European University Institute

Microeconomics Block III Winter 2013

Andrea Mattozzi

• Classes: Thu, Fri 8.45-10.45 VSP1.

• TA: Sarah Auster

• TA Sessions: Thu 11.00

• **Office Hours**: Friday from 10:45 to 12:45.

• Required Texts:

- 1. Mas-Colell A., Whinston M.D., and Green J.R., 1995, *Microeconomic Theory*, Oxford;
- 2. Reny P. and Jehle G., *Advanced Microeconomic Theory*, 2nd edition, Addisen Wesley.

Lecture Notes will be distributed.

- Recommended extra text: Salanie B., *The Economics of Contracts*, MIT.
- **Course Objectives**: This course introduces you to market failures such as asymmetric information, externalities, public goods, and agency problems. Topics include: models of asymmetric information in markets, including screening, signaling, and lemons; markets with externalities or public goods; optimal contracts, principal-agent models with hidden actions, and principal-agent models with hidden information; mechanism design and the revelation principle.
- **Course Requirements**: There will be the usual final exam. Problem sets need to be turned in, but won't be graded.

Subjects and readings

- Material for first week:
 - 1. Inefficient market equilibria when there are unobservable private characteristics that are relevant for the competitive prices. MWG-13B.
 - 2. Adverse selection and markets with signaling; MWG-13C, JR-8.1.
 - 3. Competitive screening; in labor markets MWG-13D and in insurance markets JR-8.1.
- Material for second week:
 - 1. Moral hazard and the principal agent problem in insurance and labor markets MWG-14B, JR-8.2.

- 2. Monopolistic screening; MWG-14C.
- 3. Principal-agent model with hidden information and hidden action; MWG-14D.

Material for third week:

- 1. Left-overs from the theory of complete contracts.
- 2. Mechanism design and applications of revelation principle to monopoly price discrimination and first price auctions. Salanie Ch. 2,3

• Material for fourth week:

- 1. Social choice, implementation and mechanism design, taking public good provision and collective decision making as main topics.
- 2. Myerson and Satterthwhite. MWG-23.

• Last week:

- 1. Cheap Talk: the basic one sender model.
- 2. Extensions: extensive communication, delegation and contracts, multiple senders, multiple dimensions.