

## THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS

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If you are reading this, you must be interested in something called “comparative politics.” Perhaps, it is only a passing or a required interest; but it could become a more enduring and personal one. This chapter is intended to familiarize you – the reader – with what is an intrinsically ambiguous and contentious sub-discipline of political science.

On the one hand, comparison is an **analytical method** – perhaps, the best available one – for advancing valid and cumulative knowledge about politics. At least since Aristotle it has been argued that only by identifying and labeling the generic relations of power and then examining how they produce variable or invariable effects in otherwise different societies, can scholars claim that their discipline is scientific. Admittedly, controlled experimentation would be even better, but – unlike the physical sciences – students of politics are not normally given the opportunity of introducing a treatment and holding everything else constant. We have to take the world as it is,

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<sup>1</sup> I would like especially to thank Carles Boix for his comments on an earlier version. His vigorous defense of the rational choice alternative was very instructive. It helped me to understand better how its advocates defend themselves from criticism and why I think this approach is so threatening to the future of comparative politics.

observe its myriad similarities and differences and, then, infer patterns of causality from simultaneous or time-lagged occurrences.<sup>i</sup>

The core of the method is really quite simple and it helps to explain why comparativists tend to be addicted to two things: (1) classification systems; and (2) the Latin expression, *ceteris paribus*. First, it is necessary to identify what units have in common by placing them in some generic category – say, democratic as opposed to autocratic regimes. Then, the category may be extended further into subtypes *per genus et differentiam* – say, democracies with single dominant party systems, with alternating two party systems, with alternating multiple party coalitional systems, and with hegemonic (non-alternating) multiparty systems. Once these factors have been controlled for, the Latin kicks in, namely, the assumption that units in the same category share the same characteristics and, therefore, that “all things being equal” it must be something that they do not share – say, level of trade union organization, that is responsible for producing the differences in outcome that the analyst is interested in – say, the level of public spending. Of course, waving that magic Latin wand does not really control for all of the potential things that might be causing variation in public spending, but it does help to eliminate some of them.<sup>ii</sup>

On the other hand, comparison has always had a **practical objective**, namely, to produce useful descriptive information about how politics is conducted in countries other than one’s own. Makers of public policy and investors of private funds, for example, need specialized bits of information in order to make reasonable choices when dealing with ‘exotic’ actors and organizations. They could not care less about the ‘scientific basis’ of the information, provided it is accurate and reliable. Predicting behavior and, thereby, lowering the risk involved in transactions with foreigners is what they are interested in, and fancy theories may be no better at this than simple projections from past experience or calculation of statistical probabilities. **Why** a given country decides to expropriate foreign property may be much less significant for these consumers than **whether** politics with

certain kinds of leaders, party systems, ethnic or class conflicts, etc. are more likely to do so and, therefore, can be predicted to engage in this kind of behavior..

While there is no intrinsic reason why these two sides of the sub-discipline should contradict each other in principal, they often do in practice. Accurate and reliable information for description usually comes in the form of expressions and perceptions generated by the actors themselves; cumulative and valid data for analysis depends on analogies and concepts rooted in generic categories, themselves embedded in specific theories. The closer they are to each other, the narrower will be the potential for comparison in time and space – until comparative politics becomes nothing more than a description of “other people’s politics,” and every case has its unique explanation.

As hinted above by invoking Aristotle, comparative politics is as old as the empirical study of politics itself. Today, even those scholars who only conduct research on a single polity find themselves ineluctably drawn into the sub-discipline. As soon as they move beyond pure description in native terms and start using a vocabulary based on generic analogies or more comprehensive systems of classification, they risk exposing themselves to comment and criticism from aggressive comparativists. For example, a student of American politics who concludes that a two-party system has been an indispensable element for this regime’s democratic stability may find him or herself challenged by those who have studied such exotic polities as Uruguay or Colombia where analogous institutions have sometimes failed to produce the same result. Indeed, in the latter case, it could even be argued that one of the most destabilizing features has been its oligarchic and sclerotic two-party system. Meanwhile, perhaps unbeknownst to the naïve Americanist, there are many multi-party systems in Western Europe that have been models of political stability and policy innovation.

So, even casual students of political science may not be able to escape the tentacles of comparison, no matter how hard they try. Knowing everything there is to know about some period or aspect of one's own country's politics could be misleading without some effort at placing it "in comparative perspective." Even seeking refuge in international relations will no longer suffice. There may be only one world system to be observed (although there are several of them to be compared over time), within that single case there have emerged ambiguous 'trans-national' polities, such as the European Union, other regional and functional "regimes" and a myriad of non-governmental organizations whose internal rules and relations of power more closely resemble those within national states than the allegedly endemic 'anarchy' and 'insecurity' that are supposed to characterize the relations between sovereign national states.<sup>iii</sup>

The student in search of a field of specialization should be aware that the threshold for entry into comparative politics is high. You will normally be expected to learn at least one foreign language – the more the better and the more exotic the better! You will also have to spend long hours familiarizing yourself with someone else's history and culture – and be willing to spend considerable time living away from home, often in rather uncomfortable places. Despite the amazing amount and variety of data made available by the Internet, field research abroad is still a *rite de passage* for most comparativists.

### **A Promising but Controversial Future**

If you do accept the challenge, be prepared to cope with controversy. There have been periods of relative tranquility when the sub-discipline was dominated by a single paradigm. For example, until the 1950s, scholarship consisted mostly of comparing constitutions and other formal institutions of Europe and North America, interspersed with wise comments about more informal aspects of

national character and culture. 'Behaviorialism' became all the rage for a shorter while, during which time mass sample surveys were applied across several polities in efforts to discover the common social bases of electoral results, to distinguish between "bourgeois/materialist" and "post-bourgeois/post-materialist" value sets, and to search for the 'civic culture' that was thought to be a pre-requisite for stable democracy. 'Aggregate data analysis' of quantitative indicators of economic development, social structure, regime type and public policy at the national and sub-national levels emerged at roughly the same time. 'Structural-functionalism' responded to the challenge of bringing non-European and American polities into the purview of comparativists, by seeking to identify universal tasks that all political systems had to fulfill, regardless of differences in formal institutions or informal behaviors.

None of these approaches has completely disappeared and all academic departments of political science are likely to have some mixture of them. But none is "hegemonic" at the present moment. As one of its most distinguished practitioners described them, present day comparativists are sitting at different tables, eating from different menus and not speaking to each other – not even to acknowledge their common inheritance from the same distinguished ancestors.<sup>iv</sup>

There is, however, one characteristic that they all shared. Every one of these recent approaches originated in the United States of America, usually having been borrowed from some adjacent academic discipline.<sup>v</sup> The prospective student interested in comparative politics had only to look at the dominant "fads and fashions" in American political science, trace their respective trajectories and intercepts, and he or she could predict where comparative politics would be going for the next decade or more. Who could doubt that this sub-discipline of political science as practiced in the United States of America showed the rest of the world "the face of its future"?<sup>vi</sup> After all, by far the largest number of professionals applying this method to describing and analyzing the widest variety

of politics has always been employed in this country – not to mention the fact that a substantial proportion of those applying it elsewhere have been trained in the USA.

The central assumption of this essay is that the future of comparative politics should (and, hopefully, will) diverge to some degree from the trends and trajectories followed in recent years by many (if certainly not all) political scientists in the United States. As I have expressed it elsewhere, the sub-discipline is presently “at the crossroads” and the direction that its ontological and epistemological choices take in the near future will determine whether it will continue to be a major source of critical innovation for the discipline as a whole, or dissolve itself into the bland and conformist “Americo-centric” mainstream of that discipline.<sup>vii</sup>

In other words, this essay will **not** be an effort that even pretends to survey objectively and comprehensively what has been produced by comparativists – American or otherwise – in the recent past. It will be what the French call a *plaidoyer*, a biased plea from a particular advocate on behalf of a client who faces a critical “mid-career” choice that will determine his or her status long into the future.

### **First, Some Congratulations are in Order**

Let me begin, however, with some self-congratulation. Thanks to the assiduous efforts of many methodologically minded colleagues (mostly Americans, it is true), much fewer students applying the comparative method neglect to include in their dissertations an explicit defense of the cases

selected – their number and analogous characteristics, a conscious effort to ensure sufficient degrees of freedom between independent and dependent variables, an awareness of the potential pitfalls involved in selecting the cases based on the latter, a greater sensitivity of the universe of relevant units and to the limits to generalizing about the external validity of findings.<sup>viii</sup> Despite many criticisms about the “non-cumulative” nature of the knowledge generated by comparative politics, there have emerged some continuous lines of research in which successive generations have built (critically) upon each other’s work. At the present moment, I would cite the burgeoning field of democratization as one where this has occurred. Even in my other current specialty, regional integration, something like a ‘common tradition’ has developed – despite quite fundamental theory-based differences at the point of departure.

These important gains in methodological self-consciousness have produced (or been produced by) some diminution in the “class warfare” between quantitative and qualitative political scientists. There is still some sniping going on and some of the former persist in asserting their intrinsic “scientific” superiority over the latter, but there is more and more agreement that many of the problems of design and inference are common to both and that the choice between the two should depend more on what it is the one wishes to explain or interpret than on the intrinsic superiority of one over the other – or, worse, how one happens to have been trained as a graduate student. Indeed, from my recent experience in two highly cosmopolitan institutions, the European University Institute in Florence and the Central European University in Budapest, I have encountered an increasing number of dissertations in comparative politics that make calculated and intelligent use of both methods – frequently with an initial large N comparison wielding relatively simple quantitative indicators to establish the broad parameters of association, followed by a small N analysis of carefully selected cases with sets of qualitative variables to search for specific sequences and complex interactions to demonstrate causality (as well as the impact of neglected or ‘accidental’ factors). To use the imaginative vocabulary of Charles Tilly, such research

combines the advantages of “lumping” and “splitting.”<sup>xix</sup> Hopefully, this is a trend that will continue into the future.

The real challenge currently facing comparative politics, however, comes from a third alternative, namely, “formal modeling” based on rational choice assumptions. Much of this stems from a strong desire on the part of American political scientists to imitate what they consider to be the “success” of the economics profession in acquiring greater status within academe by driving out of its ranks a wide range of dissident approaches and establishing a foundation of theoretical (neo-liberalism) and methodological (mathematical modeling) orthodoxy upon which their research is based. This path toward the future would diverge both methodologically and substantively from the previously competing quantitative and qualitative ones. It would involve the acceptance of a much stronger set of limiting initial assumptions, exclusive reliance on the rational calculations of individual actors to provide “micro-foundations,” deductive presumptions about the nature of their interactions and reliance on either “stylized facts” or “mathematical proofs” to demonstrate the correctness of initial assumptions and hypotheses derived from them. The comparative dimension enters into these equations to prove that individual behavior is invariant across units or, where it is not, that institutions (previously chosen rationally) can make a difference.

### **The ‘Genealogical Tree’ of Comparative Politics**

[Place Figure One Here]

As a prospective or practicing comparativist, the reader will find him or herself hanging or, better, sitting somewhere in the tree depicted in Figure One. It is a spatially schematized and temporally compressed representation of the genealogical roots, trunks and branches that have evolved into contemporary comparative politics. Some intrepid young scholars may be agile enough to scramble horizontally from one branch to another in the canopy; most, however, will have arrived



and will remain on their roost by climbing vertically up one or another of the multiple trunks rooted in past traditions of political thought.

Its deepest root lies in something I have called “**sociological constitutionalism**” as invented by Aristotle and subsequently nourished by such a diverse group of “Dead White European Males” as Polybius, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Benjamin Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville, Lorenz von Stein, Karl Marx, Moisei Ostrogorski, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Roberto Michels, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and Herbert Tingsten. Through various extensions and permutations this has become the branch subsequently labeled as “historical political sociology” with such luminaries as Stein Rokkan, T. H. Marshall, Reinhard Bendix, Otto Kirchheimer, Seymour Martin Lipset, Juan Linz, Hans Daalder, Mattei Dogan, S. N. Eisenstadt, Harry Eckstein and Dankwart Rustow located somewhere along it during the decades immediately following the Second World War. Karl Deutsch probably should be placed here at an odd angle, since he was so single-handedly responsible for inserting a cybernetic graft into it. On the outer reaches of this cluster, one generation later, is where I can be most safely located.

The other deep root lies in “**legal constitutionalism**” fertilized initially by distinguished Anglo-French jurists such as Léon Duguit, Georges Burdeau, James Bryce, A. Lawrence Lowell and Woodrow Wilson, and developed during the subsequent century by scholars such as Maurice Duverger, Herman Finer, Samuel Finer, Giovanni Sartori, Carl J. Friedrich, Samuel Beer, Jean Blondel F.A. Hermens and Klaus von Beyme. Someone like Robert Dahl can probably be best located hanging comfortably in a hammock strung between the sociological and legal branches – which, in any case, have been converging for some time. Samuel Huntington is another distinguished comparativist whose roost in the tree is difficult to place, although it is easier to imagine him clinging closer to this branch than to the neighboring one.

From these two tap roots have been added a number of exogenous grafts during the 20th century. Political science became a voracious consumer of conceptual and methodological innovations from other, increasingly professionalized, social science disciplines – first, from **social psychology** with the so-called “behaviorist movement” and later (and somewhat more surreptitiously) from **anthropology** with the “structural-functionalist approach.” The most distinctive product of the former was the rapid rise of comparative survey research, symbolized by the publication of the highly successful (and criticized) work, Gabriel Almond’s and Sidney Verba’s, The Civic Culture, in 1963. Today, this branch of comparative politics is routinely conducted within and often across virtually all of the world’s polities by scholars. Certainly, it is the most distinctive (and successful) contribution of American political science to the sub-discipline.

The anthropological graft has contributed much less in volume and attractiveness to the evolution of comparative politics. Its most important contribution was undoubtedly to preside over a vast extension in the range of countries brought under comparative scrutiny. When embracing “Non-Western” politics and faced with the need to explain “elections in Albania,” “budgeting in Zaire,” “civil-military relations in Indonesia,” and “federalism in Argentina,” scholars such as David Apter, Leonard Binder, Lucian Pye, James Coleman and Myron Weiner found it difficult to apply the usual legal or sociological categories and took refuge behind a variety of “functions” that presumably had to be performed by analogous “structures” in all political systems if they were to remain stable. After a major flurry of activity in mid-1950s to the early 1970s under the prestigious auspices of the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics, scholars began to realize that the stipulated functions were excessively abstract and that the structures they were trying to explain often could not be assigned to a single one of them. Moreover, the entire notion of “systemic equilibrium” as the central metaphor for guiding comparisons among Non-Western polities came into question when the stability of their institutions was revealed to be highly precarious. Once the key question was seen to be change, especially change in regime from democracy to autocracy or, more recently, the inverse, the approach became much less relevant – as exemplified by one of its most

prestigious proponent's shift to a more historical and agent-centered approach that emphasized "crisis, choice and change."<sup>x</sup>

Finally, comparativists have always borrowed ideas and concepts from **economics**, especially from such early political economists as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, John. Stuart Mill, David Ricardo, Jeremy Bentham, Friedrich List, and Adolf Wagner. Albert Hirschman, although a heterodoxical figure outside the ranks of contemporary neo-liberal economists, has made several seminal contributions. But the real novelty of the past few decades has been the transfer of root assumptions, deductive thinking and mathematical modeling techniques into the study of politics – first, in research on American politics and, increasingly, in research on "other people's politics." The leading figures have been Anthony Downs, Thomas Schelling, Howard Raifa, Kenneth Arrow, Douglas North, Mancur Olson, Gary Becker, George Stigler, and, most centrally, James Buchanan and William Riker. As we shall see shortly, this graft from economics has opened up a radically new path to the future for comparativists.

Presently, the evolutionary tree of comparative politics resembles more a Tropical Banyan than a Florentine Cypress. It has a wide canopy of branches, certainly not a single tapered and elegant peak. Its most curious aspect, however, is the number of practitioners who are roosting up there in the canopy, and who seem content with sharing the same generic label: **institutionalists**. Closer inspection of the foliage reveals that it contains an extraordinary variety of flora and fauna. About all they seem to agree upon is that "institutions matter." They differ widely on what institutions are, how they come about, why is it that they matter, and which ones matter more than others. Moreover, some of those perched up there will even admit that other things also matter: collective identities, citizen attitudes, cultural values, popular memories, external pressures, economic dependencies, even instinctive habits and informal practices – not mention the old favorites of Machiavelli, *fortuna* and *virtù* – when it comes to explaining and, especially, to understanding

political outcomes. This urge to find shelter under the capacious tent of “institutionalism” can either be interpreted as a bizarre effort to return to their legalistic origins (precisely in a world context in which such formalized constraints are manifestly inadequate for solving problems and resolving conflicts) or as a desperate attempt to make common cause with the greatest possible number of disciplinary brethren (precisely when so many of them are heading in a direction that would radically challenge their basic assumptions and methods) .

### At the Crossroads of Three Paths

At the top of Figure One, I have placed a large question mark – a decision point that will determine the future configuration and even the very viability of the whole tree. The safest thing one can say today about the future of comparative politics is that it will not be the same as in the past.

Of course, not everything is going to have to change. Comparative politics will continue for the foreseeable future to bear major responsibility for the **objective description** of processes and events in “other people’s countries” and, hence, for providing systematic and reliable information to those politicians (in and out of power) and to those administrators (at the top and bottom) charged with making and implementing national policies concerning these countries. The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Empire has, if nothing else, led to an impressive increase in the sheer number of polities whose (allegedly autonomous) behavior has to be described. The globalization of capitalism has produced increasingly indirect and articulated systems of production, transport and distribution that are much more sensitive to disturbances in the behavior of their most remote and marginal components. The ubiquitous penetration of the mass media has meant that the happenings anywhere in the world are being immediately transmitted everywhere and comparativist pundits will be expected “to place them in context” for public consumption.

Comparison between “real-existing polities” will also remain the best available **research method** for analyzing similarities and differences in behavior and for inferring the existence of patterns of regularity with regard to the causes and consequences of politics. It will always be the second best instrument for this purpose, but as long as it remains impossible for students of politics to experiment with most of their subjects and subject matter, political scientists will have to settle for analyzing as systematically as possible variations they cannot control directly.

Figure One suggests that comparative politics will have to choose between three distinctive paths. It can continue along the mainstream and very broad “institutionalist” trajectory it has been on for the last decades, presumably adding more “neo-neo-neo-“ prefixes as it permutes into more specialized approaches. Otherwise, it can take a turn to either the left or the right. Whatever the choice, it is most unlikely that comparative politics will taper toward a single peak – however much some practitioners would like it to.<sup>xi</sup> The most “clear and present danger”, as I see it, is that the sub-discipline’s evolution will lead to an irreversible split in the canopy with less-and-less communication or cross-fertilization between scholars perched on its different branches and more-and-more efforts to exclude dissidents from claiming the professional right to called themselves “scientific” students of politics.

Those who take a sharp turn to the right towards economics will be opting for ‘**simplification.**’ They will be led by those American colleagues who have already accepted the limited initial assumptions, exclusive reliance on individualistic “micro-foundations,” deductive presumptions about how these actors behave with regard to each other, and proof by ‘stylized facts’ or ‘mathematical formulae’ that characterize the path know as rational or public choice.<sup>xii</sup>

Those who choose the leftward path will opt for what I call, for lack of a better term: **“complexification.”** They will follow the lead of a less well-defined and less self-confident group of scholars who:

(1) Accept far fewer and less restrictive initial assumptions – indeed, who rely upon a calculated proliferation of assumptions about the identity and motives of actors and about the role of entrenched institutions and historical memories in determining seemingly ‘irrational’ behaviors;

(2) Are convinced that adequate micro-foundations in the present world context cannot only be based on individual persons – indeed, they have to include collectivities that cannot be simply decomposed into the preferences or actions of individuals and to take more-and-more into consideration the composition effects generated by multiple levels of political power and authority;

(3) Choose to rely upon ‘reasonableness’ rather than rationality, i.e. on ‘improvising’ and ‘avoiding the worst’ in complex situations where optimal pursuit of marginal returns is virtually impossible given the number of actors involved, the plurality of sources of information and the unintended consequences generated by interdependent layers of political aggregation;

(4) Consider that the usual fallacies of composition can be converted into novel “laws of composition” to explain outcomes in situations where multiple layers of different types of actors from a plurality of centers of power and authority bargain and deliberate with each other;

(5) Have a healthy respect for ‘real’ data – whether generated by the normal operations of the polity or invented and gathered by themselves, coupled with an abiding suspicion of simple aggregative indicators for complex phenomena, so-called “stylized” facts that suppress confounding observations or simulations produced by impressive mathematical equations;

(6) Insist upon endogenizing as many potentially causal variables as possible, even those notoriously difficult to measure such as “preferences” – rather than shoving them into the background, assuming them out of existence, presuming what values they take in a given situation or inserting new ones *ex post* in order to ‘prove’ the alleged rationality of observed outcomes.

The competition between the three alternative paths depicted at the top of Figure One is hardly going to be equal. The middle one, toward various permutations of “the new institutionalism,” should be the most favored choice, if only due to sheer inertia rooted in the fixed intellectual assets of most practicing comparativists. Given the profusion of qualifiers that usually precede it – historical, sociological, legal and rational, just to name the most common ones – this approach is sufficiently ambiguous to be appealing to a large number of them for some time to come, even if in my opinion it is already subject to diminishing marginal returns, divisive specifications, and less and less capacity to deal with anomalies.

The sharp right turn toward the simplicity of formal modeling should be (and already has been) very tempting, especially in the United States, for reasons I have discussed elsewhere.<sup>xiii xiv</sup> Comparativists may be especially seduced by its appeal since it provides a convenient justification

for eliminating what has, heretofore, been some of the most demanding requirements of the sub-discipline, namely, the need to learn a ‘foreign’ language, culture and history and to do protracted field research in a ‘foreign’ setting. Dedicated rational choicers already know what the dominant preferences are supposed to be,<sup>xv</sup> and have no need to observe directly or interview ‘exotic’ respondents.<sup>xvi</sup> Information requirements have been radically simplified and, if they are not available in one or another of a multitude of on-line data banks, they can always be smoothed out by asserting “stylized facts” or just by simulating their probable distribution or trajectory.

Most saliently, those comparativists who take this path may be convinced that they are likely to reap the same rewards from higher ‘scientific’ status as have the neo-liberal, mathematized economists from whom they have lifted their intellectual baggage – “lock, stock and barrel.”<sup>xvii</sup> They can also be assured that their work will only be understood by a small group of *conoscenti*.<sup>xviii</sup> Even if “economic science” has been notoriously unsuccessful in predicting the rate, direction or locus of change in the macro-economy and even if it has suffered recently some notorious defections from within its ranks, it still remains very prestigious in the eyes of other social scientists. Public or rational choice is by now firmly entrenched in a dominant strategic position within several leading departments and journals in the United States – although it has recently provoked a strong reaction from non-believers within the profession gathered under the banner of “Perestroika” (a substantial proportion of whom seem to have been comparativists).<sup>xix xx</sup>

The leftward turn toward complexity does not have any such disciplinary prototype to follow. At best, it can only pick up assumptions, concepts and ideas from a scattered diversity of sources within political science. Eventually, it may receive grafts from abstruse disciplines in the physical and mathematical sciences that deal with cybernetics, advanced circuits, complex systems, chaos theory, and so forth, but that remains to be experienced. By far the most important political scientist who has attempted to address these issues head on is Robert Jervis. His System Effects.



Complexity in Political and Social Life is a foundational statement that deserves to be more widely read and absorbed.<sup>xxi</sup> It is not coincidental that Jervis is a specialist in international relations and draws most of his illustrations from that literature. This is certainly the field of political science that has been most manifestly challenged by increases in complexity, as measured by the volume and variety of transactions across national borders and of inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations that have emerged to deal with them. Moreover, the approach that had dominated this field for so long – “realism” – was avowedly reductionist in its assumptions, and strongly resistant to according any significance to sub-national or trans-national political or legal authority. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane,<sup>xxii</sup> Hayward Alker,<sup>xxiii</sup> Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks,<sup>xxiv</sup> Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink<sup>xxv</sup> are other IR scholars who have made important and innovative efforts at conceptualization. Unfortunately, the compartmentalization of knowledge in political science departments has limited their contribution to comparative analysis. Such notions as “chains of consequence,” “emergent properties,” “indirect and delayed effects,” quasi-homeostasis,” “domino dynamics,” “spiral model,” “trans-national advocacy networks,” “cheap talk,” “embedded liberalism,” “complex interdependence,” “multi-layered governance,” and so forth, point the “complexifier” in the right direction and are applicable to all levels of political aggregation – and to their intercepts. They do, however, not by any means add up to a comprehensive, coherent or consistent theory.<sup>xxvi</sup> Indeed, virtually none of these sources refers to the other and even less do they offer a cumulative perspective that can subsume previous knowledge, explain new puzzles, provide counter-intuitive answers, and stand up to repeated attempts at falsification by both its practitioners and its competitors.

Sending present and future students of “other people’s politics” down such an un-explored (and unfashionable) path may well seem like the height of folly. Quite understandably, apprentice political scientists need to identify with a research program that is already flourishing and promising – and, not coincidentally, likely to provide them eventually with better career opportunities. Comparativists may be even more susceptible to such a bandwagon effect since they are

unusually dependent upon theory to identify the basic analogies between cases and to sustain the external validity of their findings. While I would argue that embracing complexity would be more “progressive” in the Lakatosian sense than the other two (both of which I regard as already “degenerative”), I would be the first to admit how difficult it is going to be to convince younger scholars at an especially vulnerable moment in their career that this is the case.

By now, it will come as no surprise to the reader that I am strongly in favor of “tilting” the future evolution of comparative politics toward embracing rather than rejecting complexity – even if I am manifestly incompetent to lead the way myself.<sup>xxvii</sup> Perhaps, it is psychologically understandable that just when the surrounding political world has rapidly become more interdependent across units and more assertive within them – i.e. when national states are becoming less sovereign externally and internally – that scholars of politics would seek refuge in simplicity, parsimony and consistency. To many of those contemplating the sheer “messiness” and “noisiness” of contemporary politics at the national, sub-national and supra-national levels, it must be profoundly comforting to imagine that, under all of this, there lies some easily specified and widely applicable ‘model’ for explaining what is going on. How reassuring it must seem to assume that “clear models about actors and preferences, strategical interaction (i.e. ‘game theory PCS), endogenization of variables one-at-a-time”<sup>xxviii</sup> constitute an adequate response. The fact that this model may not be very good at **pre**-dicting future outcomes becomes less important than its utility in **retro**-dicting past ones (and then only provided that one has eliminated much of the allegedly random “mess and noise” and subsequently inserted the ‘proper’ preferences). If, however, it is still true that “a theory can be judged by the range and apparent verisimilitude of the predictions it makes about the world” – and not just by its formal elegance or logical consistency – then, I can see no viable alternative for us comparativists than to confront the messy and noisy world in which we live and design our theories accordingly.<sup>xxix</sup> And the place to start is by changing the basic concepts and classification systems that one needs to control for similarities and to identify differences. And the best tool for producing these building blocks is the “ideal type.” It combines a multitude of discrete

variables into a recurrent 'qualitative' pattern of interrelations that invites attention to differences in type, not differences in magnitude.<sup>xxx</sup>

### Coping with a Messy and Noisy World

The core of my argument has been that comparative political analysis, if it is to remain significant, productive and innovative in the future, has to reflect the “real-existing” environment from which it should draw its observations and to which it should refer its findings. Take, for example, the admonition made above by a comparativist advocate of rational choice, Carles Boix. His assumption, I repeat, is that “clear models about actors and preferences, strategical interaction (i.e. ‘game theory PCS), endogenization of variables one-at-a-time” constitute a threesome that is capable of generating non-trivial findings about politics in the contemporary environment. But what if what is needed are “fuzzy and under-specified models about a plurality of types of actors with preferences that are contingent upon differences in political setting,” “strategic interaction between a large number of players at different levels of aggregation with inconsistent payoffs, constant communication and multiple interdependencies” and “endogenization not of single discrete variables, but of patterns of multiple variables within the same time frame”? Would not such a transposition from the simplified world of conceptual clarity, stylized two-person games and ‘stepwise’ causality risk producing findings that bare no relation to the complexity of the “real-existing” world of politics? My contention is that if their concepts, assumptions and hypotheses fail to capture – not all, that would be impossible – but at least some of core characteristics of their subject matter, comparativists will at best report only trivial or irrelevant findings. They will address problems and provide answers to issues that are primarily internal to their own scholastic paradigm. These are **not** likely to be the problems that citizens and rulers have to cope with or the answers they expect comparative political research to provide.

One thing that differentiates comparativists from their colleagues who only study one polity or one international system is supposed to be greater sensitivity to contextual factors that are so deeply embedded that they are often taken for granted or treated as “exceptional” by Americanists or “unique” by International Relations specialists.. Inversely, they should be especially well equipped to identify and incorporate the trends that affect – admittedly, to differing degrees – virtually all of the world’s polities.

Two of these trends, in my opinion, are sufficiently pervasive as to affect the basic design and conduct of comparative research. They are: (1) **increased complexity**; and (2) **increased interdependence**. However independent their sources may be – for example, logically speaking, a polity may become more complex without increasing its interdependence upon other polities and a polity may enter into increasingly interdependent relations with others while reducing its internal complexity through specialization – these two trends tend to be related and, together, they produce something that Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane have called “**complex interdependence**.”<sup>xxxix</sup>

One major implication that I draw from this is that complex interdependence is having an increasing influence not just on the substance of politics, but also upon its form. It is changing, in other words, the **units** that we should be using for specifying our theories and collecting our data and the **levels** at which we should be analyzing these data.

**Complexity:** This undermines one of the key assumptions of most of traditional comparative political research, namely, that the variable selected and observed with equivalent measures will tend to produce the same or similar effect(s) across the units being compared.

**Interdependence:** This undermines the most important epistemological assumption in virtually all comparative research, namely, that the units selected for comparison are sufficiently independent of each other with regard to the cause-effect relationship being examined.<sup>xxxii</sup>

**Complex Interdependence:** The ‘compound’ condition makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine what constitutes an independent cause (and, hence, an independent effect) and whether the units involved have an independent political capacity to choose and implement (and, therefore, to act as agents connecting cause and effect).

When Aristoteles gathered data on the ‘social constitutions’ of 158 Greek city-states, he set an important and enduring precedent. The apposite units for comparison should be of the same generic type of polity and at the same level of aggregation. And they should be more-or-less self-sufficient and possess a distinctive identity. Since then, almost all theorizing and empirical analysis has followed this model. One could compare “empires” or “alliances of states” or “colonies of states,” but not across these categories. Most of all, the vast proportion of effort has gone into studying supposedly ‘sovereign’ states whose populations shared a supposedly unique ‘nationality.’ It was taken for granted that only these ‘sovereign-national’ polities possessed the requisite capacity for “agency” and, therefore, could be treated as equivalent for comparative purposes. Needless to say, large N comparisons of all United Nations member-states rested on this fiction – and have rarely produced convincing findings. Even area specialists working with geographically or culturally denominated subsets of countries in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South, South-East or North-East Asia occasionally have had to face this issue of inference and external validity. Was Honduras in the 1950s when a substantial portion of its territory was owned by foreign banana producers “really” comparable with the much larger Brazil whose (then) major export resource, coffee, was in native hands? What is the utility of comparing the fiscal system of Kuwait that rests virtually exclusively on petroleum

derived revenues with that of Jordan that depends largely on foreign aid and its own citizens? Comparativists who pioneered in the application of their method to sub-units of the same federal or decentralized polity had to limit themselves to circumscribed issues for which these sub-units possessed some equivalent autonomy of action. For example, it hardly made much sense to study differences in the application of military conscription across US States – with the possible exception of the “Free Republic of Berkeley” during the 1960s and 1970s.

In the contemporary setting, due to differing forms of complexity and degrees of interdependence, as well as the compound product of these two, it has become less and less possible to rely on the properties of sovereignty and nationality to identify equivalent **units**. No polity can realistically connect cause and effect and produced intended results without regard for the actions of others. Virtually all polities have persons and organizations within their borders that have identities, loyalties and interests that overlap with persons and organizations in other polities.

Nor can one be assured that polities at the same formal **level** of political status or aggregation will have the same capacity for agency. Depending on their insertion into multi-layered systems of production, distribution and governance, their capacity to act or react independently to any specific opportunity or challenge can vary enormously. This is most obviously the case for those national states that have entered into supra-national arrangements such as the European Union or signed binding international treaties such as those of the IMF or the WTO. Not only do they occasionally find themselves publicly shamed or found guilty by such organizations, but they may regularly anticipate such constraints and alter their behavior accordingly. Moreover, many contemporary national polities have granted or been forced to concede extensive powers to their sub-national units and, in some cases, these *estados autonómicos*, *provinces*, *regioni*, *Länder*, *municípios* and *communes* have entered into cooperative arrangements with equivalent units in adjacent national states.

From these observations, I conclude not only that it is literally absurd to compare only at the level of individuals, but also that comparativists need to dedicate much more thought to the collectivities they do choose and the properties these units of analysis supposedly share with regard to the specific institution, policy or norm that is being examined. Try to imagine someone studying the extent of commitment to environmental policies across European polities without reference to the European Union. Or another scholar comparing the human rights record of African states without taking into consideration the conditionalities posed by bi-lateral and multi-lateral foreign aid programs. I would admit that, in neither of these examples, should one presume that all variation in behavior or outcome can be explained by supra-national linkages. There still remains a great deal of difference that can only be explained by conditions within national polities, but exorcising or ignoring the complex external context in which these units are embedded would be equally foolish.

But what is the method one should apply when comparing units in such complex settings? The traditional answer is “to tell a story.” After all, what does a political historian –comparative or not – do but construct a narrative that attempts to pull together all of the factors within a specified time period that contributed to producing a specific outcome. Unfortunately, such narratives – however insightful – are usually written in “ideographic” terms, i.e. those used by the actors or the authors themselves. Systematic and cumulative comparison across units (or even within the same unit over time) requires a “nomothetic” language, i.e. one that is based on terms that are specific to a particular approach or theory, not to a unique case. A first step for prospective “complexifiers” would be to invent or re-invent concepts so that they were more capable of grasping “fuzzy,” “contaminated,” and “layered” interrelationships among individuals and, especially, organizations (since the latter are much more salient components of contemporary political life).

For example, I experienced such a need when I began to think more seriously about the range of likely outcomes that the European Union might be heading for.<sup>xxxiii</sup> To fill this prospective space, I had to resort to pseudo-Latin and to define four “ideal type” configurations that I called: *federatio*, *confederatio*, *consortio* and *condomino*. I also delved into the language that European officials and politicians were inventing in order to make sense of what they were doing and discovered such odd things as: subsidiarity, co-decision, proportionality, additivity, complementarity, transparency, *géométrie variable*, co-responsibility, *juste retour*, transposition, mutual recognition, pooled sovereignty, home country control, economic and social cohesion, sustainable convergence, euro-compatibility, opting-in and opting-out, *comitologie*, concentric circles, *le spill-over*, *l’engrenage*, *la méthode communautaire*, *la supranationalité*, and, of course, *l’acquis communautaire*. And, believe it or not, this is just the tip of the Euro-speak iceberg!

### Polities not (just) States

The practice of comparative political research does follow and should imitate changes in “real-existing politics” – but always with a considerable delay.<sup>xxxiv</sup> As I mentioned above, the most important set of generic changes that have occurred in recent decades involves the spread of “complex interdependence.” There is absolutely nothing new about the fact that formally independent polities have extensive relations with each other. What is novel is not only the sheer magnitude and diversity of these exchanges, but also the extent to which they penetrate into virtually all social, economic and cultural groups and into almost all geographic areas within these polities. Previously, they were mainly concentrated among restricted elites living in a few favored cities or regions. Now, it takes an extraordinary political effort to prevent the population anywhere within national borders from becoming “contaminated” by the flow of foreign ideas and enticements. “**Globalization**” has become the catch-all term for these developments, even if it tends to exaggerate the evenness of their spread and scope across the planet.



Globalization has certainly become **the** independent variable – the ‘first mover’ – of contemporary political science. It can be defined as an array of transformations at the macro-level that tend to cluster together, reinforce each other and produce an ever accelerating cumulative impact. All of these changes have something to do with encouraging the number and variety of exchanges between individuals and social groups across national borders by compressing their interactions in time and space, lowering their costs and more easily overcoming previous barriers – some technical, some geographical, but mostly political. By most accounts, the driving forces behind globalization have been economic. However, behind the formidable power of increased market competition and technological innovation in goods and services, lies a myriad of decisions by national political authorities to tolerate, encourage and, sometimes, subsidize these exchanges, often by removing policy-related obstacles that existed previously – hence, the close association of the concept of globalization with that of liberalization. The day-to-day manifestations of globalization appear so natural and inevitable that we often forget they are the product of deliberate decisions by governments that presumably understood the consequences of what they have decided to *laisser passer* and *laisser faire*.

Its impact upon specific national institutions and practices is highly contentious, but two (admittedly hypothetical) trends would seem to have special relevance for the conduct of comparative political inquiry:

- (1) Globalization narrows the potential range of policy responses, undermines the capacity of (no-longer) sovereign national states to respond autonomously to the demands of their citizenry and, thereby, weakens the legitimacy of traditional political intermediaries and state authorities;

(2) Globalization widens the resources available to non-state actors acting across national borders and shifts policy responsibility upward to trans-national quasi-state actors – both of which undermine formal institutions and informal arrangements at the national level, and promote the development of trans-national interests and the diffusion of trans-national norms

If either of these is true (and especially if both are), then, a major “paradigm shift” is going to have to occur – whichever of the paths from the canopy in Figure One you choose.

Comparativists have occasionally given some thought to the implications of these developments for their units of observation and analysis, but have usually rejected the need to change their most deeply entrenched strategy, namely, to rely almost exclusively upon the so-called “sovereign national state” as the basis for controlling variation and inferring similarities and differences in response to the impact of remaining variation in (allegedly) independent conditions. They (correctly) observe that most individuals still identify primarily (and some exclusively) with this unit and that national variables when entered into statistical regressions or cross-tabulations continue to predict a significant amount of variation in attitudes and behavior. Hence, if one is researching, say, the relation between gender and voting preferences, most of the subjects surveyed will differ from national state to national state – and this will usually be greater than the variation between sub-units within respective national states.

While I would concede this assumption for comparative analyses when based exclusively on behavior and attitudes at the individual level, I am convinced that the same does not hold for the behavior of meso- and, especially, macro-units of binding collective choice. Due to differing forms

of complexity, differing degrees of interdependence and differing compounds of both of these conditions, no polity can realistically connect cause and effect through its own institutions and policies without regard for the actions of others. Virtually all of them have persons and organizations within their borders that have identities and loyalties that overlap with those of other polities; virtually all decisional units within national states are affected by “extra-national” events over which they have quite limited control. The days when such exchanges only passed through Foreign Offices and were governed by international treaties or formal bilateral arrangements are over. Regions, provinces, and even municipalities engage in external relations with each other; trade unions and professional associations become part of overarching regional and international peak organizations; economic sectors and industries include firms from many different countries; social movements regularly exchange their programs and adopt each others’ tactics. Admittedly, political parties remain among the most national in their organization and ideology (and, not infrequently, are legally prohibited from receiving foreign funds), but they do meet with each other often, join “internationals,” coordinate their appeals and sometimes even support each others’ candidates.

My conclusion is that it has become less and less appropriate to rely on the properties of sovereignty, nationality and stateness for identifying the relevant units for theory, observation and inference. No doubt, comparative politics at the descriptive level will continue to dedicate most of its effort to formally sovereign national states. That is the level at which such information is normally consumed by policy-makers, the media and the public at large. But at the analytical level, it will have to break through that boundary and recognize that units with the same formal status, e.g. all members of the United Nations or of some regional organization, may have radically different capabilities for taking and implementing collective decisions – and that virtually no national state can afford to presume that it is politically sovereign, economically self-sufficient and culturally distinct. In other words, comparativists have to give more thought to what constitutes a relevant

and equivalent case once they have chosen a problem or puzzle to analyze and to do so **before** they select the number and identity of the units they will compare.

One innovation in research design would be to compare units at different levels of spatial or legal aggregation, provided they had similar properties and capacities with regard to the problem being studied. Another would be to ignore the boundaries imposed by area studies and try to identify units of analysis that share similar patterns of complex interdependence, regardless of their cultural or geographic propinquities. Yet another would be to shift to functional criteria and compare economic sectors with similarly layered production and marketing arrangements or ethnic groups with similarly proportioned and conflictual relations with titular majorities. The most audacious would be to search for similarly configured, territorial or functional, patterns of power and authority and the effects they produce – wherever they were located spatially, culturally or even temporally.<sup>xxxv xxxvi</sup>

The most difficult challenge, however, will come from abandoning the presumption of “stateness.” Sovereignty has long been an abstract concept that “everyone knew” was only a convenient fiction, just as they also “knew” that almost all states had social groups within them that did not share the same common political identity. One could pretend that the units were independent of each other in choosing their organizations and policies and one could get away with assuming that something called “the national interest” existed and, when invoked, did have an impact upon such collective choices. But the notion of stateness impregnates the furthest corners of the vocabulary we use to discuss politics – especially stable, iterative, “normal” politics. Whenever we refer to the number, location, authority, status, membership, capacity, identity, type or significance of political units, we employ concepts that implicitly or explicitly refer to a universe composed of states and “their” surrounding national societies. It seems self-evident to us that this particular form of organizing political life will continue to dominate all others, spend most publicly generated funds,

authoritatively allocate most resources, enjoy a unique source of legitimacy and furnish most people with a distinctive identity. However we may recognize that the sovereign national state is under assault from a variety of directions -- beneath and beyond its borders -- its "considerable resilience" has been repeatedly asserted.<sup>xxxvii</sup> To expunge it (or even to qualify it significantly) would mean, literally, starting all over and creating a whole new language for talking about and analyzing politics.

The assiduous reader will have noted that I have already tried to do this by frequently referring to "polity" when the normal term should have been "state." I confess that I first became aware of this lexical problem when working on what is, admittedly, an extreme case, namely, the European Union. I then asked my reader to try to imagine a polity that did **not** have the following: (1) a single locus of clearly defined supreme authority; (2) an established, and relatively centralized hierarchy of public offices; (3) a pre-defined and distinctive "public" sphere of *compétences* within which it can make decisions binding on all; (4) a fixed and (more-or-less) contiguous territory over which it exercises authority; (5) an unique recognition by other polities and exclusive capacity to conclude international treaties; (6) an overarching identity and symbolic presence for its subjects/citizens; (7) an established and effective monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion; (8) a unique capacity for the direct implementation of its decisions upon intended individuals and groups; and (9) a uncontested potential ability to control the movement of all goods, services, capital and persons within its borders.<sup>xxxviii</sup>

Now, the European Union has yet to acquire these properties. which makes the EU quite different from those well established national states that have been losing some of them. I will also admit that there is a lot of variation in stateness among such units and that the actual and aspiring members of the EU have moved much further in this direction than others. Europe is unique as a region in which supra-national policy cooperation has been generating norms – some 80,000

pages of them it is alleged – that condition the choices and organizations of its member polities, literally on a day-to-day basis. Nothing remotely like this has come from NAFTA, MERCOSUR, CACOM or ASEAN. Nevertheless, the polities of North America, South America, Central America and South-East Asia are all ensnared in a growing network of supra-national norms and sometimes even adjudication mechanisms that call into question many of the nine “imaginary” dimensions set out above. “Conditionality” may be a vague term and its efficacy is often doubtful, but no one can question that organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization and a myriad of other global and regional “inter-governmental organizations” are having some effect “beyond the nation state.” And this is not to mention the much more numerous non-governmental organizations with direct links to political groups “beneath the nation state.”

Before comparative politics can embrace complexity, it will have to admit to a much wider variety of types of decision-making units and question whether those with the same formal status are necessarily equivalent and, hence, capable of behaving in a similar fashion. As we shall now see, this is very likely to involve paying much more attention to “patterns” than to “variables.”

### **Patterns not (just) Variables**

Contemporary comparative politics has tended to focus on variables. The antiquated version tried to explain the behaviour of whole cases – often one of them at a time. The usual approach has been to choose a problem, select some variable(s) from an apposite theory to explain it, decide upon a universe of relevant cases, fasten upon some subset of them to control for other potentially relevant variables, and go searching for “significant” associations. Not only were the units chosen presumed to reproduce the underlying causal relations independently of each other, but each

variable was supposed to make an independent and equivalent contribution to explaining the outcome. We have already called into question the first assumption, now let us do the same with the second.

Complexity requires that one attempt to understand the effect(s) of a set of variables (a “context” or “ideal-type” if you will) rather than those of a single variable. And, normally, the problem or puzzle one is working on has a multi-dimensional configuration as well. In neither case is it sufficient simply to standard score and add up several variables (as one does, for example, with such variables as economic or human development, working class militancy, ethnic hostility, quality of democracy, rule of law, etc.). The idea is to capture the prior interactions and dependencies that form such a context and produce such an outcome. In other words, the strength of any one independent variable depends on its relation with others, just as the importance of any chosen dependent variable depends on how and where it fits within the system as a whole.

There is another way of expressing this point. In the classical ‘analytical’ tradition, you begin by decomposing a complicated problem, institution or process and examining its component parts individually. Once you have accomplished this satisfactorily, you then synthesize by putting them back together and announce your findings about the behavior of the whole. But what if the parts once de-composed change their function or identity and, even more seriously, what if the individual parts cannot be re-composed to form a convincing replica of the whole? In complex political arrangements, the contribution of the parts is contingent upon their role in an interdependent whole. We comparativists have long been aware of the so-called “**ecological fallacy**,” namely, the potential for error when one infers from the behavior of the whole, the behavior of individuals within it. For example, just because electoral districts in the Weimar Republic with a larger proportion of Protestants and farmers tended to vote more for the Nazi Party (NSDAP), is no proof that individual Protestants and farmers were more likely to have voted for that party. This can only be

demonstrated by data at the apposite level. But what is more important in today's complex world is the inverse, i.e. "**the individualistic fallacy**." This consists in simply adding up – usually without any weighting or multiplying – the observations about individuals and proclaiming an explanation for what they do together. Hence, the more "democratic" the values of sampled persons; the more "democratic" their polity will be.<sup>xxxix</sup> Rational choice analysts do this routinely (with the ever present caveat that their subjects always act "under constraints"). While I would admit that this may work reasonably well where the political process being studied is itself additive, i.e. voting, it can lead to serious fallacies of inference when 'rational' individuals interact unequally within pre-existing institutions and networks. Just try to imagine the re-composition of individual preferences and rational choices into a model that would try to predict, say, the level of public spending or the extent of redistribution across social classes!

These, admittedly primitive, thoughts about complexity imply a very significant change in conceptualization – how one defines and circumscribes what it is one proposes to use as independent, intervening or dependent variables. The classical advice is to make these concepts as precise as possible, so that they can be recognized inter-subjectively: and measured unequivocally. Applications beyond these limits are said to be "stretched" out of shape for historically or culturally reasons and, therefore, invalid for comparative purposes.<sup>xl</sup> Of course, the ultimate simplification is to reduce the variable to a single dimension that can be accurately represented by numbers, by symbolic logic or by mathematical equation. Most rational choice and a good many institutional comparativists are quite proud of their ability to do this – and, thereby, to insure both clarity and parsimony in their work.

A "complexifier" is more likely to be interested in a set of variables whose boundaries and interrelationship are intrinsically unclear. What does the explaining or is the object of explanation is something "fuzzy" that may not take on the exact same observable properties in every case. His



or her concepts reference something that is similar but not identical. They may share certain properties but not all of them and when they are broken down into sub-types, the categories may be nominal and not ordinal, i.e. they may cluster according to different and not the same criteria. Just think of some of the concepts that political scientists use almost everyday: power, state, democracy, legitimacy, pluralism, capitalism, competition, hegemony, accountability, responsiveness, bureaucracy *e così via*. These and many more are ideal-types and they are blurred, radial and fuzzy in nature. A qualified observer knows what they are and grasps what they may have in common, but hesitates before specifying them in identical “non-stretchable” terms. Take, for example, the label, democracy, when applied to the United States. We find it relatively easy to dismiss the fact that this polity did not accord full citizenship to women until the 1920s and yet still deserves to be classified as a democracy before that time, but what about the “Single-Party South” and the systematic (and widely tolerated) suppression of the right to vote for Afro-American “citizens.” By any rigorous standard, the prevalence of this condition and practice should disqualify American democracy until after the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and, yet, I suspect that most American political scientists would strongly contest such a “de-classification” of their democracy. I have yet to find a comparative study of “stable Western liberal democracies” that does not include the United States – whatever the time frame. The same generic argument could be made about the political manipulation of the judiciary by the executive power in France until quite recently or the “bizarre” survival of the un-elected (but no longer hereditary) House of Lords in Great Britain or the non-rotation in power of Swiss political parties. There have been quantifying simplifiers who scored Guatemala and Colombia as democracies when the military in the former had veto power over elected civilians (as well as being an egregious violator of civil rights), and the latter was ruled by martial law over 1/3 of its territory.– just because regular competitive elections continued to be held.

My contention is that fuzzy “ideal-typical” concepts are virtually indispensable in political science, even if attempts (and there have been many) to pin them down to identical, least of all quantifiable,

measures have failed. Moreover, in a world of steadily increasing “complex interdependence,” comparativists will have to rely more and more on such concepts, both to do the explaining and to specify what has to be explained. The quest of simplifiers for precise definition and uniform measurement (not to mention parsimonious explanations) will mean that some of the key aspects of politics in our times will be excluded conceptually and dismissed as potential subjects of research. Just think of all those elements of contemporary politics that involve lengthy chains of causality, the intervention of indirect or delayed agents, the impact of un-intended consequences, the possibility of multiple equilibria, the cooperation of several layers of authority, the emergence of new (and, often, contradictory), properties, the ‘chaotic’ effect of minor variations, the concurrent presence of discrete causes and their compound impact, the un-expected resistance of entrenched habits and standard operating procedures, the effect of random or unique contingencies, the role of anticipated reactions, the ‘invisible constraints’ imposed by established powers, not to mention, the inability of any actor to understand how the whole arrangement functions.

Let me illustrate this point by invoking two concepts that I have used to describe and analyze the European Union – my assumption again being that this regional polity represents an extreme case, even a *reductio ad absurdum*, of the direction in which all polities are heading (admittedly at very different paces):

**Multi-Level Governance:** an arrangement for making binding decisions that engages a multiplicity of politically independent but otherwise interdependent actors – private and public – at different levels of territorial aggregation in more-or-less continuous negotiation, and that does not assign exclusive policy *compétence* or assert a stable hierarchy of political authority to any of these levels.

**Poly-centric Governance:** an arrangement for making binding decisions for a multiplicity of actors that delegates authority over functional tasks to a set of dispersed and relatively

autonomous agencies that are not controlled – *de jure* or *de facto* – by a single collective institution.

To the extent that the polities you are comparing have something like these characteristics, they are both spatially and functionally complex. *Nota bene*, these are not just “supra-national” properties, even if they are most prominently on display in the EU. A polity may be relatively free of constraints imposed by global or regional organizations (or by hegemonic neighbors) and still find itself in a situation of multi-level and poly-centric governance due to the autonomous behavior of sub-national units or functionally specific agencies. Consider, for example, the United States which under its present government is most emphatic about its lack of accountability to international law and organizational constraints (that it does not control) and yet on the issue of stem-cell research it has been unable to exert sovereignty over sub-units and agencies that oppose the policy of its central state. Infra-national units can contribute just as much to the complexity of politics as supra-national ones.

In addition to major implications for the operationalization of indicators – i.e. simple aggregate measures of individual or collective behavior will not do – complex interdependence within and between polities raises the prospect of major fallacies of inference between different levels of analysis. Properties reliably observed at the micro-, meso- or macro-levels may be poor predictors of what happens at other levels, lower and higher. Just as one cannot simply add up a large numbers of “civically cultured” and “democratically minded” citizens in order to produce a democracy, one cannot guarantee that conditionalities imposed by regional organizations or hegemonic democratic neighbors will suffice to ensure a successful transition from autocracy to democracy – or even to have an important impact. The correct inference may depend on context, i.e. upon the multiple layers involved and the possible existence of a plurality of competing centers of authority.

It is no coincidence that both of these descriptive qualifiers are attached to the same substantive concept: **governance**. No student of comparative politics over the past two and a half decades can have ignored the amazingly rapid and widespread diffusion of this concept and yet few concepts have ever been as fuzzy and polysemic. Whatever its opportunistic origins or the many (all ambiguous) meanings attached to it, I am convinced that behind the notion of governance hides an important message about changes in the practice of “authoritatively allocating values” (as David Easton so eloquently put it). Government, i.e. doing so through a hierarchically disposed and legitimately recognized set of public institutions, is less and less capable of making such allocations— especially when confined to a single level of spatial aggregation. What it takes is something much more complex which I have elsewhere described as:

a method/mechanism for dealing with a broad range of problems/conflicts in which actors, private as well as public, sub-national and supra-national as well as national, regularly arrive at mutually satisfactory and binding decisions by negotiating and deliberating with each other and cooperating in the implementation of these decisions.<sup>xii</sup>

The core of such a complex arrangement rests on horizontal forms of interaction between actors who have conflicting objectives, but who are sufficiently independent of each other so that neither can impose a solution on the other and yet sufficiently interdependent upon each other so that both would lose if no solution were found.<sup>xliii</sup> In both modern and modernizing societies, some of the actors involved in governance are non-profit, semi-public and, at least, semi-voluntary organizations with leaders and members; and it is the embeddedness of these organizations into something approximating a civil society that is crucial for its success. These organizations do not have to be equal in their size, wealth or capability, but they have to be able to hurt or to help each other mutually.

Also intrinsic to governance is the notion of regularity. The participating organizations interact not just once to solve a single common problem, but repeatedly and predictably over a period of time

so that they learn more about each other's preferences, exchange favors, experience successive compromises, widen the range of their mutual concerns and develop a commitment to the process of governance itself. Here, the code-words also tend to be fuzzy: trust and mutual accommodation – more specifically, trust and mutual accommodation between organizations that effectively represent more-or-less permanent social, cultural, economic or ideological divisions within a society or across several of them.

Note also that governance is not just about making decisions via deliberation and negotiation, but also about implementing policies. Indeed, the longer and more extensively it is practiced, the more the participating organizations develop an on-going interest in this implementation process since they come to derive a good deal of their legitimacy (and material rewards) from the administration of mutually rewarding programs.

Governance is not a goal in itself, but a means for achieving a variety of goals that are chosen independently by the multiple layers of actors involved and affected. *Pace* the frequent expression, “good governance,” resort to it is no guarantee that these goals will be successfully achieved. It can produce “bads” as well as “goods.” Nevertheless, it may be a more appropriate method than the more traditional ones of resorting to public coercion or relying upon private competition.

Moreover, it is never applied alone, but always in conjunction with state and market mechanisms. For “governance” is not the same thing as “government,” i.e. the utilization of public authority by some subset of elected or (self-) appointed actors, backed by the coercive power of the state and (sometimes) the legitimate support of the citizenry to accomplish collective goals. Nor is it just another euphemism for the “market,” i.e. for turning over the distribution of scarce public goods to competition between independent capitalist producers or suppliers. It goes without saying that, if

this is the case, the legitimacy of applying governance to resolving conflicts and solving problems will depend upon different principles and operative norms than are used to justify the actions of either governments or markets.

This concept of “governance” will not suffice to bear all of the weight imposed upon future comparativists who turn toward complexity. But it is definitely one starting point for those setting off in that direction.

### **Concluding Thoughts**

First, I conclude with three disciplinary suggestions:

1. Political scientists should abolish the distinction between comparative politics and international relations and re-insert an ontological one between political situations that are subject to rules, embedded in competing institutions and not likely to be resolved by violence, and those in which no reliable set of common norms exists, where monopolistic institutions (including but not limited to states) are in more or less continuous conflict and likely only to resolve these conflicts by force or the threat of force. It used to be believed that this line ran between politics within states and politics between states. This being no longer the case – the probability of war has been greater within the former than between the latter for some time – there is no generic reason that these two “historical” sub-disciplines should be kept apart. How about separating the students of politics into those working on “ruly” and on “unruly” polities, whether they are national, sub-national, supra-national or inter-national?

2. Comparativists should attempt to include the United States in their research designs when it seems apposite, but they should not expect their Americanist colleagues to join them – at least, not for some time. The present direction of politics in the US is virtually diametrically opposed to the trends I have noted above. Americans (or, better, their present leaders) have reacted with hostility to the prospect of “complex interdependence” and made all possible effort to assert both their internal and external sovereignty. They have repeatedly denied the supremacy of supra-national norms and the utility of international organizations by refusing to regard those legal or organizational constraints that do exist as binding when they contradict or limit the pursuit of so-called national interests, and by withdrawing from them when it seems expedient to do so.
  
3. , Comparativists – whether of ruly or unruly politics – should be equipping themselves to conceptualize, measure and understand the great increase in the complexity of relations of power, influence and authority in the world that surrounds them. Admittedly, “complexity” is still only a specter haunting the future of their sub-discipline and the answer to meeting this need probably cannot come only from within their own ranks. Hopefully, comparative politics will attract successful “grafts” of theory and method from disciplines in the physical and mathematical sciences that deal with analogous situations, but in the meantime the challenge should be met and the opportunity seized by us.. Just picking up a few scattered concepts from within political science, such as multi-layeredness, polycentricity and governance – as I have done – will not carry comparativists far enough. Although, if my experience in studying what must be the most complex polity in the world, the European Union, ‘real-existing’ politicians and administrators who have to cope with all of this contingency and complexity are inventing expressive new terms everyday. We should be listening to them, as well as to scholars in other disciplines, to pick up on these emerging arrangements, specify them more clearly where this is possible and search for points in our theoretical frameworks where they can be inserted. Contrary to the “simplifiers” who are genetically opposed to dialoging with their subjects, we “complexifiers” have a need and obligation to take seriously what they tell us they want and what they claim they are doing.

I cannot escape the conviction that this is the most promising path forward for the sub-discipline. The emergence of a new instrument, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), has given it some initial methodological momentum. Its originator, Charles Ragin, has been quite articulate about the implications it has for theory, in general, and the comparative method, in particular.<sup>xliii</sup> Especially in its “fuzzy set” and “two step” versions, QCA offers a far more appropriate estimation technique for analyzing complex causality than the usual ones from social statistics.<sup>xliv</sup>

And it also seems uniquely capable of explaining something that I think will become more and more salient in the future, namely, **equifinality**. Since its Aristotelean origins, the comparative method has been applied mainly to explaining differences. Why is it that polities sharing some characteristics, nevertheless, behave so differently? This has allowed the sub-discipline largely to ignore what John Stuart Mill long ago identified as one of the major barriers to developing cumulative social science: the simple fact that, in the “real-existing” world of politics, identical or similar outcomes can have different causes. Perhaps, it is only because my recent research has focused on two areas where this phenomenon has been markedly present: European integration and democratization that I am so sensitive to this ontological problem. In both of these sub-fields, the units involved had quite different points of departure, followed different transition paths, chosen different institutional mixes, generated quite different distributions of public opinion and, yet, ended up in roughly the same place. Granted there remain significant quantitative and qualitative divergences to be explained – presumably, by relying on the usual national suspects – but the major message they suggest is that of equifinality, i.e. convergence toward similar outcomes.

Of course, not all of the world’s polities are converging toward each other either in institutions, policies or behaviors. Neo-neo-neo-institutionalists will have plenty of differences to explain into the distant future. Simplifiers will no doubt come up (*ex post*) with plenty of arguments why actors



have rationally chosen different rules and policies. In other words, there will still be lots of room in the broad canopy of comparative politics. All I have been trying to do in this essay is to ensure that it will have a secure place and adequate rewards for those who choose to embrace complexity.

Second, I conclude with some personal lessons gleaned (retrospectively) from my career as a “card-carrying” comparativist. Had I run across them at an early stage of my career, I probably would have ignored them -- even rejected them. Nonetheless, I offer them to those younger scholars who might wish to take more time to reflect on their future and that of their sub-discipline than I did.<sup>xlv</sup>

- (1) Do not imagine that comparative politics is something invented by North Americans in the 1950s. It has a long and honorable history and the further back in it that you can ground your research, the more you will be protected against “ethnocentrism” and “presentism” of limited and fleeting importance;
- (2) Do not be afraid to take “natives” and “practitioners” seriously, even when they write in strange languages, come from backward (sic) countries and profess political values that are an anathema to you. You may learn more from such exotic sources than from all your colleagues, camarades, concitoyens and compagnons de route;
- (3) Pick for your dissertation committee scholars who know nothing (or relatively little) about the country or countries you have chosen to work on, but who know a lot about social and political theory, have strong paradigms of their own, and are nevertheless still willing to take you seriously;
- (4) Do not be embarrassed by the fact that your initial research is likely to be on a single country and be prepared to offer to the discipline “models” and “concepts” that have been generated by that single case -- provided that you are confident at having captured its most generic properties and are willing to spend a lot of subsequent effort defending that assumption;

- (5) If, heaven forbid, you find yourself with a conceptual albatross around your neck, as I did, make sure it is a big and important one that your colleagues and competitors cannot afford to overlook and then make yourself a moving target -- but try, at all costs, to avoid concepts that have too many unpleasant associations with the past or whose current usage is too far removed from the connotation you wish to give it. To invert the immortal saying of de Lampedusa, learn "to change without appearing to change" by defending the essential of your insights while modifying their applications and implications in response to your critics. Typologies, fourfold tables and periodizations are especially useful in this regard;
- (6) Move back-and-forth between théorie and empirie, between the library and the field, between deduction and induction, between abstract concepts and concrete observations without allowing yourself to imagine that only one side of this dialectical process of inquiry will produce truth or, worse, science. This is another way of presenting a moving target -- and of adapting your insights to the real world faster than your critics;
- (7) Be prepared to accept invitations to give talks and attend conferences on obscure topics in obscure places. You never know when you might learn something quite unexpected and you are much more likely to do so "out in the bush" than in the more predictable confines of your national political science or area studies association. If you really wish to be a comparativist, you must be prepared to live a comparative life (although it doesn't hurt to select your longer research stays carefully for climatic, cultural and human comforts).
- (8) Try to learn as many languages as possible, preferably without wasting a lot of time in the classroom. Not only will this facilitate your being invited to obscure places, but you can never tell when the political jargon spoken by the actors in weird and remote systems will alert you to some relationship that you might otherwise have ignored;
- (9) Co-authorship is a good idea, especially when it crosses national and disciplinary lines. Never, however, agree to write anything with a scholar whom you do not regard as your intellectual equal and never try to resolve your (inevitable) disputes with him or her by opting for a lowest common denominator solution. After a truly successful collaboration, it should be

impossible for either of you to tell who contributed the best ideas. In any case, readers will impute the not-so-good ideas to you;

(10) Forging close personal links with other scholars across national and even continental divides can be an important component in the "design" of comparative research. It permits one not only to include more cases and to capture a wider range of variation, but also to control for idiosyncratic or ethnocentric perspectives.

(11) If you must become a political scientist, think protractedly and carefully before choosing to specialize in comparative politics. It is by far the most demanding (and the most rewarding) of sub-disciplines.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>i</sup> And when the comparativist does this, he or she is inevitably speaking in terms of "probabilities," not invariant constant connections (i.e. "laws of politics"). No matter how closely cause and effect seem to follow each other across the cases you are analyzing, there are probably going to be exceptions or "deviant cases" somewhere out there. And there will always be another comparativist waiting to hit you with the "Pago-Pago Ploy," i.e. his or her knowledge of some exotic setting in which your most treasured finding is contradicted – maybe even inverted! In my limited experience in Latin America and Europe, Costa Rica and Switzerland have often been useful for this purpose.

<sup>ii</sup> This may help to explain why such a high proportion of comparativists have come from Scandinavia or have used data on these countries. There are so many common elements that these countries share – and a few that they do not – that cross-national inferences about causality in politics are likely to be more convincing when drawn from this 'sample.' Hopefully, something of the same will be the case with the post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Needless to say, a similar logic lay behind the practice of "Area Studies," even if it turned out that Latin American, Sub-Saharan African, Middle Eastern and Asia countries did not to have as much in common as area specialists often assumed.

<sup>iii</sup> If you have any doubt about whether a given piece of research is comparative, I suggest that you apply "Sartori's Test." Check its footnotes and compare the number of them that are devoted exclusively to the country or countries in question and those that refer to general sources, either non-country specific or that include countries not part of the study. The higher the ratio of the latter over the former, the more likely the author will be a genuine comparativist. If the citations are only about the country or countries being analyzed, then, it is very unlikely that the author has applied the comparative method – regardless of what is claimed in the title or flyleaf! "Comparazione e Metodo Comparato," *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, Vol. XX, No. 3 (Dicembre 1990), p. 400.

- iv Gabriel Almond, A Discipline Divided. Schools and Sects in Political Science (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990).
- v Although the European reader may wish to consult a recent special edition of the journal, European Political Science, where it is convincingly argued that “the American Science of Politics” has deeper roots in European culture (and European exiles) than is usually recognized.
- vi If you doubt the existence of this assumption of superiority, consult the recent A New Handbook of Political Science, edited by Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). In their introduction, the editors explicitly (and uncritically) assume that the best that one can expect for the future is to imitate contemporary trends in American political science. The notion that Europe (and, needless to say, the rest of the world) might have a different tradition of comparative analysis is not even raised – much less taken seriously.
- vii “Comparative Politics at the Crossroads”, Estudios-Working Papers, 1991/27, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones (Madrid), 1991.
- viii Here, considerable credit has to be given to the widespread use by comparativists of Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) and, more recently, to its critical counterpart, Henry E. Brady and David Collier (eds.), Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004)
- ix Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984).
- x G. Almond et al., Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Stories of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown (1973).
- xi For example, by encouraging everyone to adopt a similar syllabus for introductory courses that is strongly skewed to promoting the new graft from economics. David Laitin, “The Political Science Discipline,” paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 2001). The very notion that political science – comparative or not – should be rooted in a single theoretical orthodoxy would seem to me to do violence to its subject matter, all the more so in an epoch of radically increasing complexity.
- xii They prefer to think of themselves as “positive political theorists,” although it is a mystery to me what is so positive about their approach and (presumably) negative about all of the others. And they are definitely not “positivists” given their frequent reliance on stylized facts or mathematical proofs.
- xiii “Seven (disputable) theses concerning the future of ‘transatlanticised’ or ‘globalised’ political science”, in European Political Science, Spring 2002, pp. 23-40
- xiv One ‘appeal’ of this exclusive dependence on individualism I find especially puzzling. Some of its devotees seem to be normatively excited by the notion that this method somehow revives the prospect for re-asserting “human agency” into the study of politics. Individual choices (however smothered by those of a multitude of other individuals) can finally make a difference. What this blatantly ignores is the dependent phrase that is always (if often implicitly) attached to every one of their deductive propositions – namely, “under constraints.” Individuals act rationally, but within a pre-established system of privilege and power. The approach makes no effort to understand these constraints (which constitute most of the ‘darker side’ of politics). They are simply given. In other words, “human agency” is postulated and, then, immediately circumscribed by “the powers that be” – whatever they may be. I personally fail to find that such an approach has any normative appeal. It should be precisely the function of a ‘critical’ and ‘democratic’ political science to discover what these “constraints” are, how they came about historically, and what can be done to make them less constraining on citizens’ exercise of “human agency.”
- xv And if the actors do not confirm the initial suspicion that their purpose is to acquire more wealth or material goods opportunistically by optimizing at the margin in each political exchange, the rational choicers will

simply substitute another preference and, if necessary, yet another preference until the individual's rationality has been proven. I have yet to find an article that manipulates the preference order until "other-regardingness" becomes the dominant one, but this cannot be far away. What I doubt will ever be admitted is that the individuals in question acted simply "irrationally" according to the terms set by the initial restricted assumptions. If you want to observe a 'classic' example of this "bait-switching" by rational choice theorists, read what they have to say about "the voter paradox," where it seems irrational for any individual to vote unless the anticipated margin is very very narrow. Nevertheless, citizens do vote and even in elections whose outcome is a foregone conclusion. Just watch them hunt around *ad hoc* for a preference configuration that makes this collective behavior seem rational.

<sup>xvi</sup> This is a maxim they have inherited from the discipline of neo-liberal economics. As argued most prominently by Milton Friedman, the producers or consumers themselves have a 'rational' incentive not to admit to their 'true' preferences and, moreover, are likely to be biased into giving the interviewer more culturally or normatively respectable reasons for their choices. It is, therefore, a waste of time (and a potential source of confusion) to ask them why they are doing something. To the prospective comparativist, this can relieve him or her of some very heavy research burdens – even from the need to leave his or her desk.

<sup>xvii</sup> One of the most presumptuous assertions of those adopting this approach is that they have "micro-foundations" – something that all theories, deductive as well as inductive, are supposed to need and all others are said to lack. Their foundations rest on a radical form of individualism: no other actor or unit counts and all forms of action consist of simple aggregations of choices made by individual persons calculating rationally the costs and benefits of acting. Incidentally, it is by no means self-evident that the individual human being is **the** irreducible unit of social, economic or political analysis. One could just as well assume that most persons in our contemporary "layered" societies have multiple identities and plural interests that do not always form stable and transitive hierarchies. What such an individual wants or is trying to maximize may be contingent on many intervening spatial, temporal and/or functional factors.

In fact, the study of politics has built upon many different "micro-foundations" other than individuals. International relations in its orthodox "realist-rationalist" version rested on the presumed unity of sovereign national states acting to maximize their relative power and, thereby, protecting or promoting their national interests. This approach was manifestly indifferent to how these large and complex units were composed or governed internally. Comparative industrial relations – at least, in some versions – has been built upon the assumption that organizations (e.g. trade unions, employer associations and, sometimes, government agencies) were the irreducible units of analysis. Marxist approaches presumed a similar "foundational" role for social classes; anthropological ones did the same for homogenous cultural units such as tribes or clans.

<sup>xviii</sup> Moreover, this approach has acquired some powerful allies from the political right in the United States who have correctly understood its fundamental hostility to politics in general and to state action for solving policy conflicts in particular. Public/rational choice analysis provides respectable academic support for market-based ideological preferences and this goes a long way to explaining why neo-liberal think-tanks and foundations are so involved in financing work from this perspective. With a very few exceptions (the Santa Fe Institute is the only one I can think of), there are no equivalent sources of support for those who embrace complexity.

<sup>xix</sup> The Perestroika Movement has had some success in countering the seemingly unstoppable advance of rational/public choice in American political science, especially within its professional association and journals. However, my (sporadic) reading of its extensive e-mail correspondence suggests that this movement remains too fixed upon the divide between "quantitativists" and "qualitativists" which I regard as being less and less relevant in the future. It also has occasionally become a vehicle for the defense *à outrance* of "area studies" which, at least in its "culturalist" version, can be just as simplifying and simplistic as rational/public choice. Nevertheless, no one contemplating becoming a comparativist should miss the opportunity of consulting its website: [http://groups.yahoo.com/group/perestroika\\_glasnost\\_warmhome](http://groups.yahoo.com/group/perestroika_glasnost_warmhome).

<sup>xx</sup> There are those, political scientists of a normative vocation, who would go even further in their criticism of rational choice. Some of them argue that "individual self-regarding utility optimization" is not the solution, but the major problem in contemporary politics – and that this seemingly academic approach risks becoming self-fulfilling in the sense that the more that rulers and ruled are told that it is 'normal' for them to act according to its precepts, the more they will do so – and the worse off everyone will be. See S. M. Amadae,

Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) for an application of this critique to the conception of democracy.

<sup>xxi</sup> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Todd La Porte (ed.), Organized Complexity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) is an early and neglected work that may bear revival. My own, very schematic, understanding of this literature has been improved by the articles in a special issue of the journal, Democracy & Nature, dedicated to “Systems Theory and Complexity” (Vol. 6, No. 3 (November 2000)). Its introductory chapter by Arran Gore is especially useful to anyone looking for a non-technical introduction to the “central ideas and approaches” of the Santa Fe Institute.

<sup>xxii</sup> Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 2<sup>nd</sup>. Edition (Boston: Little Brown, 1989).

<sup>xxiii</sup> Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

<sup>xxiv</sup> Multi-Level Governance and European Integration (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).

<sup>xxv</sup> Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

<sup>xxvi</sup> As I write these words, I am reminded of the forgotten masterwork of Karl Deutsch, another IR specialist, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press, 1963). It has been along time since I read it (and when I did I could not make any productive use of it), but I wonder if its “cybernetic” approach to politics might be just the sort of comprehensive founding perspective that “complexifiers” need.

<sup>xxvii</sup> I was delighted to discover, after writing this passage, a recent comment by Robert Dahl – arguably, the most distinguished “senior statesman” of contemporary political science – in which he too urged scholars coming into the profession to recognize that “highly consequential historical contingencies add immeasurably to the complexity of the world with which we must deal – a complexity on which we must not only base our descriptions but, so far as possible, our explanations, generalizations, and predictions.” He went on to admit (as I just have) “How ought we to deal with a subject of such daunting complexity? Alas, I not only don’t have a good answer, I’m afraid I don’t even have a plausible answer.” “Complexity, change and contingency,” in Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith and Tarek Masoud (eds.), Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 378

<sup>xxviii</sup> I owe the quoted comments to Carles Boix – except for the insertion of “game theory.”

<sup>xxix</sup> The quotation is from Peter A. Hall, “Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research,” paper presented at a Workshop on Comparative Historical Analysis, Harvard University, November 10-11 2000, p. 23.

<sup>xxx</sup> There is nothing new about this strategy of focusing on “ideal types.” The great social and political theorists of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century -- all comparativists – used it in their efforts to capture the complexities of their time, e.g. Benjamin Constant with *la démocratie des anciens* and *la démocratie des modernes*, Karl Marx with capitalism and class conflict, Ferdinand Tönnies with *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, Emile Durkheim with mechanical and organic solidarity, Max Weber with types of legitimate authority and bureaucracy. What is distinctive of most of the contemporary ones listed above is their reference to relations between levels of social and political power, rather than relations at the same level of aggregation.

<sup>xxxi</sup> Op. cit., FN 22.

<sup>xxxii</sup> So named for Sir Francis Galton who raised it at a meeting of the Royal Anthropological Institute in 1889. The obvious solution to it is to include unconscious diffusion and conscious imitation across units as potential explanatory variables – much as one should test for the spuriousness of any observed relationship. The major contemporary difference is the existence of multiple trans-national organizations – governmental and non-governmental – that are in the continuous business of promoting such exchanges at virtually all levels of society and the occasional existence of regional or global organizations that can back up these efforts with coercive authority or effective ‘conditionality.’

<sup>xxxiii</sup> A wonderful example of inventive conceptualization is Fritz Scharpf's use of the term, *Politikverflechtung*, to capture the complex, "overlapping" nature of policy-making between different layers of the German political system.

<sup>xxxiv</sup> One of the repeated paradoxes of comparative politics is that scholars have a propensity for discovering and labeling novel phenomenon "at dusk, when the Owl of Minerva flies away," i.e. at the very moment when the phenomenon is declining in importance. I suspect that this is because it is precisely institutions and practices that are in crisis that reveal themselves (and their internal workings) most clearly. Nevertheless, having been involved in "owl-chasing at dusk" several times, I can testify that it is a frustrating experience.

<sup>xxxv</sup> It is intriguing to note, for example, the frequency with which the metaphor of "neo-medieval" has emerged to describe (crudely) recent developments in the relations between previously sovereign polities.

<sup>xxxvi</sup> This is **not** an appeal to engage in so-called "pooled data analysis" in which all the observations from individuals or collectivities are gathered indiscriminately across continents, countries or counties – without regard for contextual or contingent properties they may not share. For 'simplifiers' this is not only acceptable; it is practically mandatory. For 'complexifiers' this would only be justified after explicit sampling to control for variation in such contextual or contingent factors.

<sup>xxxvii</sup> No one has insisted on this more consistently than Stanley Hoffmann. "Obstinate or Obsolete: The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," *Daedalus*, Vol. 95, pp. 862-915.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> "Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts", in Gary Marks, Fritz Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, *Governance in the European Union*, (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 121-150.

<sup>xxxix</sup> An example I love to use in my "Research Design" seminar is that of European identity and the European Union. According to a Eurobaromètre survey, the highest proportion of those who answered "yes" to the question "How very often do you feel European?" was 85%. The individuals who produced such an enthusiastic response were ... Albanians! Those actually members of the EU or, then, candidates to join it did not exceed 20%.

<sup>xi</sup> Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXIV, No. (1970), pp. 1033-53.

<sup>xii</sup> "What is there to legitimize in the European Union... and how might this be accomplished?" in C. Joerges, Y. Mény, J. H. H. Weiler (eds.) *Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance*, Jean Monnet Working Paper series, no. 6/01 of Harvard Law School

It should be noted that the actors involved in such arrangements are frequently referred to as "stakeholders." That is a concept that may be even more intrinsically fuzzy than governance itself.

<sup>xlii</sup> One frequently encounters in the literature that focuses on national or sub-national "governance" another blurred concept, that of **network**, being used to refer to these stable patterns of horizontal interaction between mutually respecting actors. As long as one keeps in mind that with modern means of communication the participants in a network may not even know each other – and certainly never have met face-to-face – then it seems appropriate to extend it to cover transnational and even global arrangements.

<sup>xliii</sup> Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); *ibid.*, *Constructing Social Research* (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 1994).

<sup>xliv</sup> Charles C. Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). For two empirical examples of the application of this technique plus a two-stage design, see Carsten Schneider, and Claudius Wagemann.

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<sup>xlv</sup> These have been taken (and slightly modified) from my “Autobiographical Reflections: Or How to Live with a Conceptual Albatross around One’s Neck,” in Hans Daalder (eds.), Comparative European Politics: The Story of a Profession (London: Pinter, 1997), pp. 295-27.