The world has entered a new era of mass migration. The economic downturn that has momentarily reduced the rapid pace at which migration had been growing in recent decades will pass, and structural factors that make migration increasingly frequent and necessary—from demographic imbalances to inequalities in wellbeing and security at world level, and global climate change—will soon resurface.

In contrast with the global movement of goods, capital and ideas the global movement of people suffers a critical deficit of accurate and reliable knowledge. Advancing research that allows informed policymaking on migration has become a compelling necessity for the functioning of our democracies.

Importantly, migration by nature has two ends and, often, several intermediate steps. While migration studies have mostly been developed at, and with an exclusive focus on, the receiving end, a comprehensive understanding of migration processes requires that in-depth attention be paid to the various countries involved, from those of origin and transit to those of destination.

The Migration Policy Centre (MPC) at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies has been created in response to the major migration-related challenges mentioned above. It sets out to bridge the gap between research and policy-making in three important ways. First, by producing policy-oriented research, including theoretical
and empirical studies, databases and methodologies that address migration governance needs, from implementing and monitoring migration policies to assessing their impact. Second, by bringing together scholars, experts and thinkers, by building scholarly networks that gather a large pool of expertise worldwide to identify migration-related issues, study their causes and consequences, and devise policy responses. Third, by offering a venue for discussion, by providing a forum for exchanging ideas among participants with diverging interests, while maintaining independence of thinking and high scientific standards.

The MPC currently conducts the following projects, most of them co-financed by the European Union:

‘CARIM’ the Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration is the observatory of migration from, through and to 17 countries of the Southern & Eastern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa started in 2004.

‘Improving EU and US Immigration Systems’ Capacity for Responding to Global Challenges: Learning from experience’ studies policy responses to major migration-related challenges that policymakers face on both sides of the Atlantic.

‘METOIKOS’ studies the challenges and opportunities involved in circular migration originating in EU neighbourhood and destined for the EU.

‘ACCEPT - Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe’ investigates whether European societies have become more or less tolerant during the past 20 years.

‘Developing a Knowledge Base for Policymaking on India-EU Migration’ aims at consolidating a constructive dialogue between the EU and India on migration covering all migration-related aspects.

‘Creating an Observatory of Migration East of Europe’ aims at building a broad network of national experts to construct systematic knowledge on migration in Eastern partners of the EU, Russia and Central Asia.

The ‘Summer School on Euro-Mediterranean Migration and Development’ offers post-graduate studies and professional training in migration studies, focusing particularly on Europe and the countries to the South and East of the Mediterranean.

The Migration Policy Centre (MPC) at the European University Institute responds to the strategic need for a research centre on migration that can mobilise the best expertise available in Europe, in migrants’ countries of origins, and from the worldwide scientific community.

Alessandra Venturini, Philippe Fargues (Director), Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Anna Triandafyllidou
Demography underpins the link between migration and identity. While western populations are shrinking in relative terms compared with world population, the immigrants they receive are increasingly from non-Western parts of the world. Much has been made of changes brought to western societies by growing immigration from the non-western world. Some scholars have interpreted the ongoing movement as a gradual replacement of a native population by an immigrant one; others have stressed complementarities between the two population groups; while others still have questioned the very distinction between two populations, one 'native' and one 'of foreign origin.' Underlying these three perspectives, there is the same interest in whether and how migration challenges identity in host societies.

An iconoclastic approach, however, inverts this point of view and considers migration as a two-way process that also brings to societies of origin a number of elements taken from societies of destination. Migrants are not seen as carriers of non-western values and practices to western countries as much as the other way around, namely channels through which western models spread beyond the west. Mainstream and iconoclastic approaches offer two opposite perspectives when it comes to understanding whether western identity is weakened (from within) or strengthened (from without) by migration originating from non-western societies and bound for the west.

The fear of being replaced

According to the first group of scholars, current patterns of below-replacement fertility in Europe and Northern America combined with high rates of immigration from other parts of the world would result in a durable demographic shift, characterised by shrinking native populations—or populations of European ancestry in the case of the US—and growing populations of non-western foreign origin. This process would in turn generate a cultural shift so that the populations of western countries increasingly resemble those of the origin countries of migrants.

Slowly but inexorably, because this is underwritten by their young age structure, the balance would shift in favour of non-European populations in European countries in a movement sometimes described as gradual 'ethnic replacement.' Furthermore, this is not a universal process but one which is limited to the developed world whose population is destined to increasingly resemble that of the developing world, but not the other way around. Given the demographic, and therefore cultural, replacement that would loom on the horizon, strictly limiting immigration from non-western countries is the only way to preserve western values and identity.

Playing complementarities

Demography, however, is not only a question of population numbers but also of age pyramids. Preserving the generational contract has long been an argument for pronatalist policies and, in the face of their failure, for pro-immigration policies. Immigrants and natives have complementary population structures and dynamics. Natives have a rapidly ageing population while immigrants have a younger age structure and higher fertility. As a result the two groups have contrasting patterns of inter-generational transfers. Among natives, transfers are predominantly from active adults to retired old persons (pensions and health care), while among immigrants they are predominantly from active adults to pre-school or school-age children (cost of education).

In countries where the welfare state dominates immigrants and natives are not two disconnected groups, but they are tied by a single social security system that organises social transfers at the national level. Therefore, inter-generational transfers from active to dependent individuals result in inter-ethnic asymmetric transfers: schematically, native adults over-transfer to young immigrants while immigrant adults over-
transfer to old natives. The stratification of society along the lines of age groups intertwines with ethnic stratification. To make things still more asymmetric, social transfers to dependent age groups, old persons and children, have neither the same nature nor the same magnitude: those to the old are regarded as expenses and those to children as investments and, with the growth in life expectancy, the former have a much greater magnitude than the latter.

Two different views, one logical error

However different their conclusions may be, the above approaches both posit that ethnic distinctions will stay from one generation to the other and that they durably define two distinct populations which largely reproduce themselves in isolation. They overlook the role of intermarriage in constructing a new population out of a variety of old ones. Immigration and the arrival of foreigners is an undisputable reality, but that it must necessarily result in something like a foreign-origin population juxtaposed with the native population is simply a logical error.

Exogamy results in offspring with blurred origins. Intermarriages are usually in low proportion among first-generation migrants, become more frequent for second-generation migrants and tend to be the rule for subsequent generations. Children of mixed parentage are, therefore, a normal product of migration. How should they be classified: as persons of foreign origin or as natives? If genealogy does not allow us to delineate a population that would be of foreign origin, is culture any more relevant? While religion, which belongs to the private sphere in secular societies, tends to be transmitted by migrants to their sons and daughters, this does not apply to language—the public cultural medium par excellence—as, starting from the second generation, the vast majority adopts the language of the receiving society.

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Migrants as conveyors of values

In the cities where they live, migrants share public spaces with natives. They often work and trade with them, sometimes marry them and also consciously or unconsciously observe how they behave and listen to what they say. Migrants are continuously exposed to ideas, values and practices that they may progressively make their own, or adapt, then transmit to the community left behind in source countries. Thus the question is no longer if host societies’ identity is altered so much as whether societies of origin are exposed through migrants and transnational ties to identity-making values in receiving countries.

Studies have shown that migrants bring not only tangible, financial, remittances but also non-tangible, ideational remittances: in addition to money, they send home elements of an economic culture that will become resources for development in origin countries. The more contact that they have with the host society, the more likely they are to adopt, adapt and send back part of its values and practices to countries of origin. Paradoxically, the better integrated the migrants the greater impact (not always positive) these migrants might have on social and cultural change in their source country. Other studies have demonstrated that ideational remittances have produced a global demographic benefit: because most recent migration has been from high to low birth-rate countries, and migrants typically adopt and transmit ideas that prevail in host societies, they are potential agents of the diffusion of demographic transition to their country of origin.

Since non-migrants number many more than migrants, ideas and practices adopted by migrants reach a much bigger population through the process of transfer, with a multiplier that should be the ratio of the size of populations left behind in origin countries to the number of migrants.

Conclusion

Migration brings cultural diversity to the west. For mainstream approaches, what seems at stake is maintaining western values and practices despite migration. But migration also works the other way around as a channel for ideational transfers from host to source countries, and for an iconoclastic vision immigration may well be an opportunity to disseminate ideas and what is at stake is more than tangible, financial, remittances but also non-tangible, ideational remittances: in addition to money, they send back part of its values and practices to countries of origin. Paradoxically, the better integrated the migrants typically adopt and transmit ideas that prevail in host societies, they are potential agents of the diffusion of demographic transition to their country of origin.

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The issue of immigration is becoming crucial in explaining electoral results and patterns of party competition in contemporary Europe. Immigration is well-known for its impact on radical forms of behaviour and its capacity to boost the success of new far-right parties in countries like France, Austria or the Netherlands. More importantly, however, mainstream parties and established political elites are increasingly using the immigration issue to position themselves in a newly articulated political space. The anti-immigrant discourses and policies enacted by democratic leaders like Sarkozy and Berlusconi are probably two of the most visible examples. But the effect of immigration goes beyond these established conservative leaders flirting with xenophobic electoral spaces. Narratives about what immigration implies for contemporary European polities affect many non-radical sides of the political continuum, nourishing multicultural and pro-globalisation discourses of parties in the (new) left, and polarising mainstream centre-right and centre-left leaders in the same way that economic issues used to do in the past.

Immigration has become a powerful electoral issue because it catalyses many of the social fears and uncertainties present in advanced European democracies today. Blatantly racist beliefs about how superior or inferior foreign populations are in nature have lost the political prominence they had in periods such as the Enlightenment or during the era of colonisation. This does not mean that contemporary public views on immigration are less blunt; they are instead less essentialist and more contingent upon current social concerns. What really matters today is the framing of the issue in public opinion, and the connection between immigration and other issues affecting contemporary politics. National identity and socio-economic insecurity are two of the most well-studied issue areas linked with public views on immigration. In an era of volatile identities, weakening national boundaries, diffusion of power, and changing senses of belonging, the presence of culturally distant migrants may amplify the uncertainty citizens experience in the absence of modern cultural anchors. At the same time, the perception of scarce socio-economic resources which were more abundant in the post-war era also plays a role. The debates about the lack of sustainability of the welfare state and periods of economic recession activate the saliency of the immigration issue and polarise opinions about whether immigration represents a risk for material security. The specialised literature has also identified other framings of the immigration issue that go beyond the distinction between identity and material threats. The notions of compatibility vs. incompatibility (rather than superiority vs. inferiority) of different ethnic groups, and the difference between social and individual (i.e., the impact of immigration on society as a whole or on inter-personal relations) framings of the issue have also been identified as important.
Once the issue has been framed and constructed in public opinion, how can it have an impact on electoral results and on the structure of party competition? The behavioural consequences of immigration can be both radical and non-radical. Public and scholarly attention has usually focused on the former, probably because it is what makes the immigration issue exceptional vis-a-vis other issues and because of the obvious scientific and normative questions raised by new radical parties. It is still unclear why radical right movements become relevant in some countries and not in others. However, political scientists have reached a clearer consensus on the individual profiles of radical voters. Low levels of education and socio-economic status, high levels of political dissatisfaction, authoritarian values, and nationalistic feelings are just some of the most established findings in this respect. The idea of the immigration issue as a catalyst of additional structural fears and concerns is confirmed in radical right studies. Rather than a traditional racist voter in the fascist sense of the word, contemporary radical voters tend to be structurally vulnerable in socio-economic terms, and see migrants as a threat to or even as a cause of their precarious situation in terms of access to jobs, housing, high salaries and public aid. Radical parties thus effectively cross-cut some axes of competition through a populist and post-establishment discourse which resonates very well among traditional left-wing and socially marginalised voters who no longer feel represented by mainstream parties.

Public views on immigration, however, do not only have an impact on radical right parties. Even if less visible and attractive from a media perspective, the strongest potential of immigration to affect mechanisms of electoral change and the morphology of European party systems lies among non-radical voters. This means that immigration can become a relevant issue also in those systems where radical parties are weak or inexistent. Such was the case, for example, for issues coming out of religious cleavages and the environment, which started as the exclusive domain of niche parties but spread their influence across the political spectrum as time went by. The incorporation of immigration in mainstream party competition has been much less studied by political scientists, and the uncertainty about the overall behavioural impact of immigration is still very high among political elites and scholars. One of the few consensual findings in this respect is that attitudes towards immigration need to be embedded or integrated in established ideological axes of competition in order to have an effect on the electoral fortunes of mainstream parties. One of the more plausible findings is that immigration belongs to a new cultural dimension structuring public attitudes and party positions, together with other post-economic issues like tolerance towards homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, multiculturalism, and globalisation more generally. From this point of view, immigration has become one of the most polarising issues in contemporary politics (from strong pro-immigration to strong anti-immigration preferences along the political continuum), taking over the role that some more consensual economic issues today played in the past [...]”

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Finally, one of the less well-known features of immigration as a mainstream electoral issue is its capacity to mobilise (rather than convert) highly established and identified electorates. From a spatial perspective, party positions on immigration have a stronger potential to mobilise or demonise their core electorate rather than attracting other parties’ electorates. For instance, even if the centre-right or liberal party in a given country moderates its stance on the immigration issue, this party will still be very unlikely to attract a voter who belongs to the most natural electorate of the socialist party or who was rather undecided. The immigration issue thus proves to interact with psychological attachments towards parties and to be a powerful tool for changing the structure of party systems. This effect, however, is mediated through the mobilisation of core electorates rather than through the attraction of electorates of other parties or non-identified voters, who seem to use heuristics other than issues and specific policy stances when deciding for whom to vote.

Sergi Pardos Prado defended his thesis Beyond Radical Right: Attitudes towards Immigration and Voting Behaviour in Europe in the EUI SPS Department in September 2010. The thesis is available in full-text in the EUI institutional repository cadmus.eui.eu.
Highly-skilled migration (HSM) is widespread, and is considered an example of labour mobility in a globalized labour market—European managers going to India and to the US and vice versa. But HSM more frequently represents a precious human resource that abandons the productive and social systems of the country of origin, with consequent reduction in possible economic and social growth. This is known as ‘brain drain’.

If we limit HSM to migrants with a tertiary education, in the year 2000 there were about a million tertiary-educated German migrants in the OECD countries, 1.5 million Britons, 400,000 Italians, and 150,000 Spanish and Portuguese migrants. More importantly the share of tertiary-educated migrants (compared to the total number of tertiary educated at home and abroad), varies from 29% in Ireland, 19% in Portugal, 16% in UK, 14% in Poland, to 3.5% in France.

A large share of highly-skilled mobility is considered frictional in the global labour market and the debate is centred upon relations between HSM and growth, the potential negative effects being frequently overlooked. In less developed countries such as those in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sub-Saharan African (SSA) regions—the core geographical areas of the Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) project at the Robert Schuman Centre—HSM is an important phenomenon. In 2000 the number of highly-skilled migrants ranged from about 150,000 Egyptians and 150,000 Lebanese migrants, to 15,000 Senegalese migrants. The share of highly-skilled migrants abroad is important, but, with the exception of Lebanon (38%) no more impressive than the European one: around 18% for Senegal, Tunisia, and Mali, with much lower numbers for Egypt, Morocco, and Chad. However the debate on HSM is more relevant there because it is centered upon the relation between ‘talented’ emigration and development and poverty.

The traditional view stresses the negative effect of the departure of the highly-skilled from a country of origin. The so-called brain drain forces the country of origin into a lower growth path which is not compensated for by the remittances sent back. The more optimistic view stresses the positive effect of remittances on the investment in education and the return of emigrants who bring back physical, human and social capital. More recent literature also suggests that the higher the probability of emigration among the better educated, the greater are the country’s incentives for higher levels of investment in education, a fact that increases the average level of human capital in the sending country. In this manner of emulation the country reaches a higher growth path.

The research developed within CARIM stresses that the effect of highly-skilled emigration is conditioned first of all by the level of human capital development already prevailing in the origin country. MENA and SSA countries are in different stages of human-capital development. Despite recent increases in enrolment in tertiary education in all countries, due to an increase in public and private investment in education, very large differences remain. For example, Lebanon and Palestine had, in 2007, a tertiary enrolment rate of almost 50%, which is close to what the enrolment rate of Southern European countries was in the 1980s. However, the rate is lower in other Middle Eastern
countries and in the Maghreb—about 30% for Tunisia, 25% for Algeria, and 10% for Morocco. These figures are even lower in sub-Saharan African countries, where enrolment is around or below 5%.

Why do countries such as Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan, with their relatively high levels of human capital accumulation, still need emigration? Wouldn’t the positive effect on the development of human capital accumulation counter-act this tendency? Can we say that they are participating in the globalized labour market in the same way that European citizens do?

To answer the latter question first: they are part of the globalized labour market. However, the main reason why human-capital growth has not reduced highly-skilled outflows is local political instability. Such instability alters the frontiers of a country’s production capacity. To overcome these economic limitations, it is becoming a strategy to invest in the formation of highly-skilled men and women who will work abroad. Migrants’ remittances, investments and human-capital transfers help economic growth. If a loss in human capital takes place, this is a loss with the highest return for the country of origin and for the migrant, and an appropriate-enough strategy in the short term.

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In contrast, for other countries in the initial stages of human-capital development, the emigration of highly-skilled workers seems more dangerous. These countries have already put in place mechanisms to reduce the loss, for instance by forcing the return of migrants to the origin country after a period of education abroad and by attracting migrants for a temporary period of teaching through the Tokten programme. But even if the emigration of highly-skilled workers seems important, given the small number of the highly-educated in the total population—brain drain varies between 2% (Chad) and 16% (Senegal, Mali)—in these countries and economies the roots of underdevelopment depend on the low human-capital accumulation at all levels. The positive effect of the increase in education makes up for, if it ever existed, the negative effect of brain drain.

Countries with an intermediate level of human capital accumulation—e.g. Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt—face a dilemma. Tunisia and Algeria have invested in tertiary education, thus the supply of highly-skilled workers has increased, but local demand has not increased at the same pace. The search for income abroad is becoming a way out of unemployment or brain waste, which would otherwise take place. The dilemma of these countries is inevitable, but the only feasible policy is to fine-tune the high-skill accumulation process and encourage the return of human, social and physical capital.

The rapid increase in tertiary education has frequently resulted in a reduction in the quality of education itself, which together with large inflows into the humanities and social sciences fields are considered the main causes of increased unemployment among the tertiary educated. Then there is also the over-education of immigrants in destination countries, which our research finds limited. Over-education of immigrants, usually termed ‘brain waste’, is more wide-spread in the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand than in Europe (EU27), where over-occupation is more common. This surprising result is due to selective migration policies adopted by the first group of countries, which favour the entrance of more educated migrants who are then not all able to obtain employment equivalent to their high skills. The opposite happens in Europe where entrance is less selective and thus more open to the less educated, who have a better chance of upgrading. In both cases the phenomenon of over-education and over-occupation is not very different among nationals and foreign nationals. It varies considerably though according to the areas of destination where it is the combined result of the economic structure and the migration policy of the destination country.

References
Imagine Europe as an expo park with 27 national pavilions. At the entrance of each pavilion there is a gatekeeper who hands out tickets that give visitors access to all buildings in the park. But it is up to each gatekeeper to decide who will get a ticket. At a few pavilions you just need to wait in a queue for some time and will then be let in for free. At others you are told to come back another time and must pay a hefty price. At some gates, the bouncer picks out of the crowd his own relatives and turns away all who look foreign to him. At others he hands out questionnaires to test those who want to get in how much they already know about the exhibits in his pavilion. Together with the admission ticket for the park, visitors also get a membership card for the association managing the particular pavilion where they have queued. Such a system of autonomous local decisions on whom to admit to the park may work fine as long as a big majority of visitors only want to join one of the national associations rather than visit the other pavilions. Self-determination becomes, however, self-defeating as more and more people are interested in access to the park as a whole.

European Union citizenship is constructed in this way. It is derived from member state nationality and cannot be acquired independently, but EU citizens can freely move across Europe and settle in any member state. One might think that this dilemma would force member states to harmonize their nationality laws. Yet, comprehensive documentation and comparative analyses of citizenship laws and policies by the EUoDO CITIZENSHIP observatory (at http://eudo-citizenship.eu) suggest that convergence is rather weak and seems to be driven more by parallel domestic concerns than by European ones. EU integration has pooled and eroded national sovereignty with regard to currencies, border control, foreign and defence policies. National self-determination of citizenship, however, seems destined to remain as the hard core of member state sovereignty, even though the European Court of Justice has asserted since its 1999 judgment in the Grzelczyk case that ‘EU citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’.

Theoretically, the collective action dilemma created by the current system of self-determining pavilions can be resolved in three different ways. The first solution is to close the 27 ticket counters and replace them with a central ticket office. This office would have to be run by a much stronger park management authority. Since democracy is a central theme of the park, the ticket would have to provide visitors also with individual membership in an association to whom this central authority is directly accountable. Additionally, each pavilion could still remain autonomous in running its local show and visitors would become automatically members of any pavilion where they spend enough time. This model of a federal European state puts the present construction upside down. Instead of deriving EU citizenship from member state nationality, the latter would be derived from the former and acquired or lost on the basis of residence alone rather than through decisions taken by national authorities. Many federal democracies, among them Germany, the United States and Switzerland, had initially derived federal from member state citizenship but have reversed this arrow of causation over the course of their history. Switzerland is the only state that still has not fully done so, but even there a federal law regulates birthright citizenship and provides a set of conditions for the cantonal and municipal laws that regulate access to Swiss citizenship. This solution is extremely un-
likely to be adopted in the EU, which has been explicitly constructed as a Union of independent member states. There is neither a functional necessity nor any prospect of democratic support for creating a federal European state with a single integrated citizenship.

The second solution is to separate tickets for visiting the park from national membership cards. The former could be distributed by a central office while the latter remain under control of the national pavilions. With directives on family reunification (2003), long-term resident third country nationals (2003), international students (2004) and researchers (2005), return of irregular migrants (2008), the 'blue card' for highly skilled workers (2009) and a series of directives and agreements on asylum, the EU has indeed cautiously inched forward from a harmonisation of external border control towards a common European immigration policy. However, disconnecting EU citizenship from member state nationality, as proposed by some migrant associations, academic scholars and EU policy makers, is still unworkable as well as indefensible. It is unworkable because the core right of EU citizenship is free movement within the Union and the core right of member state nationality is an unconditional right to return. As long as pavilions remain autonomous in their own membership policies they can always create additional visitors for the park whom the controllers at a central office would have to waive through. It is also indefensible because it would enhance rather than overcome a democratic deficit with regard to the integration of long-term resident third country nationals. Giving these migrants direct access to EU citizenship without turning them also into citizens of the member state where they reside would remove incentives for migrants to naturalise as well as incentives for member states to offer them access to their citizenship. The proposed solution would therefore create a large category of second-class EU citizens who are only represented in the European Parliament without being also represented in national parliaments and in the Council by their national governments.

The third solution to the EU citizenship dilemma is to retain the basic feature of its present architecture but to harmonize the member states’ citizenship policies. The national pavilions would still hand out combined tickets for visiting and membership, but would agree on a set of common criteria. In order to prevent that each country can admit persons who may enter and stay forever in any of the other EU member states, it would no longer be permitted that birthright citizenship acquired by descent can be endlessly transmitted across generations living abroad. Preferential naturalisation of foreigners with citizen ancestors or the right kind of ethnicity would have to be restricted for the same reason. While containing in this way over-inclusive citizenship policies they would also have to agree on shared standards for the admission of immigrants and their children, including a right to citizenship for the second generation at majority and for the third generation at birth, reasonably short residence requirements, a general toleration of dual citizenship and some limits to excessive naturalisation fees or the difficulty of citizenship tests. While exclusionary citizenship policies do not as directly affect all other member states as over-inclusive ones do, they undermine the democratic legitimacy of the states concerned and of the EU as a whole. Large populations of permanently disenfranchised foreign residents are a European problem and not just a national one.

“Large populations of permanently disenfranchised foreign residents are a European problem and not just a national one.”

If this third solution required a change of the Treaties to create an EU competence to regulate nationality laws, it could turn out to be as unworkable as the first and second ones. However, since the dilemma involves vital member state interests and will become more acute with new rounds of enlargement, the Commission and Parliament might have enough leverage for promoting horizontal coordination among the member states. The EU Expo could then finally advertise that its architecture combines the themes of free movement and democratic citizenship in a harmonious design.
The Migration-Development Nexus in EU Policy: From Rhetoric to Action?

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In both national and international policy discourse, the Migration Development Nexus (MDN) has been defined as a set of objectives and instruments to foster positive links between migration and development. These links deal with countering ‘brain drain’, reducing the cost of remittances as well as enhancing their developmental impact and finally, improving legal channels for circular migration. However, as an emerging policy field of the European Union (EU), the MDN is paradoxical: while policy discourse constantly refers to it, it is hardly ever translated into concrete legal outcomes.

The first explicit mention of the MDN in EU policy documents goes back to 2002 in a Communication from the Commission. Potential expansion of this emerging policy field was subsequently explored in 2005 in another Communication specifically dealing with the MDN1. These instances, however, do not mark the debut of the MDN onto the European agenda. Implicit references to it were made in the early 1990s, especially following the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, which not only set up a fully-fledged development policy, but also laid down the legal bases for creating an EU migration policy. From the outset, this new policy was intended to be ‘comprehensive’, and was aimed at dealing with all aspects related to migration management: long-term reduction of migration pressure (including dealing with the root-causes of migration), short and medium term control of migration flows (from admission policies to the fight against irregular immigration) and integration of migrants.

Initially, the MDN was an element of the external dimension of the EU migration policy. It was considered a preventive tool for countering migration flows as opposed to the control-oriented approach, which focused on curbing irregular migration2. The main goal was to find systemic solutions to mitigate migration pressure, especially defined by the Commission as actual and potential migration flows to the EU. Under this ‘comprehensive’ policy framework, virtually all policy fields could be used to meet the policy objectives.

Among these fields, development policy seemed especially promising, as the pressure to emigrate was seen mainly as the consequence of a lack of development—this latter notion being understood in its holistic sense, including not only economic deprivation, but also absence or lack of human rights protection. Therefore, promoting development, especially through financial tools, could be used to act on the ‘root causes’ of emigration pressure. This approach to the links between development and migration may be called the ‘root causes’ paradigm of the MDN3.

The Action Plans drafted by the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration in 1998-1999 constituted the first attempt to implement a comprehensive vision of migration management, including the ‘root causes’ approach. These instruments were intended to explore effective ways of reducing migration pressure from selected countries, but, for a number of reasons, they did not lead to the expected results. First, they did not fully associate partner countries, whose participation in both drafting and implementing these instruments was necessary. Moreover, the linkage between migration and development was assessed in rather hypothetical and theoretical terms. Next, their clear focus on migration management showed a somewhat instrumental use of external policies, which made officials reluctant to grant the financial and legal means necessary to implement them. This was especially true in Directorate General Development. In this respect, although the legal bases laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty allowed for the adoption of acts in the field of asylum and some aspects of migration, the latter were insufficient to enable the full implementation of the Action Plans, particularly regarding labour immigration. Hence, the concrete outcome of the Action Plans fell short of initial expectations, and implied the failure of the root causes approach.

However, the MDN found another expression in the so-called ‘co-development’ approach. This paradigm actually builds on existing practices of migrants’ con-
tributions to development in their home countries. This expression originated in the French policy discourse and initially referred to a shared and interdependent development process of both developed and developing countries. It only took on its migration 'hue' in the late 1990s, when innovative solutions were explored to reduce immigration to France. The substantial contribution of migrants, especially via remittances, was identified as an interesting leverage point for development. Co-development was enshrined in the conclusions of the European Council's special meetings in 1999 in Tampere as an important aspect of the comprehensive approach to manage migration. This trend was later confirmed at the policy level, especially following the demise of the root causes approach. Co-development was perceived as the only concrete way to promote positive links between migration and development, not least because of the difficulty in deciphering the intricate relationships between migration and development. This approach was clearly expressed in the 2005 Communication, which focused on the two main dimensions of co-development: remittances and circular migration.

Currently, the MDN management is one pillar of the Global Approach to Migration (GAM), set up in 2005 as the overall framework for EU migration policy. It is also a focal point of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which recognizes that the development process is influenced not only by development policy, but also by other external and internal policies in areas such as trade, agriculture, and migration. Through PCD, development concerns increasingly permeate the migration management policy discourse. Indeed, one could argue that a development-oriented focus might allow for more flexibility in migration management.

Despite the presence of the MDN in policy discourse since the early 1990s, however, the relative absence of legal instruments for implementing either of the two discussed paradigms at the EU level remains striking. While we might understand the problems faced in the 'root causes' method, one wonders why the co-development approach, which has a much more straightforward formulation, does not lead to more definite legal outcomes. Instead, the favoured methodology so far has been the use of 'soft law' instruments, the most significant being mobility partnerships. Taking the form of a declaration of intentions between partners, these instruments may be considered gentlemen's agreements, whose content is neither binding nor definitive. Rather, they set up a policy framework for engaging in further discussions with the third country partner in order to find common ways of managing migration. Mobility partnerships are pilot instruments that should eventually lead to more concrete outcomes, including the adoption of hard law instruments. The structure of these instruments follows the same pattern as the three pillars of the GAM: Legal migration, irregular migration and migration and development. Interestingly, for Moldova and Georgia (two of the three countries with which the EU and some Member States have formed partnerships, the third being Cape Verde), the conclusion of mobility partnerships is related to the adoption of readmission and visa facilitation agreements. In this regard, mobility partnership may be considered 'positive' conditionality instruments.

Although one may regret the relative absence of more stringent legal measures, a soft approach seems the only sustainable one with regard to the MDN. Partnerships with third countries are, in fact, essential for achieving positive results in linking migration to development. From the material point of view, this explains the prominence of political dialogue in implementing the MDN, whether institutionalised in an international agreement or not. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether migrants' interests are addressed in an appropriate way. Although increasingly more binding legal instruments mention the relevance of the MDN, especially with regard to mobility, the significance of such references is debatable. Finally, more work needs to be done concerning remittances, as the Payment Services Directive does not (yet) cover external financial transfers.

To conclude, although the MDN is upheld in the EU policy discourse, it is still unclear whether it is more than rhetoric. From the legal perspective, legal provisions suffer from the undefined content of the MDN policy objectives, which are blurred and affected by migration management concerns focusing on migration control. Hopefully the increasing importance of political dialogue will lead to better formulated policy objectives concerning the MDN in legal terms. It will undoubtedly be a difficult road however, as the very nature of the links between migration and development is unsettled, and, as of yet, the interests of migrants as actors of development in both destination and sending countries are still not taken into account.

References
Ontology of a Readmission System

Part-time Professor, RSCAS | Jean-Pierre Cassarino

There can be no question that relative gains-seeking can help explain the reasons for which two state actors cooperate on readmission, i.e., on the expulsion or removal of unauthorised aliens. Such relative gains do motivate state actors to cooperate or not. However, there also exist systems shaped by values and dominant schemes of understanding that can impact on the conditions conducive to cooperation as well as on states’ perceptions and change of behaviours.

The recognition of such systems is important insofar as it lays emphasis on the need to consider the existence of a causal link between beliefs and (perceived) interests, subjectivities and priorities, as well as between values and policy agendas. The point is not so much to analyze the costs and benefits linked with the cooperation on readmission between two state actors. The main question lies in exploring the existence of a system whereby the cooperation on readmission has become more predictable and meaningful for state actors. Investigating such a system is key to understanding the reasons for which the cooperation on readmission has gained momentum over the last decade between EU and non-EU countries.

One characteristic of a readmission system is to overcome asymmetric and contrasting interests through repeated interaction and exchanges aimed at gradually adopting common understandings and orientations. It is no accident that the number of governmental consultations on ‘migration management’, at bilateral and multilateral levels, has dramatically increased since the mid 1990s to date. Such consultative processes have contributed to defining common principles as to how the movement of all persons should be monitored and influenced.

This has had various implications. Perhaps the most important one lies in having built a hierarchy of priorities set by countries of destination, of transit and of origin, whether these are poor or rich, large or small, democratically organized or totalitarian. The latter have realised that the cooperation on readmission allows their coercive regulatory capacity to be expressed when needed, while making their constituencies (more) aware of the presence of the sovereign within a specific territorial entity. In other words, as William Walters and Godfried Engbersen have already shown, keeping out the undesirables is not only a question of immigration control and security agenda. It is also an issue closely linked with the expression of state authority and sanction, or rather with states’ capacity of classifying aliens and citizens alike, as well as their rights and position in a territorialized society.

The consolidation of a security paradigm has contributed to favouring the adoption of measures prioritizing the greater need to respond to perceived threats. Restrictive laws regarding the conditions of entry and residence of migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees, the reinforced controls of the EU external borders, and the dramatic expansion of the web of detention centres in and out of the EU territory illustrate the community of interests shared by countries of destination, of transit and of origin.

This prioritization process has led to the flexible reinterpretation, if not serious breach, of internationally recognized standards and norms. For the need to respond to perceived threats rests on operable means of implementation that are often antonymous to transparency and to the respect of international commitments. It also rests on a subtle denial. Clearly, such a denial does not stem from the ignorance or failure to recognize the value of international norms relating to migrants’ rights, asylum-seekers and the status of refugees. Rather, it stems first and foremost from the prioritization of operable means of implementation, which generates a tension between national interests and international commitments. The removal of aliens is fully embedded in this tension. The denial may also alter the understanding of the notion of effectiveness. What is effective has become first and foremost operable, but not necessarily in full compliance with international standards.
Importantly, the state has been but one actor in the consolidation of such a readmission system. The mobilization of a technical expertise has played a key role in sustaining dominant schemes of interpretation as applied to international migration while legitimizing the prioritization of means of implementation in the field of readmission. Through the selective allocation of public funds, non-state actors have been subcontracted to deliver a technical expertise legitimizing a ‘form’ of top-down knowledge about international migration and, above all, consolidating uncritically states’ hierarchy of priorities.

Today, the production of knowledge about migration issues has become strategic, if not crucial, in political terms. By obstructing any alternative interpretation of a given problem, the production of a subcontracted expertise might not only pave the way for dealing with the ‘problem’, it might also stray away from the cause of the problem while justifying a unique technical solution as the lesser evil. This process of cooptation is, as it were, connected with the growing politicisation of readmission and of the ‘fight against illegal migration’, i.e., with the process through which not only policy-makers or migration stakeholders, but also the layman or common people may have a say—though not necessarily an informed opinion.

Incidentally, Christine Bacon, Didier Bigo, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ben Hayes, to mention just a few, have evidenced the outsourcing of migration controls to private contractors and multinational corporations (MNCs) in the security and surveillance sectors. The outsourcing has gained momentum over the last ten years or so as a result of an amazingly lucrative business. Their studies have shown, across various disciplines, the emergence of a system whereby the interests of the private remain intertwined with those of the public to respond and legitimize the abovementioned hierarchy of priorities and its operable means of implementation.

Private security companies and MNCs do not only deliver a service which, being private, often remains beyond public purview, they are also proactive in developing ‘extremely close ties’, as Michael Flynn and Cecilia Cannon argue, with decision-makers and government officials and in expanding strategic alliances with other key private actors or subcontractors. Clearly, further evidence is needed to understand the actual impact of these interconnections on policy options and priorities. There are forms of interference that neither affect decision-making processes and policy options, nor are they meant to do so substantially. However, some may entail the provision of information that policymakers value in their day-to-day tasks. Information provision, which often takes place through special advisory committees, also implies how policy issues and exigencies can be perceived and dealt with. It is reasonable to assume that the participation of private contractors’ staff people in such committees may have contributed to consolidating the security paradigm, while making its means of implementation if not more practicable, at least more banal, thinkable, and acceptable.

It is under these circumstances fraught with dominant schemes of understanding that a readmission system has emerged and that the cooperation on readmission has been branded as the only technical solution ‘to combat illegal migration’. It has been presented as a lesser evil able to tackle a common international challenge or threat while making states perhaps less careful about their own relative gains in the cooperation on readmission and undeniably far less sensitive to the reasons for which those who are viewed as illegal or undesirable left their homeland, let alone their dreadful conditions.

Hannah Arendt wrote, with reference to some of the darkest times of Europe’s recent history, that ‘acceptance of lesser evils is consciously used in conditioning the government officials as well as the population at large to the acceptance of evil as such.’ I would add to Arendt’s argument that the reference to a lesser evil fosters consensus formation beyond national interests and subtly justifies, by the same token, the use of operable means that might weaken the enforceability of universal norms and standards on human rights without necessarily ignoring or denying their existence. In other words, the acceptance of the lesser evil filters and shapes our categories of thought.

When faced with these conditions, one is entitled to wonder whether it is still reasonable to wallow in the denunciation of some states’ failure to fully respect their international commitments regarding the rights and human dignity of readmitted persons. To be sure, naming offenders is crucial. However, abuse and violations have become so glaringly obvious and arrogantly justifiable through the lens of the ‘lesser evil’ that their public denunciation might lead to no concrete change, if not to the paradoxical acceptance of things as they are (‘we cannot do otherwise’). Together with the denunciation of repeated violations, a thorough examination of the readmission system has to be provided in order to instil in the minds of officials and constituencies alike a sense of doubt and scepticism about the lesser evil and to think about the drive for operability and its implications for the respect of the rights of aliens and citizens alike.
In 2001, violent conflicts between native British and Asian Muslim youth took place in northern England. In 2005, civil unrest amongst France’s Muslim Maghreb communities spread over the country. In 2006, the publication of illustrations of the prophet Muhammad in a Danish newspaper generated the so-called ‘cartoon crisis’. The terrorist events in the United States (2001), Spain (2004) and Britain (2005) have placed Muslim communities under intense scrutiny, and extreme right wing politicians such as Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and parties such as the Northern League in Italy gain votes playing on the electorate’s fears of the ‘Muslim’ or the ‘immigrant’. The current economic crisis has only exacerbated the situation, providing fertile ground for racist and discriminatory behaviour towards minorities: the massive expulsions of Roma populations from Italy in 2008 and from France in 2010 are eloquent examples.

These tensions have given rise to intense debates in the media, in political forums, and in scholarly circles concerning the reasons underlying them, and what should be done to alleviate them and enhance societal cohesion. The question that is being posed, some times in more and others in less politically correct terms, is how much cultural diversity can be accommodated within liberal and secular democracies?

In policy terms, the main conclusion drawn from the above debates has been that multicultural policies have failed and that a return to an assimilationist approach (emphasising national culture and values) is desirable. For example the Netherlands, a forerunner in multicultural policies since the 1980s, has shifted, at least at the symbolic level, towards such a view by establishing integration courses for newcomers to the Netherlands and most recently a civic integration test to be undertaken by prospective migrants before departure from their country of origin (Ter Wal, 2007; Vasta 2007). In the face of mounting civil unrest and social exclusion of second-generation immigrant youth, the French government has reasserted its Republican civic integration model banning religious symbols from schools (Kastoryano, 2006; Guiraudon, 2006).

Germany, home to one of the largest Muslim communities in Europe, is a somewhat ambivalent case. On the one hand, politicians recently officially acknowledged that Germany is an immigration country and a multicultural society making integration the new buzzword; on the other, the restrictive implementation of the liberal citizenship law of 2000 led to a decrease in naturalisations (Schiffauer, 2006; Green, 2004; 2005). Most recently (on 14 October 2010) Angela Merkel proclaimed the ‘failure’ of German ‘multiculturalism’ as if there has ever been an implementation of multicultural citizenship policies in Germany.

Britain and Sweden are perhaps the only European countries that have maintained in practice (even if...
they changed the terminology used) a political multiculturalism approach. Concerns for cohesion, however, and an underlying need to retrieve an inclusive understanding of Britishness—particularly in the aftermath of the July 2005 London bombings—have led recent governments to introduce a ‘Life in the United Kingdom test’ (a civic integration test) and civic ceremonies (Meer and Modood, 2008).

While traditional immigration countries in central and western Europe experience an identity crisis confronted with jihadist terrorism and social unrest among immigrant communities, the so-called ‘new hosts’ like Spain, Italy, Greece, or Portugal are left to their own devices. The multiculturalism crisis comes at a time when these countries just started acknowledging their de facto multicultural and multiethnic composition. The perceived failure however of the cultural diversity approach adopted by the ‘old hosts’ discourages multicultural integration policies in southern Europe, reinforcing the view that immigration may be economically a good thing provided that immigrants become assimilated into the dominant national culture (Zapata-Barrero, 2006; Triandafyllidou, 2002; Calavita 2005).

The question of migrant and ethnic minority integration becomes more complicated, perhaps paradoxically, due to the European integration process. Old and recent member states strive to accept cultural diversity within Europe as well as to define their geopolitical and cultural position within the continuously enlarging European Union. National identities are under pressure by the Europeanisation process—especially as regards the former Communist countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (Kuus 2004, Triandafyllidou and Spohn 2003, dell’Olio 2005; De Bardeleben 2005). The question of Turkey’s accession into the EU has given rise to fervent debates about the Christian roots of European values; the compatibility between a predominantly Muslim country with a secular constitution and an Islamic governing party and the rest of the EU; and the borders of Europe [...]

In view of the different historical experiences of migration and the different paradigms of integration (or indeed marginalisation) adopted by different EU countries, there is a pressing need for considering what the ‘appropriate’ norms are for building a policy that both respects cultural diversity and honours national traditions. It is in this context that the EUI/RSCAS project ‘ACCEPT PLURALISM’ researches the normative and conceptual origins of tolerance and its relationship to concepts such as pluralism, liberalism, secularism, national identity and multiculturalism (www.accept-pluralism.eu).

The basic concept of tolerance (or Toleration) as analysed by political theorists such as Preston King and Susan Mendus is X tolerates Y, where: X does not approve of Y. X has the power to interfere with Y but refrains from doing so. This is a minimal conception of liberal tolerance, which means that one does not interfere with practices or forms of life of a person even if one disapproves of them and despite the fact that s/he has the power to suppress them.

Galeotti (2002) has however proposed a thick or egalitarian understanding of tolerance which includes institutional arrangements and public policies that fight negative stereotyping, promote positive inclusive identities and reorganise the public space in ways that accommodate diversity.

Indeed tolerance may be a useful concept as it provides for a range of normative positions that can give rise to corresponding policies.

Thus, we may accord liberal (thin) tolerance to practices of which we need not approve and for which not more than toleration is claimed. This would allow for a wider set of practices, norms and behaviour to be accepted within society. This perspective may be morally minimalist but is politically realistic and viable, guaranteeing a minimal level of liberal equality and social cohesion. The advantage of tolerance is that it provides for both ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ normative positions. Thus it provides for a framework for considering that some practices, individual or collective, are considered intolerable and are rejected. It also provides room for a thicker, egalitarian view of tolerance as recognition, a higher normative concept that may apply for a more restrictive range of practices and individuals or groups (than those concerned by liberal tolerance) but which may be considered more appropriate (politically and morally) to them.
Family Reunification in Europe and East Asia
Max Weber Fellow 2010 - 2011 (SPS) | Kristin Surak

In a region where integration frictions grab headlines, xenophobic politicians pen bestsellers, and national branding flaunts multicultural flourishes, few in Europe have asked the prior question, Why do migrants settle in a country in the first place? Motives generally offer few clues: many 'transients' annually renew their expectation to return home soon, as the years in a host society stretch into decades. To grasp the disruption between action and intent that leads to de facto settlement, one must look to the conventional kernel of private life: families. Settlement is rare without a spouse at one's side, and children learning the language of the playgrounds and the culture of the schools in their host societies attach a heavy anchor to their globe-trotting parents. Until recently, family reunification has remained relatively uncontroversial in Europe: debates have raged around not the right itself, but how far it should extend.

Yet even if family reunification is taken as a given, its origins are diverse. Former empires, like France and Britain, extended—sometimes by default—this citizens' right of reunion to their imperial subjects. And countries launching guest worker programs, such as Germany and Switzerland, conceded to employer and sending-state pressures to allow spouses and children to accompany recruited labourers. Welcoming kin through the front doors came as the family was inscribed into supranational law as the 'natural and fundamental group unit in society'—a phrase repeated verbatim in a range of international conventions and covenants protecting the sacred building blocks of social life. While the teeth marks of these gum-mouthed super-state instruments may be difficult to discern, courts in Germany and France have incised the right of family reunification into the fundamental legal structures of their countries. Thus when the embrace of kin is challenged—usually in terms of how wide the arms should open—legal standards have ensured that the basic right is guaranteed. Indeed, family reunification has become so normative in Europe that new countries of immigration—notably Spain and Italy—extended this privilege to their new pools of foreign workers almost immediately.

East Asia stands in stark relief. Like the growing economies of the Mediterranean, the liberal-democracies on the northwest Pacific Rim—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—began to open their front- and side-doors more widely to migrant workers in the early 1990s. But eager to ensure that temporary labour migration remained just that, they instituted family reunification rights in only limited cases. In South Korea and Taiwan, highly-skilled workers are allowed to bring spouses and children with them—companionship and support denied to those in the vastly larger flows used to fill undesirable jobs. These lower-skilled workers are strictly managed by their host governments for maximal economic gain, accompanied by severe exploitation in some cases. Repatriated when their time is up, they are given no opportunity to settle, even if they wanted.

In Japan, the right to reunification has been somewhat more expansively applied, with 'fellow Japanese' brethren settled in South America for three generations al-
allowed to return to the homeland with their kin. Osten-
sibly to 'visit family graves' and 'learn their forebears' 
language,' these mostly Brazilian-Japanese are granted 
unlimited 'cultural' visas—though bearing with no 
work restrictions—that enable them to fill spaces at 
the assembly line and workbench. With their families 
in tow, some have begun to settle. But the Japanese 
government has begun to roll up its welcome mat— 
paying its kindred guests to go back, and expanding 
'trainee' schemes to recruit more character-literate and 
readily returnable Chinese workers, unaccompanied 
by their families. As in Europe, each country bears its 
distinctive marks, but striking across the three East 
Asian cases has been the absence of family reunifi-
cation rights from the debate agenda—not only of 
bureaucrats, courts, and businesses, but also of unions 
and migrant NGOs.

Supranational and national legal contexts go only so 
far in explaining these sharp differences. After all, East 
Asian countries have added their seals to international 
rights' treaties, and some even enshrine the sacredness 
of the family in their constitutions. Research based at 
the University of California, San Diego has argued that 
elite political culture provides more clues. High-level 
politicians and bureaucrats in Europe have recognized 
a modicum of moral obligation to their former co-
lonial subjects and invited guests. Indeed, slamming 
doors against future migrant waves has been followed, 
in some policy areas, by more generous treatment of 
those already inside. Elites articulate a 'moral obliga-
tion' to deal 'humanely' with the consequences of 
the reception they spread, and whether on the left 
or the right, positions hostile to families are politi-
cally untenable. The German case here is instructive. 
Though guest worker programs were ended in 1973, 
the number of foreigners within the Federal Republic 
continued to grow, with reunited families adding al-
most one million newcomers by 1980. Courts ensured 
that the right to be with kin was chiselled into law, 
and by the time of the 1990 Foreigner Law debates, 
no political parties questioned the termination of 
this entitlement. But limits to these moral concerns 
have emerged with the results of settlement. By 2003, 
Germany succeeded in blunting the European Com-
misson's directive to harmonize policies in a more 
expansive direction. This restrictive back-tracking, 
particularly away from Muslims, is mirrored in the 
recent proliferation of integration and language tests 
prior to arrival in destinations such as the Nether-
lands, France, and Germany—soon to be followed by 
Austria, and perhaps others. While family reunifica-
tion is still on the table, the Old World is looking less 
welcoming than the settler societies of the New.

"While family reunification is still on 
the table, the Old World is looking less 
welcoming than the settler societies 
of the New."

But it still hardly resembles East Asia. In the north-
west Pacific, political elites have taken a much harder 
stance towards their invited guests, maintaining that 
little is owed to labour migrants beyond short-term 
work. In the absence of regional pressures, state in-
terests dominate, here defined as nurturing society 
through economic growth. Designed to maximize the 
contribution to the economy and minimize the dis-
ruption to the social fabric, policy concerns 'labourers' 
rather than 'migrants.' Without family reunification, 
these strictures have garnered an early 'victory' in pre-
venting settlement—their measure of success, ripping 
migrants from their lived contexts. One wonders how 
long these governments can continue to refute Max 
Frisch's aphorism, 'We asked for workers, but human 
beings came.'

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In Memory of Max Kohnstamm, 
First President of the EUI
Emeritus Professor of Political Science - Leiden University | Hans Daalder

On 20 October 2010 Max Kohnstamm died at the age of 96. Obituaries in the international press hailed him as a last survivor of a generation who built the European Community. His period as the founding EUI president was his last post. Hans Daalder, Head of the Department of Political and Social Sciences from 1976 to 1979, looks back on his long life.

In the shadow of national socialism

Max Kohnstamm was born in Amsterdam on the eve of the first World War, the youngest son in a large family. His family was part of an elite circle with links to the world of business, but also characterized by culture, learning and social commitment. His father (of Jewish descent but highly active in the Dutch Reformed Church and in public life) was a distinguished professor first of physics and then of education at the University of Amsterdam. Max studied history from 1933 to 1940, becoming a highly visible student leader who was deeply conscious of the growing danger of national-socialism. Still rare in his days, he interrupted his studies during 1938-1939 for a year in the USA at the height of Roosevelt’s New Deal.

Kohnstamm was twice imprisoned during the German occupation. First he was arrested as a Strafhäftling. He spent three months in the worst concentration camp in the Netherlands. Its cruelties and dehumanization made him lose his earlier religious beliefs, but also impressed upon him the need for institutions and the legal protection of a Rechtsstaat. He was interned a second time, for two years, in a very different camp which he was later to describe as Hitlers Herrengefängnis. It held some 600 prominent Dutchmen, hostages to be used in possible reprisals against acts of resistance. They formed an elite group of persons with very different political and religious backgrounds, who freely debated matters of post-war policy. When Queen Wilhelmina returned from exile in London in May 1945, she sought a young man with a decent war record to serve as her private secretary. She chose Kohnstamm. While his was a purely non-political job, he was free to join a group of civil servants, members of the newly established Labour Party, which met informally to discuss political matters. In 1947 he was a member of a small group of Protestants that sought to renew contacts with church leaders in a completely ruined and impoverished Germany. That experience made him a profound believer in the need to reintegrate a renewed Germany into the western world.

A national and an international civil servant

Kohnstamm’s work with the Queen ended with her abdication in 1948. He then joined the staff of a special government bureau concerned with the implementation of the Marshall Plan. He became familiar with international negotiations, including the development of the OECD and the European Payments Union. Later, he was appointed head of the German Division in the Dutch Foreign Office. The announcement on 9 May 1950 of the Schuman Plan had a profound effect on him. He became the vice-chairman of the Dutch negotiating team in the ensuing negotiations between the six countries which were to establish the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In that role, he first met Jean Monnet, the intellectual force behind the Schuman Plan, and was deeply impressed by him.
In turn he was also clearly appreciated by Monnet, who as the first Chairman of the High Authority of the ECSC asked Kohnstamm to become its first Secretary. This was the beginning of a close personal association which lasted for almost thirty years until Monnet's death in 1979.

From international civil servant to full-time lobbyist for European integration

During his period as the first Secretary of the High Authority Kohnstamm became thoroughly familiar with the inner workings of a supranational organization. He brought important qualities to this post: a thorough commitment to the idea of European integration, a command of the major European languages, and a gift for drafting important decisions and policy papers. In his post he acquired direct knowledge of the workings of different national bureaucracies, of the six ECSC countries as well as the countries which sought new forms of association with this new supranational organization. He came to know important political and official actors throughout Europe, finding more satisfaction in the high politics of international cooperation and organization than in daily international administration. When Monnet, impatient with the sluggish advance of European integration, decided to leave his post as Chairman, Kohnstamm was faced with an important choice. He was well-established in Luxemburg along with his wife Kathleen and his children. Yet he shared Monnet's conviction that additional steps should be taken towards further integration after the European Defence Community and the related plan for a European Political Union floundered in the French Parliament in 1954. While Monnet's interest shifted to the formation of EURATOM, for a short period Kohnstamm served as the first ECSC ambassador to the British Community in London. At this time he was unexpectedly approached for the post of Mayor of the City of Amsterdam (which is a Crown appointment in the Netherlands). Rather than accept the offer, he decided definitely to join Monnet in the establishment of what became known as the Action Group for the United States of Europe. In some ways this was an impossible step to make for a successful international civil servant with a growing family to sustain. It meant a move away from direct institutional responsibility towards the uncertain existence of an international lobbyist, however important the cause.

The twenty years to follow provided him with a unique experience of international consultation, with the widest possible array of personalities, parties and trades unions vital for steps towards further European integration. His role became important during the protracted negotiations which were eventually to lead to the formation of the European Economic Community and EURATOM. Particularly noteworthy was his role in converting the German Socialists towards a pro-European stand, as well as persuading Adenauer to take negotiations with the French directly into his own hands. In all this he remained very much Monnet's right hand man, working in the background as secretary and later vice-president of the Action Committee. From 1953 to 1967 he kept an extensive diary in some twenty-five notebooks, now safely stored in
the Historical Archives of the European Union in Villa il Poggiolo. These diaries, full of mixed hopes and frustrations, chronicle important historical events. They are not easy to use as they are written in Dutch in a difficult handwriting. Some parts have been transcribed by former users. More recently, the Dutch scholar Mathieu Segers edited and richly annotated the diaries for the 1953-1957 period in a book published in 2008. A second volume is to follow next year.

Principal at the Badia

Kohnstamm was in Messina in 1955 when the plan for a European University first appeared on the European agenda. With men like Walter Hallstein and Etienne Hirsch he was a member of the Association of the European Community for University Studies created by Jean Monnet. At the request of the Ford Foundation Kohnstamm became director of an office aimed at establishing chairs of European studies in different European countries. He witnessed the passing enthusiasm for a large-scale, mainly science-oriented university promoted by Germany as a sideline to EURATOM. But then for a long time developments stalled on French resistance. Only after De Gaulle had left office were new initiatives taken. This resulted in the 1972 agreement to establish a European University Institute (EUI) with four Departments which was to promote research at the highest level in doctoral programs in history, law, economics, and political and social sciences.

As so often happens in international organizations, Kohnstamm’s appointment as ‘Principal’ of the new Institute—the official title in the Convention—was the result of strong competition and elaborate negotiations. Once appointed, he was fortunate to have the Italian Marcello Buzzonetti at his side as the EUI’s first Secretary-General. One of their first concerns was to find a suitable location. Italy had been an assiduous scholar Mathieu Segers edited and richly annotated the diaries for the 1953-1957 period in a book published in 2008. A second volume is to follow next year.

Principal at the Badia

Kohnstamm was in Messina in 1955 when the plan for a European University first appeared on the European agenda. With men like Walter Hallstein and Etienne Hirsch he was a member of the Association of the European Community for University Studies created by Jean Monnet. At the request of the Ford Foundation Kohnstamm became director of an office aimed at establishing chairs of European studies in different European countries. He witnessed the passing enthusiasm for a large-scale, mainly science-oriented university promoted by Germany as a sideline to EURATOM. But then for a long time developments stalled on French resistance. Only after De Gaulle had left office were new initiatives taken. This resulted in the 1972 agreement to establish a European University Institute (EUI) with four Departments which was to promote research at the highest level in doctoral programs in history, law, economics, and political and social sciences.

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The Institute operated under its own Convention, modelled largely on the example of the European Economic Community. It was governed by a High Council which met twice a year, with the Chairman rotating among the nine participating countries. Its meetings had to be prepared by elaborate documents in all official languages, preceded by a budget committee of financial personnel of the member states. The Principal and Secretary-General needed for all this a substantial international staff, which was largely recruited from personnel of the European Community. This was a world with which Kohnstamm was thoroughly familiar. As the EUI was to engage in research at the highest international level, a large library was foreseen, with an experienced staff and the most modern computing facilities. Thus an elaborate permanent administration and library staff were already in place before the first professors and students arrived (one year later than foreseen) in September 1976.

Kohnstamm had virtually no influence on the choice of the first eight professors. A committee had been formed consisting half of government representatives and half of leading academics of the nine states. The procedures and quality of nomination processes within individual countries varied widely. Whereas in some cases highly prestigious scholars came forward, in other countries the candidacies were haphazard. Later nominations of new professors and the renewals of sitting ones were to be decided by the Academic Council composed of the President, the full professors, and in a non-voting capacity the Secretary-General and the Librarian. Kohnstamm discovered that under the Convention a simple majority of the first professors could renew their own mandates. He let it be known that he would not automatically countersign such re-nominations, which brought him into conflict with a potential majority among the first professors. The small academic staff fell woefully short in their capacity to ensure adequate supervision of the substantial number of chercheurs who arrived in the first years.

The first Academic Council had to decide a large number of questions, left open by the Convention. What were the requirements for a doctorate? Was there to be intensive graduate training? Should there be an interim assessment of researchers after the first year, which could mean that those below certain standards would have to leave? To what degree would they be free to choose their own dissertation subject, or should the Institute develop its own research program? If so, would that depend on the preferences of individual professors, or should the Institute develop its own research program? But then, how would this be possible with the rather rapid turnover of professors, who might make plans for the future, but would no longer be there to implement these? There were great differences among the initial group of professors on most of these points. As President, Kohnstamm might have had his own ideas and preferences, but he did not have a deciding vote. He hoped that the Institute would develop in the direction of a European ‘Brains Trust’, rather like the American Brook—
ings Institution, which combined high independent academic standards with strong policy studies. Most members of the first Academic Council thought differently, preferring more traditional approaches of fundamental scholarship.

Such discussions took place within a circle of individuals which was both too narrow and too diverse. For that reason, it was decided to establish a Profile Committee, consisting of the four Heads of Department, two members of the High Council and a number of prominent scholars from different countries. This committee recommended the establishment of a Research Council of the Institute, consisting of outside scholars. This Council would judge specific research proposals, and would also have a voice in whether the renewal of individual professors would be in the interest of the Institute or not. The Profile Committee discussed the need for more intensive graduate training during the first year. This proposal was rejected by a majority in the Academic Council which was satisfied with a system of weekly seminars offered by each individual professor. The Committee also advocated a system of attracting younger promising scholars, an idea later realized by the Jean Monnet Fellowship program.

Though Kohnstamm found it easier to deal with the High Council and the permanent administration, he presided over the Academic Council with style. He was an elegant host to numerous visitors to the Institute. He initiated the Jean Monnet Lectures, the first one being given in October 1977 by the then-President of the European Commission Roy Jenkins who used the occasion to launch his plan for a European Monetary System. The fifth lecture was given by Kohnstamm himself in 1981 as outgoing President. Under the title Le Pouvoir de l’Imagination he discussed the thoughts and achievements of Jean Monnet who remained a deciding influence throughout his life.

Looking back on the years of Kohnstamm’s presidency one is struck by the immense differences between the nascent EUI and the present Institute, which has grown beyond the wildest dreams of the pioneer generation. Many of the early problems were solved by rapid expansion. Thus it is no longer an issue whether the Institute should develop as a Brains Trust for European integration on the Brookings model, or a place of fundamental academic research: The Schuman Centre and the European Forum could do the one, the greatly expanded Departments the other. The problems surrounding three year long appointments were solved by extending appointments to much longer periods. An enlarged academic staff ensures more adequate supervision for doctoral candidates. Both the completion rate and the large number of dissertations make the Institute one of the largest institutes on the graduate level in the world.

But as Jan van der Harst and Anjo Harryvan state in their biography of Max Kohnstamm, for all the initial difficulties it was Kohnstamm who put the EUI on the European map.

**A Europeanist forever**

Kohnstamm did not rest after his departure from Florence. In consultation with prominent European statesmen he re-established an Action Committee to promote further integration, which was active between 1984 and 1988. He followed European developments intensely. And to the last he was adviser and Honorary President of the European Policy Centre in Brussels.

A large number of people attended Kohnstamm’s impressive funeral in Amsterdam. The EUI was represented by its former President Yves Mény.

Sources: Several authors described their contacts with Kohnstamm in a multilingual Liber Amicorum presented to him at his 90th birthday entitled *Een leven voor Europa* (1990). The 2008 Dutch biography by Anjo G. Harryvan and Jan van der Harst (both former EUI researchers) is being translated by Ian Fraser and will be published next year with financial support of the EUI in an English edition as *Max Kohnstamm. A European’s life and work.*

**Hans Daalder** (1928) taught political science at the Amsterdam University and the International Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, before he was appointed in 1963 as Professor of Political Science at Leiden University. He was one of the founders of the European Consortium for Political Research, serving as its chairman during the years 1976-1979, when he was the first Head of the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the EUI. His work in political science has mostly been in the field of comparative European politics.
EUI Alumni & Staff News

Alumni Association Report

As usual, this year’s Alumni weekend coincided with the Conferring Ceremony, inaugurated for the first time by President Josep Borrell. The General Assembly (GA) took place on Friday 1 October, there was a full-day visit to the Chianti on Saturday, and a guided tour of Palazzo Vecchio on Sunday.

The Alumni prize, awarded every two years for the best dissertation demonstrating interdisciplinarity and relevance to European issues, was announced during the GA. The winner was selected from among four candidates, with each department having nominated one dissertation defended in the previous two years which fulfilled these criteria. Nominated candidates were Mark Dawson (LAW), Mariya Tetryatnitova (ECO), Antonio Terrasa Lozano (HEC) and Christopher Hanretty (SPS). The dissertations were evaluated by a prestigious independent jury appointed by the Executive Committee (EC) of the Alumni Association. Peter Hertner, former EUI Professor from HEC and President of this year’s jury, announced the winning thesis The Political Independence of Public Service Broadcasters, defended in 2009 by Christopher Hanretty. The winner received the prize (€3,000, a medal and a certificate) from the Secretary-General of the EUI Marco Del Panta, who also awarded a certificate of nomination to Terrasa Lozano, who was present in the assembly. Following the ceremony, the Vice-President of the outgoing EC, Leila Talani, introduced the activity report, which had already been published in the last issue of the EUI Review. This was followed by the financial report presented by the Treasurer Pompeo della Posta. Both documents were distributed, briefly debated and approved by the GA before proceeding to the report of the electoral subcommittee (composed of Milica Uvalic, Serge Noiret and Thomas Bourke) about the elections of a new executive committee. They delivered the results after some comments and suggestions from attending alumni about improving the process of e-voting, which is an administrative issue for the EUI. The main conclusion of this debate was that the only way the EUI can guarantee that this process proceeds in a reliable and straightforward fashion is if all members of the association use their .eui account. We remind alumni that all members of the association who have paid their fees are de oficio assigned an .eui account and other benefits.

After the approval of the report, the election results were announced permitting the constitution for the next two years of a new executive committee, decided autonomously by the GA, as provided in the statutes of the association. The members of the old and new EC met President Borrell. Andreas Frijdal and the EUI administrator in charge of alumni issues, Judith Przyrowski, for a working dinner that evening. We discussed, among other matters, the common platform on which basis this new executive committee of the Association wished to work with the EUI to recast and strengthen the role of alumni in the next two years. Here are the key points:

Recent EUI structural changes, especially the post-doctoral programme which has led to a notable increase of alumni further from the core of doctoral researchers, necessitate the use of more sophisticated communication tools between alumni so that the objectives of the association (promote and reinforce contacts, mutual assistance and exchange of information between its members) can be met. Furthermore, alumni links to the EUI need to be strengthened with more active participation in the life of our alma mater, as mandated by the AA Statute. For this purpose we foresee three major strategies to enact over the next two years. First, the development of social networks so as to make the association more participative and active. Now, with the stabilisation of the EUI’s new website, the AA wishes to be a full partner in this on-going process whereby it provides its own input and requests. In addition to the social networks activity, which are generally open to all alumni (members or not of the association, current and past researchers) and which some alumni may not want to participate in given privacy issues, we also would like to create a more traditional, restricted Who's Who. This would be elaborated by the association and open only to those members who have paid their fees and provide us with the information they wish to have included on the Who's Who page, sent directly to Sigfrido Ramirez with copy to alumni@eui.eu. The third major strategy on the new agenda is the active support of the creation of local AA branches in major European cities, formally constituted with local statutes and executive committees in order to concretize activities relevant to the needs/interests of alumni in each geographical location. At present, in addition to the Brussels branch, we already have suggestions for formal branches in London, Warsaw, Berlin, Lisbon and Barcelona.
For this reason the EC encourages you to contact the AA in order to put into contact the alumni living in these cities.

The other events of the Alumni Weekend followed on Saturday with a full-day walk in the Chianti guided by Claudia Papini from Chianti Discovery and a Sunday visit to Palazzo Vecchio, conducted with expertise by Laura Bechi from the EUI staff. We would like to thank Claudia and Laura for the passion and know-how they put into these visits which brought together some 40 people, providing an informal activity where alumni could come together and enjoy Florence and Tuscany. We would like to conclude by thanking Leila Simon Talani and Pompeo della Posta who served in the executive committee with commitment.

Alumni News and Awards

‘76’ Douwe Korff (LAW 1976-1982), founder of Bar Fiasco, announces the release of the final report, executive summary, two working papers, and a number of country reports coming out of a study on data protection law he co-directed for the European Commission entitled ‘Comparative study on different approaches to new privacy challenges, in particular in the light of technological developments’. Results are available on the Commission website.


‘85’ Valeria Camporesi (HEC 1985-1990) was appointed Vicerrectora de Extensión Universitaria y Divulgación Científica at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.

‘87’ Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (LAW 1987-1991) has been awarded the ‘Prix du livre juridique 2010’ during the Salon du Livre juridique for her recently published book _Droit(s) constitutionnel(s) comparé(s)_(Éditions Economica – Collection Corpus droit public, 2010). The prize is organized by the _Club des juristes et le Conseil Constitutionnel_.


‘88’ Francisco Bethencourt (HEC 1988-1992) announces that an English, updated version of his book on the Inquisition was released last year by Cambridge University Press: _The Inquisition. A Global History (1478-1834)_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). The book has already been published in France, Portugal, Brazil, Spain, and Serbia, and has sold more than 100,000 copies. Francisco is Charles Boxer Professor in History at King’s College London.

Frank Caestecker (HEC 1988-1994) has just published his new book _Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Liberal European States, 1933-1939 with Berghahn Books (2010)_


‘89’ Christoph Beat Graber (LAW 1989-1993), Professor of Law at the University of Lucerne, received the Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences Award for Transdisciplinary Research, for the project he directed ‘e’Diversity - The Legal Protection of Cultural Diversity in a Digital Networked Environment’. The project was selected ‘for its integrative, timely and path-breaking intervention in the field of media regulation concerning the protection and promotion of diversity of old indigenous as well as very new cultural expressions.’ The award is the highest research prize of the Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences.

‘91’ Thomas Christiansen took up a position as Professor of European Institutional Politics in the Department of Political Science at Maastricht University. He was also awarded the title of Jean Monnet Chair by the European Commission and is about to direct the Maastricht part of a 3-year research project ‘EU Parliament: National Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty’ funded by the Dutch NWO, the German DFG, the French ANR and the British ESRC under the Open Research Area in Europe call in 2010.

Thomas Lawton (SPS 1991-1995) has just moved to France to take up a post as Professor of Strategy and International Business at EM-Lyon Business School, a grande ecole and a Top 10 European business school. He is also Visiting Professor of Business Administration at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College in the USA and a Visiting Professor at Imperial College London.


Hans-Joerg Trenz (SPS 1993-1999) has been appointed Professor in Modern European Studies in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen. He is co-editor of the book _The New Politics of European Civil Society_ (Routledge 2010)
César de Prado Yepes (SPS 1995-2002), Senior Researcher and Professor at the Barcelona Institute of International Studies, announces the publication of a volume co-edited with Stelios Stavridis: Panorámica de Actores y Factores en Asia Central. (Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2010).

Marc de Bourcy (LAW 1996-1997) has left his position in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General at the United Nations Headquarters in New York for a new appointment as Head of Multilateral Affairs at the Development Cooperation Directorate at the Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Guido Legnante (SPS 1996-2002) has been appointed President of the Interfaculty Degrees in Communication Cim/Cpm (1st cycle degree in Communication, Innovation and Multimedial Studies and 2nd cycle degree in Professional Communication and Multimedial Studies) at the University of Pavia.

Michael W. Bauer (SPS 1997-2000) was appointed Professor of Politics and Public Administration at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin in October of 2009.

Richard Burnley (LAW 1997-2002) has recently taken the post of Competition Counsel for the European Broadcasting Union in Geneva.

Diamond Ashiagbor (LAW 1998-2002) formerly Reader in Law, University College London, was appointed Professor of Labour Law at School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London from September 2010. She will be back at the EUI in January 2011, as a Fernand Braudel Fellow in the Law department.

Catherine Gegout (SPS 1998-2004), Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Nottingham, has published her thesis as European Foreign and Security Policy: States, Power, Institutions and the American Hegemon (University of Toronto Press, 2010).

Dorte Sindbjerg Martin- sen (LAW 1999-2004) is currently associate professor of political science at the University of Copenhagen. In 2009 she won the Vincent Wright Prize for one of the two best articles published in West European Politics in 2009.

Gabriel Toggenburg (LAW 2000-2006), in addition to becoming the proud father of twins, has just published ABC des Minderheitenschutzes, (Böhlau Verlag, 2010). Gabriel is Program Manager Research at the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in Vienna.

Geetha Garib (SPS 2001-2006) was appointed Assistant Professor in Management and Organisation at Tilburg University in the Netherlands.


Vincenzo Pavone (SPS 2001-2005) Permanent Research Fellow at the CSIC, announces the launching of the Spanish Science and Technology Studies Network. It is the first of its kind in Spain.

Rafael Leal-Arcas (LAW 2002-2008), Senior Lecturer in International Economic Law & European Union Trade Law at Queen Mary University of London, announces the publication of International Trade and Investment Law: Multilateral, Regional and Bilateral Governance (Edward Elgar, 2010).


Gustavo Gramaxo Rozeira (LAW 2003-2009) was just appointed as Assistant Professor of Law at the Law School (Faculdade de Direito) of the Universidade Lusófona do Porto in Porto, Portugal.


Silvia D’Ascoli was recently appointed Associate Legal Officer at the Appeals Section of the Office of the Prosecutor of the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), The Hague, Netherlands.

Miriam Nyhan (HEC 2004-2008) announces the opening of an exhibit related to her thesis that she has co-curated entitled ‘The Fifth Province: County Societies in Irish America’, at the Consulate General of Ireland, New York. It will run through 25 January 2011.

Thomas Paster (SPS 2004-2009) received the 2010 Erwin Wenzl Prize for his EU thesis Choosing Lesser Evils: The Role of Business in the Development of the German Welfare State from the 1880s to the 1990s, which he defended in 2009. His was one of six selected from among 192 nominees spanning all disciplines. He is now a researcher at Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of Societies (MPIfG) in Cologne.

Clara Portela (SPS 2004-2008) announces that her thesis has been published by Routledge as European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy. When and Why do They Work? (2010).
Cosmo, son of Jocelyn Evans and Gayle Yeandle, was born on 30 April 2010.

Jazmin, daughter of Emese Balint and Laszlo Bruszt, was born on 7 May 2010.

Natalia Fabra and Juan Toro announce the birth of their third son, Nicolas, on 3 August 2010.

Gideon Seraphim Dorian and Severin Cajetan Emmerich, sons of Gabriel Toggenburg and his wife Julia were born on 18 June 2010.

Births

Norman Domeier (HEC 2005-2009) has been appointed assistant professor of Modern European History at the Historical Institute of the University of Stuttgart, Germany. His 2009 EUI thesis has now been published as Der Eulenburg-Skandal. Eine politische Kulturgeschichte des Kaiserreichs (Campus, 2010).

Emanuele Tarantino (ECO 2005-2010) has been awarded the Franco Modigliani Fellowship, a 2+2 research position in an Italian University. She will take up this fellowship in the department of economics at the University of Bologna.

Cristina Ponicibo (MWF 2006-2007) has been appointed Marie Curie Fellow at the Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2) for the period September 2010 - August 2012. Cristina will be based at the Institut de droit comparé de Paris (IDC) and will work on a project about ‘etworks in European Law’

Michaël Tatham (SPS 2006-2010) was appointed Assistant Professor (Wissenschaftlicher Assistent) in the Chair of Politics and Public Administration, Institute of Social Sciences, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany.

Marcilio Franca (LAW 2007-2008) announces the publication, with Lucas Lixinski (EUI PhD Reseacher) and Maria Belén Olmos Giupponi (former Max Weber Fellow), The Law of Mercosur, (Hart, 2010).
In Memorium

The economic historian Alan Milward, who has died aged 75, will be remembered by friends and students as an inspired contrarian, although the illness that closed in on him in his last years silenced the paradoxical and outspoken judgments that they had learned to appreciate. Scholars and former policy participants who confronted him at anniversary commemorations sharply dissented from his minimalist evaluation of the Marshall Plan, or his insistence that the EEC emerged to serve national interests. Careful reading, though, revealed probing and well-documented arguments that compelled fresh thinking about developments too often shrouded in clichés.

As a professor at the University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology (1971-83), then for two terms (1983-86 and 1996-2002) at the European University Institute in Florence, with a decade between them as professor of economic history at the London School of Economics, he produced a series of superbly researched studies of 20th-century European economic history in its political contexts. He also nurtured a cohort of younger scholars who were intensely loyal and have gone on to produce their own original studies.

Milward was born and brought up in Stoke-on-Trent, where he attended grammar school and where his father worked for the post office. He earned his BA at University College London and his PhD at the LSE, which he followed with a series of short-term lectureships in Britain and abroad. He was aided in the latter by his interest in and aptitude for foreign languages.

His first book, *The German Economy at War* (1965), accepted the idea that Hitler prepared for a short blitzkrieg campaign rather than a sustained war, a thesis since challenged by Richard Overy and Adam Tooze, among others. But Milward certainly did not minimise the Nazi armament effort from 1936 on. Three other volumes followed on the economics of the second world war and the national socialist effort to create a continental bloc serving German needs. *The New Order and the French Economy* (1970) affirmed the unwelcome premise that conquest might pay.

Milward then discovered a major archival trove of Norwegian documents among captured archives still in London and wrote a revealing story, *The Fascist Economy in Norway* (1972), that illustrated how German occupiers worked to reverse that economy's earlier orientation towards international trade with Britain and the west and aspired to make it a racially pure site of agrarian autarky. A general economic history, *War, Economy and Society 1939-45* (1977), completed this series of studies, after which Milward turned primarily to postwar Europe. Along the way, however, appeared conference volumes and collaborative works on the development of the economies of continental Europe 1850-1914, with SB Saul (1977); on agriculture and food policies in the second world war (1984); the role of postwar import controls, with George Brennan (1996); as well as published lectures.

During the years that Milward spent at the Institute in Florence (of which, along with the LSE, he later became a professor emeritus), he trained students in the economic and political history of the cold-war era, undertaking research of even greater ambition and scope. He used his examination of the European archives to push unconventional assessments that could certainly offend those who had worked in postwar economic agencies. The Marshall Plan, he argued in *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951* (1984), did not rescue Europe from collapse, but eased a temporary crisis of rapid postwar recovery arising from the high demand for US imports whose cost the Europeans could not meet.

Controversies over this apparent attempt to minimise what was broadly regarded as the centrepiece of postwar US policy towards western Europe simmered throughout the 1990s. I shared similar research interests in the late 1970s and 1980s, and can recall heated discussions arising from Milward’s zest for taking on economists who met his broad-brush contentions with incredulity.

In what may have been his most influential book, *The European Rescue of the Nation State* (1992), he and later his collaborators, Federico Romero and George Brennan, argued that the EEC emerged not on behalf of some high ideal, but from the fact that supranational agencies, agreement on freer trade, social policies and agricultural subsidies best solved individual national dilemmas. Although at first glance the conclusions deflated the usual
explanations of visionary statesmanship or self-generated momentum, on reflection they made eminent sense.
Sovereign nations had surrendered aspects of independence because the new results better served their interests
than insistence on the existing prerogatives.

Given his immense archival knowledge and sustained output, Milward was an inspired choice to become the 'of-
ficial' historian of British policy toward the EU, with guarantees of access to government records and independent
judgment. He produced a rich and remarkable account, The UK and the European Community: The Rise and Fall
of a National Strategy, 1945-1963 (2002), which clarified several of the most contentious episodes, such as the
decision to remain outside the Schuman plan in 1950, and the negotiations with the Americans and the Europeans
leading up to the French veto in 1963. Although critical at points of official policy, Milward took seriously the
obligation to make sense of British calculations, as the UK confronted fundamental choices for its postwar role.
At the end he achieved a degree of empathy his earlier work had not had to aspire to. Sadly, illness prevented him
from advancing on the second volume, now being completed by Stephen Wall.

Among many accolades in a glittering career, he was in 1987 made a fellow of the British Academy. Milward is
survived by his wife, Frances MB Lynch, a historian of the French and European economies, their daughter and
two daughters by previous unions. He was buried at Highgate cemetery in north London, 'within conversational
distance,' as one friend said, 'of Karl Marx.' If the conversations take place, they will doubtless be vigorous.

- Alan Steele Milward, economic historian, born 19 January 1935; died 28 September 2010

-Charles S. Maier
Leverett Saltonstall Professor of History, Harvard University
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When I handed him the final draft of my Ph.D. thesis, Alan Milward invited me to celebrate with a drink. But
before we moved from his office to the Bar Fiasco, he asked me: 'What are you going to do next ? What new
research have you got in mind ?' I was exhausted and the only thing I could think of was some time off. He saw
my surprise and immediately added, in an obviously self-reflective mode: 'After all, each work we do is just a step
towards the next one it leads to. It's a springboard to new questions and a new search.'

He wasn't simply directing a younger scholar to roll up his sleeves and move forward. He was confessing what
drove him and energized his professional life. Because Alan had a deep, abiding, insatiable intellectual curiosity.
Like any of us he obviously liked to see his ideas succeed. But what he cherished most were new discoveries. He
wanted answers to his questions. Research for him had primarily its literal meaning, to search for information,
data and concepts that would challenge and reshape his ideas. Whenever something new came up, in a seminar
or a conversation, something that clicked and started a new train of thoughts, he burst into a wide-eyed upsurge
of mental energy. His enthusiasm, his ceaseless search for new and better knowledge radiated around him and
infected all those who studied and worked with him.

It was this relentless pursuit of new discoveries and intellectual challenges that drove his work towards new frame-
works and concepts, that pushed him to debunk weak or unproved constructs, and that ultimately allowed him to
open up new paths of historical enquiry. It was the nourishment for his pioneering voyage into history, a voyage
that changed the ways in which we think of Europe's post-war democratic reconstruction and integration.

-Federico Romero
Professor of History of Post-War European Cooperation and Integration—EUI
2010 EUI Doctorates and Honoris Causa Degrees

Honoris Causa Degree Recipients

Sabino Cassese, Justice, Italian Constitutional Court, Rome

Jürgen Kocka, Professor Emeritus of History, Free University of Berlin and Research Professor Emeritus, Social Science Research Centre, Berlin

Richard Rose, Director of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Aberdeen

Doctorates in Economics
George Alaveras
Frank Betz
Teodora Borota
Tobias Philipp Broer
Georg Duernecer
Matthias Sebastian Hertweck
Sebastian Krauthem
Michal Lewandowski
Vilen Lipatov
Francisco Javier Rivas Ruiz
Nicolas Serrano-Velarde
Mariya Teteryatnikova
Joël Van der Weele

Doctorates in Law
Iris Benöhr
Marco Botta
Andrew Butler
Adam Elsinda Casanas
Ashraf Dajani
Angelos Dimopoulos
Sacha Garben
Pablo Iglesias Rodriguez
Anna Magdalena Jaron
Bjørn Lundqvist
Claire Jeanne Eva Marzo
Joana Mendes
Nanette Neuwah
Emanuela Orlando
Sandra Cristina Passinhas
Darinka Pikani
Aurélien Maxime Racah
Iryna Ulasik
Valentina Vadi
Bart Van Vooren
Camilla Devitt
Morell Mayo Fuster
Igor Guardianicci
Christopher John Hanretty
Evelyne Hübscher
Tamara Joncic
Bram Lancee
Lasse Engelbrecht Lindekilde
Alice Mattoni
Stefania Milan
Svjetlana Nedimovic
Illas Ntinas
Vaida Obelenë
Jeppe Olesen
Sergi Pardos Prado
Patryk Pawlak
Jonas Radl
Nikolas Milan Rajkovic
Herwig Reiter
Anja Katharina Röcke
Chiara Ruffa
Janusz Rzyner
Kaat Smets
Anna Sobczak
Catherine Spieser
Rudolf Christian Thauer
Camil Ungureanu
Stan Van Alphen
Fernando Javier Veliz
Daniela Vicherat
Joachim Wentzel
Olga Wysocka
Nikoleta Yordanova

Doctorates in History and Civilization
Adrian Brisku
Irene Bueno
Francesco Catastini
Norman Domeier
Stefan Donecker
Irial Glynn
Claudia Gori
Ilse Josepha Maria Lazaroms
Hendrikus L. Looijesteijn
Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol
Antonio Munoz Sanchez
Markus Josef Prutschi
Michael Kuur Sorensen
Arthur Vincent Weststeijn
Niall Whelehan
Alf Zachäus

Doctorates in Social Sciences
Volker Balli
Clara Brandi
Andrea Calderaro
Helena Carapico
Nicolas Chaingnot
Tatiana Coutto
Elena Del Giorgio

2010 Dissertation Prizes

Mauro Cappelletti Prize
Joana Mendes, LAW

Francoise Mény Prize
Christopher Hanretty, SPS

EUI Alumni Prize
Christopher Hanretty, SPS
Doctorates *Honoris Causa*

‘*Sabino Cassese’s* contribution to administrative law, global law and democracy, judges and transnational regulation carry the constant message of the universality of the law as a dimension of society and as a tool to break the barriers of nationalism. The hallmark and intellectual legacy of such an outstanding career can be summarized in two words: ‘tradition’ and ‘innovation’. Cassese brings us the lesson that “creative vitality is a reserve of the past: we can innovate when we have a rich past: genius is wisdom and youth”’. (Cesare Pavese)

*Francesco Francioni*  
*Department of Law*

‘The main reason why the European University Institute and the Department of History and Civilization honour *Jürgen Kocka* today, however, is that he is one of Europe’s most outstanding historians. His neverending curiosity about the different experiences, structures and practices taking place inside Europe, and his integration of these phenomena into a more systematic context, including fields beyond social history, such as political, economic and cultural history, mean that his writings make an important contribution to a history of Europe, stressing its diversity.’

*Heinz-Gerhard Haupt*  
*Department of History and Civilization*

‘As one of the founding fathers of a disciplinary tradition that is driven by the same imperatives as this Institute itself, as one of the great comparative political scientists of the postwar years, and as an example of the importance in our profession of writing about politics as well as about political science, it is fitting that we now present *Richard Rose* with a doctorate honoris causae of the European University Institute.’

*Peter Mair*  
*Department of Political and Social Sciences*
The ‘François Mény Prize for the Best Comparative Study of Political Institutions’ was awarded for the first time at this year’s ceremony. The prize, an award of €2,000, was created and is generously funded by former EUI President Yves Mény and his wife Marie-Thérèse, in memory of their son François.

The prize will be awarded each year that the selection committee finds that the quality of applicants sufficiently meets the criteria of the award.

The 2010 François Mény Prize was awarded to Christopher Hanretty for his thesis *The Political Independence of Public Service Broadcasters*, defended in 2009 under the supervision of Alexander Trechsel.

Christopher Hanretty also received the Alumni Association Prize for his thesis during the General Assembly of the Alumni Association.
Mauro Cappelletti Prize

The ‘Mauro Cappelletti Prize for the Best Comparative Law Doctoral Thesis’ was awarded to Joana Mendes for her thesis *Rights of Participation in European administrative Law: A Rights-Based Approach to Participation in Rulemaking*, defended in 2009 under the supervision of Jacques Ziller.

This annual prize is in commemoration of Mauro Cappelletti, esteemed comparativist and legal scholar who was professor at the EUI from 1976 - 1987. The prize, which carries with it an award of €3,000, was generously created by his former student, EUI alumnus Robert Helm, and his wife Mimie, in 2005. This is the sixth year that the prize has been awarded.
See you at the next Conferring Ceremony in June 2011!
Maurice Glasman—First EUI Doctor to become a Lord

Maurice Glasman has accepted a nomination to the British peerage and will become a working Labour member of the House of Lords taking the title ‘Lord Glasman of Stoke Newington and Stanford Hill’. It is believed that the new leader of the British Labour Party, Ed Miliband, was responsible for the nomination and that what brought the EUI alumnus to his attention was Glasman’s involvement in London community politics through the organisation London Citizens http://www.citizensuk.org/about/london-citizens/).

Glasman’s thesis, Unnecessary Suffering: a study in applied ethics, supervised by Prof. Steven Lukes of the SPS department, was defended in 1995 and appeared in 1996 as a book of the same title.

Yves Mény—chevalier de la Légion d’honneur

Vendredi 12 novembre 2010, le professeur Yves Mény, ancien président de l’Institut universitaire européen de Florence et professeur de droit et de sciences politiques, a été fait chevalier de la Légion d’honneur par M. Jean-Marc de La Sablière, Ambassadeur de France en Italie.

Donatella della Porta and Olivier Roy—European Research Council Grant Winners

Professor Donatella della Porta (SPS) has been awarded a five-year ERC grant of €1,747,200 for her project Mobilizing4democracy.

Professor Olivier Roy (RSCAS & SPS) has been awarded a four-year €2.000.000 ERC grant for his project ReligioWest.

Michiel Tegelaars
EUI Reference Librarian

Michiel Tegelaars, Reference Librarian at the EUI for 34 years, retired in September.
We thank him for his many years of assistance to EUI faculty and researchers, and wish him all the best!

...and a fond farewell.
Recent Distinguished Visitors

On 1 October Felipe González Márquez, former President of Spain (1982-1996) and current Chairman of the Global Progress Foundation, addressed the EUI on the European Council Independent Reflection Group’s ‘Project Europe 2030, Challenges and Opportunities’, of which he has been Chair since 2007.


On 8 November Catherine MacKinnon gave the annual RSCAS Ursula Hirschmann Annual Lecture on Gender and Europe. The topic of Professor MacKinnon’s speech was ‘Europe’s New Sex Equality: Rape, Battering, and Trafficking’. The Lecture was organized by the RSCAS together with Professors Giulia Calvi and Ruth Rubio Marin.

Maroš Šefcovic, former permanent representative to the European Union (2004-2009) for Slovakia, former member of the European Commission (2009-2010) with the portfolio for Education, Training, Culture and Youth and currently Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for Inter-Institutional Relations and Administration visited in November. He spoke to EUI faculty, staff, and researchers on ‘The Lisbon Treaty, one year on’, and participated in a lengthy and lively question and answer session on this and other topics.

**Announcement to EUI Members and Alumni**

2011 will bring some changes to the EUI calendar of ceremonial events.

The **2011 Conferring Ceremony will take place on the second Friday of June**, in conjunction with the June Ball weekend.

The **2011/12 academic year will be opened in October** with an official ceremony featuring a keynote speaker.