

## **The Mediterranean: A Gulf or a Bridge? Population and Migration in the Euro-Med Process**

By Philippe Fargues

With the exception of the Balkans, the presence of Islam in Europe results from the flow of international migration that began half a century ago. In Germany most Muslim immigrants originate from Turkey and in the United Kingdom from Pakistan/Bangladesh, while in all other European countries Arabs form the majority of them. Not all but most Arab immigrants are Muslim. This paper focuses on Arab migration to Europe, with a particular emphasis on the situation in the Arab world in the future.

International migration is determined by international differentials in economic development and welfare. Looking at the Mediterranean area, one can say not only that economic conditions of intense migration are now prevailing but also that they will remain strong during at least the next decade. Sharp differentials in income—with an average 4,000 dollars per capita in Arab Mediterranean countries (year 2000, income in purchasing power parity) against 24,000 dollars in the European Union—make migration to Europe an attractive option for many individuals in the south. Demographic differentials—with a rate of population growth currently ranging between 1.5% and 2% in the south in sharp contrast with prospects of depopulation in Europe—add to the picture and could make migration an attractive option for governments in their dealing with a variety of issues related to demographic imbalances.

Some four million Arab immigrants currently live in Europe, and possibly 6 million if one includes their descendents born in host countries. The stock of migrants in Europe represents around 2% of the total population of the Arab world. This is a sizeable emigration. However, with regard to economic differentials across the Mediterranean, the true question is rather « why are there so few actual migrants, given the huge numbers of potential migrants ? » The answer lies first in the fact that not only economic or demographic reasons determine the rational choice of individuals. There is also a non-economic rationality, which takes into account the attachment to one's culture and emotional environment, so that not every Arab is a candidate for migration. A second reason why actual migrants are so few is that the choice is not free. The control that states exercise over the crossing of national borders and the stay of non-nationals is an important limiting factor for international migration.

The following will review the context in which migration takes place (questions 1 to 4), and the policies that impart it. (Questions 5 and 6).

### **Question 1 — The recent demographic transition in the Middle East and North Africa: was it due to Islam or to oil?**

A European traveller who discovered the Arab Middle East and North Africa some 25 years ago would have been struck by how many young children one could see in families, whether in villages or in urban neighbourhoods. Were the same traveller to return today in the same places, he/she would certainly be struck by how few young children there are now in sharp contrast to the large cohorts of young adults. The children of the 1970s have grown up without being replaced by equivalent numbers of newborn.

The fertility of the new generation of women is only one half or one third of that of their mothers. This is a decisive break between generations. The average total fertility rate (TFR) for the Arab world was 3.4 children per woman in 2000. Still high compared to the world average (2.7), it is low compared to the six to eight children per woman, which were the norm for the previous generation. So fertility has dropped sharply. In two countries, Lebanon and Tunisia, fertility has already reached the replacement level (2.1 children per woman), and will probably soon pass below this level. With a level of fertility far below replacement, an Arab city like Tunis (TFR as low as 1.55) does not differ from many large cities in Europe. The same observation could be made about the age of women at first marriage, which is now ten years older than in the previous generation. In Libya for example, the proportion of unmarried women at the age of 30 reaches an unexpectedly high 50%. With regard to the demographic dimension of family building, the Mediterranean now unites rather than divides.

Why did such a drop of fertility happen? If one asks people themselves, they will put forward local factors such as the economic hardships that now make children too costly to raise, the IMF inspired policies which have aggravated economic circumstances, the climate of insecurity created by wars, civil strives or international embargos that make children's future too gloomy, etc. Beyond local and specific motivations, however, any comparative approach shows that universal factors are at play: urbanization, the shift to service economies and the spread of education. The relevant question thus becomes: why did the decline of fertility happen so late in the Middle East and North Africa, by comparison with other regions of the world at the same level of economic development, for example Latin America or South East Asia? Is the Arab demographic exceptionality the result of culture or of political economy? Of values or of material conditions?

Late-starting fertility decline in the Arab world—and in other parts of the Muslim world—is commonly attributed to the influence of Islam (Morgan & al. 2002) in supposedly holding back the two agents of demographic change—women's autonomy and the emergence of civil society organisations that promote community self-empowerment—by harnessing the former to the yoke of male authority and the latter to that of political authority. And yet, whether as a state or grassroots religion, Islam has not stood in the way of radical demographic changes. Cases in point are the Islamic Republic of Iran—a (non-Arab) country which, though run by the most fundamentalist of clergies, may well have experienced one of the most rapid fertility declines in history (Abbasi-Shavazi 2001) —or Algeria, where fertility collapsed in the 1990s at the very time when Islam fundamentalism was gaining the most strength among the population. Moreover, it has been convincingly shown that Islam as a religion is not against family planning (Omran 1992), but on the contrary has demonstrated an early openness to contraception with the first *fatwa* recognising the legality of family planning being issued in 1937, long before Christianity and Judaism accepted such an idea.

Islam, however, is not all that Arab countries have in common; they also have a heavy economic dependence on oil revenues: either directly in the case of major oil exporters (Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Gulf States in the east, Libya and Algeria in the west), or indirectly for the other countries, where oil wealth has a major impact through development assistance, private investment and migrant workers' remittances. The oil economy experienced a huge growth spurt in the ten to twelve years after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, one immediate consequence of which was to send oil prices soaring. The sudden change in the scale of oil revenues (crude oil rent) enabled Arab governments—whether in oil-producing or non-oil countries—to establish state welfare systems through development financing (health, education, etc.) and consumer subsidies.

While development activities conducive to fertility decline, consumer subsidies could work to the opposite effect by reducing the cost of children. This is what happened in a number of

Arab countries, especially the most oil-rich ones, whose governments, by keeping the population in check through oil wealth redistribution, were able to play the forces of conservatism and change off against one another. Social conservatism was reflected in particular by a continuing very low labour force participation rate among married women. So, by both cutting the costs of fertility and keeping women in the home, oil revenues promoted high fertility. To some extent, oil revenues “generated” population.

The onset of the oil crisis in the mid-1980s put an end to this. Collapsing oil prices slashed revenues and all countries, apart from the Gulf States, were quick to bring in economic reforms from which families lost out. Age at marriage rose, a trend fuelled by the practice acquired in the heady oil-rich days of amassing a substantial marriage dowry, which now took many years to scrape together. Married couples had smaller families, as they continued to nurture the aspirations held for their children during the good times, while life grew more expensive. This succession of economic cycles widened the generation gap between the children of the welfare state and those of structural adjustment (Fargues 2000).

## **Question 2 — Youth in the Middle East and North Africa: are they a burden or a gift?**

The pressure exerted by youth on labour markets is regarded as a key determinant of emigration. Over the years 2000-2010, Arab labour markets will witness the arrival at working ages of the largest ever generations in their history. This alarmist state of things is only one side of the picture, however. The other side is on the contrary a reassuring signal: owing to a drastic decline in birth rates which spread across the region from the 1980s, maxima have practically been reached and absolute numbers of new entrants are going to decrease as early as 2010. More than population dynamics, it is clearly employment dynamics, which have become a matter of concern. Unemployment is indeed reaching highs, in particular since IMF-inspired programmes of economic reform have been implemented throughout the MENA: it ranges from around 10% (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria) to a record 30% or above in Algeria and the Palestinian territories.

What could be the impact of population trends on the future of international migration? The average total fertility rate has already fallen below 3 children per woman in the Arab Mediterranean countries. The emergence of a widespread pattern of two-child families does not mean that zero population growth will follow shortly, since it was only in the 1980s or early 1990s, depending on the country, that annual numbers of births peaked. Their dramatic reduction since that time (down some 30 percent in the Maghreb and 20 percent in Egypt) will not be felt on labour markets before 2010. Until then, the competition for jobs will remain fierce, especially now that more and more young women are present in labour markets and the level of education and of aspirations is rapidly rising. Yet there is a radical difference between the situations of young people entering active life today and that of their elders. This difference is due to demography. The new generation bears an exceptionally light demographic burden, by comparison with past as well as with future generations. It will have only a few children, thanks to its own low fertility rate, but already has many brothers and sisters to share the burden of old persons, thanks to the high fertility rate of the previous generation. This is an unprecedented gift that will last for just one generation (Fargues & Pellicani 2000).

Such a situation could have two opposite impacts on migration. It could first open a « demographic window of opportunity ». Young people are entering active life knowing that the future benefits of their work are not mortgaged in advance to support the preceding generation, which is favourable to savings and investment. In addition, they can now expect that the latter will be economic rather than demographic investments, that they will help

improve the quality of life rather than meet, as until the recent past, the demand effect of population explosion. From this perspective demographic changes should soon reduce the desire to emigrate among the youth. If this theoretical asset is to be transformed into tangible benefits, these young people obviously need to have the possibility to save, that is to work and earn a sufficient income: thus a resumption of employment is a pre-condition. If they are not offered such a possibility, then demographic changes might well produce the opposite result and eventually increase the availability of young people for emigration. Indeed, one facet of the new contract of the generations entailed by a dramatic decline of the birth rates is that many of the family constraints of earlier times are lifted, which means greater personal freedom of movement. From this second perspective, demographic changes are liable to increase the potential migration.

An attempt to estimate the potential migration by the proportion of persons who declare their intention to emigrate has been made during the late 1990s in a comparative survey of push and pull factors in five countries, including Egypt and Morocco, (EUROSTAT 2000, Fadloulah & al. 2000, Makhoulf 2000). The result found in these two countries of emigration deserves a comment. The proportion of persons aged 18-67 years who declare that they have the intention to emigrate was found in Egypt to be 14% (24% for men, 5% for women) and in Morocco 20% (29% for men, 4% for women). Those who had already taken actual steps – such as application for or acquisition of a visa, a residence or a work permit – were in much lower proportion: 1% in Egypt and 3% in Morocco. Enlarged to national populations of the same age (44.5 and 19.9 millions for Egypt and Morocco respectively, in 2000), this would lead to enormous numbers of potential emigrants: 6.2 and 4.0 millions respectively, out of which 450,000 and 600,000 respectively would have taken actual steps to realise their intentions within the coming two years.

Such figures suggest that rising tides of would-be migrants are ready to leave for Europe. However, one can wonder if it is correct, taking into consideration the particular sampling frame of these surveys. In order to maintain the size of the sample within reasonable limits, the survey was conducted in a few selected areas of each country, Morocco and Egypt, namely those of high emigration rate. Given that emigration is a matter of social capital and networks – a fact which explains the geographical concentration of emigrants or « why there are so many international migrants out of so few places and so few international migrants out of most places » (Faist 2000) – it is most probable that non-migrants of the sampled areas are not representative of non-migrants living in non-sampled areas, because the former are exposed to a culture of emigration and migrant networks to which the latter are not exposed. Migration would thus be a realistic option for a much higher proportion in sampled than in non-sampled areas.

The foregoing observations on current demographic changes in the MENA suggest that employment policies must tap the availability of a large number of young people who are free of the family burden and constraints that were borne by their elders. A recent IMF study suggested that advantage should be taken of this exceptionally favourable age structure by encouraging housing construction (Dhonte, Bhattacharya and Yousef 2000). It would at the same time respond to a need fostered by the demographic explosion of earlier decades (insufficiency of the housing stock) and absorb in a highly labour-intensive sector part of the excess labour, while redistributing revenues with a knock-on effect on most other sectors. Some might argue that other less traditional sectors than construction would make better use of the human capital that has been upgraded by advances in education across the region.

### **Question 3 — Ageing in Europe: does it call for replacement migration?**

Three years ago (2000), the United Nations issued a report, which soon opened a debate in the population science community and beyond. Entitled *Replacement migration: is it a solution to declining and ageing populations?* it uses population projections to answer the question « what level of migration from less developed countries would be required to compensate for negative demographic trends in more developed countries ? » The report develops three scenarios, responding to the three objectives of maintaining over the period 2000-2050: I) the size of the total population, II) the size of the working age population (15-64), or III) the potential support ratio [15-64 / 65+]. In each scenario, immigrants establish themselves permanently in the host population, since replacement migration is conceived as a repopulation and not a guest worker policy.

The results are impressive: 47 million immigrants would be needed in the European Union (15 countries) between 2000 and 2050 in scenario I, 79 million in scenario II and 674 million in scenario III. This latter figure may be expressed as follows: 14 million per year would be the volume of net migration that Europe should consider from now on so as to neutralise the effects of its demographic ageing on the balance between the working-age and the retired-age population over the next 50 years! The approach of the United Nations invites several criticisms. Let us concentrate on one of them.

Demographic ageing is universal. On one side, the immigrants that would be called to maintain the active/inactive ratio are themselves subject to the same ageing process as the native populations: the greater their number, the greater the number of immigrants needed to compensate for the ageing of the preceding generation of immigrants. On the other side, demographic ageing also affects the countries of the south from which the replacement migration would come. At the level of the world population (where migration is by definition nil), keeping the active/inactive ratio at its current level would require the total fertility rate to climb back to 3.5 children per woman, which would mean a population growth rate of 1.5 per annum, indefinitely. Such an objective is of course not a sustainable one.

Ageing combines two distinct processes. The first one, an extraordinary lengthening of the average duration of life is a long-term trend and a universal phenomenon that migration cannot compensate for. Viewing replacement migration from the south as a means for funding pensions in the north is just making a blunder. In order to balance pension funds, the solution must be internal and consists in redesigning the contract of the generations or the economic life cycle within generations. The second process, more specific to Europe and of transitional nature, is a sharp but reversible drop of fertility rates far below the replacement level during the last decades. When the post-World War II baby-boom generations enter retirement within a very short period of time (between 2005 and 2015), a number of professions are going to be deserted, resulting in a sudden rise of the demand for labour in specific sectors where there is a shortage of European supply. New opportunities for international labour mobility will be opened.

Such a transition would call for policies to manage inter-generational transfers, as they would create an asymmetrical relationship between immigrants and native populations. The immigrants (many of whom are at the start of working and family life) have a younger age pyramid than the native populations (many of whom are retired), but the two sub-populations are linked by one and the same system of inter-generational solidarity. The result is an asymmetrical pattern of social transfers. The native working population contributes over-proportionally to the cost of educating the children of immigrants, while the immigrant working population contributes over-proportionally to the cost of retirement and health care of the native population. When inter-generational transfers result in inter-ethnic transfers, there is a risk of emergence of a stratified society in which the tensions stemming from the contact of the generations in an ageing population would fuel ethnic tensions (Hayes-Bautista

& al. 1988, Fargues 1989). The process of population reproduction, in which intermarriages blur ethnic origins after the second generation, could avert such tensions over the long term. In the short term, it is up to policy makers to do this.

#### **Question 4 — Do markets generate migration against states?**

« Fortress Europe » has become a common image (Geddes 2000). Though the interminable queues in front of European consulates in MENA countries may seem to justify it, the image is misleading. One cannot describe as a fortress a region of the world that has become the first receiver of international migration in the 1990s. With the economic crisis starting from the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the 1970s, European countries denounced the bilateral agreements regulating labour migration, and subjected the entry of aliens to drastic restrictions, many of which are still in place today. The termination of the legal admission of migrant workers had two consequences. The first was the permanent settlement of immigrants: because workers could no longer travel back and forth and family reunification remained the only reason for legal admission in Europe, the two-way mobility of men which had prevailed beforehand was replaced by a one way immigration of women and children. The second consequence was that workers migration continued, though it had to use other routes in order to circumvent the law: either clandestine entries, or regular entries followed by overstays, or applications for asylum.

At the same time, the economic takeoff in Mediterranean Europe and the entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal into the European Union transformed traditional countries of emigration into new countries of immigration. With the enforcement of the Schengen agreements, they became a preferred port of entry for gaining access to the rest of Europe. In addition, the remarkable growth occurring there in export-oriented agriculture, construction and tourism generated a considerable demand for seasonal, flexible and low skill labour that is avoided by nationals. Clandestine migration began to gain momentum: because migrants in irregular situations are not protected by labour laws and are susceptible to accepting lower wages and lesser guarantees than nationals and regular immigrants, they offered the most adequate response to this new demand. It is not the irregularity of immigration that engenders irregularity of employment, but the reverse that is true (Awad 2002, Reyneri 2001, Wrench 1998).

Two policy-related observations arise from the foregoing. First, restrictions placed on the movement of aliens have done less to curb entries than to hamper two-way travel. They have encouraged the emergence of irregular stays. A visa liberalisation policy could be an instrument for combating clandestine immigration (Wihtol de Wenden 2001). Secondly, markets have proved more powerful in engendering flows than states in regulating them (Peixoto 2002). Irregular immigration across the Mediterranean is partly a rational response to the employment situation in buoyant sectors of southern Europe's economies. This statement implies on the one hand that protecting irregular migrants, in particular their human rights, has become an issue at stake (Cholewinski 2000), and on the other hand that combating irregular migration across the Mediterranean presupposes combating irregular employment in Europe.

On the topic of irregular migration, it has become clear that the Mediterranean is not an area cut off from the rest of the world. A new population has appeared, that of migrants coming from more distant regions en route for Europe. Increasing numbers of migrants from Sub Sahara Africa are now transiting through Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia for indefinite duration while waiting to cross the Mediterranean (Barros & al. 2002). These new flows bypass control systems at entry in the Sahara as well as on leaving, either by sea, or by land at Ceuta or Melilla's checkpoints. Governments of the Maghreb are at the same time faced with two kinds

of problems: those of new countries of immigration, whose economy however, unlike that of southern Europe, is not prepared to give employment to this manpower coming from abroad, and those of countries of emigration in charge of controlling the exit, not only of their own citizens, but also of aliens. Thus the Eastern Mediterranean is crossed by flows of migrants and refugees coming from the Middle East and Central Asia. Lebanon, in particular, has emerged as a launching point for the traffic of Kurds smuggled to Europe on cargo ships from Syria and Iraq.

### **Question 5 — Will the Barcelona process deter or favour migration?**

The association agreements signed between the European Union and individual MENA countries in the framework of the Barcelona process – a process designed to establish through partnership an area of prosperity and security – include several articles on migration, intended to 1) reducing migratory pressures through job creation in areas of high emigration rate, 2) guaranteeing the protection of the rights of legal immigrants in Europe, and 3) combating irregular migration and trafficking. Security, the promotion of economic exchange, and the control of people's movement are interrelated issues.

So far it is the impact of migration on security which has been of particular concern, for migration is viewed as a potential conveyor of insecurity. However, the Barcelona process implicitly invites consideration of the relation between migration and security the other way round and asks whether partnership will bring about security to Mediterranean partners, hence reducing their citizens' propensity to emigrate. In particular, will the liberalisation of trade provide an alternative to migration? In order to generate such a result, free trade should lead to a rapid increase in the standard of living and the level of employment in countries of the south. Some scholars remain optimistic and regard the free circulation of goods and capital as the best recipe for reducing migratory pressures (Martin & Strabhaar 2002). Actual experience brings a more mitigated message. The establishment of free trade in North America (NAFTA) has not produced any tangible reduction in the movements of persons across the Rio Grande (Papademetriou 1998). On the other hand, if a convincing success story is to be found, it is that of Spain and Portugal, where migratory pressures have been overcome, not in the framework of free-trade agreements, but in the context of full accession to Europe, including the freedom of circulation and settlement for people.

Most scholars share the view that the establishment of free trade in the Mediterranean will not reduce migratory pressures in the short term, but lead to their increase. It is only in the long term that it might produce the sought-after result (Tapinos 2000, Assous 2000, El Ehwany 2002, Nassar & Ghoneim 2002). The free-trade coming into force should first entail a loss of MENA industries' competitiveness on MENA domestic markets and thus possibly a decrease of industrial employment, despite programmes financed by the European Union for upgrading companies of the south. The lift of customs and other barriers to international trade should leave comparative advantages at full play: at present, technology and the control of markets are playing in favour of European rather than MENA industries. Such a situation will most probably increase the potential for emigration from south to north of the Mediterranean. After this initial shock, an economic transition could start south of the Mediterranean in the wake of Euro-partnership and generate positive results on wages and employment, thus resulting in the decrease of migration pressures.

Could the development of foreign direct investments (FDI) in MENA economies bring about more rapidly the jobs that are lacking? The comparative advantage of the south by comparison with the north does indeed lie in its abundant and cheap labour. The relocation of certain activities, in particular labour-intensive ones, could take advantage of differences in

the level of development that are currently found across the Mediterranean. However, various reservations are expressed about the possibility of rendering FDI the instrument of a genuine policy aimed at reducing emigration. Firstly, the labour-importing sectors in Mediterranean Europe (export-oriented agriculture, tourism, services) are not themselves susceptible to be moved abroad. Secondly, if FDI were to produce the sought-after result from the migration policy viewpoint (raise the standard of living so as to reduce the propensity to emigrate), they would by the same token lose their underlying economic motivation (differences in wages), in other words they would be self-eliminating. Thirdly, if FDI were to offer a substitute to emigration, it would have to be something of considerable magnitude. In Morocco, for instance, the remittances from Moroccan emigrants represent up to 25% of the total revenues of external trade. Obtaining benefits of the same magnitude through FDI would presuppose a market of considerable size as well as a legal and political environment inspiring investors with full confidence.

Finally, the overall effect of migration on security should be revisited. Most of existing literature is on how migration is a factor of insecurity and tackles the way migration challenges public security as well as the risks to which immigrants are exposed because of their situation of aliens. By contrast, only little research, whether theoretical or empirical, has been dedicated to the opposite relation, that is to economic, social, civil and political security that migration is susceptible to bring back in societies of origin. The fact that emigration adds resources to social and economic development is still a debated issue. Empirical studies in Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have shown that remittances sent back home by emigrants were used for consumption rather than investment, and concluded that this kind of savings was increasing the dependence on imports instead of producing real development. However, these studies focus only on the most direct use of remittances, while many of the indirect effects of remittances benefit to households other than the one, which receives them. Their multiplying effect is still to be researched. Beyond economies, emigration can have a civil and political impact on countries of origin. Transnational networks of migrants have demonstrated their capacity to induce economic change in certain countries. Are they liable to contribute the same way to political development, for instance through associations, networks, or civil society institutions? Several MENA governments, which in the past were suspicious of their emigrants, are now willing to establish relations with them. Looking at the future on the overall impact of emigration, not only on the economies of sending countries but also on their societies and polities, opens a wide field for new research.

### **Question 6 — Emigration policies: are they compatible with integration?**

Migration policies are usually understood as policies directed towards immigration, while policies of emigration are in most cases dismissed (Abs 2001). This state of affairs merely reflects the fact that, because immigrants are present while emigrants are not, immigration policies are more explicit and visible than emigration policies. However, in countries experiencing significant flows of emigration, it is not rare that governments have taken a series of measures to put together a true emigration policy. In MENA, emigration policies can be summarised as « how to keep inside those who are outside ».

A first line along which MENA governments have designed an emigration policy is a concern for optimising the economic benefits drawn from emigration (Collinson 1996). Actual outcomes, however, greatly depend upon other political options of governments in the domain of economy or international relations. Contrasts between Morocco's experience and Algeria's provide an illustration.



Morocco has had the most constant policy with regard to emigration. As early as 1968, the quinquennial plan set as a target the largest possible number of emigrants in order to retain as few unemployed as possible on the local labour market so as to draw, thanks to remittances, a maximum of hard currency into the national economy, and to raise the skills of the national labour force in anticipation of its return. At the same time, King Hassan II affirmed his unwillingness to include the integration of Moroccans abroad and refused to recognise dual nationality. Moroccan politics were, and remain, perfectly coherent; emigration is like any other export activity and, if promoted, it is for the country's benefit. Numbers are revealing: having around 2 million emigrants, Morocco receives more than 2 billion dollars per year in remittances.

Algeria adopted another position. In 1973, the government suspended emigration to France reckoning that oil revenues would create more jobs than the emigration of unemployed people. The government became caught between two contradictory stances, one of internal and the other of external politics. On the one hand, it couldn't ignore that unemployment remained at an alarming level and thus viewed the emigrants staying in France from a positive side as means to avoid an increase of the pressure on the labour market, and consequently on the state. On the other hand, it denounced emigration as a form of post-colonial dependence. As a result migrants, actual or potential, didn't move. Those who had left never returned and those who would have been inclined to move never did so. This policy followed in the 1970s may explain why the tragic events of the 1990s did not lead to any mass emigration: the migratory chain had been discontinued for 20 years. Along with Algeria's monetary policy, this discontinuation explains the relative weakness of the economic ties that one million emigrants and their descendents have kept with Algeria.

The second line along which MENA governments have developed an emigration policy is a will to maintain ties between expatriates and their country of origin, with an objective of preserving their rights, and beyond rights, their identity in the foreign environment where they live. How can the link with expatriates be maintained beyond the geographical separation and which form of participation in national life can be reserved for them? How to manage the emergence of transnational communities from non-government organisations to multinational companies and how to come to terms with actors who slip out of national control? How to reconcile potentially competing national loyalties? Arab states found quite similar answers to these questions. They created institutions – agencies or ministries – having the capacity to deal with the multi-faceted bond between migrants and their native country (Brand 2002, Jaouani 2002): from the banking or legislative instruments intended to facilitate direct investment, to the cultural and religious instruments intended to safeguard or revive the Arab and Muslim identity among members of expatriate communities. Whether it is school holidays organised in Tunisia, Morocco or Lebanon for youngsters living in Europe, or Arabic language taught in Europe, a particular emphasis is put on youth, that is, on the future of the relations between countries of origin and their diasporas.

Are current policies sustainable ones? By designing policies aimed at drawing economic benefits from emigrants and at reviving among them a sense of belonging to their culture of origin, that is, sharing wealth but not identity with host societies, governments of the countries of origin have counted on the persistence of transnational links across generations. However, with the passing of time, bonds between descendants of immigrants and their ancestors' country change. Economic transfers lessen, unless they find new motives. Identities mix, along the process of integration which begins at school and continues in places of work and of daily life. MENA policies of emigration might sooner or later enter into contradiction, not only with economic realities, but also with policies of integration pursued by European governments that are increasingly reluctant to promote multiculturalism. Time is thus

relatively short for taking advantage of these bonds and reflecting on how international migration can be transformed into an instrument of development, so that emigrants become true actors in the economic, social and political change in their countries of origin.

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Table 1 : Citizens of Arab Mediterranean countries residing in Europe, by country of citizenship and country of residence in 2000

Country of residence	Year	Country of citizenship				
		Algeria	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco
Austria	2001					
Belgium	1999	8452	613	215	1098	125082
Denmark	2001	408	594	785	2538	3293
Finland	2001	216	200	113	84	537
France (1)	1999	685558	15974	933	33278	725782
Germany	2000	17186	13811	11190	54063	81450
Greece	1998	216	6599	1381	2465	444
Ireland	2000					
Italy (2)	2000	11435	33652	2936	3729	170905
Luxembourg	2001					
Netherlands		917	2771	229	338	119726
Portugal	2000	91	57	78	191	330
Spain	2001	13847	952	625	912	199782
Sweden	2001	500	592	509	3369	1234
U. Kingdom	2000	15000	9000		4000	8000

Table 1 (continuation)

Country of residence	Year	Palestine	Country of citizenship			Total World
			Syria	Tunisia	Total Arab Med Countries	
Austria	2001					761427
Belgium	1999		699	4243	140402	891980
Denmark	2001		588	470	8676	258629
Finland	2001		93	164	1407	91074
France (1)	1999	869	10826	260622	1733842	5618476
Germany	2000		24421	24260	226381	7343591
Greece	1998		2587	336	14028	165444
Ireland	2000					126500
Italy (2)	2000		2370	55213	280240	1270553
Luxembourg	2001					164700
Netherlands			543	1312	125836	651532
Portugal	2000	10	75	27	859	190896
Spain	2001		1046	643	217807	895720
Sweden	2001		6035	797	13036	477312
U. Kingdom	2000			1000	37000	2450000

Source : Council of Europe, except for France: INSEE.

(1) Including persons granted French citizenship

(2) The following numbers of regular immigrants (updated 2002) of selected nationalities can be found at <http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/news/dati6feb2003.htm>:

Egypt: 52719 ; Morocco : 257513 ; Tunisia 52719

Table 2 : Population aged 20-29 in Arab countries of the Barcelona Process, 2000 – 2025  
(thousands)

Population 20-29 (1st January)	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025
Algeria	5823	6616	7033	7181	6693	5923
Egypt	11530	14728	16014	15426	14892	14971
Jordan	955	1097	1153	1162	1104	1051
Lebanon	591	626	614	583	552	542
Morocco	5475	6078	6394	6227	5820	5601
Palestine	542	638	730	882	1016	1094
Syria	3062	3760	4120	3884	3727	3790
Tunisia	1848	2009	2037	1942	1778	1709
Total	29826	35553	38096	37286	35581	34680

  

Variation over the period	2000-05	2005-10	2010-15	2015-20	2020-25
Algeria	794	417	148	-488	-770
Egypt	3199	1286	-588	-534	79
Jordan	142	56	9	-58	-53
Lebanon	34	-11	-31	-31	-10
Morocco	603	317	-168	-407	-219
Palestine	96	91	152	134	78
Syria	698	360	-236	-157	63
Tunisia	161	28	-95	-164	-69
Total	5727	2544	-811	-1705	-901

Source : Courbage 1999

Tableau 3 : Demographic competition and burden for generation born in 1980, in Arab Mediterranean countries and in Europe

Country	Intra-generational	Demographic burden	
	<b>competition (1)</b>	<b>Old age (2)</b>	<b>Children (3)</b>
Algeria	5,59	0,300	2,13
Egypt	4,31	0,377	2,27
Jordan	6,07	0,282	2,12
Lebanon	3,51	0,507	2,10
Morocco	4,39	0,374	2,13
Palestine	6,63	0,258	4,17
Syria	6,49	0,259	2,17
Tunisia	4,35	0,389	2,07
EU	1,634	1,151	1,57

(1) TFR in 1980 x probability of survival at 25

(2) Number of surviving mothers and fathers / population aged 25 in 2005

(3) Projected TFR in 2010

Source: Fargues & Pellicani (2000).