Fernand Braudel Fellow
from 1 September 2019 to 30 November 2019
Postal address: Department of Law | Via Bolognese 156 | 50139 Florence | Italy
Villa Salviati - Office SACA 212
Pierre Thielbörger is Professor of German Public Law and Public International Law at the Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany, since 2014. He is also the Executive Director of the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV) in Bochum. He received his PhD in international law in 2010 at the EUI and finished the same year a master’s degree in public policy at the Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University in 2010 as McCloy scholar. In addition to his law studies in Berlin, Hamburg and Montréal, he also holds a degree in journalism & communication studies from the University of Hamburg.
Since 2017 he is the Co-Convener of the European Society of International Law’s Interest Group on International Human Rights. Since 2016, he is the Chairperson of the General Assembly of the Europe-wide Network on Humanitarian Action. Since 2014 he is also Adjunct Professor at the Hertie School of Governance where he teaches classes on international law and oversees the coaching of the Hertie School Jessup International Law Moot Court team.
His areas of research expertise include public international law, human rights law, law and governance of climate change, international criminal law as well as the law of peace and armed conflict. Recently, he has published on topics including business and human rights, international peace and security, socio-economic rights including the right to water, and current legal problems of the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court.
Research while at the EUI
The recent European ‘essence’-jurisprudence, following the CJEU’s ruling in Schrems in 2015, has received significant attention by many legal observers and will be used as a starting point for a comparative analysis of a notion of ‘essence’ of human and fundamental rights at different legal levels.
The research project focuses on three main aspects. First, it examines whether and to what extent different fields of international law (with a focus on different categories of human rights law, but also taking into account international humanitarian law and international criminal law) employ a similar or identical concept of ‘essence’ as the European courts; second, taking these findings together, it conceptualizes what an overarching understanding of an essence-concept of international (human rights) law could look like; and third, it identifies what, if anything, both legal orders, international and European law, can learn from each other’s experiences regarding the notion of ‘essence’.