Neoliberal Multiculturalism?¹

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The era of neoliberalism is often defined as a set of changes in economic policy and in economic relationships, many of which created new challenges and insecurities for individuals. But it also reshaped the structure of social relationships, including relationships in the family, workplace, neighborhood, and civil society. It may even have reshaped people’s subjectivities — their sense of self, their sense of agency, and their identities and solidarities (Brown 2003). According to its most severe critics, the cumulative impact of these changes is a radical atomization of society. In the name of emancipating the autonomous individual, neoliberalism has eroded the social bonds and solidarities upon which individuals depended, leaving people to fend for themselves as “companies of one” in an increasingly insecure world (Lane 2011).

Yet the modern world is hardly devoid of social bonds and collective identities. Wherever neoliberal reforms have been implemented, they have operated within a dense field of social relationships that conditions the impact of neoliberalism. If neoliberalism has shaped social relations, it is equally true that those relations have shaped neoliberalism, blocking some neoliberal reforms entirely while pushing other reforms in unexpected directions, with unintended results. In the process, we can see social resilience at work as people contest, contain, subvert, or appropriate neoliberal ideas and policies to protect the social bonds and identities they value.

This chapter explores these themes through the lens of ethnic relations. Ethnic identities and ethnic differentiations are an enduring feature of modern societies despite the predictions of 1950s modernization theory. Ethnicity remains an important (although by no means the only) basis of personal identity, informal networks, social status, cultural meanings, and political mobilization. Indeed, far from disappearing as a result of modernization, sociologists

¹ Thanks to Iain Reeve for research assistance; to Matt James for helpful comments; and to the members of the Successful Societies program, particularly Peter Evans and Peter Hall, for illuminating discussions.
talk about the “ethnic revival” in the contemporary world (Smith 1981). Ethnicity seems to flourish in an era of civil rights, nondiscrimination, democratic freedoms, and global communications and mobility. For many minorities in the past, their ethnic identity was a source of stigma and disadvantage to be denied or hidden. But in our postcolonial and post–civil rights era, the racialist and supremacist ideologies that stigmatized minorities have been delegitimized, and democratic freedom and global networks facilitate ethnic self-organization and mobilization. The result has been a flourishing of ethnic projects, including the struggle of indigenous peoples such as the Maya and Inuit for land and self-government, the demands of substate national minorities such as the Welsh or Catalans for language rights and regional autonomy, or the demands of immigrant groups such as the Indian and Chinese diaspora for multicultural accommodations.²

As a result, ethnic identities are part of the field of social relations that neoliberal projects encountered, setting the stage for potential conflict. Just as neoliberalism sought to transform the structure of ethnic relations, so too members of ethnic groups have drawn upon the social resources generated by their ethnic identities and relations to contest neoliberalism. For critics who see neoliberalism as an all-encompassing hegemonic force, this was an unequal struggle that resulted in the “social destructuration” of ethnic groups (Magrod 2008: 134), eviscerating them of any collective capacity to challenge the dictates of market fundamentalism (Hale and Millaman 2005).

I will argue that the story is more complex and less one sided. Some ethnic groups have managed to resist aspects of the neoliberal project or even to turn neoliberal reforms to their advantage. When neoliberal projects ran up against preexisting ethnic projects, the results were not a foregone conclusion.

One might be inclined to interpret the resilience of ethnic projects as evidence of the primordial power of ethnicity, as if attachments to “blood and soil” are deeper in the human psyche than the material and political resources deployed by neoliberal actors. But this too would be a misreading. The capacity of ethnic actors to contest neoliberal projects depends in large part, I will argue, not on their ability to tap primordial attachments to blood and soil but on the extent to which their ethnic projects were already embedded in public institutions and in national narratives, typically through discourses of “multiculturalism” and the legal recognition of minority rights. As we will see, neoliberal projects encountered not only a field of preexisting ethnic relations but also a field of laws and policies that institutionalized certain ethnic projects, according them social acceptance and political resources.

As a result, insofar as neoliberal reformers sought to transform the structure of ethnic relations, they had to target the politics of multiculturalism that affirmed and sheltered those ethnic projects. As James puts it, “multiculturalism has been a particularly important target of neoliberal change” (2013)

² By “ethnic projects,” I refer to cases in which political actors appeal to ethnic identities as a basis for political mobilization and legal claims. I discuss how the civil rights revolution and democratic reforms enabled such projects in Kymlicka (2007).
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because it helps to define the terms of belonging and citizenship. And indeed, neoliberalism has had a marked impact on multiculturalism around the world. But it has been an uneven and unpredictable impact, and moreover, it has been a reciprocal impact, changing neoliberalism as much as it has changed multiculturalism. The story of the resilience of ethnicity is, therefore, at least in part, the story of the resilience of multiculturalism and of the picture of belonging and citizenship it offers. That is the story I want to trace in this chapter.

Multiculturalism Before Neoliberalism

To explore the impact of neoliberalism on ethnic relations, we first need to understand the rise of multiculturalism. Ethnic differentiations are an enduring feature of societies, but the idea that the state should adopt policies to affirm and shelter minority ethnic projects is relatively novel. Historically, nation-states have been distrustful of minority ethnic political mobilization, which they stigmatized as disloyal, backward, and balkanizing. The history of state-minority relations throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is one of constant pressure for assimilation, combined with animosity towards, if not prohibition of, minority political mobilization.

Starting in the 1960s, however, we see a shift toward a more multicultural approach to state-minority relations. The public expression and political mobilization of minority ethnic identities is no longer seen as an inherent threat to the state but is accepted as a normal and legitimate part of a democratic society. In many cases, these mobilizations were not just tolerated but were politically effective. Across the Western democracies, we see a trend toward the increasing recognition of minority rights, whether in the form of land claims and treaty rights for indigenous peoples; strengthened language rights and regional autonomy for substate national minorities; and accommodation rights for immigrant-origin ethnic groups.3 For this chapter, I will call all of these “multiculturalism policies” (or MCPs for short).

This term covers a wide range of policies, but what they have in common is that they go beyond the protection of the basic civil and political rights guaranteed to all individuals in a liberal-democratic state to also extend some level of public recognition and support for minorities to express their distinct identities and practices. The rise of MCPs therefore goes beyond the broader politics of civil rights and nondiscrimination. Until the 1950s and 1960s, many Western states explicitly discriminated against certain racial or religious groups, denying them the right to immigrate or to become citizens or subjecting them to discrimination or segregation in access to public education, housing, or employment. This sort of explicit state-sanctioned discrimination has been repudiated, and most countries have also adopted measures to tackle discrimination by non-state actors such as private employers or landlords. The adoption of such

3 For a statistical measure of such policies across the OECD, see the “Multiculturalism Policy Index” introduced by Banting and Kymlicka (2006) and updated through 2010 at http://www.queensu.ca/mcp.
antidiscrimination measures is often discussed as a form of multiculturalism or minority rights because minorities are the beneficiaries.

As I am using the term, however, multiculturalism is not just about ensuring the nondiscriminatory application of laws but also about changing the laws and regulations themselves to better reflect the distinctive needs and aspirations of minorities. For example, the logic of antidiscrimination required extending the vote to Aboriginal individuals in Canada in 1960, but it was a different logic that extended rights of self-government to Aboriginal communities in the 1980s through the devolution of power to Aboriginal councils. Similarly, the logic of antidiscrimination requires that Sikhs be hired based on merit in the police force, but changing police dress codes so that Sikhs can wear a turban is a positive accommodation. Self-government rights for Aboriginals and accommodation rights for Sikhs are paradigm examples of multiculturalism because the relevant policies are being deliberately redefined to fit the aspirations of members of minority groups. Although the adoption of positive MCPs has been more controversial than antidiscrimination, we see a clear trend across the Western democracies toward the strengthening of both antidiscrimination and MCPs since the 1960s.

The rise of MCPs was a response to the organized mobilization of minority groups reinforced by the specter of more radical movements. States were willing to negotiate with moderate and democratic minority actors, partly to blunt challenges from more revolutionary and violent movements, such as the Black Panthers and American Indian Movement in the United States or the Front de libération du Québec in Canada.

In this way, multiculturalism emerged out of the emancipatory social movements of the 1960s, although the ultimate outcome was shaped as much by the imperatives of state control as by the objectives of social movements. MCPs helped to define a new “system of interest intermediation” that gave organized ethnic groups a seat at the table of public decision making while also giving states a means to shape and discipline those groups to ensure their compliance with overarching state needs for social peace and effective state regulation of economic and political life (James 2013).

Commentators debate the relative balance of “emancipation” versus “control” in the resulting settlements. For a critic such as Katharyne Mitchell, the form of multiculturalism that emerged was fundamentally an instrument of control: “a broad technology of state control of difference, and as one of many capillaries of disciplinary power/knowledge concerning the formation of the state subject.” Multiculturalism was a “tool of domestication” to bring everyone into a shared national narrative, and hence “a strategic partner in the growth and expansion of a Fordist capitalist regime of accumulation” (Mitchell 2004: 92, 119, 123–4).

But it is important to remember not only that multiculturalism arose in response to mobilization by minorities themselves (Hinz 2010) but also that it gives them an ongoing seat at the table of public decision making that they have used to some effect. In the Canadian case, for example, multiculturalism was
invoked in the 1980s to strengthen equality rights in the Canadian Charter, strengthen hate-speech laws, strengthen employment equity legislation, and lobby for historical redress agreements (e.g., for the internment of Japanese Canadians) (James 2006: 79–82, 104–6). If multiculturalism was a “tool of domestication” by the state, it was also “a tool of civic voice for historically excluded and oppressed people,” and “equality-seeking movements invoked the official commitment to multiculturalism to buttress their claims for inclusion and respect” (James 2013).

One way to reconcile these contradictory views of multiculturalism is to attend to the nature of the “national citizen” and “state subject” being created. Mitchell views multiculturalism as a tool by which states seek to contain difference within national boundaries, by constituting “nationally oriented multicultural selves” (Mitchell 2003: 399), and by “inculcating a sense of tolerance as part of a citizen’s obligation toward national social coherence” (Mitchell 2004: 87). But as she acknowledges, the “national social coherence” being constituted was defined in progressive “social liberalism” terms that sought to redress disadvantages: “as a socially liberal philosophy and policy, Canadian multiculturalism invoked a complex mix of tolerance of differences, social equity, opportunity and nationalism” (Mitchell 2004: 87–88).

This complex mix took root in part because it is attractive to both members of minorities and state elites. This mix of nationalism and social liberalism created space for minorities to contest disadvantage and to renegotiate the terms of belonging while reassuring state officials that it is still “Canada” to which all citizens belong and to which all citizens wish to contribute.

Put another way, multiculturalism’s mix of nationalism and social liberalism can be seen as a process of citizenization. Historically, ethnic relations have been defined in illiberal and undemocratic ways – including relations of conqueror and conquered, colonizer and colonized, settler and indigenous, racialized and unmarked, normalized and deviant, orthodox and heretic, civilized and backward, ally and enemy, master and slave. The task for all liberal democracies has been to turn this catalogue of uncivil relations into relationships of liberal-democratic citizenship, both in terms of the vertical relationship between the members of minorities and the state and the horizontal relationships among the members of different groups.

4 I take the term “citizenization” from Tully (2001). As Tully emphasizes, citizenization is not just about extending formal citizenship to minorities because this can be done in a unilateral and paternalistic way. (This is how Canadian citizenship was extended to Aboriginal peoples in 1966.) Citizenization, rather, involves a willingness to negotiate as equals the terms of belonging with the goal of reaching consent. In the case of indigenous peoples, this may include the willingness to consider challenges to the state’s legitimacy and jurisdiction, which were initially imposed by force on colonized groups. In that sense, citizenization is not only more than formal citizenship; it can also include challenges to state citizenship, as when some Aboriginal leaders insist they never consented to being Canadian citizens. As long as the goal is to replace coercion and paternalism with democratic consent and to replace hierarchy with nondomination, then we have citizenization.
In the past, it was widely assumed that the only way to engage in this process of citizenization was to impose a single undifferentiated model of citizenship on all individuals. But multiculturalism starts from the assumption that this complex history inevitably generates group-differentiated ethnopolitical claims – that is, claims for MCPs, not just for antidiscrimination. The key to citizenization is not to suppress these differential claims but rather to frame them through the values of social liberalism. This is what liberal multiculturalism seeks to do, whether in the form of land claims and self-government for indigenous peoples, language rights and regional autonomy for substate national groups, or accommodation rights for immigrant groups. All seek to convert older hierarchies into new relations of liberal democratic citizenship.

The idea that multiculturalism can serve as a vehicle for deepening relations of liberal-democratic citizenship is contested. But we now have 40 years of experience with liberal multiculturalism, and there is growing evidence that it can serve this function.

Citizenization is a complex idea, with at least three dimensions: effective political participation, equal economic opportunities, and social acceptance. On all three dimensions, evidence suggests that MCPs contribute to citizenization. It would take too long to review all of the evidence here, so will focus on the immigrant case, partly because it is the most controversial.

I will start with the Canadian case, which was the first Western country to adopt an official multiculturalism policy towards immigrant-origin ethnic groups, and remains the only country in which multiculturalism is enshrined in the constitution. It therefore provides a good first test case for the impact of MCPs. The evidence to date shows that:

- In terms of political participation, compared with other Western democracies, immigrants in Canada are more likely to become citizens (Bloemraad 2006), to vote and to run for office (Howe 2007), and to be elected to office (Adams 2007), partly because voters in Canada do not discriminate against such candidates (Black and Erickson 2006; Bird 2009). There are many factors that explain this, including the fact that Canada tends to select more highly skilled immigrants than other countries. But scholars who study the political participation of immigrants in Canada in comparison with other countries concur that multiculturalism has enhanced their participation (Bloemraad 2006).
- In terms of economic opportunity, opportunity has two key dimensions: first, to acquire skills; and second, to translate those skills into jobs that are commensurate. In both cases, Canada outperforms other Western democracies. The children of immigrants have better educational outcomes in Canada than in other Western democracies (Organisation for Economic

5 Other examples of citizenization include the claims of women, gays, and people with disabilities. They have a similar trajectory starting in the 1960s, seeking to replace earlier uncivil relations of dominance and intolerance with newer relations of democratic citizenship. All of these struggles borrowed arguments and strategies from each other.
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Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2006), and in terms of acquiring employment, although immigrants in all Western societies suffer from an “ethnic penalty” in translating their skills into jobs, the size of this ethnic penalty is lowest in Canada (Heath 2007). Here again, several factors explain this comparative record, but there are good reasons to think that MCPs play a role, partly because of the way they help children acculturate (Berry et al. 2006).

• In terms of social acceptance, compared with other Western democracies, Canadians are more likely to say that immigration is beneficial (Focus Canada 2002; Laczko 2007), and whereas ethnic diversity has been shown to erode social capital in other countries, there appears to be a “Canadian exceptionalism” in this regard (Kazemipur 2009). Here again, many factors are at work, but researchers argue that the presence of multicultural norms has played an important role, helping to “normalize” diversity and making it part of Canadian national identity (Harell 2009; Kazemipur 2009).

So, growing evidence indicates that in the Canadian case, MCPs contribute to citizenization. A skeptic might respond that Canada is an outlier and that we cannot generalize from one case. So let us set aside the Canadian case, and ask which country comes second in cross-national studies of immigrant political participation, equal opportunity, and mutual respect. The answer typically is Australia, which is the country that most quickly and closely followed Canada in adopting an MCP.

A skeptic might retreat further and argue that Canada and Australia are both New World “countries of immigration” and that evidence from those countries cannot be applied to Europe. But if we ask which European country does best on these criteria, it is often Sweden, which has been one of the strongest and most consistent proponents of a multicultural approach. Sweden outperforms those countries that never embraced multiculturalism (France, Germany) or that have retreated from earlier commitments (Netherlands).6

So countries with strong and consistent policies of immigrant multiculturalism seem to outperform other Western democracies. This is still just three countries, and perhaps all three are exceptional. But insofar as we have cross-national data, the evidence suggests that the beneficial effects of MCPs are more generalized. For example, a cross-national study of 13 countries shows that children are psychologically better adapted in countries with MCPs (Berry et al. 2006); a cross-national study of diversity and social capital in 19 countries shows that MCPs have a positive impact on political participation and social capital (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010); a cross-national study of prejudice shows that multiculturalism has a positive effect on reducing prejudice (Weldon 2006); and earlier cross-national work that I conducted with Keith Banting suggested that MCPs may have a positive effect on redistribution (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006; see also Crepaz 2006).

6 For documentation on the points in this and preceding paragraphs, see Kymlicka (2010).
I believe that a similar story can be told about the impact of MCPs for indigenous peoples and substate national groups. For example, on a wide range of measures, indigenous peoples fare better in countries with stronger indigenous rights policies (Kauffman 2004), and this result is confirmed by case studies from within individual countries, including the United States (Cornell and Kalt 2000), Canada (Chandler and Lalonde 1998), and New Zealand (Ringold 2006).

Much of this research focuses on large-scale statistical comparisons and does not yet specify the causal mechanisms by which MCPs contribute to citizenization. More work is needed to “drill down” to see how MCPs affect people’s circumstances and choices. The answer, I suspect, will center primarily on how MCPs shape the social identities, networks, narratives, and cultural resources available to individuals and groups or indeed to society as a whole. The amount of money spent on multiculturalism is tiny in most countries, and if MCPs have significant effects, it is not primarily by directly putting more money in anyone’s hands, but rather by changing people’s sense of what is possible, of what is legitimate, of who belongs, of who we can trust, of what we can take pride in from the past (and what we can hope for in the future), and of what we owe each other. I think these effects arise at multiple levels – from informal interactions in neighborhoods and workplaces to formal institutional rules of participation – and cumulatively affect the magnitude and distribution of social resources in society.

There is surprisingly little evidence on these social effects, partly because there are very few evaluations of MCPs (Marc 2009; Reitz 2009: 13). But the problem is not simply the lack of studies but also the level of analysis. Most existing attempts to evaluate multiculturalism operate at the level of discrete programs – such as introducing a new multicultural component to a particular school curriculum and then evaluating its effect on student performance in that grade or introducing a new culturally sensitive mode of health delivery in hospitals and then evaluating its effect on patient recovery. But this misses the potentially significant effects of MCPs on broader social identities and narratives. If hospitals in Vancouver train their nurses to be sensitive to the cultural needs of Chinese patients, the most significant result may not be better health for a particular patient but rather a stronger sense among the Chinese community generally that they are accepted and welcomed by public institutions in Canada. Seeing a family member treated respectfully in hospitals may make someone more likely to trust the police, join a political party, or get involved in the local school. The benefits of MCPs may therefore show up in strengthened feelings of trust in one’s co-citizens and in public institutions and strengthened feelings of belonging and membership.7 The cross-national evidence suggests

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7 These feelings of belonging and participation may in turn have beneficial health outcomes given the well-known indirect effects of stigmatization on health (Williams 1999). In this way, MCPs may indirectly promote health in addition to whatever direct effects arise for an individual patient from (for example) more culturally sensitive health care.
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that MCPs are indeed having these sorts of effects, but existing studies of policy impacts do not get at them effectively.

We can learn here from similar debates about anti-poverty strategies. One way to evaluate an anti-poverty policy is to examine its immediate effect on a beneficiary’s material resources – that is, putting money into a needy person’s pocket. But the framing of anti-poverty policies also has powerful long-term effects on people’s sense of identity, community, and solidarity, reconstructing shared definitions of “us” and “them” and of who is valued and “deserving” (e.g., Guetzkow 2010) – effects that over time can either sustain or erode the moral commitments that underpin anti-poverty policies in the first place. We need comparable studies of the impact of MCPs, not just on individual beneficiaries but on social identities and cultural narratives as well.

From Social Liberal to Neoliberal Multiculturalism

When neoliberalism emerged as a powerful force in the early 1980s, it emerged into societies that were being transformed in a multicultural direction. One of the first questions confronting neoliberal reformers was how to respond to this new social reality. Because at the time multiculturalism was clearly rooted in a social liberalism and was an outgrowth of 1960s progressive social movements, the initial reaction of most neoliberal actors was one of hostility. Indeed, the first wave of neoliberals in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia were uniformly critical of multiculturalism, which they viewed as a prime example of unjustified intervention in the market in response to “special interests” caused by the capture of state power by ethnic entrepreneurs and their rent-seeking allies in the bureaucracy. The result, neoliberals argued, was both the distortion of the proper use of state power and the unhealthy dependence of civil society on government funds. Indeed, the close links between advocacy groups and the state built up under multiculturalism represented precisely the sort of “nanny state” that they aimed to demolish. Neoliberals opposed on principle the idea of state support for ethnic projects and opposed most of the reforms that followed in multiculturalism’s trail, such as the employment equity laws that minorities demanded in the name of multiculturalism. In short, neoliberals viewed multiculturalism as embodying the sort of welfare state liberalism they opposed.

This neoliberal attack on multiculturalism took both an institutional and a symbolic form. Institutionally, neoliberals severed the links between the state and progressive advocacy groups, slashing funding and political access for such groups. Symbolically, neoliberals delegitimized multiculturalism by contrasting “ordinary” hard-working tax-paying citizens against the “special interests” represented by “ethnic lobbies.” As James puts it, neoliberals invoked discourses that “valorized the so-called ‘ordinary Canadian’, figured as a

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taxpayer and consumer, to delegitimize group experiences and identities as positive considerations in civic deliberation and debate” (James 2013).

And yet multiculturalism survived this initial onslaught of neoliberalism. Indeed, multiculturalism has not only endured in the era of neoliberalism but expanded. Based on the Multiculturalism Policy Index we devised to measure the diffusion of MCPs across the OECD countries, there has been a steady trend toward an increasing adoption of MCPs in the period after 1980. Despite talk about the “retreat from multiculturalism,” only the Netherlands shows a real retreat from MCPs; most other countries actually strengthened their commitment to MCPs.

In part, this can be seen as evidence of the resilience of the coalitions that generated MCPs in the first place. Confronted with neoliberal opposition, minority groups and their allies mobilized to sustain the programs they had initially fought for and to defend the image of belonging these programs promoted. Faced with this opposition, many neoliberal actors sheathed their swords against multiculturalism, judging that it was not worth the fight (James 2013). Viewed this way, multiculturalism persists as an island of social liberalism in a sea of neoliberal change.

9 See the Appendix for our measure of the increasing level of MCPs across the OECD. In a separate study, Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel (2012) have also identified a clear trend toward the increasing adoption of MCPs for immigrant groups in Europe, with the Netherlands as the obvious exception. This may surprise readers accustomed to high-profile declarations about the “death” or “retreat” of multiculturalism, particularly in Europe. But the evidence suggests this “retreat” is more rhetorical than real. Politicians in many countries have decided not to use “the ‘m’ word” and to talk instead about, say, “diversity,” “pluralism,” “intercultural dialogue,” “civic integration,” or “community cohesion,” but these changes in wording have not necessarily affected actual policies on the ground. As Vertovec and Wessendorf note, although the word multiculturalism “has mostly disappeared from political rhetoric,” this “has not emerged with the eradication, nor even much to the detriment, of actual measures, institutions and frameworks of minority cultural recognition” (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 18; see also McGhee 2008: 85). Talk of a “wholesale retreat” (Joppke 2004: 244) is therefore misleading. Of course, the fact that politicians are retreating from the rhetoric of multiculturalism may well be undermining the benefits of the policies. Insofar as MCPs work by publicly expressing a more inclusive sense of identity and belonging, rhetoric may be an essential component of their success.

10 There have been important policy changes across the West in the field of immigration, but the main change has not been the abandonment of MCPs but rather changes to settlement and naturalization policies. In many Western countries, immigrants are required to pass new or strengthened tests of their knowledge of the country’s official language and of its laws and institutions in order gain citizenship or even to renew their residency. Although these “civic integration” reforms are often described as a retreat from multiculturalism, they do not directly affect any preexisting MCPs. Moreover, if we examine the conceptions of citizenship promoted within the new citizenship tests, they tend to mirror the preexisting commitment to multiculturalism. Countries with strong MCPs promote a multiculturalist conception of citizenship in their citizenship tests (see the comparison of Canadian and Danish tests in Adamo [2008]; for a broader attempt to measure the ethnic exclusiveness of naturalization policies, see Koning 2011). Citizenship tests are not an alternative to multiculturalism but rather are one more forum in which countries manifest their commitment (or lack of commitment) to multiculturalism. For further discussion of the relationship between multiculturalism polices and new civic integration policies, see Kymlicka (2012).
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But this is hardly the full story. Many neoliberal actors have not only tolerated multiculturalism but positively embraced it and became agents for its diffusion. The same international organizations that championed neoliberalism—such as the World Bank, the OECD, or the European Union—have also pushed multiculturalism. For example, the World Bank requires developing countries to comply with indigenous rights norms to qualify for loans. The European Union requires countries seeking to join the Union to respect the rights of national minorities. In these and other cases, neoliberal actors have promoted multiculturalism in countries that had little experience of them.

Clearly, neoliberal actors saw something in multiculturalism that they found useful. If at first glance neoliberals saw multiculturalism as a pathology of the interventionist welfare state, on a sober second glance, they saw certain elective affinities that could be built upon. They saw, in short, the potential for something like “neoliberal multiculturalism.”

The overriding concern of neoliberals in the field of ethnic relations is with integrating minorities into global markets and with the contribution they can make to economic competitiveness. If social liberalism was fundamentally about citizenization—about the creation of relations of democratic citizenship—neoliberalism is fundamentally about creating effective market actors and competitive economies. This need not lead to support for multiculturalism. Indeed, in the past, the attachment of minorities to their languages and cultures was seen as a hindrance to effective market participation. But the defining feature of neoliberal multiculturalism is the belief that ethnic identities and attachments can be assets to market actors and hence that they can legitimately be supported by the neoliberal state. And this is precisely what many neoliberals have come to believe.

In some contexts, ethnicity is a market asset in the very tangible form of cultural artifacts that can be marketed globally (music, art, fashion). But in most cases, ethnicity is seen as a market asset because it is a source of “social capital” that successful market actors require. Consider the following description of the World Bank’s commitment to “ethnodevelopment” for indigenous peoples in Ecuador:

Social exclusion, economic deprivation, and political marginalization are sometimes perceived as the predominant characteristic of Ecuador’s indigenous peoples. But as they often remind outsiders, indigenous peoples are also characterized by strong positive attributes, particularly their high levels of social capital. Besides language and their own sense of ethnic identity, the distinctive features of indigenous peoples include solidarity and social unity (reflected in strong social organizations), a well-defined geographical concentration and attachment to ancestral lands, a rich cultural patrimony, and other customs and practices distinct from those of Ecuador’s national society. . . . The [World Bank] project aims to mobilize this social capital, based on these characteristics, as a platform for ethnodevelopment (van Nieuwkoop and Uquillas 2000: 18).

All of these organizations eventually backed away from neoliberalism, but they were all participants in the “hegemonic globalization” that characterized the neoliberal era.
Or consider this quote from Shelton Davis, one of the driving forces behind the World Bank’s indigenous policy:

Until recently, a local culture has been seen as a hindrance to development, whereas today we must rather look upon culture as an asset, as a driving force for self-development . . . one might argue that more culture is more wealth, that having more know-how, more languages, and more centres of interest enriches indigenous peoples as well as enriching in the process the rest of a country’s citizens and some segment of humanity as well (Davis and Ebbe 1993: 8).

In short, a neoliberal multiculturalism is possible because ethnicity is a source of social capital, social capital enables effective market participation, and governments can promote this market-enhancing social capital through MCPs that treat minorities as legitimate partners.12

The way in which ethnicity facilitates market participation varies from group to group. In the case of immigrants, social capital does not flow from “a well-defined geographical concentration and attachment to ancestral lands” – immigrants are precisely uprooted from their ancestral lands. But from a neoliberal perspective, this uprooting is itself a potential asset because it enables transnational linkages that native-born citizens lack. Immigrant transnationalism, then, is an asset in an increasingly global marketplace – it facilitates global trade – exemplified by the commercial linkages in the Indian and Chinese diasporas. Insofar as multiculturalism legitimates the ethnic identities that underpin these transnational links, it can be seen as good for the economies of both sending and receiving countries.

We see this version of multiculturalism emerging in Australia and Canada in the 1980s as neoliberal governments adopted the discourse of “productive multiculturalism” and organized conferences with titles such as “Multiculturalism Means Business” and cities marketed themselves as the multicultural home of transnational entrepreneurs.13

So the neoliberal vision of transnational multiculturalism for immigrant groups is different from their vision of ethnodevelopment for indigenous peoples (which is different yet again from the neoliberal vision of the market role of substate national groups).14 But in each case, neoliberals have found a way

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12 “Social capital” in this context is a broader notion than found in Putnam’s influential work (2000), where it refers primarily to generalized interpersonal trust. It is being used here as a label for any social or cultural feature that supports effective community development.

13 See Murphy, O’Brien, and Watson (2003) on the neoliberal marketing of multicultural Sydney; Abu-Laban and Gabriel (1998) and Mitchell (2004: 100–1) on Vancouver and Toronto; and Glick-Schiller (2011) on Manchester, New Hampshire. This valorizing of immigrant transnationalism as a source of economic competitiveness is related to, but distinct from, the more general claim that ethnic diversity in the workplace or in corporate boards increases productivity or profits (Herring 2009). This latter idea was another trope in the neoliberal reframing of multiculturalism.

14 Granting autonomy to groups like the Catalans and Scots has been supported by some neoliberals as a potential site for a more innovative and entrepreneurial culture, sustained by higher levels of social cohesion (Keating 2001).
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to legitimize ethnicity, to justify MCPs that shelter those ethnic projects, and to reinterpret these policies in line with neoliberalism’s core ideas (enhancing economic competitiveness and innovation, shifting responsibility from the state to civil society, promoting decentralization, deemphasizing national solidarity in favor of local bonds or transnational ties, viewing cultural diversity as an economic asset or commodity in a global market).

In the process, the meaning of multiculturalism has clearly changed. As we saw, multiculturalism originally was rooted in both social liberalism (committed to remedying disadvantages) and nationalism (building good citizens who can work across differences for the good of the nation), both of which shaped the underlying idea of citizenization. The neoliberal vision of multiculturalism, by contrast, is largely indifferent to both the progressive equality-seeking component of multiculturalism and its national boundedness. The goal of neoliberal multiculturalism is not a tolerant national citizen who is concerned for the disadvantaged in her own society but a cosmopolitan market actor who can compete effectively across state boundaries. I will discuss below the extent to which these two images of tolerant national citizen and effective global market actor can be combined, but the main impulse of the neoliberal reform of multiculturalism was to displace the former with the latter. Mitchell captures this in her account of changes to multicultural education in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada under the influence of neoliberalism:

There is no longer much need for the multicultural subject interested in working towards harmony across the differences of race or class, one able to find points of convergence in the general spirit of a nexus of production and consumption benevolently regulated by the state. The spirit of harmonious accumulation, for the capitalist, the worker and the nation, is gone, and the multicultural self is no longer the ideal state citizen. . . . In this neoliberal vision of education, educating a child to be a good citizen is no longer synonymous with constituting a well-rounded, nationally oriented, multicultural self, but rather about attainment of the “complex skills” necessary for individual success in the global economy. (Mitchell 2003: 392, 399)

Focusing specifically on the Canadian case, Mitchell summarizes the shift from social liberal to neoliberal multiculturalism this way:

Multiculturalism [in its social liberal form] operated effectively as an instrument of state formation on a number of levels: as a national narrative of coherence in the face of British-French and then immigrant “difference,” as a broad technology of state control of difference, and as one of many capillaries of disciplinary power/knowledge concerning the formation of the state subject. In all of this, but especially in the constitution of national citizens able and willing to work through difference for the nation, the socially liberal philosophy and practice of multiculturalism was a strategic partner in the growth and expansion of a Fordist capitalist regime of accumulation. However, with the rise of transnational lives, deterritorialized states, and neoliberal pressures in the past two decades, this type of state subject has been increasingly irrelevant. The

15 According to Resnik (2008), the resulting new spirit of multicultural education is “Good for Business but not for the State.”
particular form of what I have termed “liberal multiculturalism” – one jointly bound up in the constitution of the nation, the tolerant national self, and the formation of a regime of accumulation regulated by the state – is evolving into something qualitatively different. Liberal multiculturalism, a spatially specific ethos of tolerance contingent on the history and geography of a city and a nation, is now rapidly morphing into neoliberal multiculturalism, the “progressive process of planetary integration.” It reflects a logic of pluralism on a global scale, and a strategic, outward-looking cosmopolitanism (Mitchell 2004: 123–4).

The shift toward a neoliberal conception of multiculturalism has entailed a dramatic narrowing of the scope of political contestation. In the case of immigrants, old-style multiculturalism opened up space to raise issues of structural inequalities in racialized societies, leading to programs such as employment equity. But the new multiculturalism replaces this with ideas of “managing diversity” for competitive success:

The diversity within the “managing diversity” model that has supplanted employment equity in important ways suggests that all individual differences are important and that firms and sectors that fail to acknowledge this will not be able to compete effectively in a global market. This vision of diversity is also narrow insofar as it fails to problematize structural inequalities that exist between groups of people. (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 1998: 173)

Neoliberal multiculturalism for immigrants affirms – even valorizes – ethnic immigrant entrepreneurship, strategic cosmopolitanism, and transnational commercial linkages and remittances but silences debates on economic redistribution, racial inequality, unemployment, economic restructuring, and labor rights.

In the case of indigenous peoples, neoliberal multiculturalism has sought to divide Indians into “safe” and “radical” and seeks to accommodate the former – the indio permitodo (“permitted Indian”), in Hale’s phrase – through a range of multicultural rights. These rights are deemed acceptable as long as (a) they do not contradict the long-term economic development model of moving toward free-market service- and manufacturing-based economies and (b) the resulting level of political clout does not pass a certain line where existing authorities are seriously challenged. Neoliberal multiculturalism thereby gives state and business elites the “ability to restructure the arena of political contention, driving a wedge between cultural rights and the assertion of the control over resources necessary for those rights to be realized” (Hale 2005: 13). The “cultural project of neoliberalism” accords rights to indigenous peoples but only “to help them compete in the rigors of globalized capitalism or, if this is deemed impossible, to relegate them to the sidelines, allowing the game to proceed unperturbed” (Hale and Millamen 2005: 301). And as McNeish notes, this cultural project is not just about limiting indigenous demands but also about restructuring indigenous subjectivities:

Indians are recognized as citizens by governing elites as long as they do not question or threaten the integrity of the existing regime of productive relations, especially in
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the sectors most closely connected to the global markets. As such... the ultimate goal of neoliberalism is not just radical individualism, but rather the creation of subjects who govern themselves in accordance with the logic of globalized capitalism (McNeish 2008: 34).16

Viewed this way, the persistence of multiculturalism in the face of neoliberalism is a Pyrrhic victory, obscuring its fundamental transformation. The original aims of multiculturalism – to build fairer terms of democratic citizenship within nation-states – have been replaced with the logic of diversity as a competitive asset for cosmopolitan market actors, indifferent to issues of racial hierarchy and structural inequality.

Indeed, the ability of neoliberalism to appropriate the discourse of multiculturalism has been so great that many people assume multiculturalism was a neoliberal invention. Zizek famously stated that multiculturalism emerged as the “cultural logic of multinational capitalism” (Zizek 1997). The historic link between multiculturalism and national projects of social liberalism has been erased from memory, washed away by the hegemonic forces of neoliberal change.

Locating Resilience

So far, so bad. We are back to the view of neoliberalism as a hegemonic force that “destructures” any ethnic projects that seek to resist it. The persistence of multiculturalism in the neoliberal era, it seems, is not evidence of social resilience but is simply one more manifestation of the “cunning of imperialist reason” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999; cf. Melamed 2006).

And yet, this story of multiculturalism’s transubstantiation is too neat and misses important moments of resilience. Neoliberal reformers may have hoped that minorities would use MCPs only for “safe” demands, but if so, they miscalculated because minorities have demonstrably refused to contain their ethnic projects within the boundaries of neoliberalism. Indeed, some commentators have argued that insofar as neoliberal multiculturalism was a cultural project aiming to change people’s subjectivities and political aspirations, it has simply failed. Neoliberalism may have tried to create “subjects who govern themselves in accordance with the logic of globalized capitalism” (McNeish 2008: 34), but Sawyer argues that this effort “backfired” and instead produced new “transgressive political subjects” (Sawyer 2004: 15) who invoke multiculturalism for their own purposes relating to democratic citizenship and self-determination.

We can see three different aspects to this resilience. First, in some cases, neoliberal reformers simply lacked the capacity to displace earlier socially liberal forms of multiculturalism, which therefore endured over time. This is most

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16 See also the description of how neoliberal reforms aimed to reshape indigenous subjectivities in Macdonald and Muldoon (2006: 218–19) (on Australia) and Ratner Carroll and Woolford (2003) (on Canada).
apparent in contexts where earlier multicultural settlements have been constitutionalized, rendering them immune from the vagaries of everyday politics. In their study comparing the impact of neoliberalism on Francophone minorities in Canada with the Welsh minority in Britain, Cardinal and Denault (2007) note the crucial role played by the constitutional protection of French language rights in Canada compared with the merely administrative protection of Welsh. In the former case, because of the preexisting constitutional commitments, neoliberal reforms (e.g., techniques of New Public Management) changed the means used to administer minority rights but could not change their underlying goals or core mission.\textsuperscript{17} Macdonald and Muldoon (2006) tell a similar story about the impact of neoliberalism on the Maori in New Zealand compared with Aboriginals in Australia. Because the basic terms of the state–Maori relationship are defined by a constitutional treaty (the Treaty of Waitangi), the preexisting commitment to self-determination was relatively immune to neoliberal reform, which was largely limited to matters of administrative technique. By contrast, the absence of constitutional protection of Aboriginal rights in Australia left Aboriginal peoples exposed to a harsh form of neoliberal restructuring that cut deeply into the basic terms of Aboriginal citizenship.\textsuperscript{18}

Even where earlier settlements were not constitutionalized and hence were vulnerable to neoliberal reform, they sometimes endured because of concerted political efforts to preserve them. Abu-Laban and Gabriel (2002: 22) and Joshee (2004: 144–50) argue that neoliberal reforms to immigrant multiculturalism in Canada were partially blocked by effective lobbying, generating a hybrid mix of social liberal and neoliberal programs and discourses.

Second, even where neoliberal reforms have taken place, they have not always had the effects that were intended by their advocates. In many cases, neoliberal reforms gave a seat at the table to groups that used their voice to contest neoliberalism. For example, Bolivia was widely cited in the literature as the paradigm case of neoliberal multiculturalism and its associated ideals of the “permitted Indian.” But it was precisely these neoliberal multicultural reforms that made possible the election of the radical indigenist regime of Evo

\textsuperscript{17} For a similar analysis, see Heller (2010), who notes that the preexisting constitutional and statutory protection of Francophone minorities meant that “the state’s general neoliberal strategies, focused on individual worker skills development and privatization, were modified to accommodate commitments to ‘linguistic duality’ in the form of programs supporting ‘community economic development’” (Heller 2010: 115), empowering Francophone communities to shape their collective development.

\textsuperscript{18} See also Davidson and Schejter’s (2005) analysis of neoliberal multiculturalism in Israel, where media privatization was rhetorically justified on the grounds that it would better serve minorities. In practice, however, the Arab minority lacked the political standing to influence the licensing process and therefore remains excluded from both public and private media. Neoliberal multiculturalism in Israel, they argue, has been “a rhetoric that champions the cultural and economic rights of minorities and the disadvantaged while masking a policy stance that negates these very rights” by defending “the preservation of existing political power blocs” from which Arabs were excluded (Davidson and Schejter 2011: 15, 17).
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Morales. Neoliberals in Bolivia instituted reforms to implement their image of neoliberal good governance (i.e., decentralization, delegation to civil society), but anti-neoliberal indigenous groups were able to capture these new political opportunities and use them as a stepping stone to take over the central state itself (Lucero 2008: 141). The social capital that neoliberals hoped indigenous peoples would use to turn themselves into better market actors was instead used to turn themselves into effective political citizens who captured the opportunities created by neoliberal innovations and used them for their own anti-neoliberal purposes.

Nor is this a unique case. Wherever neoliberal multiculturalism has been adopted, its limits have been contested by minority actors and its institutions used for purposes that were not intended by their neoliberal designers. Speaking of Ecuador, Lucero notes that “despite worries over the [depoliticizing effects] of multiculturalism, the dynamism of indigenous politics remains unextinguished. Multicultural neoliberalism, either as a strategy of governance or development, cannot once and for all impose rigid limits on indigenous political subjectivities” (Lucero 2008: 151). Speaking of Latin America generally, Fischer notes that although neoliberalism offers only a “confined multiculturalism,” indigenous peoples have been “able to use these manageable categories to make further demands and redefine the terms of relations between the state and civil society and indigenous peoples” (Fischer 2007: 11; see also Van Cott 2006).

These first two forms of resilience suggest a picture of opposition between social liberal and neoliberal multiculturalism, with resilience taking the form of either blocking neoliberal reforms from taking place (the first form of resilience) or capturing and subverting neoliberal reforms when they do take place (the second form). In each case, the assumption is that the advocates for ethnic projects are indifferent to, or actively opposed to, the neoliberal preoccupation with turning minorities into effective actors in global markets. But there is a third form of resilience in which minority ethnic actors embrace the logic of global competitiveness and integrate this with their earlier commitments to democratic citizenization. On this view, minorities can adopt neoliberal multiculturalism, not in place of a social liberal multiculturalism that aspires to citizenization but as a supplement to it and indeed as a way of extending it.

This raises complex issues about the relationship between our status as democratic citizens and our status as market actors. In much of the critical literature on neoliberalism, it is assumed that these operate in a zero-sum relationship: the neoliberal emphasis on expanding the scope of the market comes at the expense of shrinking the scope of citizenship (e.g., Somers 2008). This may indeed be true for many members of dominant groups, who have historically used the nation-state effectively to affirm their citizenship and for whom neoliberalism has eroded the protections that national citizenship offered. But for minority groups, the centralized nation-state has rarely been a benign protector of citizenship – it has rather been a vehicle for assimilation or exclusion.
And this exclusion has both an economic and a political dimension: minorities have been disadvantaged within national labor markets and property regimes, as well as within national political systems. As a result, neoliberal reforms that open up markets while delegating state power may be seen by minorities not as replacing citizenship with markets but as enhancing their status as both market actors and democratic citizens.\(^{19}\)

Of course, enhancing one’s status as a democratic citizen requires that there be sites for the exercise of political agency. And here we return to the earlier point about the significance of preexisting settlements establishing forms of multicultural citizenship before the introduction of neoliberalism. Recall that in the case of Francophone minorities in Canada and Maori in New Zealand, these constitutionalized settlements protected social liberal multiculturalism from neoliberal erosion. But in fact, where these constitutional protections existed, neoliberal reforms may actually empower minorities to make fuller use of their multicultural citizenship. Neoliberal reforms helped these groups to more fully enact the rights that first emerged from socially liberal multiculturalism.

According to Macdonald and Muldoon, for example, neoliberalism “did not always work against attempts by indigenous people to obtain greater control over their lives. Provided there was an effective treaty or underlying commitment to self-determination in place, the introduction of neo-liberal systems of governance in New Zealand and Australia could create opportunities for indigenous people to extend the scope of self-determination” (Macdonald and Muldoon 2006: 221). The constitutional commitment to Maori self-determination not only blocked certain neoliberal reforms – for example, plans to privatize state property were blocked by Maori claims that they had vested rights in that property – but also meant that the Maori were in a position to take advantage of the reforms that did take place. Before neoliberal reforms, Maori affairs (and the delivery of public services to the Maori) were monopolized by one (paternalistic) department of government, but neoliberal reforms allowed Maori organizations to contract with various government departments to provide a wide range of services to Maori and indeed to non-Maori people. The techniques of neoliberal New Public Management “released a myriad of political possibilities that Maori seized with both hands,” strengthening their ability to shape the future of their communities.\(^{20}\) Neoliberal reforms also allowed Maori communities more direct access to global markets, which in turn allowed them to “stand tall” in negotiating with the state (ibid., 216, 212–13).

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\(^{19}\) Speaking of francophone minorities in Canada, Heller describes the impact of neoliberalism this way: “The only thing the state had ever made of their Frenchness was to construct it as a problem that somehow had to be resolved. Now, the state, at various levels, regards it as something to sell” (Heller 2010: 149). Critics may bemoan this framing of cultural difference as a commodity, but it is surely better than framing difference as a “problem” to be “resolved.” The former opens up both political and economic possibilities that the latter forecloses.

\(^{20}\) For a similar argument about neoliberalism’s effects on indigenous self-determination in Canada, see Slowey (2008). For a more skeptical view, see Friedel (2011).
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It is crucial to emphasize that indigenous politics is not driven by neoliberal motivations. As Lucero puts it, “the rise of indigenous politics is about nothing less than the finding of a democratic route toward decolonization, and a decolonizing route toward democracy” (Lucero 2008: ix). The point, rather, is that where these democratic and decolonizing impulses have gained political recognition – where forms of multicultural citizenship are in place – then indigenous people are capable of taking advantage of neoliberal reforms to enhance their status as market actors and to use their enhanced status as market actors to further strengthen their ethnic projects of indigenous self-determination. This is a theme that recurs repeatedly, if sotto voce, in the literature on neoliberal multiculturalism. The dominant motif in the literature is Hale’s claim that neoliberalism has reduced space for indigenous political projects to the “safe” confines of the “permitted Indian.” The contrapuntal theme is that neoliberalism’s promotion of market participation for indigenous peoples has strengthened their capacity to pursue “a democratic route toward decolonization.” In at least some circumstances, “indigenous groups can find tools and resources in neo-liberal programs” (Fischer 2007: 11).

A similar story applies to the case of immigrants and national minorities. Where a threshold level of democratic citizenization was established before neoliberalism, the introduction of neoliberal reforms could sometimes benefit rather than harm minorities. For example, Cardinal and Denault (2007) argue that new forms of neoliberal governance helped to empower francophone minorities in Canada to extend their language rights. Similarly, Mitchell (2004) argues that Chinese immigrants were able to deploy neoliberal commitments, such as the valorizing of transnational entrepreneurship, to challenge exclusionary aspects of national identity in Canada.21 And Harney (2011) argues that the shift to a more entrepreneurial model of nongovernmental organization advocacy was seen as by some activists as a way of enhancing their effectiveness without undermining their core mission.22 In all of these cases, a commitment to multicultural citizenship was already institutionalized, and neoliberal reforms provided new opportunities to advance that goal.

21 For the complexities of “acceptable Asianness” in an era of neoliberal multiculturalism, see Park (2011).
22 According to Harney’s ethnography of a multicultural organization in Ontario, the staff adapted to, and embraced, the logic of financialization and entrepreneurship while retaining their commitment to a “pre-neoliberal ethos of solidarity and democratic pluralism.” As he puts it, “This is not to suggest that workers did not find their now flexible labour positions more precarious, the long-term stability of the institution more unclear nor that they did not begin to think of themselves as human capital or entrepreneurs of the self” but nonetheless they “maintained their solidaristic pre-neoliberal conception of multiculturalism even as they experimented with a sociality dominated by market exchange” and indeed “envisioned that some of these specific features of neoliberal practice might enhance the prior localised practices and ethics” (Harney 2011).
I am not suggesting that only neoliberalism could have secured these benefits or that neoliberalism did not have offsetting negative effects. Free trade agreements and deregulated markets should not be necessary to give indigenous peoples greater self-determination, to give Francophone minorities more autonomy, or to give Chinese immigrants more respect. Keynesian welfare states should have been able to do so. Unfortunately, in many cases, they did not, partly because they served majorities better than they served minorities, and hence some minorities were able to see neoliberal reforms as strengthening both their market participation and their political standing.

This suggests that multiculturalism is most effective when it attends both to people’s citizenship status and to their market status. Either, on its own, may be inadequate. On the one hand, social liberal forms of multiculturalism may fail if they leave their intended beneficiaries excluded from effective market access. This is (part of) Koopmans’s analysis for the failure of multiculturalism in the Netherlands compared with its apparent success in countries such as Canada, Australia, and the United States (Koopmans 2010). Although Dutch multiculturalism provided political recognition to immigrant groups and generous social rights, it did not give them effective access to Dutch labor markets, leading to a situation of social segregation and political stigmatization. The problem was not poverty because the Dutch welfare system is reasonably generous. The problem, rather, is that participating in markets and making an economic contribution is a source of many intangible social resources – bridging and bonding networks, identities, narratives of belonging – from which immigrants were excluded. In Koopman’s view, the older model of Dutch multiculturalism neglected the importance of market participation.

On the other hand, neoliberal reforms that expose minorities to market reforms will also fail if minorities lack a robust citizenship standing that enables their effective political agency. This is the story of the neoliberal destructuring of Aboriginal communities in Australia, in which neoliberalism undermined the fragile forms of Aboriginal self-government and replaced them with a “range of new initiatives that interpellate Indigenous people as a collection of failed liberal individuals who need to be encouraged (by ‘carrots and sticks’) into taking greater responsibility for themselves” (Macdonald and Muldoon 2006: 218–19).

There is rich material here for reflecting on the nature of social resilience. If we are indeed moving into a post-neoliberal age in which we are trying to reintegrate democratic citizenship and markets, multiculturalism might provide some instructive cases of how they can (or cannot) be combined.

23 Macdonald and Muldoon (2006) say that neoliberalism “released global forces that devastated the social and economic worlds of Maori,” including a massive jump in unemployment. Yet they argue that the political gains made by Maori under neoliberalism mean that “Maori have reconfigured their citizenship to such an extent that they have reduced the structural inequalities that existed prior to the globalisation of the economy” (Macdonald and Muldoon 2006: 212, 216).
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However, it is premature to draw conclusions from these cases, and more work is needed to clarify how different forms of multiculturalism affect people’s resources and capacities. As a starting point, we might predict that social liberal multiculturalism has quite different impacts from neoliberal multiculturalism – the former contributing to citizenization and the latter to market access at the expense of citizenship. But we do not yet have systematic evidence for such predictions. I noted earlier that there was compelling evidence that MCPs have contributed to citizenization. But none of the studies I cited there distinguish between social liberal and neoliberal MCPs, and we do not yet have reliable evidence to disentangle the effects of these different forms of multiculturalism. Nor is it clear that we can make this distinction in practice. Real-world MCPs are always hybrids, not ideal types, reflecting multiple interests and path-dependent influences. Moreover, social liberal multiculturalism in the West was always capitalist, so a background of market relations was taken for granted even if not highlighted in the same way as in the era of neoliberalism. And conversely neoliberalism – similar to any form of liberalism – is not just about markets but also about the liberal civil and political rights that are essential to citizenship. So even as ideal types, it is inaccurate to say that social liberalism is about citizenship, not markets, or that neoliberalism is about markets, not citizenship. These are differences in emphasis, not bright lines. In seems unlikely, therefore, that we will be able to devise large-scale studies that would systematically test the differential effects of social liberal MCPs compared with neoliberal MCPs. In any event, no one has yet undertaken such a project.

Similarly, it would be premature to claim that the prior existence of social liberal multiculturalism is a precondition for minorities to be able to effectively resist or adapt neoliberal reforms. That is one possible conclusion of the case studies mentioned earlier, but they are a small sample, and other factors are likely to play a significant role. I believe it is important that minority actors be able to draw upon a discourse and practice of multicultural citizenship when resisting or adapting neoliberalism, but in today’s world, that discourse circulates globally. Ideas of multicultural citizenship are pervasive within the globalized policy networks and transnational advocacy networks that play such a prominent role in contemporary debates and indeed are codified in various international conventions. In that sense, minority actors everywhere can draw upon global norms and global networks of multicultural citizenship even in countries that lack their own history of MCPs. A full analysis of the preconditions for minorities to effectively resist or adapt neoliberal reforms would require a more multilevel analysis than I have given here.

In the absence of such evidence, I have made a more modest argument. I have disputed the easy assumption that a hegemonic neoliberalism operated to destructure ethnic groups – to disable their collective capacities and political projects – and have suggested instead that the impact of neoliberalism depended

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24 On the international diffusion of ideas of multicultural citizenship, see Kymlicka (2007).
Will Kymlicka

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on the extent to which groups were able to rely on preexisting multicultural settlements that ensured their effective political agency. To make further progress, we will need to find new ways to explore the interactions between our status as citizens and as market actors.

Note

Countries could receive a total score of eight, one for each of the following eight policies:

1. Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal levels and the existence of a government ministry, secretariat or advisory board to implement this policy in consultation with ethnic communities; 2. The adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum; 3. The inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing; 4. Exemptions from dress codes; 5. Allowing of dual citizenship; 6. The funding of ethnic group organizations or activities; 7. The funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; 8. Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.
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Source: Multiculturalism Policy Index, http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/

References


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