Juncker's curse? Identity, interest and public support for the integration of core state powers[*]

Björn Bremer, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne (https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4629-1814)

Philipp Genschel, European University Institute, Florence

Markus Jachtenfuchs, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin (https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6484-7727)

Abstract

We analyse the patterns and covariates of support for the European integration of core state powers based on a new original survey. We find considerable variation across integration instruments, member states, and policy issues: horizontal transfers are more supported than vertical capacity building; the EU's Southeast is more supportive than the EU's Northwest; and support increases from debt relief to unemployment assistance, refugee burden sharing, military defense to disaster aid. Identity is a strong and fairly consistent predictor for individual-level variation in support. The association with interest is less consistent, but can be quite strong with respect to specific policy issues such as debt and unemployment. Overall, support for the integration of core state powers is higher and more variable than expected. This suggests considerable room for political agency rather than a general constraining dissensus.

Keywords: capacity; core state powers; identity; interests; public opinion

I. A postfunctional predicament?

The recent crises of the European Union (EU) have fuelled a functional demand for the integration of core state powers (CSPs) (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2018). More and stricter rules of national conduct no longer seem enough to ensure the viability of the EU. What

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appears required is instead the sharing of key resources of sovereign government (money, coercion, administration):

- The Eurocrisis highlighted the need for a common fiscal backstop (e.g. common debt, common taxes, and a common budget) to quell self-fulfilling liquidity crises in the Eurozone.
- In the wake of the Eurocrisis, (youth) unemployment in some member states rose to levels not seen since the 1930s, triggering calls for a common EU unemployment insurance.
- The refugee crisis led to proposals for a joint refugee relocation scheme, the transformation of Frontex into an independent European border police and the creation of a common asylum administration.
- Putin, Trump, and the erosion of the post-WWII peace order have triggered calls for an integrated European army to increase military security and leverage European power (cf. Genschel and Hemerijck, 2018).

Despite the pronounced functional demand, political supply has remained meagre at best. Even during the brunt of the Eurocrisis, fiscal capacity building through the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program of the European Central Bank (ECB) was highly contested, and invariably late. During the refugee crises, a joint refugee relocation scheme was agreed but not consistently implemented. Plans for strengthening Frontex were mutilated by sovereignty concerns. Emmanuel Macron's call for a European army or Olaf Scholz' proposal for a common European unemployment scheme retain a dreamy pie in the sky quality.

Why is the integration of CSPs so difficult even in the face of imminent collective disaster? Perhaps Jean-Claude Juncker has the answer: 'We all know what to do but we just don't know how to get re-elected once we have done it' (quoted in Buti *et al.*, 2009, p. 65): in principle, member state governments can agree on effective European problem-solving including the integration of CSPs; in practice, they are hindered by their voters. In theoretical terms, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism hold that integration is supplied by political elites and economic interest groups if it promises collective gains in situations of asymmetric interdependence (Moravcsik, 2018; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 2012). Postfunctionalism warns, however, that '(m)ass politics trumps interest group politics when both come into play' (Hooghe and Marks, 2009, p. 18). As political entrepreneurs, especially challenger parties from the radical populist right (RPR), mobilize voters' parochial identities and interests, incumbent parties increasingly 'worry about the electoral consequences of their European policies' (Hooghe and Marks, 2009, p. 21). Their willingness to compromise on EU issues decreases as those become politicized (Hutter and Grande, 2014; Hutter *et al.*, 2016; Wilde *et al.*, 2016). The risk increases that integration fails even when efficient and useful.

Does Juncker's curse explain the 'undersupply' of CSP integration? To find out, we need to know what voters think. This information is hard to get from existing surveys such as the

Eurobarometer or the European Election Study because they lack specific questions on attitudes to the integration of CPSs. In this paper, we present new survey evidence that helps fill this gap. It is based on a 2018 YouGov poll that asks specifically whether respondents support or oppose ceding national fiscal, coercive, or administrative resources to other member states or to EU institutions. The YouGov survey thus offers a better measure of our dependent variable (voter attitudes to the integration of CSPs) than alternative sources.

In the next section, we develop our analytical framework for presenting and interrogating the data. We define CSPs and discuss interest-based and identity-based reasons why voters may oppose or support their integration. In section III, we present our survey and empirical approach. In sections IV and V, we present the evidence. We find that public support for the integration of CSPs is positive overall, though the level varies markedly across countries, individuals, issues, and instruments. We also find that identity is a stronger predictor than interest for individual-level variation but not for variation at the country level. Finally, we find that the share of 'don't knows' is often but not consistently high, suggesting considerable uncertainty and ambiguity about the desirability of the integration of CSPs among voters. In section VI, we conclude that there may be more room for political agency than Juncker's curse suggests.

II. Why should voters care?

Core state powers are the action *resources* deriving from the state's twin monopoly of legitimate coercion and taxation (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2016, 43, 2018, 181). They include coercive capacity (e.g. military, police, border patrols), fiscal capacity (money, taxes, debt), and the administrative capacity (people and organization) to implement and enforce public laws and policies. CSPs constitute the state: states without sufficient coercive, fiscal, and administrative resources are failed states at best (Besley and Persson, 2013); institutions possessing such resources are states *de facto*, if not always *de jure* (e.g. Taiwan).

After the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954, the EU tried to steer clear of CSPs, focusing on market integration instead. Yet, the completion of the Single Market, the introduction of the Euro, the abolition of border controls as well as Southern and Eastern enlargement have pushed the EU into CSPs, nevertheless. They created new interdependencies that could not be managed by market regulation alone. The issue was no longer the *will* of member state governments to cooperate and avoid negative externalities (which could be addressed by stricter rules and better enforcement) but rather their *ability* to do so (for this disctinction, see Chayes and Chayes, 1993). Eurozone countries going into deficit to bail out banks or to deal with massive unemployment, member states confronted with many refugees, or states feeling threatened by Russia do not need more rules but more resources – money, force, or bureaucrats. The cohesion and viability of the EU then depends on the sharing of financial, coercive, or administrative resources (Ferrera and Burelli, 2019; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2018; Schelkle, 2017). This can happen in two ways:

- *Horizontal transfers* by which one state sends money, credit guarantees, police agents, administrators, or troops to another state lacking them (obviously, the same can happen between groups of states). No EU resources are involved, but EU institutions regulate, coordinate, or facilitate the transfers. The first Greek rescue package is an example.
- *Vertical capacity building* creates genuinely European core state powers independent from the member states (a European Monetary Fund, a European border police, or a European army), thus unburdening member states unable to mobilize sufficient powers on their own. The OMT program of the European Central Bank is an example.

Why should mass publics oppose (or support) horizontal transfers or vertical capacity building? Intuitively, there are two main reasons: fear of material loss and fear of ideational loss. As the large literature on public opinion towards the EU suggests (de Vries, 2018; Hobolt and de Vries, 2016; Jupille and Leblang, 2007) people may resist integration because they believe that it implies more material costs than benefits to their member state (and hence presumably also to them individually). Alternatively, they may resist integration because they perceive it as a threat to their national identity and sense of belonging.

The integration of CSPs is likely to have high salience for both people's distributive interests and sense of identity (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2018; Winzen and Schimmelfennig, 2016) (de Vries, 2018; Hobolt and de Vries, 2016; Jupille and Leblang, 2007). Take interests first. Since fiscal, coercive, and administrative resources are very costly to mobilize and maintain, their integration immediately raises the issue who pays and who benefits, who gains and who loses. Given the size and heterogeneity of EU member states, it is unlikely that national net balances will always be completely even. Structural asymmetries may turn the horizontal or vertical sharing of CSPs into a permanent redistribution mechanism from fiscally sound to fiscally weak member states, from competitive economies to less competitive ones, or from states geographically protected from refugee inflows to those exposed to inflows, etc. Also, there is moral hazard involved in sharing or pooling CSPs: some member states may be tempted to free ride on resources provided by others. At the same time, however, the integration of CSPs may also be a source of material gain. People may believe, for instance, that their home state will mostly be at the receiving end of horizontal transfers or that vertical capacity building will unleash economies of scale with benefits for all member states. These arguments lead to the following expectation:

> *Interest-conjecture*: Individuals will oppose the integration of CSPs if, and to the extent that, they expect a net material loss for their member state; they will support integration if, and to the extent that, they expect a net material gain.

Turn to identity next. CSPs are intimately linked to people's sense of collective identity, i.e. to 'that part of "me" that belongs to a larger "we"' (Risse, 2010, p. 22): CSPs constitute the state that defines the political community; they provide that community with the essential means of self-government; they standardize experiences across the community by imposing the same money, the same taxes, the same rules and regulations on all citizens by the same

administration and enforcement regime. All this links the integration of CSPs tightly to fears (or hopes) of the demise of the nation state and the emergence of a European super-state. Individuals with a strong and exclusive sense of national identity will perceive this as a threat that they oppose. Individuals with more inclusive identities will be more sanguine about integration. In some cases, such as post-Franco Spain, people may even perceive European integration as a boon to national identity because it confirms the normalcy and modernity of their own nation (e.g. Diez Medrano, 2003). Also, despite the prevalence of national identity, many people feel European, some of them even exclusively so (Fligstein, 2008; Diez Medrano, 2003; Risse, 2010). To the extent that they do, they may support the integration of CSPs as a way to realize that identity. A strong collective identity facilitates solidarity and mitigates fears of material loss. Thus, a widespread sense of German identity allowed the German Federal government to transfer roughly six per cent of GDP annually to East Germany without major protest in West Germany during the 1990s (Scharpf, 1999, p. 9, FN 3). These arguments lead to the following expectation:

> *Identity-conjecture*: Individuals will oppose the integration of CSPs if, and to the extent that, they hold exclusively national identities; they support integration if, and to the extent that, their sense of national identity is complemented or even dominated by European identification.

Interest and identity are analytically distinct determinants of individual attitudes. This makes them useful guides for a systematic comparison of attitudes to the integration of CSPs. Empirically, however, they often interact in important ways: 'who we are influences what we want' and vice versa (Abdelal *et al.*, 2006, p. 698; see also Cram, 2012, p. 75; Kohli, 2000, p. 118; Kuhn and Nicoli, 2019). People with an exclusively national identity may perceive the material costs and benefits of integration very differently from people with inclusive European identities; cost-benefit perceptions, in turn, may shape whether people hold national or European identities. For instance, Hobolt and Tilley (2014) find that citizen's attribution of responsibility in the EU is influenced by group-serving biases. Moreover, there is evidence that in Britain, committed Leavers have a very different view of reality than committed Remainers (Curtice, 2017, p. 31; Hobolt, 2016, p. 1270). This needs to be taken into account when we assess the relative power of the interest and the identity conjecture below.

III. Data and approach

Comparative data on attitudes to the integration of core state powers is scarce. In the wake of the financial crisis, various studies have analysed attitudes to financial assistance. Some of these used very specific measures including support for the ESM in Germany (Bechtel *et al.*, 2014) or votes in bail-out referenda in Greece or Iceland (Walter *et al.*, 2018; Curtis *et al.*, 2014). Others relied on general indicators of financial solidarity (Stoeckel and Kuhn, 2018; Verhaegen, 2018) or support for joint economic governance (Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014). None of these studies allowed for comparison across issues (i.e. attitudes to the integration

of CSPs for other purposes than debt relief and financial assistance) or instruments (horizontal transfers between states v. vertical capacity building at the EU level). Existing surveys (e.g. Eurobarometer or the European Election Study) simply lack the relevant questions (see also Kleider and Stoeckel, 2019, p. 11).

A new online survey by YouGov helps to fill this gap. The survey was fielded in April 2018. It covers eleven EU member states from Western Europe (Germany, France, the UK), the Nordic region (Denmark, Finland, Sweden), Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain) and Eastern Europe (Lithuania, Poland). It is broadly representative of the (voting-age) population on basic socio-demographic variables (age, education, and gender), and the total sample size was 11,284 respondents. Table 1 summarizes the relevant questions that we use in this paper (for summary statistics, see Table A-1, Appendix A).

--- Table 1 about here ---

The first four questions in Table 1 serve as measures of our dependent variable, attitudes to the integration of CSPs. Importantly, the questions cover support or opposition for different instruments of CSP integration (horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building), not just integration in general. They also ask for different issues that might be addressed through these instruments (horizontal transfers for debt relief, unemployment insurance, refugee reception, military assistance, or natural disaster relief; vertical capacity building to create a joint EU army or increase the EU budget).

The last three questions in Table 1 proxy our independent variables, identity and interest. The 'net contributor' question is a rough measure of respondents' expectation of net gains or losses associated with integration for their member state. In line with the interest-conjecture, we expect respondents perceiving their own member state as a net contributor to be less supportive of the integration of CSPs than respondents perceiving their home state as a net recipient. The 'Radical Populist Right (RPR) voter' question measures national identity at the individual level (see Table A-2, Appendix C for information about our coding of RPR parties). In line with the identity-conjecture, we expect RPR voters to be less supportive of the integration of CSPs because they have a stronger and more exclusive sense of national identity. To be sure, the RPR vote is not an ideal measure of identity because voters have various reasons beyond identity to vote for RPR parties (Rooduijn, 2018). Yet, there is widespread agreement that the mobilization of nationalist feelings is key to the electoral success of RPR parties (Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Meijers, 2017; de Vries and Edwards, 2009). At the country level, we rely on the Moreno question to assess the exclusiveness or inclusiveness of respondents' identity. In contrast to the other questions, the Moreno question is not included in the YouGov survey. We draw it from the Standard Eurobarometer 89 (Spring 2018).

Our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. In section IV, we map the dependent variable. We compare support and opposition for the integration of CSPs across *issues* (debt relief, unemployment insurance, refugee assistance, natural disaster, or military attack),

instruments (horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building), and *countries*. In section V, we explore how well the interest and the identity conjectures account for the observed variance in support. We investigate whether country differences in support are associated with country differences in our measures of material interest and collective identity. Then, we explore individual-level differences across issues and instruments: do voters with an exclusive national identity differ in their attitudes to the integration of CSPs from other voters? How does the perceived net position of the own member state vis-à-vis the rest of the EU affect individual attitudes?

IV. Patterns of support: variation across issues, instruments, and countries

Variance across issues and instruments

Two survey items measure support for *horizontal transfers* of CSPs: Would respondents support or oppose financial transfers to member states suffering from unsustainable debt, high unemployment, large inflows of refugees, or natural disaster? Would they support military assistance to member states under foreign attack? Two other items gauge support for *vertical capacity building*: Are respondents in favour of an integrated European army? Do they think the EU should raise and spend more money and the member states less? Figure 1 reports the main results (cf. Genschel and Hemerijck, 2018).

--- Figure 1 about here ---

Consider horizontal transfers first (see the left panel of Figure 1). The level of support varies strongly by issue. While nearly 80 per cent of respondents, on average, support assistance to member states in case of natural disaster, less than 40 per cent are in favour of helping over-indebted member states. Support is generally higher than opposition (if only by a slight margin for debt relief). It is inversely related to both opposition and uncertainty ('don't know'): high support goes together with low opposition *and* with low uncertainty about the desirability of horizontal transfers. While the case for disaster relief seems clear-cut, the case for debt-relief is apparently more ambiguous.

Turn to vertical capacity building next (right panel of Figure 1). Support is generally lower than for horizontal transfers. While a majority of respondents supports the creation of an integrated European army, only a minority favours fiscal capacity building: the share of respondents wanting to expand EU fiscal capacity (support) is smaller than the share of people wanting to either shrink it (oppose) or to keep it at current levels (neither).[1] Uncertainty ('don't know') about the desirability of fiscal capacity is much higher than uncertainty about the desirability of EU military capacity.

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[1] As Table 1 shows, the YouGov survey presents financial capacity building as a tradeoff between EU capacity and member state capacity. By contrast, the question on military capacity building implies no such tradeoff. Respondents are simply asked for their opposition or support for a European army without any national level quid-pro-quo involved. This difference may reduce the comparability of results and bias the findings.

Overall, public support for the integration of CSPs is higher than one would perhaps have expected after the acrimonious conflicts over burden-sharing during the Eurozone and refugee crises. Yet, the level of support varies strongly by instrument and issue area. Ironically, support is highest for issues that either have low problem salience (natural disasters) or are beyond the EU's current remit (military security is still largely in the hands of NATO). Support tends to be low, by contrast, for issues of immediate and pressing importance to the EU: debt and unemployment. Only in the case of refugee assistance, we find fairly robust support for an issue of high policy relevance. However, the European averages reported in Figure 1 may mask fundamental cross-national differences in attitudes.

Country variance

Figure 2 maps respondents' average net support (i.e. support minus opposition) for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building by country. It shows low cross-country variation in issue *rankings*. Respondents across all member states have fairly similar intuitions regarding the relative desirability of horizontal transfers (left panel). Disaster relief ranks highest everywhere; debt relief ranks lowest almost everywhere; and the ranking of the other issues follows roughly the order suggested by Figure 1. Cross-national variation is even lower for vertical capacity building (right panel). Average net support for an integrated European army ranks higher in all member states than net support for an expansion of EU fiscal capacity.

--- Figure 2 about here ---

Despite similarities in ranking, there are considerable differences in support *levels*. Starting with horizontal transfers (left panel), we find little variation in support for disaster relief. Net average support is high and positive in all countries. Cross-national variation is more pronounced on refugee inflows and military attack. Still net support for transfers on these issues is positive in all countries. Finally, cross-national variation is very high for unemployment and debt relief. While there is positive net support for these transfers in a Southeastern country group (Greece, Spain, Italy, Lithuania and Poland), net support is negative in a Northwestern group (Germany, Denmark, Great Britain, Finland, France, Sweden). The differences are stark: while support for debt relief is almost at the level of disaster relief in Greece, there is a huge gap between both issues in Sweden.

Compared to horizontal transfers on debt and unemployment, the cross-national variation in support for European fiscal and military capacity building (right panel) is surprisingly muted. To be sure, there is net support for both types of capacity building in Greece and there is net opposition to both in Denmark. Yet, the gap between these two extreme countries is lower, and the level of cross-country agreement is higher than in the transfer case. Net support for the European army is generally positive (except in Britain and Denmark). Net support for expanding EU fiscal capacity is generally negative (except in Greece, Germany and Spain). The Northwest-Southeast divide is less clear cut because support in Germany and France is closer to Southeastern than to Northwestern levels.

In conclusion, we find little cross-country variance in the *rank* order of support for different types of horizontal transfers or vertical capacity building. Yet we find considerable cross-national variation in the *level* of support, especially for horizontal transfers for debt relief and unemployment and, to a lesser extent, for vertical capacity building for military and financial purposes. Support tends to be higher in Southeastern than in Northwestern EU member states.

V. Correlates of support: interest and identity

How well do our two conjectures on interest and identity account for variance in attitudes to the integration of CSPs? We investigate this question first at the country and then at the individual level.

Interest and identity at the country level

Are country differences in net support associated with country differences in interest or identity? As a first cut, we plot support for horizontal transfers (Figure 3) and vertical capacity building (Figure 4) against our measures of interest and identity. Our interest indicator is the national average of respondents' replies to the 'net contributor' question in the YouGov Survey (Table 1); our identity indicator is the national average on the Moreno question (see also Table 1).

Figure 3 plots support for horizontal transfers for two issues: debt relief and refugee assistance (see Figure A-1, Appendix B for similar plots for unemployment relief, military assistance, and disaster relief). It shows a strong association between distributive interest and support for transfers in the case of debt relief (upper left plot in Figure 3): people favour horizontal transfers when they think other member states will pay for them (i.e. own country perceived as net recipient); they favour transfers much less when they think their own member state will have to pay (i.e. own country perceived as net contributor). In short, attitudes are strongly related to distributive interests as the saga of the creditor-debtor cleavage during the Eurozone crisis would suggest. The same applies to unemployment relief (see Figure A-1, Appendix B).

Yet, for refugee assistance (lower left panel in Figure 3) we find essentially no relationship. The same applies to horizontal military assistance and disaster relief (see Figure A-1, Appendix B). Distributive interests apparently do not matter for these issues. Alternative measures of interest (such as the number of asylum applications per capita in the case of refugee assistance or the distance from Moscow in the case of military assistance, see Figure A-2, Appendix B) do not change the picture: the association between interests and support for horizontal transfers remains weak and insignificant. What about identity?

--- Figure 3 about here ---

Figure 3 (panels on the right) shows essentially no association between support for horizontal transfers and European identity. Support is high in countries where European

identity is generally weak (e.g. Greece) but also in countries where European identity is strong (e.g. Spain). The same pattern holds in unemployment relief, military assistance, and disaster relief (see Figure A-1, Appendix B). In the appendix, we also use an alternative measure stressing the emotional (rather than cognitive) dimension of collective identity (Cram, 2012; see also the introduction to this Special Issue). It yields an even more surprising pattern: countries in which people feel happier about living in the EU tend to be *less* supportive of horizontal transfers (see Figure A-3, Appendix B).

Figure 4 plots support for vertical capacity building against our indicators of interest and identity. The pattern is broadly similar to Figure 3. Support for military capacity is associated with distributive interest (see Figure A-2, Appendix B for an alternative measure of interest). It decreases as the share of people viewing their own country as a net contributor increases. Yet, surprisingly, support for financial capacity is essentially unrelated to interest. Support also does not vary with identity. A higher share of people with European identification does not significantly increase support for a EU army or EU fiscal capacity no matter whether we use the Moreno question (Figure 4 right panels) or the happiness measure of identity (see Figure A-4, Appendix B).

--- Figure 4 about here ---

In conclusion, we find mixed support for the interest-conjecture. In some instances (i.e. horizontal debt relief as well as horizontal unemployment assistance and vertical military capacity building), attitudes to European CSPs are indeed correlated to distributive interests as this conjecture suggests. Yet, we find no such correlation for horizontal refugee assistance, military assistance, disaster relief, and vertical fiscal capacity building. We find no support for the identity-conjecture. Country-level differences in European identification are essentially unrelated to country-level differences in attitudes to the integration of CSPs. To be sure, this non-finding could simply reflect our small sample size of only 11 states. Hence, we reproduce our analysis with 28 member states for the one Eurobarometer item that explicitly considers the integration of CSPs: support for a European army. The results are shown in the appendix (Figure A-7, Appendix F) and they look similar to Figure 4: European identification and support for a European army are essentially unrelated.

Interest and identity at the individual level

Obviously, a non-finding at the country level does not imply that identity does not matter at the individual level. We perform a simple logit regression to avoid the ecological fallacy. The dependent variable is individual support for horizontal transfers or vertical capacity building (questions 1-4 in Table 1). The key independent variables are constructed from the 'net contributor' and the 'RPR vote' items respectively (Table 1). The former provides our indicator of interest. It is a categorical variable with three values: 'net contributor', 'net recipient', or 'balance' depending on how the respondent perceives her home country's net balance with the rest of the EU. The latter is our identity measure. It is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent has voted for an RPR party (indicating exclusive

national identity) and 0 otherwise. Finally, we enter three common socio-demographic control variables from the YouGov survey: age, educational attainment, and gender.

--- Table 2 about here ---

As Table 2 shows, RPR voters are significantly less likely than other voters to support the integration of CSPs. The regression coefficient for RPR voters is large and statistically significant for all issues and instruments and particularly large for refugee assistance. Obviously, identity matters at the individual level. Distributive interests also matter but less consistently: the perceived net position of the own state is a much weaker predictor for individual-level variation. Respondents who think of their country as either a 'net recipient' of EU funds or as having a balanced net position vis-à-vis the EU tend to offer more support for horizontal transfers than voters who think of their country as a 'net contributor' (the reference group). Notable exceptions are natural disasters and, to a lesser extent, military attack, and financial capacity building. Interestingly, both identity and interest are less strongly and consistently associated with attitudes to vertical capacity building than attitudes to horizontal transfers.

Table 2 only looks at main effects. Yet, identity and interest may interact in important ways (see section II). First, exclusive nationalists may have a higher propensity to view their own country as a victim of EU exploitation. Indeed, our data suggests that RPR voters are somewhat more likely to perceive their country as a net contributor to the EU than other voters (Appendix G). Second, exclusive nationalists may feel more strongly about the political implications of their country's net position. Conceivably, RPR voters oppose integration particularly strongly if they fear that their own country will have to pay for it and support integration strongly if they believe it will benefit their own nation. Finally, people who conceive their home state as a net contributor may more easily adopt an exclusive national identity to justify their interest-based opposition. To test these intuitions, we add interaction effects to the regression models (Table A-3, Appendix D). Since interaction effects are difficult to interpret by coefficients alone, we plot them for selected scenarios (Figure 5; see Figure A-5, Appendix D for plots of the other scenarios).

--- Figure 5 about here ---

Three observations stand out. First, RPR voters tend to support horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building less than other voters. Second, the size of the gap varies by issue and instrument: it is much larger for the refugee issue than for the debt issue, and larger for horizontal transfers than for vertical capacity building. Third, there is a weak interaction effect. While the 'support gap' between RPR and other voters is often significant if the own country is perceived as 'net contributor' or as having a balanced position, the gap is insignificant if the own country is perceived as a net recipient (except for the refugee issue). This suggests that RPR voters hold slightly more opportunistic attitudes to the integration of CSPs than other voters.

On the individual level, we thus find clear support for the identity-conjecture. The effect of an exclusive national identity (proxied through the RPR vote) on support for the integration of CSPs is consistently negative, but the size of the effect varies across issues and instruments. It also varies in the perceived net position of the own country: if the home country is perceived as a net recipient of EU funds (i.e. integration brings material benefit), the attitudes of RPR voters converge towards those of other voters (except for the refugee issue). In general, however, support for the interest-conjecture is mixed. Distributive interests are a less powerful predictor of individual attitudes than identity. Only support for horizontal debt relief and unemployment assistance is strongly related to the perceived distributive position of the home country. Finally, our indicators of identity and interest are less consistently associated with support for vertical capacity building than to support for horizontal transfers.[2]

VI. Juncker relax!

Juncker's curse has become a folk theorem of practitioners and scholars alike. In principle, it claims, governments are willing and able to strike efficient and effective bargains on European integration, including the integration of core state powers. In practise, they are hindered by voters.

Postfunctionalism has turned Juncker's curse into a theory of EU integration (see the landmark article by Hooghe and Marks, 2009). It starts from a critique of the functional optimism of neo-functionalist and liberal intergovernmentalist scholars who believe in the ability of EU elites to strike efficient bargains under conditions of asymmetric interdependence and largely unencumbered by mass politics. Its main contribution is to theorize the potentially inhibiting role of mass publics, party politics, and collective identity on EU policies and institutions. It insists that voters are not just a nuisance factor for EU elites but may shape integration outcomes in major, if not necessarily salutary, ways (see also Hooghe and Marks, 2018).

In this paper, we assessed the extent of the constraining dissensus regarding the integration of CSPs. Although the EU's recent string of major crises was closely related to CSPs, there is scarce information on what voters think about their integration. We presented new survey evidence to help closing this gap. Our analysis reveals a complex picture of public attitudes.

- First, there is no *general* constraining dissensus with respect to CSPs. Overall, support outweighs opposition. Public opposition is limited to some issues, some countries and some voters. It is driven by both interest and identity. An exclusive national identity is generally associated with lower support for integration of CSPs. Interest kicks in selectively, when distributive implications are stark and obvious (debt and unemployment relief). The strongest resistance comes from those who fear having to

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[2] Appendix E includes several robustness tests which support the findings reported here.

    pay the bill (respondents in Northwestern countries regarding financial transfers for debt and unemployment relief) and those who dislike refugees (RPR voters).

- Second, there is explicit support for CSP integration on some issues and instruments: even RPR voters are more likely to support than oppose horizontal military solidarity and the creation of a European army, and even in Germany, there is net support for more fiscal capacity.

- Finally, opposition to the integration of CSPs is tempered by high cognitive uncertainty: low support is generally associated with high uncertainty in our data, i.e. high shares of respondents who 'don't know' whether they support or oppose integration. This is important because where voters are uncertain, political leaders can cue them – not only those from the radical populist right but also from the rest of the political spectrum.

Evidently, there are limits to our analysis. Some are due to data restrictions. Perhaps most importantly, our measures of identity and interest are very basic and could be improved. Also, the limited number of countries in the YouGov survey prevent us from analysing the interaction between individual-level indicators of subjective interest and identity and country-level indicators of objective structure and opportunity systematically in a multilevel framework (see Kleider and Stoeckel, 2019 for such an analysis). Other limitations are due to findings for which we have no good explanation. Perhaps most surprising to us was how little work the distinction between horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building seems to do for the empirical analysis. To be sure, the general level of support for the former is higher than for the latter. Yet, the variance in support is also higher for horizontal transfers. This is puzzling given that the creation of vertical capacities is likely to be more durable and intrusive and more closely associated with state-making than horizontal transfers.

In conclusion, governments should listen carefully to what voters want. But they should also be careful not to misread public opinion (Bremer, 2019). There is no reason to do something which voters did not ask for, or not to do something voters would not object to. If voters are uncertain what to think, there is nothing wrong with telling them. Hence, our analysis provides some guarded hope for Jean-Claude Juncker and Ursula von der Leyen. If EU elites do indeed know what to do, they should go ahead and do it. The electoral risks from intense nationalist minorities are obvious. Yet, stalling is also risky. Large majorities want to keep the EU. If this requires more integration of CSPs, they may actually support political elites who give them the choice to opt for it (Ferrera and Burelli, 2019, p. 106).

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Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Public attitudes towards the integration of core state powers by instrument and issue

a) Horizontal transfers

b) Vertical capacity building

Note: The figure shows the average support across countries.

Figure 2: Average net support for the integration of core state powers by country

Note: The figure shows the 'average net support' by country. Net support refers to the average of supporters (coded as 1) and opponents (coded as -1) in a given country. Countries are sorted by the average net support across all issues for horizontal transfers (left) and vertical capacity building (right), respectively.

Figure 3: Average net support for horizontal transfers by interest and identity

Note: The figure shows the country-level relationship between 'average net support' for horizontal transfers by interest (left) and identity (right), respectively. Each graph includes a linear regression line and the associated 95 percent confidence interval.

Figure 4: Average net support for vertical capacity building by interest and identity

Note: The figure replicates Figure 3 for vertical capacity building. Each graph again includes a linear regression line and the associated 95 percent confidence interval.

Figure 5: Predicted probability for supporting the integration of core state powers by identity and interest

Note: The graph shows the predicted probabilities for supporting horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building as well as the corresponding 83 percent confidence intervals. Overlapping confidence intervals indicate that differences between two observations are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, while the absence of an overlap indicates the opposite. The plots for unemployment, military attack and natural disasters are shown in Appendix D.

Table 1: Operationalization of independent and dependent variables from the YouGov survey

Variable	Survey question	Operationalization and scales	Source
Horizontal transfers (debt, unemployment, refugees, natural disaster)	Thinking about different sorts of problems and crises that could hit other members of the European Union, do you think EU countries should be willing to offer financial aid to another member state in the following circumstances?	Support = Other member states should give them financial help; Oppose = Other member states should not give them financial help; Don't know	*YouGov* (individual-level)
Horizontal transfers (military attack)	If another European Union country came under military attack by a country outside the European Union, would you support or oppose your country coming to its military defence?	Support = Strongly support, tend to support; Oppose = Strongly oppose, tend to oppose; Don't know	*YouGov* (individual-level)
Financial capacity building	Thinking about the money that is spent by the European Union and the money that is spent by member states, which of the following best reflects your view?	Support = Available answers: more money should be raised and spent by the European Union, and less by the member states; Oppose = more money should be raised and spent by the member states, and less by the European Union (oppose); Neither = the current balance is about right (neither); Don't know	*YouGov* (individual-level)
Military capacity building	Would you support or oppose the creation of an integrated European army?	Support = Strongly support, tend to support; Oppose = strongly oppose, tend to oppose; Don't know	*YouGov* (individual-level)
Radical populist right voter	Which party did you vote for in the previous general election?	1 = Radical populist right; 0 = all other parties	*YouGov* (individual-level)
Net financial position	Imagine there was an EU fund to help member states facing a crisis of some sort. Over the long term, do you think [COUNTRY] would be a…	Contributor = a country that puts more into such a fund than it gets out of it; Recipient = a country that gets more out of such a fund than it puts into it; Balance = A country that gets about the same out of such a fund as it puts into it	*YouGov* (individual-level)
Identity (Moreno question)	Do you see yourself as…? - (NATIONALITY) only - (NATIONALITY) and European - European and (NATIONALITY) - European only	Exclusive national identity = (NATIONALITY only) European identity = all others	*Eurobarometer* (country-level)

Table 2: Support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in all countries (Logit regression)

	Horizontal transfers					Vertical capacity building	
	Debt	Unempl.	Refugees	Nat. dis.	Attack	Financial	Military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other parties)	-0.50***	-0.36***	-0.85***	-0.39***	-0.43***	0.20*	-0.38***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Interest: net financial position (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	0.23***	0.22***	-0.08	-0.89***	0.13	0.02	0.16*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
= Balance	0.44***	0.48***	0.22***	-0.22**	-0.01	-0.19**	0.17**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Age	-0.003*	-0.002	0.01***	0.02***	0.01***	-0.01***	0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Education (ref: low)							
= Medium	0.06	0.20***	0.40***	0.65***	0.26***	-0.11	0.18**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
= High	0.17*	0.44***	0.77***	0.97***	0.52***	0.02	0.26***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.20***	-0.14**	-0.04	0.08	-0.68***	-0.36***	-0.46***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.82***	-0.89***	-0.64***	0.16	0.21*	-0.95***	-0.87***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214

Note: $^*p<0.05$, $^{**}p<0.01$, $^{***}p<0.001$

Online appendix

A. Summary statistics

B. Additional bivariate plots (net support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building by interest and identity)

C. List of radical right parties by countries and descriptive results

D. Additional regression tables and predicted probability plots not shown in the main text

E. Robustness tests:

   o Regression results without survey weights

   o Regression results with additional control variables for Western Europe

   o Regression results with *opposition* to horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building as the dependent variable

F. Additional analyses with data from the Eurobarometer

G. Additional analysis of relationship between (perceived) interest and identity in our data

Appendix A: Summary statistics of individual-level variables

Table A-1: Summary statistics of key independent and dependent variables from the YouGov survey

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Horizontal transfers (debt)	11,284	1.9	0.8	1	3
Horizontal transfers (unemployment)	11,284	1.8	0.8	1	3
Horizontal transfers (refugees)	11,284	1.7	0.8	1	3
Horizontal transfers (natural disasters)	11,284	1.3	0.7	1	3
Horizontal transfers (military attack)	11,284	2.6	1.4	1	5
Financial capacity building	11,284	2.7	1.1	1	4
Military capacity building	11,284	2.9	1.4	1	5
Radical populist right voter	11,284	0.1	0.3	0	1
EU fund	11,284	2.1	1.2	1	4
Age	11,284	46.8	15.7	18	91
Education	11,278	2.2	0.7	1	3
Gender	11,284	1.5	0.5	1	2

Appendix B: Additional bivariate plots (average net support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building by interest and identity)

Figure A-1: Average net support for horizontal transfers by interest and identity (other scenarios)

Note: *The figure replicates Figure 3 from the main text for the other scenario not shown. Each graph includes a linear regression line and the associated 95 percent confidence interval.*

Figure A-2: Average net support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building with alternative variables for interest

Note: The figure replicates earlier graphs with an alternative measure for interest. Each graph includes a linear regression line and the associated 95 percent confidence interval.

Figure A-3: Average net support for horizontal transfers by happiness about living in the EU

Note: The figure shows the country-level relationship between support for horizontal transfers and an alternative measure for identity. Each graph includes a linear regression line and the associated 95 percent confidence interval.

Figure A-4: Average net support for vertical capacity building by happiness about living in the EU

Note: The figure shows the country-level relationship between support for vertical capacity building and an alternative measure for identity. Each graph includes a linear regression line and the associated 95 percent confidence interval.

Appendix C: List of radical right parties by countries and descriptive results

We classify radical right-wing parties based on the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow, 2018). However, we divert from the database in two cases by also classifying the Finns Party (formerly known as True Finns) in Finland and the Order and Justice Party (PTT) in Lithuania as parties of the radical populist right. We made this choice based on the literature (e.g. Mudde, 2007; Kriesi, 2015; Akkerman *et al.*, 2016) and membership in political groups of the European parliament that are mostly made up of other radical populist right parties (see Nicoli, 2017 for such an approach).

Table A-2: List of parties coded as radical populist right (RPR)

Country	Radical populist right party
Britain	UK Independence Party (UKIP)
France	Le Pen (Front National / Rassemblement National)
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD)
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DPP)
Finland	Finns Party, The Blue and White Front
Sweden	Sweden Democrats
Greece	Golden Dawn (XA)
Italy	Lega
Spain	n/a
Lithuania	Order and Justice (PTT)
Poland	Law and Justice (PiS)

Appendix D: Additional regression tables and predicted probability plots not shown in the main text

Table A-3: Support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in all countries with interaction effects (Logit regression)

	Horizontal transfer / Vertical capacity building						
	Debt (1)	Unempl. (2)	Refugees (3)	Nat. dis. (4)	Attack (5)	Financial (6)	Military (7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other parties)	-0.64***	-0.24*	-0.76***	-0.41**	-0.43***	0.31*	-0.36**
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Interest : net financial position (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	0.19**	0.23***	-0.07	-0.90***	0.12	0.04	0.16*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
= Balance	0.43***	0.51***	0.25***	-0.21*	-0.001	-0.15*	0.18**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Age	-0.003*	-0.002	0.01***	0.02***	0.01***	-0.01***	0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Education							
= Medium	0.06	0.20***	0.41***	0.64***	0.26***	-0.11	0.18**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
= High	0.16*	0.44***	0.77***	0.97***	0.52***	0.02	0.26***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.20***	-0.14**	-0.04	0.08	-0.68***	-0.36***	-0.46***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Interaction (ref: contributor)							
= RPR Voter*Recipient	0.41*	-0.04	-0.13	0.10	0.11	-0.13	-0.03
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)
= RPR Voter*Balance	0.09	-0.45*	-0.26	-0.05	-0.14	-0.40	-0.09
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.20)
Constant	-0.81***	-0.91***	-0.65***	0.16	0.21*	-0.96***	-0.87***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Figure A-5: Predicted probability for supporting the integration of core state powers by identity and interest (other scenarios)

Note: The graph shows the predicted probabilities for supporting horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building as well as the corresponding 83 percent confidence intervals. Overlapping confidence intervals indicate that differences between two observations are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, while the absence of an overlap indicates the opposite. The plots for debt, refugees, financial capacity, and military capacity are shown in Figure 5 in the main text.

Appendix E: Robustness tests

To test the robustness of our regression analysis, we compute several alternative regression models: first, we run the same regressions from the main analysis without the survey weights provided by YouGov (Table A-4 and Table A-5); second, we use additional control variables, including marital status, children, and urban vs. rural, which we only have for six Western European countries, i.e. Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK (Table A-6 and A-7); and third, we use *opposition* to the integration of core state powers as the dependent variable instead of *support* (Table A-8 and A-9 and Figure A-6). The robustness tests generally support the findings reported in the main text.

Table A-4: Support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in all countries (Logit regression, without survey weights)

	Horizontal transfer / Vertical capacity building						
	Debt (1)	Unempl. (2)	Refugees (3)	Nat. dis. (4)	Attack (5)	Financial (6)	Military (7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other party)	-0.54***	-0.43***	-0.82***	-0.43***	-0.39***	0.06	-0.43***
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Interest: net financial pos. (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	0.28***	0.23***	-0.13*	-1.07***	0.03	0.01	0.13*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
= Balance	0.46***	0.43***	0.13*	-0.40***	-0.01	-0.17*	0.18**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Age	-0.003*	-0.001	0.01***	0.02***	0.01***	-0.01***	0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Education (ref: low)							
= Medium	0.12	0.13	0.34***	0.39***	0.21**	-0.26**	0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
= High	0.23**	0.35***	0.74***	0.71***	0.41***	-0.16*	0.12
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.23***	-0.13**	-0.02	0.09	-0.67***	-0.31***	-0.40***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.89***	-0.90***	-0.60***	0.39**	0.37***	-0.79***	-0.86***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214
Log Likelihood	-5,629.16	-5,774.41	-5,834.34	-3,515.69	-5,556.97	-4,305.44	-5,953.24
Akaike Inf. Crit.	11,294.32	11,584.82	11,704.68	7,067.39	11,149.94	8,646.88	11,942.48

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table A-5: Support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in all countries with interaction effects (Logit regression, without survey weights)

	Horizontal transfer / Vertical capacity building						
	Debt (1)	Unempl. (2)	Refugees (3)	Nat. dis. (4)	Attack (5)	Financial (6)	Military (7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other party)	-0.62***	-0.38***	-0.78***	-0.59***	-0.46***	0.09	-0.48***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Interest: net financial pos. (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	0.26***	0.22***	-0.12	-1.12***	-0.01	-0.01	0.11
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
= Balance	0.45***	0.46***	0.14*	-0.43***	-0.01	-0.14	0.18**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Age	-0.003*	-0.001	0.01***	0.02***	0.01***	-0.01***	0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Education (ref: low)							
= Medium	0.12	0.13	0.35***	0.38***	0.21**	-0.26**	0.09
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
= High	0.23**	0.35***	0.74***	0.71***	0.40***	-0.16	0.12
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.23***	-0.13**	-0.02	0.09	-0.67***	-0.31***	-0.40***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Interaction (ref: contributor)							
= RPR Voter*Recipient	0.18	0.07	-0.06	0.38	0.34	0.11	0.18
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)
= RPR Voter*Balance	0.10	-0.26	-0.09	0.19	-0.04	-0.27	0.001
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.19)
Constant	-0.89***	-0.91***	-0.60***	0.41**	0.37***	-0.79***	-0.86***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214
Log Likelihood	-5,628.72	-5,773.13	-5,834.21	-3,514.28	-5,555.29	-4,304.25	-5,952.74
Akaike Inf. Crit.	11,297.45	11,586.26	11,708.43	7,068.57	11,150.59	8,648.50	11,945.47

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table A-6: Support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in Western Europe (Logit regression)

	Horizontal transfer / Vertical capacity building						
	Debt (1)	Unempl. (2)	Refugees (3)	Nat. dis. (4)	Attack (5)	Financial (6)	Military (7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other party)	-1.18***	-0.66***	-1.06***	-0.52**	-0.40**	-0.07	-0.50***
	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)
Interest: net financial position (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	0.40***	0.30**	-0.39***	-1.64***	0.04	0.22	0.27*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)
= Balance	0.55***	0.41***	0.07	-0.77***	-0.17	-0.15	0.13
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Age	-0.01**	-0.003	0.003	0.02***	0.01**	-0.01***	0.005*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Education (ref: low)							
= Medium	0.07	0.09	0.38***	0.22	0.13	-0.53***	-0.09
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)
= High	0.36***	0.50***	0.90***	0.73***	0.49***	-0.40**	0.04
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.27***	-0.11	0.01	0.06	-0.66***	-0.36***	-0.49***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Married = Yes	-0.09	-0.07	0.04	-0.15	-0.02	-0.005	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Children = Yes	-0.01	0.003	-0.06	-0.05	0.03	0.14	0.09
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Urban = Yes	0.01	-0.01	0.10	-0.01	0.07	0.15	0.12
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Constant	-0.67***	-0.90***	-0.69***	0.77**	0.36*	-1.14***	-1.05***
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.18)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table A-7: Support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in Western Europe with interaction effects (Logit regression)

	Horizontal transfer / Vertical capacity building						
	Debt	Unempl.	Refugees	Nat. dis.	Attack	Financial	Military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other party)	-1.12***	-0.54**	-1.10***	-0.66**	-0.40*	0.13	-0.48**
	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Interest: net financial position (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	0.40***	0.34**	-0.44***	-1.66***	0.03	0.32*	0.26*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.11)
= Balance	0.56***	0.42***	0.09	-0.81***	-0.16	-0.11	0.15
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Age	-0.01**	-0.003	0.003	0.02***	0.01**	-0.01***	0.005*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Education (ref: low)							
= Medium	0.07	0.09	0.38***	0.22	0.13	-0.53***	-0.09
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)
= High	0.36***	0.50***	0.90***	0.73***	0.49***	-0.40**	0.04
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.27***	-0.11	0.01	0.06	-0.66***	-0.35***	-0.49***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Married = Yes	-0.09	-0.07	0.05	-0.16	-0.02	-0.002	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Children = Yes	-0.01	0.004	-0.06	-0.05	0.03	0.14	0.09
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Urban = Yes	0.01	-0.01	0.10	-0.01	0.07	0.15	0.12
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Interaction (ref: contributor)							
= RPR Voter*Recipient	-0.11	-0.59	0.64	0.25	0.09	-0.98*	0.10
	(0.48)	(0.45)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.46)	(0.38)
= RPR Voter*Balance	-0.17	-0.20	-0.29	0.40	-0.08	-0.35	-0.19
	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.34)	(0.41)	(0.34)
Constant	-0.67***	-0.91***	-0.69***	0.78**	0.36*	-1.15***	-1.05***
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.18)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556

Note: $^{*}p<0.05$, $^{**}p<0.01$, $^{***}p<0.001$

Table A-8: Opposition to horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in all countries (Logit regression)

	Horizontal transfer / Vertical capacity building						
	Debt	Unempl.	Refugees	Nat. dis.	Attack	Financial	Military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other party)	0.69***	0.50***	0.88***	0.42***	0.50***	0.46***	0.50***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Interest: net financial position (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	-0.12	-0.07	0.09	1.01***	-0.02	0.09	-0.10
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
= Balance	-0.53***	-0.55***	-0.23***	0.24*	0.03	-0.09	-0.21***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	0.002	0.001	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.005**	0.01***	0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education (ref: low)							
= Medium	-0.05	-0.14*	-0.29***	-0.65***	-0.24***	0.14*	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
= High	-0.07	-0.23***	-0.52***	-0.78***	-0.48***	0.17**	-0.12
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.12**	-0.11*	-0.20***	-0.18*	0.39***	-0.33***	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.94***	-1.21***	-1.07***	0.02
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214

Note: $^{*}p<0.05, ^{**}p<0.01, ^{***}p<0.001$

Table A-9: Opposition to horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in all countries with interaction effects (Logit regression)

|	Horizontal transfer / Vertical capacity building						
	Debt	Unempl.	Refugees	Nat. dis.	Attack	Financial	Military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other party)	0.79***	0.46***	0.91***	0.41*	0.47***	0.35**	0.53***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Interest : net financial position (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	-0.07	-0.05	0.12	1.01***	-0.03	0.07	-0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
= Balance	-0.53***	-0.58***	-0.24***	0.23*	0.03	-0.12	-0.20**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	0.002	0.001	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.005**	0.01***	0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education (ref: low)							
= Medium	-0.05	-0.14*	-0.29***	-0.65***	-0.24***	0.14*	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
= High	-0.06	-0.24***	-0.51***	-0.78***	-0.48***	0.17*	-0.12
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.12**	-0.11*	-0.20***	-0.18*	0.39***	-0.34***	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Interaction (ref: contributor)							
= RPR Voter*Recipient	-0.41*	-0.12	-0.25	-0.04	0.12	0.20	-0.003
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.20)
= RPR Voter*Balance	0.001	0.36	0.15	0.10	0.02	0.27	-0.14
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.31)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Constant	-0.04	-0.01	-0.03	-0.94***	-1.21***	-1.06***	0.02
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214

Note: $^{*}p<0.05$, $^{**}p<0.01$, $^{***}p<0.001$

Figure A-6: Predicted probability for opposing the integration of core state powers by identity and interest

### a) Horizontal transfers

b) Vertical capacity building

Note: The graph shows the predicted probabilities for opposing horizontal transfers or vertical capacity building as well as the corresponding 83 percent confidence intervals. Overlapping confidence intervals indicate that differences between two observations are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, while the absence of an overlap indicates the opposite.

Appendix F: Additional results with data from the Eurobarometer (Spring 2018)

The Eurobarometer survey from spring 2018 includes one question about attitudes towards a common European army. We use answers to this question as a robustness test for our analysis.

We repeat the exercise from part III and plot support for a European army on the country-level against the share of citizens that feel European (based on the Moreno question). The plot reveals that again there is no clear relationship between support for the integration of core state powers and identity.

**Figure A-7: Support for a European army by identity**

On the micro-level, we can also analyse the data by way of regression analysis. Below are the results from a logistic regression where the dependent variable is support to for a European army (1 = support, 0 = oppose or don't know).

Table A-10: Support for a European army (Logit regression)

	Vertical capacity building
	European army
European identity = Yes (ref: no)	0.17***
	(0.04)
Age	0.0002
	(0.001)
Education (ref: low)	
= Medium	0.04
	(0.16)
= High	-0.14
	(0.16)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.36***
	(0.04)
Constant	-1.79***
	(0.19)
Country fixed effects	Yes
Observations	26,439
Log Likelihood	-9,206.69
Akaike Inf. Crit.	18,477.39
Note:	*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

The predicted probabilities for supporting a European army for individuals with a European identity and those without a European identity (as measured by the Moreno question) are shown in Figure A-8 below. The results indicate that the effect of European identity is small but significant: it is associated with a higher support for a European army, which supports our findings in the main text.

Figure A-8: Predicted probability for supporting a European army by identity (Moreno question)

Note: The graph shows the predicted probabilities for supporting a European identity by identity. Overlapping confidence intervals indicate that differences between two observations are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, while the absence of an overlap indicates the opposite.

Appendix G: Additional analysis of relationship between (perceived) interest and identity in our data

There is some reason to believe that interest and identity, as operationalized in our paper, are not independent. Rather, it is reasonable to assume that people who RPR voters are more likely to perceive their country as a net contributor than other individuals. However, on the aggregate level, our data does not confirm this hunch: voting for the radical populist right and viewing one's country as a net contributor is not correlated.

This is shown in Table 1, which shows how RPR voters view their country compared to all other voters. It indicates that in our sample among RPR voters 51.38 percent view their country as net contributors, while 55.20 percent of all other voters view their country as net contributor.

Table A-11: Perceived interest (net financial position) by identity (vote for the RPR)

Percentage	Other	RPR
Contributor	55.20	51.38
Recipient	21.84	24.51
Balance	22.96	24.11
Sum	100	100

This is also confirmed by a regression analysis, where the perceived creditor status (recoded into a binary variable) is the dependent variable. As model 1 from Table A-12 shows, RPR voters are not more or less likely to view their country as a net creditor. This is also visualised in the left panel of Figure A-9 below.

Moving beyond the simple binary regression analysis, however, changes the results: it shows that RPR voters are indeed more likely to view their country as a net creditor, controlling for age, education, gender, and differences across countries. As the right panel of Figure A-9 shows, the difference between the two groups is not large, though: RPR voters have a predicted probability to view their country as a net creditor of 0.86, while all other voters have a predicted probability of roughly 0.78.

**Table A-12: Perceived interest and identity (Logit regression)**

	Country perceived as net creditor	
	(1)	(2)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other party)	-0.10	0.50***
	(0.08)	(0.09)
Age		0.01***
		(0.002)
Education (ref: low)		
= Medium		0.03
		(0.03)
= High		-0.04
		(0.05)
Gender = Female (ref: male)		0.28*
		(0.11)
Country (ref: Great Britain)		
= Denmark		-0.39***
		(0.10)
= Finland		-1.14***
		(0.10)
= France		-0.54***
		(0.10)
= Germany		-2.58***
		(0.12)
= Greece		-1.85***
		(0.10)
= Italy		-2.56***
		(0.12)
= Lithuania		-2.71***
		(0.11)
= Poland		-2.31***
		(0.10)
= Spain		-0.04
		(0.11)
= Sweden	0.22***	0.93***
	(0.02)	(0.14)
Observations	9,216	9,213
Note:	*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001	

Figure A-9: Predicted probability for perceiving one's country as net creditor by identity

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