition itself constituted a historically unprecedented rupture with the dominant pattern of modernisation in Romania based on collective autonomy, integral nationalism, and etatism, the anti-communists were not able to embed their emulationist/universalist discourse sufficiently in the local discursive context to create a convincing crisis narration of the notions of collective autonomy, positive freedom, ethno-cultural integration and social cohesion. In addition, the coalition itself from time to time promulgated integral nationalism in tension with professed individualism and legal-rationalism. I argue that the governing period of the anti-communist coalition can be read as a failure to produce a discursive break with the dominant pattern of modernisation and to institutionalise the main tenets of its alternative modernisation programme. On the normative level, the anti-communists failed to promulgate a discourse that was sufficiently embedded/legitimated in the Romanian context. Its neoliberal, emulationist, individualist discourse ran counter to historically firmly embedded collectivist, nationalist perceptions (in terms of discursive traditions as well as political and economic institutions). The individualist, legal-rational, and universalist components were open to critiques of a political nature – as detrimental to the national interest – as well as of a social nature – as resulting in social polarisation and disintegration.

On the level of institutional discourse, institutionalisation and political practice, the most vulnerable element of the anti-communist programme of modernisation was its relation to collective autonomy/independence and national integration. Both its reference to the need for a civic conception of nationhood and citizenship and for unmediated integration into Euro-Atlantic integration seemed to imply a loss of sovereignty, autonomy, and social cohesion. The anti-communists failed moreover to realise a positive consensus in terms of a political project (complementing its negative consensus on the totalitarian nature of post-communism). Ambiguity towards legal-rationalism and individualism as well as discontent on the scope and pace of socio-economic reforms undermined the coherence of its programme. The outcome of this lack of a positive consensus was an only very limited institutionalisation of its primary tenets (no comprehensive reform of political institutions, no decisive advance towards Euro-Atlantic integration, and an only limited reform of socio-economic institutions).

Some theoretical considerations

The Romanian experience with modernity indicates that a singular, unitary reading of modernity as a phenomenon that ultimately leads to the convergence and unification of modern societies (as currently indicated by the term globalisation) is unsustainable. The emergence and diffusion of Western modernity should be understood as having resulted in a range of reactions and alternatives to the Western main pattern, thereby creating variations of the Western pattern as well as distinct alternatives. In this sense, the experience of 'later modernising societies' can better be understood as producing varieties of modernity rather than as aberrations or deviations from a main pattern. The Romanian case shows a variation of the Western pattern in that it demonstrates its own distinct features (statism, integral nationalism) which are partially the result of the structural impact of alternative forms of modernity on the Romanian experience (in particular, fascism and communism). In themselves these distinct features do not give shape to a sustained alternative pattern, but they do constitute a distinct legacy with significant consequences for the present.

Modernity is not a monolithic whole, which prescribes a singular uni-linear course from the traditional *Gemeinschaft* to the modern *Gesellschaft*. Rather, the 'original', Western pattern evoked reactions from 'later modernising societies', whose élites adopted some of the main tenets of Western modernity but adapted these tenets to local circumstances thereby constructing different visions. The Western pattern has thus functioned as a main 'reference point' without exhausting the experiences of other societies. A key role in the production of different understandings of modernity has been played by political and cultural élites (cf. Eisenstadt 1992; Kaya 2004). If modernity can have different connotations in particular contexts, an analytical search for those modernising agents that exhibit the Western mind-set forecloses the identification of agents with alternative programmes. The analysis is then restricted to the identification of 'functional élites', 'change agents', or 'interactionist-individualist élites' (Kaminski and Kurczewska 1995), i.e., those agents that portray the right dynamic and rational attitude which is necessary for a decisive rupture with the old system and who are capable of designing a

programme of modernisation which coincides with Western self-understandings of modernity.[1]

As the impact of programmes of modernity takes place in different historical-societal contexts, these programmes interact with different settings of conflict, and can be adopted by various political and cultural élites. Therefore, a plurality of modernising agents has to be acknowledged (cf. Kaya 2004: 4). For instance, rather than being sustained by an emerging bourgeoisie (one of the most significant modernising actors in Western Europe), the Liberal nationalist project in nineteenth-century Romania was initiated by parts of the gentry who not only engaged in a thorough reconstruction of the societal order, but who also produced a significantly different interpretation of modernisation by primary pursuing the objectives of collective self-determination and unification of the Romanian nation. The analysis of modernisation needs not to be concerned with the identification of substitutive 'functional élites' but rather shift its focus to a plurality of (constellations of) actors, and conflicts and interactions over the meaning of modernisation in particular societies. In principle, various élites and their programmes should be analysed as potentially harbouring projects of societal reconstruction, rather than relegating some projects to the status of conservatism whereas others are identified as dynamic and progressive.[2] Likewise, modernisation creates conflict in itself as any (re-)construction of the social order leads to the institutionalisation of particular values and to the suppression of others. Therefore, modernisation creates tensions between those that build the new order and those whose values and visions are not represented and who are (effectively or perceptively) excluded (cf. Eisenstadt 1978; Wagner 1994: 25). In this way, modernisation exacerbates tensions in society and can result over time in the emergence of counter-élites, which contest the existing order and promulgate an alternative project.

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[1] As Kaminski and Kurczweska argue: 'We find more of the interactionist-individualist type of élites in the Baltic states, where such traditions have survived from the interwar period, than in Bulgaria and Romania. This suggests that the first three societies will probably make faster progress in developing their democratic and market institutions than in the latter' (Kaminski and Kurczweska 1995: 150).

[2] Cf Stark and Bruszt: '[W]e should not be too quick or too confident in our a priori ability to distinguish strategies of survival from strategies of innovation' (Stark and Bruszt 1998: 7).

Next to a plurality of modernising agents, a multiplicity of programmes of modernisation should be considered. Although the dominance of the Western pattern of modernity should be acknowledged, its diffusion gave rise to reactions and alternative constructions of understanding modernity. Thus, although programmes of (political and economic) liberalism have constituted and been understood as the dominant vision of modernity, these programmes have evoked counter-visions that entailed different solutions to the questions of liberty and self-rule as raised by liberalism (in the most radical form in the programmes of fascism and communism, see the chapters 8 and 9). As the condition of modernity is founded on the notions of human autonomy and the malleability of society, any concrete, institutionalised solution for modern society is temporary and essentially contestable. Any programme of modernisation is based on multi-interpretable concepts (liberty, democracy, progress) which – due to their general and abstract nature – are open for different interpretations and thus to critique regarding their unfulfilled status.

This leads me to a final point, i.e., the multiplicity of institutional configurations that can underpin modern society. Multiple programmes of modernisation lead to multiple forms of institutions, in which key tenets of modernity are institutionalised in different ways. Thus, the configuration of democracy, the market economy, and the nation-state has constituted the main pattern of Western modernity,[3] but cannot be seen as exhausting the institutional patterns that can be imagined and realised. Different configurations have figured in alternative projects of modernisation (the most durable pattern has been constituted by the communist project).

In sum, Westernisation is a significant component of modernisation in later modernising societies, not as an offshoot of a master process of modernisation, but rather as one (contested) proposal among others. In pursuing projects of modernisation, actors can follow different rationalities (emulation or self-imitation; past- or future-oriented; totalising or pluralistic) and often seek to institutionalise very distinct sets of values and ideas. Rather than having the inevitable choice between the preservation of traditions, on the one hand, or the complete rupture with the traditional order, on the other,

[3] Another interpretation of the archetypal Western constellation is capitalism, industrialism and the nation-state, see Giddens 1990.

modernising élites can pursue the construction of variegated orders in which both rational-legal elements and substantive elements can be present. In later modernising societies, it is the intersection of external models, local, indigenous traditions, and the creativity of agency that results in ‘varieties of modernity’.