Empirical Personnel Economics (7 Lectures)

Fabian Lange

November/December 2016
1 Overview

Personnel economics concerns itself with the implicit and explicit contractual relationships between employees and firms. The core problem in personnel relationships is that there is incomplete information that is often also asymmetrically distributed. Personnel economics asks how firm-workers acting in a market overcome these information problems.

2 Assignments / Grading

I will assign two papers to write referee reports about. They are due on Dec. 22nd 2016 and will - together with class participation - form the basis of the grade for this class.

3 Lectures 1-3: Static Incentives

Lecture 1 The Basic Model of Incentives and Moral Hazard


2. Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, Contract Theory (The MIT Press, 2004): Chapter 4

Lecture 2: The Empirical Literature on the Basic Model


Lecture 3: Multitasking / Gaming the System


4 Lecture 4-5: Perspectives on Careers and Promotions

Lecture 4: Job Hierarchies: Tournaments and Span of Control


5 Lecture 5-6 Information Revelation over a Career

Lecture 5: Career Concerns and Assignment


Lecture 6: Employer Learning


6 Lecture 7 Supervisors