

ANTI-CORRUPTION

Max Weber Programme Multidisciplinary Research Workshop

14 October 2021 | 13.30 – 15.00 and 17.30 – 19.00
28 October 2021 | 17.00 – 19.00

5 November 2021 | 11.00 – 12.30 and 14.00 – 15.30
TBA | TBA
TBA | TBA

Organisers: Michele Castiglioni (MWF - SPS) and Aline Bertolin (former MWF – LAW)

Abstract:

The Anti-Corruption MWP Multidisciplinary Research Workshop aims at discussing cutting edge research on the topics of corruption measurement, prevention, displacement, and reduction. Policy-oriented research is a central focus of the workshop. The workshop format includes one hour long remote seminars. Where the research methodology employed offers itself a training opportunity, one hour long practical sessions are also be organized.

Location: Online (Zoom) and Badia Fiesolana

Program

28 October 2021 | 17.00 – 19.00

Martin J. Williams (Oxford University, Blavatnik School of Government) on “**From Paper to Practice: Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa**”

Practical session: Design and institutionalise performance-oriented reforms

Online, via Zoom (the Zoom link will be shared **after registration**)
To register, click [here](#).

Abstract

Improving the performance of the core civil service is one of the most important tasks facing government, but is also notoriously challenging. Based on studying 30 years of reforms across 6 countries in Africa, this book shows that these reforms have largely failed to achieve their goals because they have approached organizational change mainly as a matter of changing formal structures and processes through one-off projects. The book proposes a new approach in which reform is viewed not as a short period of rewriting rules but as catalyzing an ongoing process of continuous organizational change, and discusses strategies for reformers to achieve this in practice.

The workshop includes a **presentation** and **practical session**.
The practical session will take place after the presentation.

5 November 2021 | 11.00 – 12.30 and 14.00 – 15.30

Isabela Mares (Yale University) on “Reforms limiting electoral irregularities in first wave democracies”

Practical Session: Designing the book ‘Conditionality and Coercion’

Hybrid, in person (Badia Fiesolana) and online (Zoom)

TBA | TBA

Raúl Sánchez De La Sierra (University of Chicago, Harris School of Public Policy) on “Corruption (With a Hierarchy)”

Hybrid, in person (Badia Fiesolana) and online (Zoom)

TBA | TBA

Sultan Mehmood (The New Economic School) on “The impact of Presidential appointment of judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?”

Abstract:

A central idea in the institutions and development literature is whether the executive is adequately checked by the legislature and judiciary (North, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 2004). This paper provides plausibly causal evidence on how increased constraints on the executive, through removal of Presidential discretion in judicial appointments, impacts judicial decision-making. In particular, we find that when the judge selection procedure in Pakistan changed, from the President appointing judges to appointments by judge peers, rulings in favor of the government decreased significantly and the quality of judicial decisions improved. The age structure of judges at the time of the reform and the mandatory retirement age law provide us with an exogenous source of variation in the implementation of the selection reform. We test for and provide evidence against potential threats to identification and alternative explanations for our findings. The analysis of mechanisms reveals that our results are explained by rulings in politically salient cases and by “patronage” judges who hold political office prior to their appointments. According to our estimates, Presidential appointment of judges results in additional land expropriations by the government worth 0.14 percent of GDP every year.

Online, via Zoom

Past sessions of this workshop:

14 October 2021 | 13.30 – 15.00 and 17.30 – 19.00

Cesi Cruz (University of California, Los Angeles) and **Julien Labonne** (Oxford University, Blavatnik School of Government) on “Making Policies Matter: Voter Responses to Campaign Promises”

Practica Session I: Field experiments in difficult political settings

Abstract:

Can campaign promises change voter behavior, even where clientelism and vote buying are pervasive? We elicit multidimensional campaign promises from political candidates in consecutive mayoral elections in the Philippines. Voters who are randomly informed about these promises rationally update their beliefs about candidates, along both policy and valence dimensions. Those who receive information about current promises are more likely to vote for candidates with policy promises closest to their own preferences. Those informed about current and past campaign promises reward incumbents who fulfilled their past promises; they perceive them to be more honest and competent. However, voters with clientelist ties to candidates respond weakly to campaign promises. A structural model allows us to disentangle information effects on beliefs and preferences by comparing actual incumbent vote shares with shares in counterfactual elections: both effects are substantial. Even in a clientelist democracy, counterfactual incumbent vote shares deviate more from actual shares when policy and valence play no role in campaigning than when vote-buying plays no role. Finally, a cost benefit analysis reveals that vote-buying is nevertheless more effective than information campaigns, explaining why candidates do not use them.

This Workshop Session is organised in two moments:

- At lunchtime, 13:30-15:00, Julien Labonne (Oxford) will present the paper “Making Policies Matter: Voter Responses to Campaign Promises”.
- In the afternoon, 17:30-19:00, Cesi Cruz (UCLA) will give a practical session “How to conduct field experiments in difficult political settings” (see details and requirements below).

N.B. To take part in the practical session, the following reading are required:

- List, John A. 2011. "Why Economists Should Conduct Field Experiments and 14 Tips for Pulling One Off." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 25 (3).
- Research Methods Knowledge Base by William Trochim (2001). Chapter 7. Manuscript available online. (<https://conjointly.com/kb/experimental-design/>)

Online, via Zoom (the Zoom link will be shared after registration)

To register, click [here](#).