

Course: When Pollsters Are Wrong and Lobbyists Win: Economic Sociology and Political Economy
David K. Levine – 2017-2018

1. Lobbies and Democracy

Costs of Rent Seeking; Good Corruption Versus Bad Corruption; Menu Auctions; Voting, Lobbying and Populism

2. Political Contests

The All-Pay Auction; The Tripartite Auction Theorem; Costs of Organization; Types of Equilibria in the All-Pay Auction; Why Lobbyists Win

3. Groups and the Provision of Public Goods Individual Effort; Peer Enforcement; Endogenous Social Norms; Rule Consequentialism and Altruism; Why not Split a Large Group? Who Will Guard the Guardians? A Repeated Model of Peer Auditing; Optimal Punishments; The Cost of Punishment; Learning Leadership Equilibrium in a Group

4. Lobbying and the Agenda

Unequal Prizes and the Tripartite Auction Theorem; Non-Rival Prizes; Fungible Prizes; Subsidies versus Civil Rights; Why Not a Cartel?

5. More Than Two Groups

The Menu Auction; The All-Pay Auction; Pivotality and Uncertainty

6. Uncertain Outcomes in Conflict

Interior Pure Strategy Equilibrium in the Tullock Model; Existence of Interior Pure Strategy Equilibria; Comparison of the Auction and the Contest; Power Sharing, Efficiency and Federalism; Sources of Uncertainty; Exogenous versus Endogenous Uncertainty; Upper Hemi-Continuity of the Equilibrium Correspondence; An Auction with Exogenous Uncertainty; Why Pollsters are Wrong - the Uncertainty Principle in the Social Sciences

7. Pivotality, the Anti-folk Theorem and the Paradox of Voting How Relevant is Pivotality in Large Elections? The Anti-Folk Theorem and Common Punishment; Incentive Constraints with Pivotality; The Holdup Problem and the Tragedy of the Anticommons

8. Strategic and Expressive Voting

Turnout; School Board Elections; Voter Suppression; Expressive Voting; Soccer Hooliganism; Bimodality in Turnout

9. Reputation and Social Norms