

# Research Projects

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## **I. Endogenous institutional change (including both formal institutions like rules and laws, and informal institutions like social norms)**

This project aims to investigate how individuals wishing to change institutions in the organization to which they belong set about doing so and what determines their likelihood of success. As examples of such institutions, think of policies related to gender, age discrimination (including retirement), or environmental measures. The project addresses the following main research questions: (1) what mechanisms determine whether individuals with a wish to change their organization's institutions will attempt to do so?; (2) what determines the approach used by individuals when attempting to change an institution and how does the likelihood of success depend on this choice?; (3) what mechanisms determine whether and how organizations respond to individual attempts at institutional change?

[Social Values and Institutional Change: An Experimental Study](#). *Journal of Institutional Economics*, 15(2): 259-280.

([Appendices A and B](#). "Social values and institutional change")

[Time Lag and Communication in Changing Unpopular Norms](#). PLoS ONE, Vol. 10, e0124715.

[Sociale kaart van Nederland: Over instituties en organisaties](#) (*The Netherlands' social map: On institutions and organizations*).

[Sociale kaart van Nederland](#) (*The Netherlands' social map: On institutions and organizations*).

[‘I Am Not Alone’: Understanding Public Support for the Welfare State](#). *International Sociology* 27(6): 768-787.

[Violating Your Own human rights? The Role of Social Norms in Compliance with Human Rights Treaties](#). *Working paper*.

Rule Change and Cooperation: The Interaction between Private Interests and Social Preferences. *Work in progress*.

## **II. Social status (and gender)**

An important feature of social status is that it is culturally constructed and based on widely shared evaluations of where different ‘types’ of people should stand in the social hierarchy as well as who deserves to be more esteemed, respected and recognized. This project aims to investigate the causes and consequences of social status. It does so based on both observational and experimental data. The latter complement the former in establishing causal relationships and examining the underlying mechanisms. These are difficult to study empirically, as field data cannot accurately capture or isolate status-related outcomes like status anxiety.

[Social-Status Ranking: A Hidden Channel to Gender Inequality under Competition](#). *Experimental Economics*, 22(2): 396-418.

[Giving up on the Joneses? The relationship between income inequality and status-seeking](#). *European Sociological Review* 33(1): 112–123.

[Status-Ranking Aversion](#). *Working paper*.

[Anticipating Peer Ranking Causes Hormonal Adaptations that Benefit Cognitive Performance](#). *Working paper*.

[Status Ranking and Gender Inequality: A Cross-Country Experimental Comparison](#). *Working paper*.

Gender Differences in Performance under Competition: What and Why? *Work in progress*.

### **III. [Gender biases in hiring](#)**

Gender is a characteristic that influences social interactions and the way individuals make evaluative judgments. Discrimination in hiring on the basis of gender may result from biased assessments. Individuals hold shared beliefs about the traits and abilities of women and men and tend to associate agentic characteristics such as assertiveness and competence to men, and communal characteristics such as warmth and empathy to women. The core research question of this project is whether and under what conditions employers evaluate applicants of opposite gender differently?

Credit Attribution to Joint Production: Another Disadvantage to Women? *Work in progress*.

Gender Inequalities in Academia. *Work in progress*.

Hiring Same-Gender Applicants for Jobs in Gender-Segregated Occupations: Experimental Evidence. *Work in progress*.

### **IV. [Employers' recruitment behaviour and networks](#)**

Employers' recruitment strategies have been shown to play a crucial role in the functioning of labor markets. Various HR strategies, like formal hiring, employee referrals or college recruiting, are examined in detail in prior studies, but the role of social networking has remained under-researched. This is particularly the case regarding the information networks of employers. This is a significant gap given the increasing importance of external recruitment and the increasing role of social networking therein via e.g. on-line networks, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.

[The Experimental Approach to Studying Employers' Hiring Behavior](#). *Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. 1–14.

[The Demand Side of Hiring: Employers in the Labor Market](#). *Annual Review of Sociology*, Volume 43: 6.1-6.20.

[Making the Right Move: Investigating Employers' Recruitment Strategies](#). *Personnel Review* 44(5): 781–800.

[Employers' Social Contacts and Their Hiring Behavior in a Factorial Survey](#). *Social Science Research* 51: 93-107.

[The Emergence of Employer Information Networks in an Experimental Labor Market](#). *Social Networks* 35: 541-560.

[Information, Bilateral Negotiations, and Worker Recruitment](#). *European Economic Review* 54(8): 1035–1058.

[Size Doesn't Matter! Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets](#). *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 76: 544-548.

[The Effect of Social Networks on Migrants' Labor Market Integration: A Quasi-Experiment](#). *Working paper*.

Finding a Good Match or Contributing to Inequality? Recruitment Strategies through the Lens of Employers' Institutional Interpretation. *Work in progress*.

## V. Former communist countries

This project is quite broad and includes studies on informal sector and tax evasion; formal and informal institutions; social capital; and individual well-being.

[Tax Evasion and Well-being: A Study of the Social and Institutional Context in Central and Eastern Europe.](#) *European Journal of Political Economy* 45: 149-159.

[The Effect of Education on Informal Sector Participation in a Post-communist Country.](#) *European Sociological Review* 29(3): 464-476.

[Financial Satisfaction and \(In\)formal Sector in a Transition Country.](#) *Social Indicators Research* 102(2): 315-331.

[Clientelism and Polarized Voting: Empirical Evidence.](#) *Public Choice* 141(3): 305-317.

[Mind the Gap: Social capital, East and West!](#) *Journal of Comparative Economics* 36: 264-286.

[Explaining Gender Differences in Tax Evasion: The Case of Tirana, Albania.](#) *Feminist Economics* 13(2): 119-155.

["Did you pay your taxes?" How \(Not\) to Conduct Tax Evasion Surveys in Transition Countries.](#) *Social Indicators Research* 80(3): 555-581.

[Albanië: 15 Jaar Worstelen met de Instituties.](#) *Internationale Spectator* 61(6): 301-304.

[Tax Evasion and Income Source: A Comparative Experimental Study.](#) *Journal of Economic Psychology* 27(3): 402-422.

[Politico-Economic Institutions and the Informal Sector in Albania,](#) Chapter 6, pp. 81-95. In Bezemer, D.J. (ed.) *On Eagle's Wings. Ten Years of Market Reform in Albania*, New York: NovaScience Publishers.

Formation of Social Capital in Central and Eastern Europe. *Beyond Transition* 16(3): 18-20.

[Tax Evasion in Transition: Outcome of an Institutional Clash? Testing Feige's Conjecture in Albania.](#) *European Economic Review* 48(4): 729-745.

[The Informal Sector in Developed and Less Developed Countries: A Literature Survey.](#) *Public Choice* 120(3-4): 267-300.

[Porezna evazija u Albaniji: Institucionalni vacuum](#) (Tax Evasion in Albania: An Institutional Vacuum). *Financijska Teorija I Praksa (Financial Theory and Practice)* 1: 55-83.

[The Informal Sector in Transition: Tax Evasion in an Institutional Vacuum](#) Ph.D. thesis, University of Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute Research Series, no. 265, Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam

Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a Clan Culture. *Journal for Institutional Innovation, Development and Transition* 4: 5-14. [Working-paper version.](#)

[Understanding Tax Evasion: Combining the Public Choice and New Institutional Perspectives.](#) *Working paper.*

