Integration and culture: From ‘communicative competence’ to ‘competence of plurality’ (Draft Version)

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Integration is a reciprocal process in which the efforts of those who are permitted to remain in Austria must without doubt be greater. Because the basic values of Austrian society are non-negotiable and must therefore be followed. (S. Kurz Integrationsbericht 2016, 5)

In its terminological considerations, Expert Counsel rejects a notion of culture that can be defined only vaguely and is ideologically loaded. A static and essentialist notion of culture would not do justice to the reality of a pluralistic and changing migration society. Indeed, at the “end of the road” there awaits neither a perfectly assimilated society, nor a patchwork of diverse social groups that has become estranged from itself, but a plural togetherness that must continually be re-negotiated. Both sides of the migration society must therefore develop, in addition to a competence involving inclusion and integration, something like a competence of plurality, because from a longitudinal perspective society is becoming more similar and diverse at the same time. Correspondingly, integration will in any event continue to be seen as a two-sided process whose functioning requires effort. (H. Fassmann Integrationsbericht 2016, 85)

1. Introduction: defining relevant notions

1.1. Integration
The two quotes above indicate two significantly different positions on a continuum of total rejection of the ‘other’ to total acceptance of the ‘other’. In-between, we detect many other approaches to culture and integration: ‘integration’ understood as ‘assimilation’, ‘integration as living in parallel societies’, ‘integration as respect for the ‘other’ and so forth. Importantly, the second quote, written by the so-called Austrian expert committee for integration (Expertenrat) consisting of an interdisciplinary group of scholars in various fields specializing in migration studies (linguists, demographers, legal scholars and political scientists), journalists, architects and urban planners, as well as various NGOs, emphasizes the danger of essentializing culture as static and homogeneous, as a discrete category, something which you possess or do not, something which one can acquire as an ‘entity’, or cannot. Following Heinz Fassman, chair of Expertenrat (see above), integration should be perceived as negotiating and co-constructing a pluralist society, as negotiating, co-constructing and adopting practices of relevant domains in a society – practices which, of course, are always open to change. Whereas the Austrian Minister for Integration (and Foreign Affairs), Sebastian Kurz – in spite of praising the expert committee and its work – argues that immigrants are obviously required to invest more work in order to cope with the norms and values of the host society1. Thus, learning and accepting the constitutive values of the host society are defined as the *sine qua non* of successful integration.

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1 See also “50 Punkte Plan zur Integration” (2015) of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Integration (file:///C:/Users/RW/Downloads/50_Punkte_Plan_zur_Integration%20(1).pdf)
As Miller (2016, 9) maintains, “In earlier times ... immigrants were left to their own devices so long as they did not become involved in illegal or antisocial behaviour”. Nowadays, Miller (Ibid, 9ff.) argues that “the contemporary democratic state cannot take such a hands-off view: it wants and needs immigrants to become good, upstanding citizens. And achieving this may involve encouraging or even requiring them to shed some of the cultural baggage they bring with them.” However, it is obvious that such decisions are not easy to take – which benefits should immigrants enjoy, what are the costs and benefits, and which cultural or religious beliefs are perceived as not being fit for Western societies or actually clash with common and widely accepted routines and knowledges? In this paper, I have to neglect the important political and philosophical debates elaborated in Miller’s recent book Strangers in our Midst (2016). Suffice to state that many decisions about rights and obligations (apart from the foundational human rights), on the side of immigrants and the host society, are strongly influenced by many contextual factors (such as the numbers of immigrants, their countries of origin, levels of xenophobia in the host country, time factors, levels of education, gender politics and so forth).

In this vein, Ager and Strang (2008) introduce a conceptual framework which defines core domains of integration (pp. 169–70)² (Fig. 1, below). In this model, they propose four dimensions. First, they distinguish between markers and means (such as employment, housing, education and health), defined as key aspects of integrating into a society. Furthermore, they argue that citizenship and rights are to be assumed as the constitutive foundation for integration. Of course, these are dependent on notions of nationhood, citizenship and rights, which vary across settings, due to national traditions, policies and identity politics. (Ibid, 176)

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² In this context, see also Carvill et al. (2016), Delanty et al. (2011), Krzyżanowski & Wodak (2009), Messer et al. 2011), Penninx et al. (2008) and Schmiederer (20130, who all discuss different models and forms of political, legal and cultural integration. Moreover, I also rely on the Migration Policy Index 2015 (MIPEX), but I have to restrict myself to cultural – and, even more specifically, linguistic-communicative – integration in this paper, due to reasons of space and expertise.
Figure 1: Integration Model (adapted from Ager & Strang 2008, 170).

The third dimension in this model relates to social connection, i.e. investigation of the processes that mediate between foundational principles and public outcomes in the first dimension (markers and means). In other words, how do feelings of ‘belonging’ evolve, when are migrants accepted and when do they feel accepted in communities of practice? For example, Delanty et al. (2011) were able to illustrate in much detail, while analysing data from 48 focus groups with migrants from different ethnic origins in eight European member states in the EU-funded project XENOPHOB, that foundational rights (such as having acquired citizenship), fluency in the host language and so forth, do not necessarily imply access, respect and acceptance; access to housing and the labour market remains difficult due to prejudices and discriminatory beliefs. Social bonds, social bridges and facilitators are viewed as essential mediators in transcending various thresholds and gatekeepers in the complex process of integration (Ager & Strang 2008, 179–81).

Such facilitators were studied, for instance, in a recent ethnography of a Pakistani family, moving to the UK, over several years. Indeed, the entire trajectory of applying for language tests, visas, residence permits and work permits, up to settling in a small town in Lancashire, was observed and recorded (Capstick 2015). Capstick (2015, 228) concludes his study by stating:

By employing the concept of ‘cultural brokerage’ to emphasize the bridge it provides between dominant and non-dominant knowledge, the decisive role of brokers in negotiating the links between individuals’ everyday non-dominant literacies and dominant institutions’ bureaucratic literacies enables researchers to explore issues of power when examining the relationship between local and global contexts in migration. This is because literacy events like completing a visa form invoke broader cultural patterns of literacy practices, such as registering marriages, and provide opportunities for migrants to appropriate bureaucratic literacy practices in order to make successful visa applications. For example, the British Pakistani immigration solicitor in Preston understands both the Mirpuri tradition of providing work for spouses of family members as well as the British government’s immigration and employment law relating to visa requirements and visa sponsors’
salaries. The literacy events which instantiate these practices, such as the completion of visa forms by a cultural broker who is able to draw on her understanding of dominant and non-dominant contexts, are shaped by the priorities of individuals who have much to lose if visa applications fail. Thus, when bureaucratic literacies have significant personal as well as practical consequences for the whole family, migrants are able to draw on wider community networks which allow them to comply with the institutional requirements which shape the family’s lives in both the UK and Pakistan.

It becomes apparent that without cultural and literacy brokers this family would never have been able to enter the UK legally and successfully. This is why Ager and Strang (2008, 182) rightly identify a fourth dimension in their model, the dimension of language and cultural knowledge as well as perceptions of safety and stability. The latter aspects are particularly relevant if refugees, for instance, have encountered traumatic events during their flight.

It also becomes apparent, however, that the four dimensions in the model discussed above are connected and related with each other in very intricate, complex and context-dependent ways, which have to be investigated both quantitatively (by surveys, document and policy analysis, and interviews) and qualitatively (by focus groups, ethnography, online ethnography, discourse and semiotic analysis of images and other genres, and so forth) in order to be able to assess positive and negative forms of integration. Accordingly, MIPEX (2015) states in its ‘International Key Findings’ that “the links between integration policies and outcomes are not always clear. Some countries actively improve their policies to respond to problems on the ground while others ignore them ... Researchers using MIPEX around the world find that the countries with inclusive integration policies also tend to be more developed, competitive and happier places for immigrants and everyone to live in” (p. 9). In this way, a drop in the MIPEX score usually indicates a rise in anti-immigrant attitudes and of far-right parties.

1.2. Negotiating culture

When following the dominant political and media debates throughout Europe and the EU (and beyond), one is struck by a quite consistent hierarchy of values which is presented as the hegemonic value system of the West. Apart from the central role of the national language which should be acquired (Wodak 2011, 2012, 2015a, 90ff; see below), specific areas are highlighted and perceived as salient for ‘us’, for democratic and secular European states which have signed up to the Human Rights Charter and other international treaties (such as the Geneva Convention) and have – it is presupposed – implemented gender equality, anti-discrimination laws, high standards of justice and education, and so forth. Subsequently, a huge Manichean contrast emerges between (an educated, liberal and progressive) West and (a retarded, undemocratic and uneducated) East, two solidified and homogenous blocs, with nothing in-between. Accordingly, we observe a culturalization of discourse (Yilmaz 2016, 17), i.e. a right such as freedom of speech being transformed into a cultural value, although rights have certainly not developed via cultural evolution but rather as a result of political struggles, revolutions and abrupt breaks with the past (e.g.
Chanock 2000). Indeed, as Soysal (2009, 5) argues, culture has become the dominant frame for political issues and policies such as citizenship, security, the economy and so forth. It seems that culture can be defined as a floating/empty signifier onto which politicians, media and lay persons are able to project whatever problems or categories they choose (Yilmaz 2016, 18ff.).

It is important, therefore, to discuss culture in more differentiated terms. Miller (2016, 141ff) draws a line between public and private culture. He argues that we can distinguish, on the one hand, the culture of the wider society (i.e. its language, symbols and institutions). On the other hand, there are different religions, forms of art and literature, a variety of cuisines and respective mother tongues. But where, how and when should this thin line be drawn? Immigrants will probably wish to retain many symbols of their own culture and integrate them with the host culture; the host society, however, expects identification with its national identity and (banal) symbols (Billig 1995; Rheindorf & Wodak 2016). A problem arises most vehemently – as can be observed across Europe and beyond – in the case of religion, i.e. when specific religious beliefs and practices collide with elements of the host society’s culture. Miller (Ibid, 149) concludes that “full cultural integration requires that members of the indigenous majority understand why the private cultures of immigrants need to be accommodated and offer ungrudging support for the measures needed, and that the immigrants themselves understand and embrace the public culture of the society they have joined”. In view of the highly controversial debates about the burqa and the headscarf as metonymic tropes for Muslim and indeed Islamist religion and related oppression of women, Miller’s proposals might be considered utopian (Wodak 2015b, 151 ff.).

Reviewing anti-Muslim rhetoric in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century reveals that specific iconic images of the ‘female’ have become the ultimate ‘Other’. Countless political debates have surrounded and continue to surround the so-called ‘headscarf’ (hijab: a scarf that covers the hair and sometimes the shoulders) and the ‘burqa’ (which covers the hair, face (except the eyes) and entire body) as symbols of uncivilised, barbaric Islam and of oppressed women who should be liberated by the rules of Western culture. In this enterprise, interestingly, right-wing populist movements have aligned with some left-wing intellectuals and parties, as well as many feminists, all assuming and presupposing that all veiled Muslim women are forced to wear headscarves or the burqa and that the West faces a twofold challenge and responsibility: to protect women from oppression by Islam; and to empower and liberate oppressed Muslim women. In this context, Hammerl (2016) points to many hypocritical, contradictory and fallacious arguments: thus, the burqa is accepted if worn by rich Saudi tourists, but it is not accepted if worn by poor Afghan refugees; the liberation of Muslim women is called for by right-wing populist politicians who, simultaneously, campaign against Free Choice or equal pay for women and men, and so forth.
Furthermore, I argue that the debate about culture and Islam is primarily fought in an attempt to discipline the female body (Wodak 2015b). This anti-Muslim discourse is instrumentalised to cover up other socio-political and – most importantly – socio-economic agendas: Indeed, appeals to liberate women from ‘textual-sexual oppression’ (Amin 2015) unite more voters around a right-wing populist agenda than do anti-modernisation and anti-globalisation agendas. Such a dichotomisation renders it very difficult, if not impossible, for progressive Muslim women to criticize fundamentalist patriarchal positions.

Marsdal (2013) convincingly deconstructs the traditional left-right cleavage with respect to a change in voting behaviour related to social class in detail. He emphasises that votes for (moral) values have replaced votes for parties and amply illustrates (e.g. with developments in Norway) that:

...[c]lass issues are shoved into the background and value issues come to the fore. Tensions over economic distribution and fairness are demobilized. This takes place, however, at the top level of party politics, and not in society. In society, economic and social inequalities and tensions have been rising over the last decades, not only in Denmark, but also all over Europe. The political demobilizing of class conflicts does not take place because most voters have come to emphasize value issues more than class issues, which they do not have, but rather because, under the neo-liberal elite consensus on class issues, confrontation on moral and cultural issues (‘values’) has become the only available means of party-political and ideological demarcation [...]. Economic policy debates are dull and grey. Then, someone says something about the Muslim veil and media hell breaks loose. (Ibid, 51–52)

This observation provides evidence for Yilmaz’s claim that “the culturalization of discourse has changed the understanding of politics as site where problems caused by cultural encounters are handled” (Yilmaz 2016, 18). Accordingly, he identifies a ‘hegemony of the cultural paradigm’ (Ibid, 19).

In the following, I first provide a brief overview of multilingualism policies in the European Union as the broad context for the subsequent implementation of national language and KoS (Knowledge of Society) tests in the form of NAPs (National Action Plans). Here, I draw primarily on surveys conducted by the Council of Europe. I then summarise two empirical case studies which serve to illustrate some complex challenges to ‘cultural integration’: First, are the results of a study of Austrian political and media discourses (2015/16) regarding the term ‘Integrationsunwilligkeit’ (‘unwillingness to integrate’). This term is employed in order to legitimate punitive measures for migrants and refugees already living in Austria once they are perceived to reject ‘our values’. This discourse emerged as reaction to the terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015; some politicians linked potential terrorism and radicalization to Integrationsunwilligkeit allegedly manifested by male Muslim adolescents. Consequently, debates about positive measures for integration were backgrounded. Secondly, I discuss the results from an ongoing study – INPUT – on language acquisition by children with and without a Turkish background, in correlation with parental linguistic input. INPUT provides evidence that socio-economic status overrides ethnic origin, i.e. children who receive more support from their parents and grow up in HSES (high
socio-economic status) families learn German faster than children from LSES, regardless of migrant background. These results obviously contradict many school curricula designed specifically for migrants (children and adults), while neglecting other relevant variables.

2. Language competence and language tests

2.1. EU multilingual vs national monolingual policies

European multilingualism has been defined as an essential component of the future construction of a European identity, or of European identities, and for the preservation of national, regional, local, societal and individual multilingualism. The importance of language learning, for example, has been repeatedly stressed by various European authorities in declarations of political intent on matters of language, education and pedagogy (e.g. Article 2 of the European Cultural Convention, 19 December 1954; ‘Recommendation 814 on Modern Languages in Europe’ from the Council of Europe, 5 October 1977; the KSZE final document of 1 August 1975). In the Maastricht and Amsterdam 2000 treaties, the EU committed itself to European multilingualism, which was echoed by the Council of Europe’s Resolution from the Committee of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) ‘Recommendation concerning modern languages (98)’.

The last of these warns explicitly “of the dangers that might result from marginalisation of those who lack the skills necessary to communicate in an interactive Europe” (ibid.) and states inter alia in its Appendix that:

[S]teps should be taken to ensure that there is parity of esteem between all the languages and cultures involved so that children in each community may have the opportunity to develop oracy and literacy in the language of their own community as well as to learn to understand and appreciate the language and culture of the other. (Ibid, Appendix 2.2)

The recommendations also stress that governments should “[C]ontinue to promote bilingualism in immigrant areas or neighbourhoods and support immigrants in learning the language of the area in which they reside” (Ibid, Appendix 2.3). It is important to emphasise that the Council of Europe endorses a more nuanced notion of plurilingualism than does the European Union (i.e. the Commission). Nevertheless, in a ‘White Paper on Education and Training’, issued by the European Commission, it is stated that “[L]anguages are also the key to knowing other people. Proficiency in languages helps to build up the feeling of being European with all its cultural wealth and diversity and of understanding between the citizens of Europe” (European Commission 1995, 67, my emphasis). Between 2005 and 2007, the EU recognised the relevance to policy of language and multilingualism by adding a multilingualism portfolio to the remit of the Union’s Commissioner on Education and Culture. The key document of that period – ‘The new framework strategy for multilingualism’ (European Commission 2005) – argues for the Commission’s

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See [www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/migrants2_EN.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/migrants2_EN.asp)#P110_13141.
“commitment to multilingualism in the European Union” (Ibid., 1) and for “promoting multilingualism in European society, in the economy and in the Commission itself” (Ibid.). By arguing that multilingualism is not only good for the European economy but also for a ‘social Europe’ and the democratisation of the EU, it places multilingualism between major EU discourses: the discourse on democratisation, and the discourse on the knowledge-based economy. In the same period the EU also proposed – for the first time – a policy-relevant definition of multilingualism. It argues that “multilingualism refers to both a person’s ability to use several languages and the co-existence of different language communities in one geographical area” (Ibid, 3). The document states that:

The European Union is founded on ‘unity in diversity’: diversity of cultures, customs and beliefs – and of languages... It is this diversity that makes the European Union what it is: not a ‘melting pot’ in which differences are rendered down, but a common home in which diversity is celebrated, and where our many mother tongues are a source of wealth and a bridge to greater solidarity and mutual understanding. (Ibid, 2)

In 2007, however, in discourses related to the Lisbon Strategy of the early 2000s, we witness a (return to) rhetoric oriented towards skills and competences (Krzyżanowski & Wodak 2011; Wodak 2011a, b). The European Multilingualism Strategy has recently adopted a new and broader understanding of the social, political and economic role of languages and multilingualism. Sadly, in the wake of the 2008 crisis and because of the transfer of the Multilingualism Portfolio of the European Commission to Education, Culture and Youth in 2010, most of the key provisions of the policies elaborated above have not yet been implemented. It is, however, clear that multilingualism and support for both individuals’ and collectives’ language identities form part and parcel of European language policies.

These policies – as will be illustrated below – contradict national language policies in some EU member states in many respects. National policies, however, exert major influence on language requirements for migrants from non-EU countries. In fact, many national politicians endorse the so-called Leitsprachenmodell (a model which proposes that the language of the majority should serve all communicative purposes), thus contradicting the European language policies mentioned above, which emphasise multilingualism and the equality of languages and diversity. As sociolinguist Michael Clyne famously stated, “[E]uropean integration was never intended to mean homogenization. One of its aims has always been unity within diversity and this should be one of its contributions to the world” (Clyne 2003, 40).

2.2. Culture and Communication
Via naturalisation regulations, the 27 member states of the European Union (EU) determine who belongs or does not belong to the European Union, and thus who remains ‘outside’ and who is allowed to venture ‘inside’ Europe, i.e. the European Union (e.g. Bauböck &
Goodman-Wallace 2012). Naturalisation conditions vary enormously: In 1998, only six states had citizenship and/or language tests; by 2010, the number had grown to 18, by 2014 to 23 (see Table 1; note, however, that the situation is constantly changing). Moreover, requirements and the content of tests also vary. Orgad (2010, 69–70) rightly states with respect to German citizenship tests that they:

Mirror not only what German culture is, but also what the Germans want it to be. Although the Länder tests have been replaced by a federal test, they indicate an ideological concept of Kulturnation.

By adopting these policies, Germany embraces a strict rule of forced cultural assimilation.

Many European countries are promoting a re/nationalisation with respect to language and culture – in spite of being part of the multilingual and multicultural EU (see above). The concept of ‘mother tongue’ as a salient prerequisite of belonging has become part and parcel of new citizenship laws, regulations and requirements, advocated or even championed not only by the far right but also by mainstream political parties in government.
Table 1: Citizenship and language requirements in selected EU countries (A indicates a language test before entering; B a language test required for a work permit; C a language test required for citizenship) 4

In the following, I summarize some results from a survey conducted by the Working Group: Linguistic Integration of Adult Migrants (from the Language Policy Division of the Council of Europe; LIAM) in 2013/14, in 36 European countries (thus including more than the 27 EU member states). This survey illustrates the variation across the investigated countries. The key document opens with the following mission statement:

The findings reported here, considered in the context of Recommendations and Resolutions of the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, underline the constant need to reflect critically on the appropriateness and effectiveness of aspects of our language integration policies while taking fully into consideration the implications for human rights, the rule of law and participation in the life of democratic society. This is a logical and necessary step in the continuous process of ensuring that any requirements enacted and accompanying language provision actually correspond to the real needs and capacities of migrants in their diversity, and that they reinforce their motivation to develop their plurilingual profile within a continuing process of integration. While of course language is an important instrument in this process, in itself it is not an indicator of how successful integration actually is.

The following indicators were included in the survey (its results were also compared to two previous surveys; 20 countries responded to all three surveys) (p.8):

- Optional/compulsory integration programme
- Language tests prior to entry
- Optional/compulsory official language classes
- Use of CEFR proficiency levels to define requirements
- Cost to migrants
- Sanctions for non-attendance or low attendance at language courses
- Quality of courses
- Optional/compulsory knowledge-of-society course
- Optional/compulsory testing of language proficiency and knowledge of host society
- Cost to candidates
- Sanctions if test not taken or failed
- Course curriculum
- Is the effectiveness of programmes measured?

More than half of the participating countries (20/36) indicated that they attach a language requirement to other purposes besides entry, residence and citizenship. For 12 countries other purposes include obtaining a work permit/gaining access to the labour market. In another six countries a language requirement must be fulfilled to obtain a long-term residence permit, often in the case of family reunification. Two countries attach a language requirement to higher education and training programmes. Nine countries reported a pre-

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entry language requirement (usually A1, only one country requires A2\textsuperscript{5}): Austria, Albania, Germany, Finland, France, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Poland (only in the case of certain regulated professions) and the UK.

Several states offer significantly more and better provision than others in terms of language lessons and second language acquisition: Migrants are obliged to take a language course in 12 of the 23 countries that attach a language requirement to the granting of a residence permit. Of the 22 participating countries that attach a language requirement to a residence permit, 14 provide official language courses. Attendance is compulsory in four countries and optional in eight. The CEFR reference levels range from A1.1 to B2. The shortest course lasts 75 hours, the longest 3,000. To bring learners to level A2, one country provides a course lasting 75 hours, another 180 hours, and a third 364 hours. Language courses for adult migrants are provided by adult education centres, schools, institutions of HE and institutions funded by Ministries of Culture, Internal Affairs or Employment – or by NGOs or volunteers.

In 26 countries migrants are legally obliged to demonstrate a specified level of competence in a/the language of the host country in order to obtain citizenship. Nineteen countries that attach a language requirement to citizenship also attach one to residence. In 2007, 12 of the 20 countries that participated in all three surveys indicated that they had such legislation, by 2013 17 countries had language requirements (A) prior to entry, (B) for residence and/or (C) for citizenship.

Moreover, 18 countries organise a knowledge-of-society (KoS) programme for migrants seeking a residence permit; attendance is obligatory in eight countries and optional in 11. In nine countries migrants are required to take a KoS test. In almost all cases, KoS tests for citizenship are in written form. Four countries (Germany, Liechtenstein, Lithuania and the UK) have multiple-choice tests, three countries (Germany, the Netherlands and the UK) computer-based tests. In Greece, the test is part of an oral interview with a representative of the Naturalization Council; in Switzerland some cantons have a written test (possibly computer-based), while others examine KoS in an oral interview; in Lithuania the written test can be replaced by an oral test in cases of special need.

In sum, the following states require language for residence and citizenship: Austria since 2011, Bosnia-Herzegovina, France and the Netherlands since 2012, Denmark and the UK since 2013. Altogether there were 18 changes between 2009 and 2013 and none further ones planned in 2013. Furthermore, if one considers the 42 states which participated in at

least one of the three surveys, 15 states have introduced a legal language requirement since 2008. In most cases, knowledge of the language is required for residence and the acquisition of citizenship. This applies to 19 countries, mostly in Western Europe. Another notable trend is an increase in the amount of legislation concerning language requirements from 2009 to 2013 compared with 2007–2009. From 2007 to 2009, 11 new laws were passed, in the period from 2009 to 2013 18, with nine new ones planned after 2013. Lastly, a distinction exists between the so-called *interventionist countries* in northern Europe and those in the south, but there are also less demanding countries alongside these two groups. In Eastern Europe, the issue of migration management is less important, given the low levels of immigration.

The authors of the survey conclude, that

The ability of a democratic state to integrate migrants depends equally on their own willingness – which needs to be supported as regards language learning – and on the intercultural sensitivity of the community of citizens. This must be enhanced by educating all citizens in linguistic and cultural diversity, which has proven to be an invaluable source of enrichment throughout European history. (Ibid, 33).

3. Case Studies

3.1. The Culturalization of Discourse – Debating “Unwillingness to Integrate (*Integrationsunwilligkeit*)”

Detailed linguistic analyses illustrate how *Integrationsunwilligkeit* came to briefly dominate Austrian political and media discourse. To trace the “life history” of this term, we combined qualitative and quantitative linguistic methods to show its frequency, collocates, contextualization and instrumentalization in legitimizing ever-stricter policies (see Rheindorf 2016 and Wodak 2015a for extensive analyses and discussion).

The discourse on integration is represented by a corpus of 3,200 texts compiled from 11 nationwide newspapers in Austria (i.e. *Der Standard, Die Presse, Heute, Kleine Zeitung, Kronen Zeitung, Kurier, Oberösterreichische Nachrichten, Österreich, Salzburger Nachrichten, Tiroler Tageszeitung, Wiener Zeitung*) as well as four magazines (*Profil, News, Biber, Die Zeit*). In early 2015, the discourse on integration converges with two other discourses, i.e. the *discourse on educational reform* (which focuses on teachers taking on new responsibilities with respect to the integration of children with migrant backgrounds) and the *discourse on terrorism* (focusing on so-called Islamic State as an initially external but increasingly internal threat, embodied by radicalized young adults and schoolchildren sympathizing with or joining the terrorist group). The convergence of these three discourses constitutes the immediate discursive context of the term *Integrationsunwilligkeit* in Austrian political discourse.
“Integration” is primarily discursively constructed as cultural and, more specifically, linguistic assimilation (Permoser & Rosenberger 2012). Among other things, this has meant that language policy in Austria regarding languages other than German and the constitutionally protected linguistic minorities (Croatian, Romanès, Slovakian, Slovenian, Czech, Hungarian, Austrian Sign Language) is rather restrictive (de Cillia 2012; de Cillia & Vetter 2013). Acting individually, for example, schools have repeatedly tried to prohibit children with migration backgrounds from speaking their L1 during breaks while in the school grounds (de Cillia 2012; e.g. Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999). Disciplining those who do not comply has been an integral part of related discourses for decades, most notably in the form of the “Integration Agreement” as part of Austrian residence law (since 2003, amended in 2005 and 2011). The provisions of the Integration Agreement apply only to immigrants from non-EU states, who must sign it if they want to obtain a right to residence. The language requirements here specify three stages: A1 before immigration, A2 within two years under penalty of deportation, and B1 within five years of residence in Austria.

The discourse on Integrationsunwilligkeit comprises 280 texts from the aforementioned sources, published between 20 January and 5 February 2015. Its onset is marked by three events: a resolution passed in the regional parliament of Styria – explicitly linking the terrorist attacks in Paris to “a lack of integration” and calling for a legal definition of “Tatbestände”, i.e. punishable offences, under the heading of Integrationsunwilligkeit (Resolution 3237/6, 20.01.2015) – and two subsequent newspaper interviews promoting the concerns of the said resolution. The two interviews were given on the same day by two prominent politicians of the center-left SPÖ, Franz Voves and Hans Niessl, then Governors of the Austria Federal Provinces of Styria and Burgenland, respectively. Both were campaigning in regional elections, faced with declining popularity and increasing pressure from the right-wing populist Freedom Party (FPÖ) propagating a politics of fear and securitization (Wodak 2015a, b). The supposedly divergent behaviour identified by them as indicative of said “unwillingness” comprised absences from class at school, wearing a “headscarf”, speaking a language other than German in school breaks and disrespecting female teachers.

The measures suggested to counteract these undesired behaviours can only be qualified as punishments, ranging from community service and severe fines of € 1,000 to (on failure to pay) imprisonment, loss of welfare, loss of citizenship or even deportation. It is not surprising that the two interviews triggered a strong response, more so than the resolution itself, because the latter had not included any specific suggestions for punishable behaviours or punishments. To indicate the terminological effect these interviews have had on discourses on migration and integration in general, and in the Austrian media in particular, Figure 2 shows the average frequency/week for the term
*Integrationsunwilligkeit* on the World Wide Web (Austrian domains only) and in Austrian newspapers for the past decade; Figure 3 focuses on the same data for a more narrowly defined period centred on the discourse strand analyzed here.

Both figures indicate that the gradually increasing use of the term on the Web was not matched by corresponding use in the Austrian media. Indeed, the term and its derivatives
remained a marginal phenomenon up until the interviews and subsequent reporting, when their use peaked. At least in the short run, the interviews established the term as a fixture in Austrian media and, by implication, public discourse.

The discourse strand stands out from the overall discourse on integration through articulating the alleged lack or unwillingness to integrate with (a) schoolchildren, (b) Islamist terrorism and (c) punishments. Those suspected and accused of being “unwilling” are mainly schoolchildren, also referred to as boys and sons more frequently than as girls and daughters. Indeed, familial relations play an important role as this group is also represented as families and parents, fathers more frequently than mothers. The third most common form of representation is linked to a topos of difference, emphasizing their alleged difference as migrants, immigrants, Turks, foreigners, Muslims or minorities. The fourth most common way of representing this group is by reducing them to the quality of being “unwilling” in a nominalized form. Less frequent are neutral representations as (fellow) human beings, women and men.

This, then, marks a notable shift in the political discourse on integration, which is now informed by three main argumentative patterns:

- **Integration through achievement**: If Austrians are an industrious and diligent people, and foreigners are not, then to be successful (demonstrating such qualities) is to become (more) Austrian. Note that the seemingly liberal evocation of the “entrepreneurial migrant” is embedded in a strictly paternalistic view of integration in which migrants must be pushed if not forced for their own good (de Cillia & Preisinger 2012).
- **Integration through language competence**: If the national language of Austria is German, then to acquire language competence in German is to become (more) Austrian.
- **Integration through punishment**: If noncompliance with desired behaviours is indicative of (cultural) otherness, any means to enforce compliance will help the offenders become (more) Austrian and prevent radicalization.

The former two arguments have been employed to legitimize hegemonic politics implemented in policies for considerable time; the third argument, however, is a recent innovation tied to the discursive construction of religious and cultural tensions between a homogenous Self (white, Christian, German-speaking) and an Other (coloured, Muslim, non-German-speaking) living inside Austrian borders, and thus an internal threat to national integrity. Where previously policies had referred to the need to integrate as well as to criteria for integration by which to measure the success or failure of integration, the terminology has now obviously shifted to accommodate a vague blaming strategy (scapegoating). Moreover, the focus of media and political attention seems to have shifted from ‘integration’ to an ‘unwillingness to integrate’, providing an example of the culturalization of discourse on integration.
3.2. The salience of social (in)equality for (second) language acquisition, regardless of ethnic background

In contrast to many expert opinions and migration research, socio- and psycholinguistic research confirms that the socio-economic status of small children has more impact on the acquisition of language (L1 and L2) than ethnic origin. Indeed, this is not surprising as these results confirm some foundational theories of sociolinguistics since the 1970s, e.g. from Basil Bernstein and his collaborators. When Bernstein wrote about language he was not referring to systems of grammar, syntax and vocabulary, the structures of language systems, but to the social relationships that make up institutions, such as families. He was interested in the way social relationships align and order ideas, characterized as the grammar of the social in contradistinction to the grammar of linguistics. He argued that working-class children participate in different kinds of social interaction with parents than do middle-class children and, even more importantly, that fractions within the middle classes are oriented to meaning in different ways.

In the INPUT project, the researchers study 24 parent-child dyads living in Vienna, Austria, i.e. in a predominantly German-speaking environment (see Korecky-Kröll et al. 2015 for details). Half of the children are bilingual and speak Turkish mainly at home and German mainly in kindergarten, half of them are monolingual German-speaking. Their age range is from 3 y 2 m to 3 y 6 m (mean age: 3 y 4 m). The groups are balanced for socio-economic status (SES) and almost balanced for gender:6 Austroturkish HSES (high socioeconomic status) vs LSES (low socioeconomic status), monolingual HSES vs LSES (Korecky et al., in press). The main caretaker was identified as the person that spent the most time with the target child or the person whom the child was most closely attached to (in all cases but one, this was the mother). Whereas HSES parents are known to use more conversation-eliciting speech acts, LSES parents often show a behaviour-directing conversation style. The most salient intermediary results among many are that the cleavage between HSES and LSES input and output is stronger with Austrian monolingual speakers than among Austroturkish children, and that a surprisingly large part of HSES Austroturkish children develop some of their German language skills earlier and faster than typical LSES native speakers of Austrian German.

In the following, I focus only on pragmatic variables as one of many examples, such as the acquisition of speech acts, although the project has been investigating a wide range of linguistic indicators (data were collected via interviews, participant observation, storytelling and picture descriptions, as well as competence tests). Especially, directive speech

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6 The data of this study are part of Project SSH11-027 "Investigating Parental and Other Caretakers’ Utterances to Kindergarten Children (INPUT)" that is supported by the Vienna Science and Technology Fund (WWTF).
acts provide an interesting testing ground for exploring different conversation styles (e.g. Hoff et al. 2002): parental conversation style is closely related to the socio-economic status of families. Parents from HSES backgrounds,7 who mostly have broader knowledge of child development and child care issues (Rowe 2008), are more responsive to their children’s verbalizations, initiate and sustain conversation with their children more frequently and encourage them more often to talk by asking them questions (Hoff 2003). HSES parents also tend to formulate requests in an indirect way, e.g. in the forms of questions, such as “Why don’t you pick up the toys for me?” On the other hand, parents from LSES backgrounds, who often experience greater social stress and are thus more focused on goal-directed caretaking settings than on play situations, reportedly use more behaviour-directing speech acts (Hoff-Ginsberg 1991), such as direct commands and prohibitions (e.g. “Put it here!”, “Don’t touch it!”).

Speech acts are, of course, important characteristics of parenting styles (Searle and Vanderveken 1985). Speech acts occurring in child speech and child-directed speech are assertives (e.g. assertions and statements), expressives (e.g. complaints, praise and greetings), commissives (e.g. promises, offers and threats) and directives (e.g. requests and questions). Requests are very frequent in child-directed speech due to the position of parents’ authority. Directive speech acts are also frequent in child speech because children are in need of caretakers’ help and information. Among directive speech acts, requests are more characteristic of a behaviour-directing than of a conversation-eliciting parenting style. They are relatively rare in adult-directed speech but very common in child-directed speech. Clearly, adults tend to direct children’s rather than other adults’ behaviours. Much daily talk is focused on motivating the child to get some task done that serves the ongoing daily schedule. Like other speech acts, requests may be direct or indirect (cf. Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 10ff.): Direct requests are usually performed via imperatives (e.g. “Bring me the toy!”), whereas indirect requests have the locutionary form of other speech acts, e.g. questions, such as “Could you please bring me the toy?” (I have to neglect language-specific grammatical forms here and refer the reader to Korecky-Kröll et al., in press).

Suffice to state that all groups of children prefer assertive speech acts, whereas all groups of parents use directive speech acts most frequently. Expressive speech acts are more frequent in child speech than in child-directed speech, but commissive speech acts are rare in both children and parents from both language backgrounds. In monolingual and bilingual children, we find similar SES differences: HSES children use more requests, whereas LSES

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7 SES was assessed via the highest level of education of the main parental caretaker (cf. Czinglar et al. 2015): Children of parents that had obtained at least a high-school diploma according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97, cf. OECD 1999) were classified as high SES, whereas children of parents that had lower levels of education (e.g. compulsory school or an apprenticeship) were classified as low SES.
children use more real questions. This SES difference is greater in bilingual than monolingual children. Among requests, both monolingual and bilingual HSES children use more indirect requests, whereas both groups of LSES children clearly prefer direct requests, but here the SES difference is greater in the monolingual than the bilingual group. Hence, language acquisition (both L1 and L2) is highly dependent on the parents’ SES and their linguistic input (i.e. the family language environment). LSES children (both Austro-Turkish as well monolingual children) use similar conversational styles, their progress is slower. In sum, HSES monolingual children do better than HSES Austro-Turkish children; all HSES children do better than all LSES children. Austro-Turkish LSES children perform better than monolingual LSES children (e.g. Korecky-Kröll et al. 2015).

The following two reasons might play a role: On the one hand, families that have taken the initiative to migrate from one country to another in order to improve their living conditions tend to show greater mobility (including social mobility) and higher educational aspirations than families that have always stayed in the same place, regardless of SES (Block 2016). On the other hand, HSES families in the majority population have well-established networks that help them to acquire good jobs and high-quality education for their children. HSES migrant families do not have these relations, they have to focus on building them up successively, which may put them under greater social distress than autochthonous HSES families. These results confirm new theoretical sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic approaches, which elaborate both Bernstein’s class-centred sociolinguistic theory, such as Block’s (2016) studies on “declassing” and “reclassing” resulting from migration and transnationalism, and Pennycook’s insights into new urban developments in a globalised world, condensed in the concept of “metrolinguistics” (2015). As migrants frequently lose their former class position in the host country and have to resituate themselves in a new social environment, they preserve “their multi-stranded relations that link together their societies and communities of origin and settlement” (Block 2016). Social divisions thus seem to be smaller in migrant communities than in the host country, i.e. in Austria. This fact as well as the greater pressure for assimilation that is experienced by all families with migration backgrounds may be reflected in the linguistic input that they give to their children. It is obvious that these results should be considered when devising new language policies, both for children and adults.

4. Conclusion

The Council of Europe (2016) emphasizes that linguistic integration depends on the higher or lower value accorded to the languages present in their repertoire before migrants arrived in the host society. The degree of success in integrating languages into the repertoire is obviously not quantifiable. Frequently linguistic experts are not being involved in designing the various test items, which are also not standardized across languages and countries. It should be emphasized that the success of linguistic integration highly depends
on the motivation and attitudes of adult migrants as well as on their SES, the time spent in the host country, their level of education, their religious routines, their gender identities, and their access to work and housing; accordingly, migrants could

- Decide not to change their repertoire, i.e. not to learn the main language of the host society systematically;
- Wish to change their repertoire, but unable to do so due to lack of time or self-confidence;
- Aim to functionally rearrange their repertoire, without attempting normative adaptation, as part of a single-identity language strategy, marked by the migrant’s language of origin;
- Aim to rearrange the linguistic repertoire in order to achieve 'linguistic naturalisation', involving the gradual dropping of the language of origin;
- Aim to rearrange the functional repertoire but with two joint languages of identity.

It is up to migrants to decide for themselves which of these language strategies is best suited to their goals in life and the management of their identity. In any case, the fact that migrants may wish to choose among these various types of adaptation implies that arrangements need to be made for listening to migrants' views and for designing and managing tailor-made courses.

To acquire plural competence, both migrants and the host country have to invest much energy, work and funds. This competence does not only consist – though it is certainly important – of acquisition of the majority language. Successful integration implies knowledge of relevant language games, in all domains of life; indeed for many people (both migrants and host population) a Gestalt-switch. Motivation, learning, curiosity, patience and respect are necessary prerequisites in order to enable understanding of each other’s different ways of life, always on the foundations of human rights and respective societies’ constitutions.

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