

SERVANTS OF
GLOBALIZATION

Migration and Domestic Work

Second Edition

Rhacel Salazar Parreñas

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PREFACE

THE FIRST EDITION OF *SERVANTS OF GLOBALIZATION*, published in 2001, looked at the outflow of women from the Philippines in the 1990s and tracked their entrance into domestic service in scores of destinations across the globe. It looked closely at the lives of migrant Filipina domestic workers in Rome and Los Angeles, the two most prominent destinations for Filipino migrants in Italy and the United States, countries that historically have had the largest population of Filipinos in Western Europe and North America.¹ Nearly twenty years later, Filipino domestic workers continue to immigrate to both countries, but they also work in larger numbers in Canada (Pratt, 2012), Israel (Liebelt, 2011), Taiwan (Lan, 2006), and Hong Kong (Constable, 2007), among others.

This second edition of *Servants of Globalization* updates the original study, expanding on the initial set of data that I gathered in 1995 and 1996 (forty-six interviews with Filipina domestic workers in Rome and twenty-six in Los Angeles) with twenty-five in-depth interviews conducted with Filipino domestic workers in Rome in 2011 and 2012, a survey conducted of 100 Filipino domestic workers in Los Angeles in 2013, two focus group discussions with thirty Filipino domestic workers in Los Angeles in 2012, and three follow-up

interviews with domestic workers I had initially interviewed in the mid-1990s. To provide context for the global migration of domestic workers from the Philippines, I also draw from interviews I conducted with Filipina domestic workers in Denmark (seventeen) and the United Arab Emirates (forty-seven). Many of the theoretical claims I make in *Servants of Globalization* regarding the international division of reproductive labor, partial citizenship, and contradictory class mobility still bear much weight in our understanding of migrant domestic work. The notion of the “international division of reproductive labor,” which refers to the phenomenon of women passing their caring labor as paid or unpaid work to other women in a global context, seems to have struck a chord in the general public. It was not only featured in *The Chain of Love*,² a film produced by VPRO-TV in the Netherlands, but also documented in a front-page article in the *Wall Street Journal*³ and later by a working paper titled “Global Care Chains,” by the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women.⁴ In Chapter Two of this new edition, I revisit my original discussion and address the continuing utility of the concept for examining unequal divisions of labor among women in globalization.

The idea of partial citizenship is one I revisit in Chapter One. This concept refers to the liminal legal status that migrant domestic workers occupy when they are not full members of host countries, but at the same time not fully protected by their home countries. In its discussion of partial citizenship, the first edition of *Servants of Globalization* solely focused on domestic workers who could freely choose their employers without being penalized by the state, as this had been their situation in Italy and the United States. What I did not include in my earlier discussion of partial citizenship is the lack of freedom that domestic workers experience in most other destinations in the diaspora. The majority of Filipino migrant domestic workers across the globe—in Canada, Asia, and the Middle East—are not free; they are bound legally to work solely for their sponsoring employer. For instance, domestic workers in Singapore and the United Arab Emirates have to be released by their employers before they can seek a new sponsor. The restricted labor of migrant domestic workers, specifically those bound to work for their employer without the flexibility to change jobs, now needs to be in the forefront of our discussion of migrant domestic work. However, with the exception of Pei-Chia Lan’s discussion of

“legal servitude” (Lan, 2007) in Taiwan and the earlier works of Bakan and Stasiulis (1997a) on Canada, this remains largely ignored in the literature. Accordingly, I account for the condition of this lack of freedom when revisiting the concept of partial citizenship.

Discussions initiated in the earlier edition of *Servants of Globalization* continue to resonate, partly because much has remained the same for migrant domestic workers in Rome and Los Angeles. Most Filipina domestic workers are still highly educated, having completed some years of college prior to migration. This gives continuing credence to my discussion of contradictory class mobility. As I describe in Chapter Five, this process refers to the simultaneous experience of upward mobility and downward mobility in migration as earning more abroad usually comes at the cost of a decline in occupational status. Transnational families also remain the norm, as I discuss in Chapters Three and Four, but with one significant difference being the increase in children reunifying with their mothers, particularly in Italy. I accordingly update my discussion to account for the greater presence of youth, specifically teenagers, in Rome.

Drastic changes have also taken place in the Filipino migrant communities of Rome and Los Angeles. For one, in Italy migrant Filipinos are now eligible for permanent residency. Another change is the greater number of male domestic workers in both Los Angeles and Rome. Finally, we see a larger number of older domestic workers in their fifties and beyond. Their presence raises the question of retirement options for domestic workers. Accordingly, this new edition of *Servants of Globalization* includes two additional chapters that look specifically at the situation of male domestic workers and what happens when men find themselves occupationally segregated into domestic work (Chapter Six), and examine how elderly migrant domestic workers fare in old age (Chapter Seven). In my focus on men and the elderly, I illustrate the continuing challenges that Filipino migrants confront in Rome and Los Angeles. These include the racial segregation of Filipinos into domestic work in Europe and the heightened precariousness of labor among low-wage workers in the context of a shrinking welfare state.

R.S.P.

Singapore

August 2014

SERVANTS OF GLOBALIZATION



CHAPTER ONE

THE GLOBAL
MIGRATION OF
FILIPINO DOMESTIC
WORKERS

TWENTY-NINE-YEAR-OLD NENE SORIANO is one of approximately 4,000 Filipino au pairs in Denmark.¹ As an au pair, Nene works only thirty hours a week, during which she mostly performs light cleaning and occasionally helps in the kitchen and with afternoon child care. Her workload is a vast improvement over her previous job in Singapore, where she had been a domestic worker for five and a half years, working every day from 6 am to 10 pm. Her duties included general cleaning, cooking, washing all the household laundry by hand, cleaning the car, and child care. By relocating from Singapore to Denmark, Nene saw not only a reduction in her workload but also a jump in her salary from US\$270 to US\$580 per month.

Nene and I met in the Roman Catholic Church of St. Anne's in Copenhagen during the summer of 2012.² Nene hoped Denmark would be a launching pad to the European Union and eventually Italy, where she wanted to

secure long-term employment as a domestic worker.³ Italy is an attractive final destination for someone like Nene not only for the promise of long-term residency but also for its amnesty programs that regularize the status of undocumented domestic workers (Codini, 2010). Italy granted amnesty to undocumented migrants in 1987, 1990, 1995, 2002, and 2009 (Parreñas, 2008b; Codini, 2010). Yet, without established networks, Italy is not an easy destination to reach.

Not wedded to the idea of being a domestic worker, Nene was also open to finding a husband to secure long-term residency. Her preference for white men encouraged her to actively participate in online dating sites, where she looked for a potential husband from Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, or the United Kingdom. Nene even maintained communication with a pen pal serving time in a federal penitentiary in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Nene had also asked me to introduce her to a potential partner among my friends in the United States. Though I was unsuccessful in finding her a match, I later learned that she did not need my help after all. Quite attractive, Nene eventually married a Norwegian man nearly twenty years her senior in the fall of 2013, after meeting him through an online dating site. Nene now lives with him in Norway, where she is a stay-at-home mom.

Nene's story provides a glimpse of Filipino domestic workers' wide range of migration. Her goal of becoming a long-term resident outside the Philippines also points to the continued construction of Italy and the United States as coveted destinations in the diaspora, as they are but two of four locations—along with Canada and Spain—that have historically provided domestic workers with a gateway to permanent residency. Lastly, her story shows that domestic work takes multiple forms, ranging in her case from a pair to child care worker to all-around cleaner; is a long-term career for migrant women; and, for some like Nene, is tied to marriage and desires, fantasies that exceed political-economic approaches to understanding labor markets and migration processes.

A culture of emigration is pervasive in the Philippines. Migrants include land- and sea-based workers. Women primarily work on land, and the majority of them are domestic workers like nannies, housecleaners, and caregivers for the elderly. Domestic work, according to the UN International Labour Organization (ILO), refers to “work performed in or for a household or house-

holds.”⁴ Filipina women are the domestic workers par excellence of globalization. As they did in the 1990s, they work across the globe, including in East Asia, West Asia, North America, and Western Europe. In 2010, the top destinations for domestic workers and caregivers from the Philippines included Canada, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Israel, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates.⁵ With no migration recruitment program, the United States has never been an official destination for Filipino migrant laborers seeking domestic work, but it has been reached by those migrating with a tourist or immigrant visa.

The number of newly deployed Filipino migrant domestic workers has steadily increased through time, from approximately 60,000 in 2008 to 80,000 in 2009 and 100,000 in 2010.⁶ According to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), women make up a disproportionate bulk of these workers: In 2008, 57,354 women left to do domestic work in contrast to only 2,835 men;⁷ 78,389 as compared to 2,395 in 2009;⁸ and 103,630 versus 2,245 in 2010.⁹ It is difficult to determine the exact number of Filipino migrants doing domestic work around the world.¹⁰ These official figures do not include rehires as well as those who leave the country as undocumented workers and those who secure employment outside official channels, for instance someone who departs as a tourist and secures employment once in the destination country. As these Philippine government figures are based solely on migrants annually deployed as temporary contract workers by the POEA, they also do not include the mostly female au pairs whose outmigration is processed by the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, the Philippine government branch responsible for the departure of those seeking permanent residency abroad (for example, spouses of foreigners and those leaving the country with an immigrant visa), as well as those who are relocating abroad but without the intention of securing migrant employment (for example, students).¹¹

While the Philippine government does not provide an estimated count of migrant domestic workers, neither does the ILO, which, in its study of domestic workers, reports that data limitations make it “not possible to give a reliable estimate of the share of migrants among domestic workers.”¹² Yet it is probably safe to say that at least 50 percent, or 1.4 million, of the estimated 2.8 million female temporary migrant workers from the Philippines are domestic workers.¹³

PATHS OF MIGRATION

The outmigration of Filipina domestic workers is not a historical accident but emerged from the state's promotion of migrant labor exportation. In the early 1970s, President Ferdinand Marcos institutionalized the export of labor as an economic strategy when he implemented the "manpower exchange programme" (Basch et al., 1994). Government ministers and President Marcos himself canvassed for the importation of Filipino workers into East Asia, West Asia, Europe, and North America. The establishment of POEA in 1982 only solidified the country's economic strategy of exporting labor, which the government promotes not only by assisting departing migrants but also by pursuing "marketing missions" and securing memoranda of understanding on the hiring of migrant workers with an array of labor-receiving countries. The annual number of migrants has expectedly increased since the 1970s. Whereas fewer than 50,000 per annum departed in the early to mid-1970s, this number has since escalated, jumping from 266,243 in 1981 to more than 700,000 in 1994 and more than a million per annum since 2009 (Martin, 1993; POEA, 2013).

Migrant Filipina domestic workers are located in more than 160 destinations, raising the question of how one chooses a particular destination. In the diaspora, that is usually based on what one can afford, with the cost largely decided by potential wage earnings in a particular place. In the mid-1990s, recruitment agencies charged approximately US\$600 in fees to prospective domestic workers in Hong Kong, where the standard labor contract indicated a monthly salary of approximately US\$410 (Constable, 1997). Today, the fees have jumped to US\$3,000. In contrast, Singapore remains a more affordable destination than Hong Kong, costing migrants only an initial fee of US\$115 to \$230 and a three- to five-month salary deduction (approximately US\$350 per month). Even lower-cost destinations than Singapore are the Gulf Cooperative Council nations, including the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, which cost prospective migrants only US\$115. This figure covers the costs of their passport, medical clearance, and other documents required for migration. But although the Gulf nations cost less, domestic workers' wages are lower there.¹⁴

A more expensive destination for domestic workers is Israel, which costs up to US\$5,000 in placement fees (Liebelt, 2008: 108). There, domestic workers can earn anywhere from US\$500 to US\$800 per month (Liebelt, 2011). In

Canada, domestic workers earn more. For this reason, the cost of migration is significantly higher for those coming directly from the Philippines, reaching up to US\$16,000 (Paul, 2011: 1855). Similarly, the fees that travel agencies charge to go to Italy are enormous, having steadily increased over time along with Italy's reputation as a humane destination that offers high wages and minimal risk of deportation.

The migration costs shouldered by the family of one woman I interviewed, Michelle, illustrate this steady increase. Although her older sister initially paid US\$3,250 to migrate to Italy in 1986, it cost Michelle US\$4,250 to follow her in 1989. In 1994 a third sister had to pay the exorbitant amount of US\$12,000. Women who migrated to Rome in the early 1990s usually paid anywhere from US\$6,400 to US\$8,000 to enter Italy. By 2011, fewer individuals were using "travel agency" services. Migrants more often entered cost free as the direct hires of Italian employers. However, I did meet one woman who paid US\$12,000 to enter Italy clandestinely; she used a Paraguayan passport, which exempted her from having to obtain a visa. Also requiring economic resources, the United States has long been an elusive destination for prospective migrant domestic workers. If not entering via family reunification, they enter with a tourist visa that requires proof of property, investments, and savings in the Philippines.

Cost is not the only factor that determines where migrants go. Educational qualifications matter as well, as those without a high-school degree are restricted from employment in most destinations in Asia (Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, for example), and those without at least two years of tertiary education cannot be domestic workers in Canada. Aspirations also determine migration paths. Migrant domestic workers who desire permanent residency will set migration to Europe or the Americas as their long-term goal. Others may view migration as a strategy for accumulating enough capital to operate a business in the Philippines. These migrants would be comfortable setting their sites on lower-cost destinations. Individuals I met in Dubai, for instance, would rather invest the money they earn in a business than pay to migrate somewhere else. Religion can also determine a location, with Muslims preferring to migrate to the Gulf region (Silvey, 2000).

As established in migration studies, social networks and "migrant institutions" determine one's migration pattern (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Castles and Miller, 1998).¹⁵ Migrants will relocate to follow friends, family, and neighbors.

This had been the case for many women I met in Singapore,¹⁶ the United States, and Italy, indicating their reliance on social networks. In contrast, migrants in the United Arab Emirates usually relied on a “migrant institution” and only went there because it was the first destination offered to them by the recruitment agency in the Philippines. For those relying on a “migrant institution,” a destination is determined not necessarily by the prospective migrant’s networks but by the institutionalized relationships that the recruitment agency has forged with partnering agencies in specific destinations across the globe.

Across the diaspora, the migration patterns of most Filipina domestic workers do not fit the classic assimilation narrative, as their children do not necessarily follow them and integrate into the society (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996). This is because domestic workers are disqualified from permanent residency in most destinations, including Israel, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This exclusion results in varying paths of migration for Filipina domestic workers, with many working in different countries prior to retiring in the Philippines or before settling in one of the few countries that grant them permanent residency (for example, Italy, Canada, the United States, and Spain). Although some migrate directly for a prolonged stay in only one destination, they do not necessarily settle there permanently. For instance, their children do not migrate but instead stay behind in the Philippines; moreover, many plan to retire in the Philippines and not the migrant host society. This had been the case with Rose, who did domestic work for ten years in Dubai, as well as Aida, who worked in Singapore for twenty-four years.

Three of the most salient paths migrant domestic workers take include direct migration, serial migration, and step migration. Direct migration applies to the majority of my interviewees in Rome and Los Angeles, as most migrated directly from the Philippines to each of these destinations. In contrast, serial migrants (Siu, 2007) relocate to new destinations between labor contracts. These migrants are often searching for a “new experience” and a “good employer,” prolonging their stay when they find one and moving on when they do not. Serial migrants have managed to extend their career in migrant domestic work by moving across the diaspora; for example, one might work for four years in Kuwait, then three years in Dubai. Lastly, some are what Anju Mary Paul (2011) would describe as “stepwise international migrants,” referring to those who participate in a multistage process of international labor migration.

In this scenario, a typical migration path would begin in a low-cost destination such as the United Arab Emirates, then proceed to a medium-cost one like Taiwan or Hong Kong, and then eventually move upward to coveted and high-cost locations such as Canada and Italy.

What differentiates serial migration from stepwise migration is the lack of upward mobility in the former; a serial migrant moves across borders within low-cost destinations like Jordan, Kuwait, and Singapore. Conditions from one destination to another do not necessarily improve in serial migration, suggesting that this type of movement exceeds rational calculation. Conditions that would extrinsically improve the quality of life for domestic workers include wage rates, family reunification policies, citizenship eligibility, or labor benefits such as health coverage and access to a day off. Considering the various paths of migration in the diaspora, who chooses one path of migration over another, and why? What factors determine the migration trajectory of domestic workers? And what can specific mobility paths tell us about the organization and segmentation of the Filipina domestic worker diaspora?

STEP MIGRANTS

Sociologist Anju Mary Paul (2011) describes a four-tier hierarchy of destinations for Filipino domestic workers. At the bottom are the low-cost destinations of countries in West Asia, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain; at the third tier are the Southeast Asian destinations of Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei; in the second tier are the East Asian destinations of Taiwan and Hong Kong; and finally the top and most coveted in the diaspora are the United States, Canada, Spain, and Italy. Paul (2011) argues that Filipino domestic workers engage in “stepwise migration,” meaning the process of embarking on a hierarchical progression across countries in the diaspora as they make their way toward their preferred destination. The concept of “stepwise migration” adds an element of intention to the long-established concept of “step migration,” described by the International Organization of Migration as “the mobility from an original residence to first one and then another destination, e.g. in a ‘stepwise’ or sequential fashion” (International Organization of Migration, 2008: 51).

In this schema, Paul asserts that migrants follow a pattern of step migration that goes from the bottom toward the top of the hierarchy of destinations. She places countries in a tier according to their affordability; average wage—the higher the tier, the higher the wage; labor conditions—the lowest tiers offering the least labor protection; and, lastly, citizenship—the highest-tier countries being distinguished by the possibility of permanent residency.¹⁷ As Paul's research establishes for Canada, Hong Kong, and Singapore, many in the diaspora chose the path of stepwise migration. My research, however, indicates a greater number of direct or serial migrants.

Migrant domestic workers may aspire to earn higher wages and accordingly move up the hierarchy of destinations, but what they want does not necessarily reflect what they do. Various factors may preclude them from moving up, such as a lack of either financial or social capital. My original research in Italy and the United States yielded just a handful of "stepwise migrants." Although my recent survey of domestic workers in Los Angeles indicated that thirteen of 100 migrants had worked elsewhere, they did not use the social and economic capital they acquired in the process of step migration to get there. Instead, they entered the United States via happenstance, fleeing an abusive employer on vacation in the country or being petitioned by a family member, usually a sibling, to join them in the United States. Likewise, in Italy, the four migrants who had worked elsewhere in the diaspora had gotten there by jumping ship (as a seafarer) or legally following a family member, either as a family dependent or a direct hire. In the United Arab Emirates, only two of forty-seven interviewees intended to migrate elsewhere as "stepwise migrants"; they specifically wanted to relocate to Canada for the promise of permanent residency.

The majority of domestic workers I have met had neither the desire nor the aspiration to relocate to a higher-tier destination. This is perhaps because of the location's inaccessibility. For instance, most did not plan to move to Canada, as they had not achieved the minimal educational level—seventy-two units of postsecondary training—required to participate in the Live-In Caregivers Programme. Highly educated migrants were more likely to aspire to work in Canada, as the opportunity for permanent residency gives them the promise of transitioning out of domestic work.

Filipino migrant domestic workers in Dubai are fully aware of the wide span of destinations in the diaspora and have somewhat of a sense of the oppor-

tunities available in various destinations (such as permanent residency, wages, and better working conditions). Despite their knowledge, not all aspire to relocate to what would seem to be the most desirable destinations (Canada and Italy). Even if they are eligible to enter Canada or have the resources to go to Hong Kong, many are risk averse, preferring to stay where they have become accustomed to living but also wanting to minimize the expense of their migration. Relocating would not only add to their migration cost but also might not yield the stable employment they are looking for. Among my interviewees in Dubai, the majority did not wish to relocate to a higher-tier destination. For instance, second-tier countries are less preferable given the higher cost of entry, the risk of deportation imposed by policies like the "two-week rule" in Hong Kong, and the undesirable restriction of employment options in Israel and Taiwan to elder care work.¹⁸

Significantly, labor conditions do not necessarily improve as one moves up the hierarchy of destinations. Returning to Nene's case, she described her situation in Singapore as more humane than it had been in the higher-tier destination of Denmark, despite her higher salary and fewer work hours. In Singapore, she had a "good employer," while in Denmark she told me she was "like a slave" because she did not have complete control over her physical movements. As she told me, she could consume food from the refrigerator only with her employer's permission and use the toiletries her employer selected, and she could not move around her home—that is, her employer's home—freely. Her employer would even kick her out of the house, regardless of weather conditions, whenever she wanted to be alone. For Nene, freedom is defined by her ability to control her corporal movements, which she could not do in Denmark. In contrast, Nene felt much freer in Singapore, despite her lower pay, longer work hours, and the absence of a day off during her first two years of employment. According to Nene, she had freedom in Singapore because her employers neither screamed at her nor dictated how and when to cook or clean.¹⁹

Nene's situation and the differences between her labor experience in Singapore and that in Denmark point to the significance of employer-employee relations in determining the conditions of labor migration. Domestic workers aim to secure and hold on to "good employers" as much as they want the highest extrinsic rewards (for example, salary, citizenship, labor conditions).

Those who secure “good employers” usually hold on to them, suggesting that intrinsic rewards, which are centrally defined by the relations of mutual respect they cultivate with employers, may sometimes supersede the extrinsic standards Paul uses to measure the desirability of destinations in the diaspora. In this scenario, a domestic worker with a “good employer” in a low-tier destination like the United Arab Emirates may decide to stay long term. This is the case, for example, with Rose, who now earns US\$1,000 as a domestic worker for a retired British couple in Dubai. Jocelyn is another example; she sacrifices a day off and stays with an Emirate employer who lets her leave the house only to do grocery shopping every morning because they “treat [her] well” and pay her US\$680 per month. For instance, not once have her employers screamed at her or limited her access to the Internet and a mobile phone. Finding a “good employer” is the primary factor shaping their migration path and has encouraged their long-term employment in Dubai.

Despite the near absence of stepwise migrants among my interviewees in Italy and the United States, I recognize migrants’ aspirations to reach destinations where they would have greater labor-market flexibility, more humane labor standards, pathways to permanent residency, and the ability to participate in society. In the Philippine diaspora, migrants consciously measure and compare the costs and benefits of settling in various destination countries. They try to learn about opportunities to resettle in other destinations, as demonstrated by the vast knowledge domestic workers in the United Arab Emirates have of the labor systems and standards in a variety of destinations in the diaspora. Interestingly, domestic workers in Italy and the United States tend to know less about the conditions elsewhere, suggesting they are indeed more likely to be direct migrants.

DIRECT MIGRANTS

Direct migrants are those who migrated to one destination in the diaspora and continuously renew their contract with one employer there, those who seek other employers but in the same host country, and those who have likely reached their target location in the diaspora. Migrants stay in one place for many reasons, including the presence of a robust network of family and friends, the cultivation of good working relations with employers, and their social and

cultural integration in a locale. For example, as I have already noted, migrants may select a particular destination for religious reasons. Indonesians, for instance, choose to work in Saudi Arabia because the practices there agree with their religious beliefs and allow them to uphold a pious lifestyle (Silvey, 2000).

Most of the domestic workers I have met in Los Angeles and Rome are best described as direct migrants. They did not need to settle somewhere else first to amass either the human, social, or economic capital they would need to enter these more desirable destinations. Instead, they often already had a robust social network of family and friends there, as well as the economic resources to cover the high fees recruitment agencies charge to go to Italy, or the financial capital they must demonstrate to obtain a tourist visa to enter the United States. Indeed, sixteen of the twenty-six domestic workers I interviewed in 1996 entered the United States with a tourist visa.²⁰

Whereas most women I interviewed in Los Angeles entered the United States legally with a tourist visa, most of the women in Rome entered Italy by crossing the border clandestinely. Many initially entered a country in Eastern Europe, then traveled to Italy with the prearranged assistance of a “coyote.” Of forty-six female interviewees in Italy, thirty entered illegally with the assistance of recruitment agencies, or “travel agencies,” as they are referred to in the community. Other research participants entered with a valid visa: eleven with a tourist visa, two as direct hires, and three with a family visa.

Among the twenty-five domestic workers I interviewed in Italy in 2011 and 2012, most were direct migrants who followed a family member who had sponsored their migration or found them a sponsoring employer. Only four had worked elsewhere: one in Taiwan, one in Dubai, another in Saudi Arabia, and one as a seafarer. Two of the four had followed their spouses to Italy. Of those who participated in the survey I conducted in Los Angeles, only thirteen had worked somewhere other than in the Philippines. It is unlikely that the direct migrants I met in Los Angeles and Rome would consider relocating elsewhere; they are more likely to choose a path of assimilation and integration instead of serial or step migration to another destination.

Despite their restricted geography, most direct migrants are aware of the wide scope of domestic-worker migration. Many are part of multinational kinship networks that link them to far-flung destinations in the diaspora. As they increasingly rely on migrant institutions (Goss and Lindquist, 1995) and

not their social networks to determine their path of migration, friends and family may end up in different locations. Vanessa, a single woman who followed two sisters to Rome in 1990, is the seventh of eleven siblings who opted to work abroad, as two of her sisters and a brother live in Kentucky while an older brother works as a seafarer. The youngest among her siblings, Ruth works in Rome while one sister resides in Switzerland and another in Saudi Arabia. All three send remittances to their parents in the Philippines. Gloria, a nurse who failed her board exam, is a domestic worker in Rome, while her older sister works as a nurse in the United States. Randy, a vendor who sells Filipino food outside the Philippine Embassy in Rome, shares the responsibility of supporting his parents in the Philippines along with siblings in the United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States. Libertad, a domestic worker in Los Angeles, at some point had children working in the Philippines, Greece, and Saudi Arabia. Together with her children in Greece and Saudi Arabia, Libertad sent money to her children in the Philippines. Direct migrants might not physically circulate in the diaspora, but they function within its terrain because many participate in the circulation of money, information, and emotions across multiple nations.

SERIAL MIGRANTS

Anthropologist Nicole Constable (1999), capturing the ambivalence of settlement for migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong, describes how they long to return home to the Philippines only to yearn for their life in Hong Kong once they return. Working in Hong Kong involves a process of learning “to make themselves at home, away from home” (224). Constable found that Filipina domestic workers continuously renew their labor contracts to work in Hong Kong for most of their adult life. Serial migrants share these same sensibilities of home. Yet, unlike the domestic workers Constable observed in Hong Kong, they look to other countries when prolonging their stint abroad.

Of the forty-seven domestic workers I had interviewed in Dubai in June and July 2013, almost half of them had worked elsewhere prior to the United Arab Emirates, and most did not see themselves returning home “for good” anytime soon. Some intended to renew their contract at the end of their current two-year agreement, whereas others hoped to stay in Dubai but under

the sponsorship of a different employer. Some planned to return to the Philippines for a three- to six-month hiatus, after which they would apply to work elsewhere in the diaspora. The serial migratory paths of domestic workers in Dubai were often limited to low-cost destinations. Prior to the United Arab Emirates, they had worked in a plethora of other countries in West Asia, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. A handful had worked in the slightly more costly destinations of Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Israel, relying on the “fly now, pay later” system of recruitment agencies. Describing the “fly now, pay later” system, Pei-Chia Lan (2007) notes that domestic workers in Taiwan pay for the costs of migration via a salary-deduction system, under which all of their wages during their first year of employment would go toward covering the recruitment agency fees. Other destinations, including lower-cost ones, also have such a system in place. In Singapore, for instance, Filipino migrant domestic workers do not usually receive a salary during their first three to five months of employment, being restricted instead to an allowance of US\$40 per month during this time; employers give the rest of their salary directly to the recruitment agency to pay their migration cost. Likewise, in Hong Kong, domestic workers can pay the US\$3,000 fee via a monthly salary deduction during their first year of employment, which gives access to prospective migrants with limited resources.

Although salary-deduction systems make more expensive destinations accessible, serial migrants still avoid them to minimize the risks of migration. Serial migrants tend to have a low level of economic capital. For this reason, they limit their range of prospective destinations to those with minimal fees to avoid being saddled with debt, despite the lower pay they will receive. They also avoid destinations with risky employment systems, including Hong Kong and Taiwan. When I asked why she did not go to a higher-paying destination like Hong Kong, Mary, who had been a domestic worker for nearly twenty years in Singapore and had recently migrated to the United Arab Emirates, responded, “I would never go to Hong Kong. It is because there I would face the Terminator.” When I asked her to explain what she meant by the “Terminator,” as I doubted that she was referring to Arnold Schwarzenegger’s famed film character, Mary explained how domestic workers in Hong Kong are made particularly vulnerable by the “two-week rule.”

Under this policy, a domestic worker terminated by his or her employer, regardless of reason, will be deported if he or she does not secure a new sponsoring employer within two weeks of termination (Constable, 2014). Deported employees could include those who had amassed significant debt to cover the US\$3,000 recruitment fee. Another serial migrant, Elaine, likewise avoided Hong Kong, opting to go to Dubai after seven years in Lebanon. Explaining why she will not consider going to Hong Kong, she stated pointedly, "Termination. If you get terminated, then it is over for you. I have a friend who got terminated after three months. She was forced to go back to the Philippines. She still had not paid off the [US\$3,000] she borrowed to go there. She pawned her house and the land of her in-law. She had no payment because she was terminated. . . . It costs a lot to go to Hong Kong. . . . Then if you get terminated, you have no fight. You have to go home."

In contrast to the threat of termination in Hong Kong, domestic workers also avoided Taiwan due to the six-year residency cap it once imposed on unskilled migrant workers, which was extended to twelve years in 2012. They also avoided Taiwan due to the greater demand for elder care work—a twenty-four-hour job that many do not want. Lastly, serial migrants are unlikely to migrate to the high-cost destinations of Canada, Italy, and the United States either because they do not meet the educational requirements to enter Canada or because of the networks and resources they would need to enter Italy or the United States.

Serial migrants do not move in an upward trajectory from a less desirable location to a more desirable one. Their migration plans rarely involve a strategic plan to reach a target destination. The serial migrants I encountered in Dubai had relocated there after being displaced by wars in Iraq and Lebanon, having to end their last contract due to a family emergency, or hoping to secure better employment after completing a two-year contract in another country. The United Arab Emirates had not necessarily been their destination of choice, but it was one determined by the recruitment agency that processed their deployment.

Without a high level of education, many of the serial migrants I met in Dubai saw their job prospects limited to domestic work. Their primary goal had been to secure a "good employer," which they were more likely to find by extending their labor market to encompass multiple nations. However, secur-

ing a good employer is made more challenging by the job-placement system for migrant workers; as it is now, employers learn a lot about the domestic workers they hire, as recruitment agencies provide them with information including job history, health record, and skills. Domestic workers, however, do not learn much about their employer until they arrive at their household. This system, in turn, encourages domestic workers to change jobs more frequently, which some are willing to do across multiple nations for minimal financial cost until they secure that "good employer."

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

The category of human trafficking had not yet legally existed in the United States, or Italy, during the time of my original field research. Yet the experiences of some of the domestic workers I had initially interviewed in 1995 and 1996 would arguably fit our common understanding of trafficking victims. The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (otherwise known as the Palermo Protocol) defines "trafficking in persons" as:

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of persons, by means of the threat of use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.²¹

According to this definition, trafficking involves three essential elements: There must be transportation of a person; that transportation must involve force, fraud, or coercion; and it must be for the purpose of exploiting him or her. Adapting the principles of the Palermo Protocol, in October of 2000 the United States signed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act into law, criminalizing the forced or deceptive movement of individuals into exploitative labor conditions.

Filipina domestic workers who accompany migrant Filipino professionals or business owners and their families to the United States are arguably

vulnerable to human trafficking. Often of a lower class status than middle-class domestic workers who enter the United States with tourist visas, the domestic workers of professional Filipinos tend to have limited networks and lack the resources and autonomy needed to change jobs. As a result, they are usually more vulnerable to exploitative work conditions and forced labor. Additionally, employers can easily deceive them by saying that they will sponsor them for a green card when they have no intention of doing so. The migrant has no way to hold employers accountable to this promise. One woman I spoke to who was deceived and subjected to forced labor is Marilou Ilagan, a domestic worker in the United States since 1972:

MI: I came in through a Filipino family The woman was pregnant, and so they also wanted someone to take care of their baby.

RP: How long were you with them?

MI: Seventeen years.

RP: They were that good to you?

MI: They were OK, but I couldn't just leave them. I did not know anyone here. I had no friends. I had no outlet. I could not just go out if I wanted to because I had nowhere to go. So, I had no day off. I had no place to go to since they took me along with them. So, I did not go out. I did not know anyone.

RP: They did not take you out with them?

MI: Yes, they took me out here and there. When they go out as a family, they would take me with them once in a while. But just by myself, I did not go out. I was with them for seventeen years. After seventeen years, after I finally was able to legalize my stay, I left.

RP: How did you get papers?

MI: They helped me. This was in 1989 with the amnesty.

RP: How much did you earn?

MI: Very little. Unbelievably low, very, very, very low.

RP: Five hundred dollars a month?

MI: Not quite.

RP: Less?

MI: Four hundred dollars a month.

RP: This was until 1990?

MI: Yes.

RP: Wow.

MI: That was it. I made a \$100 a week. No, they only paid me \$300 a month for my services. That is why when I was able to leave them I was happy.

RP: More like ecstatic?

MI: Yes. [Laughs.] . . . That is why when I was finally able to leave them, I felt like my life was beginning. You know what I mean—my life changed. I felt free. And can you imagine the first job I got after that paid me \$400 a week? Can you imagine that? And my salary with them was only \$300 a month.

Although Marilou could have sought employer sponsorship elsewhere, the isolation enforced by her Filipino employers ensured her dependence, guaranteed her continued service, and accordingly denied her the option of seeking higher-paying jobs. It was only after her employers' children were older, almost in college, and her services were no longer needed that they helped her obtain legal status. From the interviews I conducted in the mid-1990s, this pattern of isolation emerged among three of the four other women who entered the United States with professional Filipino migrants. For example, one who worked in New York was expected to stay at home at all times; in the two years she worked for them, her employers never gave her a coat or winter boots. Notably, none of the domestic workers I met in Italy in the mid-1990s faced the same vulnerability. Their lesser vulnerability in Italy is perhaps because the legal residency of domestic workers in this country does not bind them to work for only one sponsoring employer, as is the case for their counterparts elsewhere, including Canada, Denmark, Singapore, and, among other destinations, Qatar. In most destinations, migrant domestic workers are bound to their employer in servitude, as they can work for only one sponsoring family. By being bound to the will of another person, domestic workers are rendered vulnerable to human trafficking. Yet servitude is not a uniform condition but varies in degree according to the conditions of citizenship across nations, including employer flexibility, permanent residency eligibility, and, among others, family reunification eligibility. Notably, the servitude of migrant domestic workers points not only to their vulnerability to human trafficking but also to their limited citizenship rights, specifically their partial citizenship vis-à-vis the receiving nation-states of migration.

THE PARTIAL CITIZENSHIP OF MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS

Rendered partial citizens in the process of migration, Filipina domestic workers are neither fully integrated in receiving nations nor completely protected by the Philippines. In other words, they are denied full citizenship at both ends of the migration spectrum. However, not all destinations are equally exclusionary. More desirable destination countries like Italy, Canada, and the United States offer higher wage rates for domestic workers, as well as the option of permanent residency. In Italy, migrant domestic workers can gain permanent residency, and obtain a *carta di soggiorno*, after six years of legal residency. This notably had not been the case in the 1990s, when Filipino domestic workers had been restricted to a *permesso di soggiorno*, which is a temporary residence permit that they had to renew with the sponsorship of an employer. In Canada, domestic workers can enter under the Live-in Caregivers Programme and become eligible for landed immigrant status after working continuously for one sponsoring family as a live-in domestic worker for two years.²² In the United States, domestic workers can most easily have access to permanent residency via marriage. In the past, domestic workers qualified for permanent residency in the United States if sponsored by their employers under the Labor Certification Program. In this situation, a migrant worker becomes an "out of status" migrant until her or his petition is approved, which according to a representative of the nonprofit organization Damayan in New York City took an average of ten years for migrant domestic workers. During this time, the migrant worker is not eligible to sponsor her or his dependents. Approximately 40,000 domestic workers received immigrant visas via this program between 1988 and 1996 (Kuptisch and Pang, 2006: 94).

In contrast, domestic workers in almost all other destinations cannot easily transition to permanent residency. They are instead limited to a renewable two-year residence permit that binds them to work for their sponsoring employer. This is the case in East Asia and West Asia, with the exception of Taiwan, which grants domestic workers a twelve-year residency permit, and Israel, which allows a domestic worker to reside in the country until the death of his or her employer (Liebelt, 2011). Table 1.1 provides a comparison of labor migration standards for domestic workers in key destinations, indicating that conditions of partial citizenship vary according to ineligibility for long-term

TABLE 1.1.

Labor migration standards for domestic workers.

Destination	Mandatory Live-In Employment	Flexibility to Change Employers	Average Salary (USD)	Residency Cap	Labor Protection	Pathway to Permanent Residency	Rights to Family Reunification	State Policy on Pregnancy
Singapore	Yes	No ¹	\$365	None	No	None	No	Deportation
United Arab Emirates	Yes	No ²	\$215	None	No	None	No	Incarceration (if unmarried) and deportation
Hong Kong	Yes	Yes ³	\$500–550	None	Yes	None	No	State benefits
Israel	Yes	Yes	\$500–800	63 months ⁴	Yes	None	No	State benefits
Taiwan	Yes	No	\$700	12 years	Yes	None	No	Deportation
Canada	No ⁵	Yes ⁶	\$1000+	4 years	Yes	Yes	No	Deportation
United States ⁷	Yes	No	\$1000+	None	Yes	None	No	State benefits
Italy	No	Yes	\$1000+	None	Yes	Yes	Yes	State benefits

¹ Two-month wage penalty. Requires employer permission to change sponsors before and after the end of a contract.

² Only between contracts. Otherwise requires employer permission.

³ Must identify new sponsor within two weeks to avoid deportation.

⁴ If a domestic worker stays employed with the same sponsoring employer, the employer can petition for an extension past the limit of sixty-three months.

⁵ This has been the case since 2014.

⁶ Limited by requirement that domestic worker remains employed by one sponsor for two continuous years within a span of four years to qualify for permanent residency.

⁷ Temporary visa program for domestic workers sponsored by ex-pat employers, foreign investors, and diplomats.

residency, the absence of employer flexibility, denial of the right to family reunification, limited reproductive rights, and, among others, their status as bound laborers whose legal residency is contingent on their continued live-in employment with a citizen sponsor.

Italy and the United States are considered more desirable than other destinations not only for their higher wages and the possibility of permanent residency but also for their higher standards of employment. In Italy and the United States, domestic workers have more residence flexibility than in other destinations, where the legal residency of migrant domestic workers is usually contingent on their live-in employment. The latter is the case, for example, in Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and even Canada after 2014 (Lan, 2006; Constable, 2007; Pratt, 2012). Notably, this is also the case for migrant domestic workers employed in the United States with a temporary migrant visa.²³ Also distinguishing Italy and the United States are the higher wages of migrant domestic workers relative to other destinations, averaging more than US\$100 a day for elder caregivers in Los Angeles and reaching US\$13 an hour for domestic workers in Rome.

In contrast to Italy and the United States, other destinations offer less favorable conditions for migrant domestic workers. In most other places, conditions of partial citizenship are starkly more exclusionary. First, average wages are significantly lower, limiting the mobility of domestic workers, deterring their ability to accumulate savings, and maintaining the cycle of their dependency on migration. In Singapore, domestic workers can expect to earn no more than an initial monthly salary of US\$365; in Hong Kong, their starting salaries are slightly higher at US\$520; and in Gulf Cooperative Council countries salaries reach a monthly average of only US\$215.

What also differentiates Italy and the United States from other destinations is the recognition of domestic work as labor (Rinolfi, 2007; Covert, 2013). In Italy, domestic workers have the right to various benefits, including employer-paid social security, an extra month's pay per year, and a weekly day off, among others. The United States offers weaker legal protection for domestic workers than does Italy, disqualifying domestic workers from the right to collective bargaining and excluding them from the right to overtime pay (Glenn, 2012). However, in the United States domestic workers are protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act, which gives them the right to a minimum wage. In contrast,

many other locations do not recognize domestic work as labor, resulting in fairly low standards of employment including the absence of a minimum wage, exclusion from overtime pay, and no days off. Those include the top destination countries of the United Arab Emirates, where domestic worker immigration was handled by the Ministry of Interior instead of the Ministry of Labor until January 1, 2015; Singapore, where domestic workers received the right to a weekly day off on January 1, 2013, but remain exempt from the Employment Act (Singapore Ministry of Manpower, 2013); Taiwan, where domestic workers are not covered by the Labor Standards Law (Taiwan National Immigration Agency, 2012) and the newly enacted Domestic Workers Protection Act gives domestic workers only the right to negotiate for their employment conditions but does not grant minimum labor standards; and Israel, where domestic workers have the right to a weekly day off, although a 2009 Supreme Court ruling excluded them from the Work and Rest Hour Law (Kav LaOved, 2010). In Asia, only Hong Kong and Malaysia grant labor protection to migrant domestic workers, guaranteeing them a minimum wage and a weekly rest day (Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development, 2010).

Another distinction between Italy and to a lesser degree the United States from most other destinations in the diaspora is the flexibility workers have to change employers. In other destinations, migrant domestic workers are not only occupationally segregated but also bound laborers with restricted employer flexibility. In Hong Kong, domestic workers are limited by the "two-week rule," which requires they secure another sponsoring employer within two weeks to avoid deportation (Constable, 2007). In Gulf Cooperative Council countries, domestic workers can change employers only with the permission of their current employers, making it quite difficult to leave abusive employers (Sabban, 2012).²⁴ This is also the case in Singapore, where domestic workers suffer a one- to two-month salary reduction when they change employers. In Taiwan, migrants can work for only one employer, which they cannot change, unless their employer declares bankruptcy, dies, relocates to a foreign country, or cannot pay their wages (Taiwan National Immigration Agency, 2012).²⁵ Likewise, domestic workers in Israel cannot easily change employers (Liebelt, 2011).

Notably, domestic workers cannot participate as freely in the labor market in the United States as they can in Italy. For instance, domestic workers participating in the U.S. Foreign Labor Certification Program lose their

sponsorship once they change employers. In the United States, temporary migrant workers, specifically B-1, A-3, and G-5 visa holders, also do not have labor-market flexibility (Glenn, 2012). B-1 visa holders are “servants” of former expats who return to the United States with domestic staff who had worked for them for at least one year outside the country. As nonimmigrant visa holders, they cannot transition to permanent residency, must remain an employee of their sponsor, and do not have the flexibility to change employers. A-3 visa holders (household staff of diplomats) and G-5 visa holders (servants of officials and employees of international organizations such as the World Bank) are in a similar situation.²⁶

As another condition of partial citizenship, some countries impose a residency cap on migrant domestic workers. In Israel, domestic workers lose their residency status on the death of their employer (Liebelt, 2011). In Taiwan, domestic workers can stay in the country for no more than twelve years (Taiwan National Immigration Agency, 2012). In most other destinations (Singapore and Hong Kong, for example), domestic workers can continuously renew their residence visas but without the option of permanent residency. They would have to return to the Philippines only once they are mandated to retire (sixty years old in Singapore, for example). Notably, domestic workers in Italy and the United States, with the exception of nonimmigrant visa holders, do not have a residency cap and can transition to permanent residency.²⁷

Most destination countries deny domestic workers a family life, also contributing to their condition of partial citizenship. For example, only Italy grants migrant domestic workers the right to family reunification. However, if they do not yet have a *carta di soggiorno*, meaning permanent residency, or the required housing, they can sponsor a family member only with the approval of their sponsoring employer (Parreñas, 2008b). In Canada, domestic workers did not historically qualify for family reunification until after they obtain landed status. In most other destinations, family members cannot join domestic workers. This would include nonimmigrant visa holders in the United States and historically those whose status was still pending under the Foreign Labor Certification Program. The limited citizenship rights of migrant domestic workers are also reflected in their limited reproductive rights. Singapore, for instance, automatically deports pregnant domestic workers and likewise bars foreign domestic workers from marrying Singaporean nationals.

Lastly, the “postnational membership” (Soysal, 1994) accorded to undocumented domestic workers in Italy and the United States, meaning their ability to walk the streets freely without the threat of deportation and to have access to a robust informal economy as well as health care, draws prospective migrants to these destinations. In other host countries, domestic workers’ partial citizenship is aggravated by the lack of opportunities in the informal labor market. Not all destinations offer domestic workers a robust economy for undocumented workers. In other words, they cannot opt out of domestic work and seek other forms of labor as undocumented workers in the informal economy. This is the case in Singapore, Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, and arguably the United Arab Emirates—where absconding from a sponsoring employer, as it is illegal, leaves undocumented domestics in too precarious a situation. Other countries, however, do grant undocumented migrants postnational membership. For instance, in Malaysia and Taiwan, undocumented workers have the opportunity to work in the informal labor market (Lan, 2007; Chin, 2013); according to sociologist Pei-Chia Lan (2007), illegal workers who escape their sponsoring employers are in a better position to negotiate for fair working conditions than legal workers under contract to their citizen sponsor. The situation in Israel is quite similar (Liebelt, 2011), as domestic workers there could also escape into a robust undocumented migrant economy.

Although partial citizenship exists to varying degrees, it does set a tone of exclusion from the host society. Partial citizenship reminds us of the limited rights migrant domestic workers have, even in the most inclusive of nations. This is illustrated in Canada, where eligibility for landed status had been contingent on two years of live-in residency until 2014. During this time, they are ineligible for family reunification. As noted earlier, this was also the case for migrants sponsored via the Foreign Labor Certification Program in the United States. As sociologists Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson (2000) argue, destination countries impose a process of “differential exclusion” on migrants and accept them only within strict functional and temporal limits; they welcome unskilled migrants, including domestic workers, as laborers but not as persons, and as temporary sojourners, not long-term residents. Without question, destination countries do not accord migrant domestic workers the same rights as their own citizens.

Partial citizenship is admittedly less severe in Italy and the United States, but more pertinent to those whom we can consider unfree laborers, such as domestic workers whose legal residency ties them to a sponsoring employer as a live-in worker. Still, the condition of partial citizenship is significant as it helps us understand the idealization of Italy and the United States in the diaspora and explains why they are covered destinations. Moreover, it is the negotiation of partial citizenship that prompts individuals to find “good employers” as direct, stepwise, or serial migrants. “Good employers” and the cultivation of relations with them ease the restrictions that conditions of partial citizenship enforce.

The reality of partial citizenship in economic globalization puts the Philippines in a tenuous position.²⁸ On the one hand, the denationalization of economies compels the Philippines to respond to the demand for low-wage laborers by extending their range of exports to include able-bodied workers. On the other hand, the renationalization of politics renders the Philippines incapable of protecting its exported citizens. Though international human rights codes may protect migrant workers (Soysal, 1994), the fate of Filipina domestic workers remains largely dependent on the conditions of membership set by receiving nations, which as we see impose policies that render the workers vulnerable to servitude. This is not to say that sending nations like the Philippines do not advocate for the safety and well-being of migrant workers or discourage their pursuit of vulnerable occupations such as domestic work. On December 16, 2006, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Governing Board voted to implement a US\$400 minimum salary for all migrant domestic workers, a doubling of the prevailing wage rate in destinations in Southeast Asia and West Asia (POEA, 2007). A government representative informally told me that this had been done in hopes of reducing the demand for domestic workers from the Philippines, rendering them “too expensive” for undesirable markets.

One could argue that the Philippines’ lack of juridical power in various receiving nations makes this minimum wage nothing but symbolic. Indeed, the average salaries of migrant Filipina domestic workers in several destinations remain below the minimum wage. In the United Arab Emirates, the terms of employment for migrant domestic workers rarely abide by the written contract, which guarantees them a salary of US\$400 and a weekly rest day; they usually

follow the oral agreement domestic workers make with their employers prior to migration. Still, most migrant domestic workers in places like the United Arab Emirates are conscious of the minimum wage and use it as a standard when renewing their contracts or to justify their need to change employers. The Philippines’ power to determine migrant workers’ labor conditions is extending not just because of the demand for their labor but with the increasing influence of human rights discourse, spurred by the antitrafficking movement and charges of enslavement of migrant domestic workers in West Asia (ILO, 2012). Events in Saudi Arabia illustrate the extension of this influence.

In protest of the minimum-wage hike contractually demanded by the Philippine government and the consequent rejection of Saudi Arabia’s petition to reduce the minimum wage to US\$200, on July 2, 2011, the Labor Ministry of Saudi Arabia initially banned Filipino domestic workers from entering the country (Agence France-Presse, 2011). Yet, just four months later, on October 1, 2012, it lifted the ban and agreed to the US\$400 minimum wage demanded by the Philippine government (Ruiz, 2012). This case suggests a more complicated relationship between sending and receiving countries and indicates that employment standards are not solely determined by market demands. Yet, without question, employment standards for migrant domestic workers in Saudi Arabia continue to stay low, and protectionist policies remain difficult to implement.

THE DISLOCATIONS OF MIGRATION

Discussions of Filipino migrant domestic workers should not ignore the wide scope of their global migration. Still, most studies on their experiences are confined to one destination, focusing solely on Hong Kong (Constable, 2007), Taiwan (Lan, 2006), Malaysia (Chin, 1998), Israel (Liebelt, 2011) or Canada (Pratt, 2012). Yet, the similar experiences of migrants across various destinations, including their shared exclusion of partial citizenship across the diaspora, make the need for a global perspective particularly pertinent. In Rome and Los Angeles, for instance, most migrant workers maintain transnational families; as such, their labor migration entails the negotiation of the pain of family separation. A substantial number of them are also mothers who directly care for other children and not their own. In both cities, most Filipino domestic

workers have completed a few years of postsecondary education, leading to their shared experience of contradictory class mobility or inconsistent social status in the labor market; these remain as salient now as they were in the mid-1990s. My analysis of the experiences of migrant domestic workers does not concentrate solely on domestic work as an occupational issue. Instead, it examines various aspects of their migratory experience, including their family life, gender relations, labor-market incorporation, and the precariousness of retirement for workers outside the formal labor market. I specifically focus on what I refer to as *dislocations*, meaning the positions that marginalized members of society occupy as a result of external forces. My analysis of dislocations looks at how they are constituted and the means by which migrant Filipino domestic workers resist or negotiate their effects in everyday life.

It surprised me to find similar dislocations for migrant Filipina domestic workers across destinations with remarkably different government policies, labor-market conditions, attitudes toward different ethnicities, and societal makeup—or what Portes and Rumbaut refer to as “contexts of reception” (1996: 86). Italy and the United States, for example, have quite different contexts of reception for Filipino migrant workers. Italy is notably a country of emigration, whereas the United States is a country of immigration. The former channels Filipinos solely into domestic work, whereas the latter accommodates Filipinos across diverse labor-market sectors. Accordingly, one migrant community is comprised mostly of the working class, whereas another includes members across a wide range of class backgrounds. Additionally, Italy only recently granted Filipino domestic workers the right to permanent residency, while the United States has long included them into the social polity. Lastly, among their many differences, one has to consider the gender composition of the community; in Italy, approximately two-thirds of all entering migrants from the Philippines are women, whereas in the United States there is a more proportionate balance between men and women.

One of the underlying questions this study asks is why migrant Filipino domestic workers in cities with different contexts of reception share similar dislocations of migration. The answer lies mostly in their shared role as low-wage laborers in global capitalism, or, to put it in other terms, as servants of globalization. By identifying the shared dislocations of migrant Filipina domestic workers, this study underscores the similarities engendered by global-

ization among low-wage migrant domestic workers in the economic centers of global capitalism (Portes, 1997).

This book thus analyzes how particular subject positions and dislocations are constituted for Filipino domestic workers in migration. I frame this analysis around two related questions: What are the particular dislocations that define the experience of migrant Filipino domestic workers, and how do they deal with these conditions?

In the first edition of *Servants of Globalization*, I described how partial citizenship resulted in an imagined diasporic community of migrant domestic workers, one that materialized through the circulation of magazines, like *Diwaniwani* and *Tinig Filipino*, across the diaspora. Although these are no longer in print, migrant domestic workers continue to communicate and build alliance with one another through other means, including social media. Many migrants thus are aware of the conditions of partial citizenship they will face but are not deterred by them. Instead, they manage their limited citizenship rights and the partial citizenship in a variety of ways. Their strategies are not uniform; some become serial migrants, whereas others pursue stepwise migration. Notably, partial citizenship also potentially deters prospective migrants from leaving the Philippines or encourages some to return home and live life as an “ex-abroad.” Still, many aspire to reach the coveted destinations of Canada, Italy, and the United States. As we will see in the subsequent chapters that detail the dislocations of family separation, distance mothering, contradictory class mobility, the crisis of masculinity among male domestic workers, and the precariousness of retirement, domestic workers in these countries, particularly Italy and the United States, still confront a number of challenges similar to their counterparts in other destinations, albeit not necessarily to the same degree of difficulty.

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NOTES

ENDNOTES TO PREFACE

1. The Italian Ministry of Interior reports 155,945 registered Filipinos with a valid permesso di soggiorno (permit to stay) or a carta di soggiorno (residence card). They remain concentrated in domestic work. See "Know Your Diaspora: Italy," *Positively Filipino*, January 1, 2013; retrieved on October 14, 2013, from <http://positivelyfilipino.com/magazine/2013/1/1/know-your-diaspora-italy>.
2. "The Chain of Love," VPRO TV, Netherlands (Episode 42 of the television program *The New World*, November 12, 2000).
3. Robert Frank, "Child Cares: To Be a U.S. Nanny, Ms. Bautista Must Hire A Nanny of Her Own," *Wall Street Journal*, December 18, 2001, A1.
4. UN-INSTRAW, "Global Care Chains: Toward a Rights-based Global Care Regime," January 2013; available at <https://unp.un.org/Details.aspx?pid=21307>.

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. For statistics on au pairs, see the Danish Immigration Service, 2012. The sizeable presence of former domestic workers in Denmark supports Cameron McDonald's (2011) categorization, which places au pairs in the realm of domestic work as opposed to seeing them as a distinct group that is merely participating in a cultural exchange program.
2. In June and July of 2012, I spent six weeks in Copenhagen, where I conducted preliminary research on Filipino au pairs. I interviewed seventeen, a handful of whom had worked in either Hong Kong or Singapore prior to entering Denmark. I located interviewees by visiting known gathering places in the community, including the Roman Catholic Church they frequented and the central train station. I also identified interviewees through the local migrant advocacy organization Babaylan-Denmark. Interviews were one to two hours in length, anonymous, and focused on the labor, migration, and family life of au pairs.

3. Nene relocated to Denmark from Singapore in 2011, not long before the Philippine government lifted its ban against the migration of au pairs to Europe on February 16, 2012. In 1988, the Philippine government banned Filipinos from leaving the country as au pairs due to a reported case of abuse in Sweden. By migrating directly from Singapore to Denmark, Nene managed to bypass the ban that would have been imposed on her as a Philippine national if she had traveled to Denmark directly from the Philippines. Migration to Denmark as an au pair does not require the facilitation of an agency, which helps keep the cost of migration low. Instead, the au pair or sponsoring family can post an advertisement on a number of websites, including www.newaupair.com/visas_copenhagen.aspx, and directly negotiate the terms of the au pair contract.
4. International Labour Organization, "Domestic Workers Convention (No. 189)," adopted on June 16, 2011, 100th ILC Session; retrieved on October 14, 2013, from www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C189.
5. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, "OFW Deployment by Occupation, Country, and Sex—New Hires, Full Year 2010"; retrieved on October 14, 2013, from www.poea.gov.ph/stats/2010%20Deployment%20by%20Occupation,%20Destination%20and%20Sex%202010%20-%20New%20hires.pdf.
6. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration OFW Statistics, "Deployment Per Skill Per Sex, 2008–2010"; retrieved on October 14, 2013, from www.poea.gov.ph/stats/statistics.html.
7. My calculation includes those deployed as caregivers and domestic helpers. The migrant worker's entry visa usually determines the category of employment. For instance, those employed as domestic workers in Israel would enter as "caregivers," whereas those who work in the United Arab Emirates would enter with a "servant visa." The former would depart the Philippines with the employment category of "caregiver," and the latter would be categorized as a "domestic helper." See POEA Statistics, "2008 Deployment by Major, Sub-Major Occupation and Sex"; retrieved on October 23, 2013, from www.poea.gov.ph/stats/Skills/Skill_Sex/Deployment%20per%20Skill%20and%20Sex%202008.pdf.
8. My calculation includes those deployed from the country as caregivers and domestic helpers. See POEA Statistics, "2009 Deployment by Major, Sub-Major Occupation and Sex"; retrieved on October 23, 2013, from www.poea.gov.ph/stats/Skills/Skill_Sex/Deployment%20per%20Skill%20and%20Sex%202009.pdf.
9. My calculation includes those deployed from the country as caregivers (9,293) and domestic helpers (96,583). See POEA Statistics, "2010 Deployment by Major, Sub-Major Occupation and Sex"; retrieved on October 14, 2013, from www.poea.gov.ph/stats/2010%20Deployment%20by%20Major,%20Sub-Major%20Occupation%20and%20Sex%202010%20-%20New%20hires.pdf.
10. The latest stock estimate of Filipinos residing overseas shows a total number of 10,455,788 individuals with 4,867,645 permanent residents, 4,513,171 temporary migrant workers, and an estimated 1,074,972 undocumented or irregular migrants. See Office of the President of Philippines Commission on Filipinos Overseas, "Global Mapping of Overseas Filipinos"; retrieved on October 15, 2013, from http://cfo.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1340%3Astock-estimate-of-overseas-filipinos&catid=134&Itemid=814. Of temporary migrant workers, most are women; figures from POEA indicate that women comprised 62.5 percent of all newly deployed temporary labor migrants from 1992 through 2007. See Philippine Migration and Development Statistical Almanac, "Total Deployment of New-Hire Temporary Contract Workers by Gender, 1992–2007"; retrieved on October 15, 2013, from http://almanac.ofwphilanthropy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=doc_view&gid=335&Itemid=5.
11. Although the Philippine government does not consider au pairs to be laborers, many scholars have argued that the category of au pair merely masks the employer–employee relationship inherent in this cultural exchange program. See Mitchell (1996), McDonald (2011), and Stenum (2011).

12. ILO, 2013: 24.

13. I base my estimation of 2,800,000 from a calculation of the percentage of female workers from the stock estimate of approximately 4.5 million temporary migrant workers in 2011. See Commission on Filipinos Overseas for the estimated figures on temporary migrant workers. This conservative estimate is based on the percentage of domestic workers among newly employed female workers reported by POEA, comprising approximately 56 percent of deployed female workers in 2009; 45 percent in 2009; and 54 percent in 2008 (POEA, 2009, 2010, 2011; retrieved on October 15, 2013, from http://cfo.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1340%3Astock-estimate-of-overseas-filipinos&catid=134&Itemid=814). For the estimated count of female workers, see POEA estimate. Of temporary migrant workers, most are women; figures from POEA indicate that women comprised 62.5 percent of all newly deployed temporary labor migrants from 1992 through 2007. See Philippine Migration and Development Statistical Almanac, "Total Deployment of New-Hire Temporary Contract Workers by Gender, 1992–2007"; retrieved on October 15, 2013, from http://almanac.ofwphilanthropy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=doc_view&gid=335&Itemid=5.

14. According to a migrant broker I met in Dubai in June 2013, this nominal fee is imposed on domestic workers only so they would feel invested on their jobs. In other words, the fee of US\$115 is supposed to deter them from quitting if faced with a difficult employer.

15. The term *migrant institutions* refers to the "sets of rules and resources which govern the actions and interactions of agents who operate within them" (Goss and Lindquist, 1995: 334).

16. I conducted sixty-seven interviews with migrant Filipina domestic workers in Singapore in July and August 2014.

17. Paul provides a fairly accurate tier system that represents the hierarchy of destinations. Most accurate in her assessment is the prevailing wage in different tiers. Yet her description of the tier system has many inaccurate claims, including the assertion that labor laws protect domestic workers in Taiwan and not in the lower-tier destination of Malaysia.

18. Further problematizing Paul's hierarchy, migrant domestic workers in the United Arab Emirates did not agree with the hierarchical distinction of West Asia as a fourth-tier destination and Southeast Asia as third tier. Many had previously worked in Malaysia and Singapore and did not see the United Arab Emirates as a worse place to work.

19. In Singapore, she had autonomy in the workplace. Still, her situation had not been ideal. One day off a month, long work hours, and a heavy workload nearly eliminated her discretionary time, thereby limiting her temporal autonomy and, some would say, her freedom.

20. Four others entered with immigrant visas they had obtained via the sponsorship of a family member, and five others entered as companions of a business investor from the Philippines. One initial interviewee entered the United States by clandestinely crossing the border from Canada.

21. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Resolution 55/25, "The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children," December 12–16, 2000; retrieved from www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/Conventions/decatoe/final_documents_2/convention_2020traff_eng.pdf.

22. In 2014, Canada changed its laws and gave domestic workers the option to live out of their employer's homes. Despite granting bound laborers a pathway to citizenship, this program is still criticized by domestic worker advocates such as the scholar Geraldine Pratt. A great number of Filipinas who enter Canada under the Live-in Caregivers Programme do not qualify for landed status because they could easily fail to meet the basic requirement of regular employment for two continuous years within a four-year period. Employers—not rarely—have let their domestic workers go before they meet the two-year requirement. Canada is restricted to those who have completed the equivalent of two years of post-secondary education (Pratt, 2012).

23. See Glenn (2012). Those restricted to live-in employment would be B-1, G-5, or A-3 visa holders. *B-1 visa holders*

G-5 visa holders work for foreign government diplomats; and A-5 visa holders are domestic workers of employees of international organizations.

24. Arguably the most rigid and restrictive sponsored-migration program is the *kafala* program in Gulf Cooperative Council nations: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Under the *kafala* system, the residency of the foreigner is contingent on her or his sponsorship by a local citizen known as the *kafel*. The *kafel* grants the foreigner permission to enter and exit and holds responsibility for the foreigner's stay. In many cases, although not always, the *kafel* must also consent to a change in employment or sponsor. In Kuwait, for example, one must have worked for a minimum of three years before qualifying to change jobs independent of her or his citizen-sponsor's consent, whereas domestic workers, regardless of years of employment, are always required to obtain the permission of their citizen-sponsor (Human Rights Watch, 2011: 554). A withdrawn sponsorship could result in the illegality of the foreigner, which is a crime that potentially results in imprisonment.
25. However, abused and illegally placed migrant workers can petition to change employers.
26. Bound labor also occurred in the United States via its Foreign Labor Certification Program.
27. In the United States, they do so via marriage. In the past, domestic workers had the opportunity to participate in the Labor Certification Program, which allowed them to transition to permanent residency. See Parreñas, 2005, for my previous discussion of this program.
28. The status of partial citizenship emerges from the contradictory forces of nationalism in economic globalization in which the denationalization of economies incites the renationalization of politics (Sassen, 1996). The increased demand for migrant labor usually goes hand in hand with heightened anti-immigrant sentiments, as immigrants are frequently used as scapegoats for the economic displacement of "native" workers in the deindustrialization of economies. Migrant workers are consequently included as laborers yet excluded as persons and imposed with limited citizenship rights.

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

Ideas presented in this chapter draw from my essay, Parreñas (2012).

1. By definition, *patriarchy* refers to the systematic inequality between men and women in any given society. In a patriarchal society, men carry greater power and privilege over women.
2. The community first assumes the cause of separation to be a "deficiency" with the wife (for example, she nags or is lazy) for not being able to hold on to her partner.
3. In the Philippines, for example, "barrenness on the part of the wife may be a ground for separation or an excuse for the husband's infidelity" (Lopez-Rodriguez, 1990: 21).
4. Italy, though known to be "the traditional 'bambini' country," has the lowest birth rate in the world at only 9.6 per 1,000 inhabitants (Beck and Beck-Gersheim, 1995: 102).
5. In making this assertion, I do not claim that Filipinas are defined racially as domestic workers. They are more so categorized and identified as nurses. Yet in the Filipino migrant community, it is known that a visible contingent of recent migrants has turned to domestic work. In a study of undocumented women in the San Francisco Bay area, Hogeland and Rosen found that 41 percent of fifty-seven survey participants from the Philippines were care providers, and an additional 23 percent were employed as housekeepers (1990: 43).
6. Reflecting Glenn's observations, Jacqueline Andall (1992) likewise finds a direct correlation between the entrance of migrant women into Italy and the entrance of native Italian women into the labor force.

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. Although I use the terms *household* and *family* interchangeably in this chapter, I generally follow the definition of the *family* as a determinate group of people usually related by marriage,

partnerships, or blood and the *household* as a "set of relationships that impose a mutual obligation to pool resources from a multiplicity of labor forms whether or not one of those resources is a common residence" (Friedman, 1984: 48). Moreover, I do not limit my view of a household to the modern conception of a residential unit inclusive of kin and nonkin (Mintz and Kellog, 1988).

2. The complexity of household maintenance is not completely captured in my typology. Extended kin are ever present and intrinsically woven in the migrant family. However, by placing individual subjects in a type of household, I limit my formulation of the family to the family of orientation for married domestic workers and the family of origin for single domestic workers. For married migrants, core family members include spouses and children. For single migrants, the core family refers to parents and siblings; however, the core families of single migrants do include married brothers and sisters and their children.
3. Although I could have placed single migrants in the category of "independent household," I found that strong family ties between single migrants and relatives in the Philippines would be nullified by classifying them as single householders. With the formulation of the category adult child(ren) abroad transnational households, I link single migrants to dependent relatives in the Philippines and emphasize the interdependent transnational ties that they sustain in migration.
4. A jeepney is a vehicle made from a U.S. military jeep left over from World War II and is a popular mode of transportation in the Philippines.
5. Although I have chosen not to profile any of the families in Los Angeles, the intergenerational relations in those families are reflected in the two that I featured here. What is different are the circumstances forcing the formation of split households, as the undocumented status of parents in Los Angeles has primarily prevented them from petitioning for the migration of their now-adult children(e).
6. A nipa hut has a bamboo structure and a roof made of nipa palm leaves.
7. According to French theorist Erienne Balibar, racism is based less on traditional biological constructs of race and more on the exclusion of immigrants as culturally unassimilable Others (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1988). He refers to this trend as "neoracism."

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. Although the state grants free public education until high school, it neither enforces nor mandates the education of children, nor does it strictly enforce children's legal protections from abuse.
2. Paz Cruz conducted a survey of 212 high school and college students with international migrant parents, as well as with ninety students with internal migrant parents living elsewhere in the Philippines.
3. Matthei and Smith (1998) also observe the tendency of parents in Belizean transnational households to commodify love.
4. Although my interviews include only a limited number of children—six in Rome—who had grown up without their mothers, my assessment of the children's perspectives also uses the survey conducted by Victoria Paz Cruz (1987), writings by children published in *Thing Filipino*, and previous interviews that I had conducted with children who had followed their parents to the United States after a prolonged period of separation.
5. Constable (1999) also recognizes the greater priority children give to emotional bonds in the family than their transnational parents in Hong Kong do.

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. Due to the greater labor market opportunities for migrants in Los Angeles, it is surprising to see a number of my interviewees having chosen to stay in domestic work. I assume that there are many women who left domestic work for more skilled employment immediately after they obtained