SOME ERRONEOUS (BUT STILL DISPUTABLE) ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT ‘INTERESTS’

Philippe C. Schmitter
September 2002

1. INTERESTS CAN BE ‘GIVEN’ TO ACTORS BY THEORISTS.
2. INTERESTS CAN BE ‘REVEALED’ FROM THE OBSERVABLE BEHAVIOR OF ACTORS.
3. INTERESTS ARE INTRINSICALLY STABLE AND, HENCE, DO NOT VARY FOR A SPECIFIED CATEGORY OF ACTORS ACROSS TIME; INDEED, IT IS THIS STABILITY THAT IDENTIFIES SUCH A CATEGORY (CLASS, STATUS, POWER, SITUS, ETC.).
4. INTERESTS ARE STRUCTURALLY DETERMINED AND, HENCE, DO NOT VARY FOR A SPECIFIED CATEGORY OF ACTORS ACROSS SPACE AND, HENCE, IT IS POSSIBLE TO DERIVE AND TEST HYPOTHESES ABOUT INTERESTS ACROSS POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS.
5. INTERESTS CAN BE ANALYTICALLY SEPARATED FROM EACH OTHER AND, THEN, ORDERED HIERARCHICALLY ACCORDING TO KNOWN AND STABLE SET OF INTRANSITIVE PRIORITIES.
6. INTERESTS CAN BE SPECIFIED INDEPENDENTLY FROM THE THEORIES THAT ACTORS HAVE ABOUT THEIR INTERESTS.
7. INTERESTS ARE WHAT ‘INTERESTED’ ACTORS SAY THEY WANT AND, HENCE, ARE THE SAME AS THEIR MEASURABLE PREFERENCES/ATTITUDES.
8. INTERESTS CAN ONLY BE ‘HELD’ BY INDIVIDUALS AND, HENCE, SO-CALLED COLLECTIVE INTERESTS CAN ALWAYS BE ‘DECOMPOSED’ INTO THOSE OF INDIVIDUALS.
9. INTERESTS ARE CULTURALLY DETERMINED AND, HENCE, NATURALLY ASSESSED AND CONTAINED WITHIN ‘NATIONAL’ SOCIETIES OF ACTORS.
10. INTERESTS ARE ALWAYS SELF-REGARDING AND, HENCE, DO NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS.
11. INTERESTS ARE SUFFICIENT TO EXPLAIN MOST POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND, WHEN SUPPLEMENTED BY POWER CALCULATIONS, SUFFICIENT TO EXPLAIN MOST POLITICAL OUTCOMES.
12. INTERESTS ARE THE ONLY REGULAR AND RELIABLE POLITICAL FORCE THAT CAN CHECK AND CONTROL OTHER INTERESTS.
13. INTERESTS CAN BE SATISFIED AND, WHEN THEY ARE, THE POLITICAL ORDER WILL BE STABLE AND LEGITIMATE.