



Multidisciplinary Research Workshop

“Legislative Behavior in the EU Parliament”

Gérard Roland, UC Berkeley

Max Weber Programme

30 May 2012, 11.15-11.45, Villa La Fonte, Conference Room

Do procedural rules influence the behavior of legislators in the European Parliament? Do they affect voting outcomes? How does the observability (roll call votes) of the legislators' behavior affects party discipline? And accountability? In this workshop, Professor Gerard Roland investigates some of these questions, and explores whether there is a selection bias in the Roll Call votes in the European Parliament. Katrin Huber, a former European Parliament insider, will discuss Professor Roland's paper from a practitioner's viewpoint, and Pedro Riera (researcher SPS) will comment on the paper's analysis.

Gérard Roland is professor of economics and political science at UC Berkeley and chair of the campus's Department of Economics. His expertise is in political economy, comparative economic analysis of institutions and reforms in post-socialist economies. He has been a regular consultant to the IMF, World Bank and EBRD in the last 15 years and has also consulted for the European Commission and the Inter-American Development Bank. He is editor of the *Journal of Comparative Economics* and his recent book *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament* (joint with Simon Hix and Abdul Noury) received the Richard F. Fenno Prize for the Best Book Published in the Field of Legislative Studies during 2007.

Katrin Huber is an official of the European Parliament. She worked as assistant to a Member of Parliament and in the secretariats of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Committee on Transport and Tourism as well as in the Codecision and Conciliation Unit. She is currently EU Fellow at the European University Institute.

On the other hand, Pedro Riera is a SPS researcher, and in his dissertation argues that a change of electoral institutions in Latin American and former communist countries will take place when a political party or a coalition of political parties supports an alternative which brings it more seats than the status quo electoral system (outcomecontingent motivations), does not penalize it in terms of votes (act-contingent motivations), and has the power to affect through fiat that institutional alternative.

11:00-11:15 coffee break

11:15 - 11:20 Brief introduction by Isabelle Guinaudeau.

11:20 – 12:05 Prof. Roland.

12.:05 – 12:20 P. Riera and K. Huber

12:20 – 12:45 Questions and discussion.

13:00 - Lunch