



EUI Review

The European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
Via dei Roccettini, 9
I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy

<http://www.iue.it/>
e-mail: publish@datacomm.iue.it
EUI Review now also at
<http://www.iue.it/General/EUI-review>

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The European Union is not an Exclusive Club

The President of Ireland, H.E. Mary McAleese,
delivers the 21st Jean Monnet Lecture

The door is open and must remain open to our democratic European neighbours as and when they are ready to join.

Europe's four major challenges and the four principal means facing these on the threshold of the new millennium were the theme of the 21st Jean Monnet lecture, 'Europe – The Challenges of the New Millennium',



The Irish President, Mary McAleese

which was delivered by the President of Ireland, H.E. Mary McAleese, on 9 February 1999 at the Badia Fiesolana.

The Institute's President, Dr Patrick Master-son, welcomed her recalling that 'over a thousand years ago (...) an Irishman Donatus, on his way to Rome, paused here at what was then the cathedral site of Fiesole'. He underlined the importance of the Institute in the development of contemporary Europe as 'a truly international centre of comparative interdisciplinary research in the human sciences'.

President McAleese with reference to the 21st Jean Monnet lecture on the eve of the 21st Millennium, pointed out that '21st birthdays are associated with (...) new opportunities and new responsibilities' which lead to new challenges.

'The first challenge facing the Union is that of equipping itself internally to maintain the

basis for its success and to address effectively the concerns of its citizens' (...) in areas like employment, the environment, social exclusion and the fight against international crime. (...) 'To remain open to the wider world and to play an external role commensurate with our potential and responsibilities' should be the second challenge. The 'Union is not an exclu-

sive club, neither must it be an introverted one - obsessed with its own rules and regulations'. (...) 'The third great challenge is that of increasing popular understanding of the European Union'. President McAleese underlined the importance of ensuring that

H.E. SEYED MOHAMMAD KHATAMI, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on 10 March gave a lecture at the Institute (see p. 8)

the Union functions more transparently and that the democratic contribution of the European Parliament is strengthened,

as is already reflected in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The fourth and last challenge should be the subtle blend of flexibility and coherence at the outset of a new millennium.

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Mary McAleese

'Mary McAleese, the President of the Republic of Ireland, came to the Institute with a distinguished record of academic achievement. Your early and undergraduate education in law was in Belfast. You then qualified as a Barrister at Law of the Inn of Court of Northern Ireland and of the honourable Society of King's Inns Dublin and you were a member of the European Bar Association and the International Bar Association.

Your academic distinction was recognized early and you were appointed Reid Professor of Criminal Law, Criminology and Penology in Trinity College Dublin. Subsequently, for ten years you were the Director of the Institute of Professional Legal Studies at the Queen's University of Belfast and from 1994 to 1997 Pro Vice Chancellor of that distinguished University. You have been an active member of many national and international associations for the promotion of legal studies.

With all of this professional activity you have combined a truly astonishing range of public involvement and service, including work for several years as a current affairs television journalist and presenter. Let me mention just a few of these activities, which have engaged your energy and concern. You have worked on hospital issues, for overseas prisoners, for homeless people, for housing rights. You have been concerned with gender issues such as the advancement of women in the workplace and homosexual law reform. You have been a director of public companies and participated in international promotion of trade and investment in Ireland. You have been a member of the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace and actively involved in Catholic and Inter-Church matters.

In the midst of this remarkable professional and public life you have had the good fortune to enjoy and cultivate a rich private and family life with your husband Martin and three children Emma, Sara-Mai and Justin. I understand too, from the media, that you are also an accomplished skier!

In 1997 the Irish people, with their customary wisdom, recognizing your many splendid personal, professional and civic qualities elected you as their President and I am happy indeed to receive you as my President.'

From the Introductory speech of Dr Patrick Masterson to the 21st Jean Monnet Lecture



President McAleese
and Dr Masterson

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Looking at these challenges, might seem very daunting, until we bear in mind the means which the founding members of the EU, people like Jean Monnet, have left at our disposal.

There are – in the first place – the Treaties on which the EU is founded as 'the most remarkable Union of free democratic countries and peoples that the world has known'. The Union's institutions, probably the most original and important cornerstone of the edifice, represent a second important instrument. The reality of shared interests is another tool of 'the armoury of the EU'. She pointed out that the 'Union is founded on the pursuit of real national interests - interests defined in a wide and long-term perspective. The Union involves, as this University Institute amply testifies, not a withering but an enriching of national identity'. The fourth strength of the EU is its way of doing business. She underlined that the Union looks for compromises with which everyone can live, as the future could not be built on the 'win-lose formula of the past'.

Developments in Northern Ireland show that 'these values on which the European Union is founded - which

find expression in respect for diversity and the peaceful resolution of conflict – have already had a tangible effect in (...) the peace process in Northern Ireland'.

She stressed that 'the advent of the millennium offers an occasion to all of us' bearing in mind that 'the Europe we have today grew from a vision of the impossible which a few courageous men and women had the courage to imagine. Let us never become so caught up in the realpolitik of conflicting national self-interests, that we forget that ethic of partnership, consensus and decency which has made our peace and prosperity possible'.

The questions asked by members of the audience were basically related to the peace process in Northern Ireland and to the development of women's rights in the European Union.

The full text of the 21st Jean Monnet Lecture is available in English on the EUI's website: <http://www.iue.it/General/Jms.htm>

15 January 1999

Inaugural Lecture of the Mediterranean Chair

Address by Rt. Hon. Lamberto Dini, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am delighted to be able to speak about the Mediterranean in such a prestigious setting. I am so all the more because, particularly for Italy, Foreign Policy and Mediterranean Policy can correctly be interpreted only in a European light. That lends all the more meaning to this Chair we are inaugurating today, to act as a nodal point for research on the Mediterranean and to open up a channel between the academic worlds on our continent and in the countries on the other shore. This well-deserving initiative has been rendered possible in part by the generous assistance of public and private bodies. I wish to testify all my appreciation to them and to the institution that is our host.



Lamberto Dini

In the Mediterranean perhaps more than elsewhere the need is emerging for new responses, in a world filled with impetuous currents of change. It is worthwhile asking about the meaning of these responses.

First and foremost is the challenge of development, to secure stability and prosperity in a region shot through with tensions and conflicts. Suffice it to mention the

diaspora of clandestine migrants. Or the ups and downs of oil wealth, part of a global market. Or population growth. Or the resources needed to alleviate the miseries of nations caught between underdevelopment and overpopulation, where human expansion is rendering every growth in production vain. Without a concerted strategy that sees Europe directly committed, mere aid to survival cannot do more than pass on the problem to the future, tragically enlarged.

Europe arrived at an awareness in Barcelona of the need for a continuing commitment, for the allocation over time of resources of great dimensions. Economic collaboration aims at infrastructure projects; it is supported on regional integration; it pursues gradual liberalization; and it will after the conference in Stuttgart in April have a renewed volume of resources available. The difficulties, indeed the disappointments, we have met with to date are not diminishing our commitment to conveying the Euro-Mediterranean partnership far beyond the threshold of the new century. In the longer term, only reasonable development can be able to contain the scourge of uncontrolled movements of populations across the sea.

2. Then there is the challenge of peace. The Mediterranean, perhaps more than any other area, is always at risk. Yet as the place where so many diversities co-exist, it needs prosperity and stability. It needs peace, for instance, in the oldest, most tenacious conflict, the one between Israel and the Arab world. Application of the Oslo agreements is going through a pause associated with internal events in Israel. The elections under way in that country are taking place in the context of a democracy that still has a very special load of emotion and meaning for us, in the context of a State founded on bases of freedom and pluralism. It will, we are convinced, ultimately be that framework that will set the guidelines for the necessary foreign policy adjustments to be able to carry through reconciliation with the Arab world.

We cannot, in the Mediterranean, once again propose processes like Helsinki, which were associated with a



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particular historical context. But here too, in the longer term, rules and institutions will be needed. This is the line being pursued through the Charter for Peace and Stability we are still negotiating, which will hopefully be approved in Stuttgart. The Charter should give rise to a Council for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, with the task of advancing the Barcelona strategy. It should also undertake initiatives to prevent conflicts and cope with emergency situations, through consultation mechanisms and conciliation procedures. Though the unresolved Arab-Israeli confrontation still hangs over us, we believe that the Charter can be able to have a life of its own. We have been amongst the most convinced promoters of the Charter. We brought its adoption closer through the Euro-Mediterranean conference in Palermo last June.

3. Allow me, considering the place where we are meeting, to dwell a little longer on the cultural challenge.

The Mediterranean is the crossroads of many cultures, of dialogue, but also of old and new fundamentalisms. Every Islamic nation has produced a fundamentalist extremism of its own, generating various types of terrorism, closely associated with inter-Islamic conflicts and events. From the national extremisms, from their power struggles, from their divergencies and convergencies brought by the existence of Israel, from the ownership of oil, from the uncertain strategic equilibria in the Third World, from their differing degrees of openness towards a modernity that has been presented as Western, multiplying the local antagonisms, have come the sparks to light or re-light a terrorism that is



Dr Masterson and Ministers Dini and Amato (on the right)

often fragmented, mobile and uncontrollable. But the explosions of intolerance in the Middle-Eastern universe should not be associated with the religious convictions of the peoples that in the past created the great Islamic civilization. Today's extremists have more to do with newer nationalist motivations in struggle than with pan-Islamic religious factors. What is more, holy war is an idea that emerged recently, with Islamic decline following the Crusades. It was never part of the fundamental pillars of Islam: monotheism, prayer, Ramadan, solidarity with the poorest, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. It is only in a

Mediterranean in decline, degraded and fragmented, that the conviction could emerge that there was a need for purification from the contamination of foreign ideologies and for a return to the foundations of the Koran; that political reform movements ought to be guided by submission (Islam) of the individual and the State to God's law.

In the countries where political democratization is creating more open regimes and permitting the existence of oppositions it is easier to form leaderships able to organize society. Violence is born of the political struggle that utilizes religion as a means to win or retain power. But the problem is supposed to be solved by invoking a new metaphysics of the clash of civilizations.

With the collapse of the totalitarian ideologies and the secular religions, the philosophy of human rights is the only one available. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was conceived 50 years ago as the expression of a universalistic culture of Western stamp targeting the political totalitarianism and its cultural framework that had shaken the first half of the century. The declaration may borrow its language from Western culture, but it is not Eurocentric. It is not true that its formulas are aimed at imposing a Western view, or that it favours a particular socio-economic or religious or secularized system. Imposing or denying the right to free speech or representation is not a different cultural form for guaranteeing one's own identity or that of others.

Italy strongly upholds dialogue between the cultures as the priority axis for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. So far, the cultural dimension has remained in the margins of pacification and development of the Mediterranean region. Here, I feel, is the key to interpreting the Chair being inaugurated today in Florence. Cultural exchanges are the outcome, sometimes spontaneous, of modern forms of communication that enormously influence individuals' perceptions and social conduct. In that awareness Italy, along with such others as France, Germany, Tunisia, Morocco and Malta, has laboured to put forward the idea, today less far from reality, of a multi-lingual, multi-cultural Mediterranean television channel. It would serve to strengthen solidarity and mutual understanding, and in time to eliminate suspicions and fears in relation to all sorts of diversities.

The cultural component is an integral part of the more general processes of modernization. In the absence of a harmonized perception of the common challenges, of their impact on the structure of society and on the social and productive infrastructure, it would be hard to imagine solid understandings on possible remedies. The very transfer of scientific and technical knowledge, and professional training, imply cultural acquisitions: in particular, acceptance of a culture of modernity that can make one's own values, conservation of

one's own identity and memory, compatible with participation in the worlds of technology and of markets.

4. We respond to the challenges from this side of the Mediterranean also, and I would say chiefly, by enhancing the European Union's capacity to act, by conferring on it the political profile it still lacks. The single currency is a promising beginning, not the end of the road. Nor, by the way, is that road irreversible, as the history of so many empires that claimed invulnerability teaches us.

To be sure, a unified monetary order is essential to the stability of advanced but vulnerable economies like the European ones. After the decline of the pound sterling with the dissolution of the British Empire, the dollar's move away from the gold standard in 1971, and the abandonment of fixed exchange rates, the international monetary system needs new forces and new protagonists. The dollar cannot operate on its own indefinitely, in such an agitated, complicated world. But the strength of the dollar would be inconceivable without having a semi-continental power behind it. If in history the primary power of every State was always that of coining money, the contrary is not necessarily true, that it is enough to coin money in order to achieve a political Europe; a Europe able to perceive the threats and give firm, rapid, unequivocal answers. Europe cannot confine itself to dissenting from the United States. Political power is not born spontaneously. It is born of a set of convergent actions that each State brings into play on its own account. And to make Europe able to compete, to build the euro, the States have made intense solitary efforts at alignment.

Some recent events have legitimated some doubt as to the euro's capacity as a spontaneous mechanism which, through the market, can oblige politics and the institutions to follow the path traced by the currency. The Öcalan case and the Iraq crisis have both been pointers to Europe's inadequacy, and both had origins in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The safety of citizens is increasingly threatened by the risks of terrorism, of organized crime, of uncontrolled migration. In the Öcalan case the Schengen system was de facto suspended or revoked in face of the particular interests of the individual countries, always tempted to shut themselves up inside a circle of an illusory, ephemeral sovereignty.

In foreign policy, an adequate European ambition is lacking. It is important for this ambition to be re-launched specifically from developments in the Mediterranean area. Had there been a Union foreign policy in the Iraqi crisis, Britain might perhaps have felt more bound to European loyalty. Perhaps President Clinton might have had to take more account of the opinion of European partners joined together in institutional solidarity. Perhaps the United Nations might have received more mediating strength from a

unanimous European mandate. It is no coincidence that at our instance the European Council in Vienna decided to include the Mediterranean among the first themes of the common Union strategies to be developed in implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty. In the negotiations on resources (Agenda 2000), the Italian government is pressing for adequate consideration of the Mediterranean both within the Union in terms of a re-balancing of agricultural outputs, and externally as a measure of commitment towards the countries on the other shore.

What was a divided, hostile area has first become a common market, but is hesitating to transform itself into a political subject. The market has certainly pushed the European construction forward, given rise to institutions, created rules and guided national interests. The currency reflects the intuitions of two decades and is calling upon politics to do its bit from now on to enrich it with the institutional context it still lacks. This is a battle the Italian government has always waged, and proposed once again at the very moment of ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty. We are seeing a growing awareness that currency sovereignty without an army is not enough. But Europe cannot continue to stay in the shade, nourishing ambitions that unflinchingly prove at the crucial moments to be impotent. It must, instead, exist as an external subject; as bearer of a right of defence and, where necessary, of offence; as a world interlocutor.

The premises have barely been set, in any case, for the idea of Europe to take shape within the concept of the West, despite the survivals of a mannered Atlanticism



Dr Masterson welcoming Minister Lamberto Dini

that is proving to be almost a delayed ideology. The point is not to renegotiate solidarity with the United States, but to strengthen it with a spirit that is at long last European, alongside the American spirit. That is the last great prospect emerging, on the threshold of the new century.

5 January 1999

Inaugural Lecture of the Mediterranean Chair

Europe and the Mediterranean: The Future of the Barcelona Process

Lecture by Prof. GHASSAN SALAMÉ,
Institut d'études politiques, Paris

Abstract

The Barcelona Process launched in fall 1995 is not in its best shape. The concept was certainly innovative and ambitious. But its implementation has proved to be much more complex than expected. Hence some frustration in Brussels and a lot of disillusionment in many capitals on all sides of the Mare Nostrum.

Essential are the attempts to properly diagnose the problems that have arisen and therefore to amend the basic concept of this -basically- European initiative, so that a second start becomes feasible, especially that no party seems willing, at least in its public utterings, to let the process fatally falter out of the next century's horizon.

A cluster of issues are therefore to be addressed:

1. On the economic level:

- The Free Trade area is the target, but the objective incites a lot of fears on the southern shore, because it entices radical fiscal reforms and real threats to local, vulnerable industries. The volume of aid promised by Europe looks very minimal when compared to what was disbursed in Eastern and Central Europe after 1989.

- Although limits to migration to Europe have been explicitly cited as a major *raison d'être* for the Process, it is somehow conceptually difficult to pose, in the same vein, strong regulation on the movements of people while calling for a free flow of trade and investments. The basic idea remains

valid: economic prosperity in the Levant and the Maghreb is the best remedy to illegal migration, but this does not solve short and mid-term problems and fears.

- Oil (the most vital export from the South), contrary to natural gas, can hardly be "regionalized", it is part and parcel of the global market. However, to leave it out of the process has been a serious mistake especially in terms of facilitation of upstream investments.

2. On the security issues:

- The "Helsinki paradigm", the governing concept on security matters, has proved to be largely useless in the Mediterranean. There, conflict is not opposing two blocks in need of CBMs (confidence-building measures) to engage in dialogue. The basic issue is rather dominated by conflicts between the Eastern and Southern shores' countries (Arab-Israeli, Greek-Turkish, Western Sahara etc). The defining issue is therefore Europe's ability and willingness to be an active and efficient party in these conflicts' resolution. Partnership in the Mediterranean (contrary to Eastern Europe) is not a step in a long integration process, neither in the EU not in NATO.

- The American influence over European policies is heavily felt, most importantly on the sanctions issues and the Arab-Israeli peace-process management. The US architecture for the area is somehow different: MENA on one side and the project (announced in

1998) of a US-Maghreb Free Trade Area on the other.

3. Politically:

- The very foundation of the process is somehow ambivalent in its relation to politics: in Barcelona, La Valetta and since, parties have adopted very contradictory stands on how politicized the process should be.

- Islam, islamism and democratization are very poorly understood on the European side, sometimes tempted by very debatable views of a "clash of civilizations" and other incongruities of the sort. On the other side, "the Mediterranean" is often viewed as a "colonial concept", worse, as a useless one and the Process degraded to an easy way to get fresh aid from the North.



Prof. Ghassan Salamé

4. On the procedural level:

- The area definition is sometimes (inclusion of Jordan, a non-riparian state) more than what a purely geographic criterion would entail

and, much more often, less than what political factors would impose (Iraq, the Gulf countries, Iran, the Balkans). The exclusion of Libya, even if provisional, is particularly unrealistic.

– The temptation is always there, on both sides, to separate the Eastern from the Western Mediterranean issues and there are good reasons for that, but the separation

has proved to be politically problematic.

– Most vital decisions on the Mediterranean are normally taken by the European side outside the Barcelona Framework, within NATO, EU or the WEU.

– Integration levels are far from being similar on the two shores. Bi-multilateralism is the way that

has been adopted: the EU negotiates and signs agreements with countries of the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean, taken unilaterally, one by one. The imbalance is too evident and Barcelona has somehow aggravated rather than alleviated it.

The full text of the lecture is available from the Robert Schuman Centre at the Institute

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5. What is Italy's role in a context of such rapid transformations and in a region loaded with risks, but also opportunities? Mediterranean policy is the hardest part, the least obvious and the least foreseeable. It calls more than anything else for constant attention, flexibility and rapidity of response. That is in accordance with our best traditions, the willingness to launch ourselves, like Columbus, on to unexplored routes; to believe, like Galileo, in our capacity for observation, against the scepticism of the many.

The current historical phase of globality and instant communications, for all its contradictions, is opening up new horizons. In order to grasp them, we do not even need much force of imagination. A fleeting glance at a map is enough to show the obvious: Italy is a peninsula surrounded on three sides by the Mediterranean Sea. That may be obvious, but its potential had remained not fully realized to date. But that was partly because foreign policy had until yesterday to move in the context of a division of the world that is no longer there; so that we can now think in a new way, though still within the context of European and Atlantic compatibilities. Thus, if the location in the Mediterranean can sometimes be seen as a negative factor, it is now becoming an advantage. This is all the more true in the context of globalization that is reducing the weight of States and in any case benefiting integrated areas in economic regions that go beyond national boundaries.

According to some, the world is, after the fall of Communism, going to move into conflicts based on an opposition among old religious identities. These are, in the transnational era, supposed to be becoming the connective tissue around which the various countries are assembled. If that were true, and we have instead seen that European policy presumes the opposite, the Mediterranean could become an impassable barrier. It would impel Italy into a condition of marginality. The logic of opposition can only harm Italy, and its function of communication between the two shores. As it harms a policy of peace, construction and reconstruction of a cultural and economic fabric.

We have to rediscover the Italian identity in a special connection between the Mediterranean and Europe. It

is important, too, not to let Southern Italy fall to the level of a second-class Europe. But Europe too needs dialogue with the Mediterranean, in order not to be shut up in a continental narrowness that recalls, for instance, the rise and fall of Venice devoid of its Mediterranean projection. Southern Italy is not the ends of the Earth, but a front-line position from which to play the card of encounter with other peoples directly. This has been understood by a new entrepreneurial class, ready to project itself across the Mediterranean.

Our chief task is to show that development and identity can live together; that for all the peoples of the Mediterranean peace is the most appropriate choice; that those who are on the other shore do not just have to learn, but also have something to teach. "The sea requires courage," said Hegel; "those who venture upon it to gain life and wealth must be courageous, must put life and wealth at stake." We do not want this to be the dream solely of the many desperate people crossing the Mediterranean every day in search of better shores.

Courage ought instead to be the mark of the policy of States and of undertakings. That should be a policy able to create trust, to multiply forms of individual and collective action. The sea will not then be a trench that separates, but the vehicle of a great civilization, of exchange, of solidarity among people that differ. It will be a means not just to reinterpret our history, to consolidate our national cohesion, but also to relaunch our role in the world in creative fashion.

A long tradition going back to the Greeks sees the specific feature of Europe as lying in that relationship with the sea. According to a happy, if paradoxical, formula, psychoanalysis was "invented by the Jews to persuade Anglo-Saxons to behave like Italians". It is for the Southern countries of the European Union to supplement a vision of the world that identifies rationality and discipline solely with the North and its artificial light. That, then, might also be a function for the peoples of the Mediterranean in their relationship with those dwelling in the heart of our continent.

Lecture

by

H.E. SEYED MOHAMMAD KHATAMI,
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and
President of the Islamic Conference Organization

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Honourable Guests,

Attending an academic gathering has always been a pleasant and enjoyable exercise for me. For in such gatherings, the proceedings most often revolve around three functions: talking, listening and understanding. Understanding results from talking and listening, and the two functions of talking and listening, combined with looking, constitute the most important physical, psychological and spiritual activity of a human being. What is gained by looking expands one's realm of knowledge and also consolidates the consciousness of one's own presence, the feeling that I exist. While we talk with others and listen to others, looking takes place from one's home base; from the base labelled I, and the world and Man belong to the domain of sight, and are subjects of what I can see. But talking and listening combine to make up a bipartite - sometimes multipartite - effort to approach the truth and to reach a mutual understanding. That is why dialogue has nothing to do with the sceptics and is not a property of those who think they are the sole proprietors of Truth. It rather reveals its beautiful but covered face only to those wayfarers who are bound on their journey of discovery hand in hand with other human beings.

The phrase dialogue among civilizations and cultures, which should be interpreted as conversing with other civilizations and cultures is based upon such a definition of truth, and this definition is not, necessarily, at odds the well-known definitions of truth that one finds in philosophical texts. The dialogue among civi-



Dr Masterson and President Khatami

zations requires listening to and hearing from other civilizations and cultures, and the importance of listening to others is by no means less than talking to others. It may be in fact more important.

Talking and listening create a conversation; one side addresses the other side, and speech is exchanged. Under what circumstances is Man addressed? In other words, in what kind of a world is he or she addressed? The world of science is not the world of speeches and addresses - science is a conscious effort to discover the relationship of objects, and for this reason scientific discourse does

not transcend the level of Man's self-consciousness. But the world of art and the world of religion are the world of addressing. We are addressed by a work of art, and in religion, words of God address Man. That is why the languages of mysticism and religion are linked together by genuine and profound ties. And that is why the earliest specimens of art that have been created by Man are also specimens of Sacred Art.

Man is addressed again and again in the Bible and in the Holy Qur'an, and it is with this call that the individual human being is elevated and becomes a person.

Etymologically speaking, the word person is related to persona, the mask that actors would put on their face in the theatre. But the

important point here is that in the concept of religious address, when Man is being addressed by God on a general and universal level, and not in specific terms of religious teaching and codes of conduct, none of his psychological, social or historical aspects are really being addressed. What is addressed is Man's true, non-historic and individual nature, and that is why all the divine religions are not quintessentially different. The differences arise from religious laws and codes of conduct that govern the social and judicial life of human beings.

Now we must ask ourselves who is this person that is being addressed.

From the earliest times, philosophers have devoted a major part of their time and energy to answering this question. They have tried to explain how and in what manner we may get to know Man, to know him inside out, in absolute terms. And the question of how one can get to know himself or herself, and reach the goal of self-knowledge constitutes a major part of this philosophical quest.

Recounting the fascinating story of philosophical anthropology, and the episodes dealing with self-knowledge and self-discovery would take several long nights in the Thousand and One Nights of the history of philosophy. Some of these tales were first told in the East and some originated in the West. And it is significant to note that the Eastern tales explain the Oriental side of Man's being while the Western tales reveal the properties of his Occidental side. Man is in fact the meeting point of the soul's East and the reason's West. Denying the existence of any part of his essence would impair our understanding of the significance of his being. In our effort to grasp the meaning of the person we should watch out not to fall in the trap of individualism or in that of collectivism. Even though the views expressed by Christian thinkers have helped the modern concept of the individual to chrysalize, this should not be taken to mean that there exists a natural link between the two views. Just as the profound attention focused on the meaning of the person as the recipient of the Divine Word should not be credited, in my view, to the influence of personalism. Of course, it has been said by everyone that in modern society, it is individual human beings who are the criterion and the yardstick for all the institu-

tions, laws and social relations, and that the civil rights and the human rights are in fact nothing other than the rights of this same individual. On the other hand, collectivism which was launched vis-à-vis individualism was formulated by multiplying the same concept of the individual, and therefore the two ideologies have the same philosophical foundation. And for this reason we consider, from our position of spiritual wisdom, the antagonism between the individualistic liberalism and the collectivist socialism to be superficial and incidental. The concept of the person can be easily explained in terms of Islamic mys-



President Khatami during his lecture

ticism. The Islamic mystics consider Man to be a world unto himself, a microcosm. Man's originality does not emanate from his individuality or his collectivity. His originality is solely due to the fact that it is him, and him alone, who is addressed by the Divine Call. With this address, Man's soul transcends its boundaries, and with the transcendence of his soul, his world also becomes a world of justice and humanity.

Anyone who examines even briefly the meandering course of philosophy from its beginnings to the present will clearly notice the continuous swing of the philosophers: from one extreme to the

other. The last swing, the last link in the chain is modernity. This would which seemingly is the latest term to be derived from the Latin modernus was apparently first used in the 19th century. But the Latin word itself has been in use for more than fifteen centuries; and it was only in the 19th and 20th centuries that modernity was applied to a wide range of concepts in such diverse fields as philosophy, art, science, history and ethics. The common denominator in all these concepts is the cataclysm that shook the very foundations of Man's existence and thinking towards the end of the Middle

Ages. It was a cataclysm that pushed Man and the world onto a new orbit. The Man and the contemporary world (so far as it is affected by Man's ideas) result from this modern orbit to which they were sent in the aftermath of the Middle Ages. This new orbit was labelled modern in those times, but today we call it the Renaissance. Italy has played a decisive role in the birth of the Renaissance. And though many books and essays

have been written to describe and explain this great milestone, there is still a definite need for philosophers, historians and scientists to think and talk about it.

Renaissance's sole aim was not to revive classical Greek culture. The principal aim of the Renaissance was - as already pointed out by a number of thinkers - to revitalize religion by giving it a new language and fresh ideas. Renaissance defined the man of religion not as someone who would contemptuously turn his back on the world in order to repress it, but as somebody who would face the world. The Renaissance man of religion turns to the world just as

the world awaits him with open arms, and this reciprocal openness and opening up of the world and Man constitutes the most fundamental point about the Renaissance, and inherently it is a religious event aimed at conserving, reforming and propagating religion, and not opposed to it or against it.

But this great event ended up, in due course, somewhere diametrically opposed to the original intention. The opening of the world was transformed into violent conquest and subjugation. And this violent conquest did not remain limited to mastering nature. Its fires soon spread to human communities. What came to be known in the socio-political history of Europe as colonialism is the result of extending the domineering attitude of Man towards nature and the natural sciences to men and the humanities. And as a result, it is evident that we cannot study this chapter about modernity without adopting a humanitarian and ethical approach. The critique of modernity that I propose is undertaken from a vantage point and angle which is profoundly different from the position of its well-known critics, especially in the domain of philosophy. Someone who sets out to prune a tree should not cut the very branch he is standing on. And that is exactly how some of the philosophers of our time are behaving in their critique of modernity. By denying Reason any argumentative authority, they turn it either into a weapon that destroys everyone and everything, itself included, or transform it into a blunt and rusted sword that can only become a museum piece. One cannot use Reason as critical weapon without accepting its authority and without recognizing its limits.

The critique of pure reason - (which opened a new chapter in Western philosophy) and may be taken to mean the critique of everything and all concepts including pure reason itself - becomes only possible if reason is endowed

with authority. Without the authority of reason - which should be discussed at length and with precision in some other venue and at a more appropriate time, without forgetting to discuss its relationship to domination and power, it will not be possible to have a clear picture and concept of such vital political issues as human rights, peace, justice and freedom. And without this clear concept, our efforts for the establishment of these ideals will not succeed. But this should not be interpreted as a call to rationality and European-style logocentrism that preceded post-modernism. Because of the fact that Europe has given birth to modern rationality, it should feel a

serenity, if it is taken in the Oriental sense of the word, goes far beyond the two Dionysian and Apollonian elements of Western culture. The Age of Enlightenment was an Apollonian era, while Romanticism was the movement of the pendulum in the opposite direction. The next century should be a century for turning to a kind of spirituality that the Oriental Man has several thousand years of experience in its pursuit.

The exuberance and vitality of the European culture stems from its critical approach towards everything, itself included. But the time has come for Europe to take another step forward and view itself dif-



President Khatami and the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Lamberto Dini

stronger responsibility for criticizing it and finding a solution to prevent its destructive consequences.

Europe has itself fallen prey to its over-reliance on rationality, and is today engaged, through its thinkers and philosophers, in totally discrediting its own rationality. The Orient, which etymologically speaking has given rise to a number of words pertaining to order and the sense of direction, can undertake in the course of a historical dialogue with the West aimed at reaching a mutual understanding, to call on Europe and America to exercise more equilibrium, serenity, and contemplation in their conduct, thus contributing to the establishment of peace, security and justice in the world. This sense of equilibrium and

ferently, as others see it. This should not be taken to mean that Europe should forget its great cultural heritage or that it should turn to a new type of obscurantism. It is rather an encouragement to the European culture and civilization to embark on new experiences to gain a more precise knowledge of the global cultural geography. In Orientalism, we find that the East is treated an object of study, rather than as "the other side" of a dialogue. For a real dialogue among civilizations to take place, it is imperative that the East should become a real participant in the discussions and not just remain an object of study. This is a very important step that Europe and America need to take towards the realization of the dialogue-among-civilizations project. Of course this

is not a one-way invitation. We too, as Iranians, as Moslems and as Asians, need to take major steps towards gaining a true knowledge of the West, as it really is. This knowledge will help us to improve our economic and social way of life. And taking such bold steps by us and the Europeans would require a character trait that was first recognized and promoted in Europe by the Italians.

Renaissance historians have written that as a result of the continuous contacts of the Italians with Byzantium and the Islamic world the people of Italy developed a sense of tolerance. The Italians were familiar with the Islamic civilization ever since the Crusades, and they admired it. This knowledge and familiarity with a foreign culture, and the sense of wonder that accompanied it, was the biggest factor in developing this sense of tolerance among the Italian people. It is ironic that this concept of tolerance that was adopted from the Moslems and is a result of the contacts made by the Europeans with them, is now, in our time, being offered by the Europeans to the Moslems as an ethical and political piece of advice. Evidence of the Moslem influence in the creation of this spirit of tolerance among the Europeans is clear and can be traced in Europe's literary history. A very well-known play by the German dramatist Lessing entitled "Nathan the Wise", which is itself based on an Italian work called "One Hundred Old Tales" (Cento novelle antiche) is a case in point. But the influence of Moslem thought and culture on Italian and European culture is not limited to the question of tolerance. No nation has the right to confiscate the contributions of others to its own civilization, and to deny the share of any civilization in the history of human

culture. Apart from the influence of Moslem philosophy, theology and art on Europeans, something that has been very instrumental in freshening and purifying the temper of the Europeans is the Islamic literature, in all its diversity and richness. As an example, one can cite the influence of Ibn al-Arabi upon Dante, but here fortunately much has been said and written by well-known European scholars.

Speaking of the historical past without any reference to the future would be an idle academic exercise, whereas it is imperative upon us, for the sake of helping human communities and improving the state of the world, to find out how the relations of the Asian countries, and especially those of the Moslem countries, with Europe stand today. Why? Because Moslems and Europeans are next-door neighbours, and nations, unlike individuals, cannot choose their neighbours. Therefore, apart from moral, cultural and humanitarian reasons, Islam and Europe must, by force of historic and geographical circumstance, get to know one another better, and then move on to improve their political, economic and cultural relations. Our futures are inseparable because our pasts have been inseparable. Even today, in our schools of philosophy, the views of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, and those of Descartes, Kant, Hegel and Wittgenstein from among the modernists are taught alongside the views of al-Kindi, Farabi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra. If the great civilizations of Asia view themselves today in a Western mirror and get to know one another through the West, it was Islam that served in the not-too-distant past as a mirror to the West; it was a mirror in which the West could see its own past and its own philosophical and cultural heritage.

If dialogue is not a simple choice but a necessity for our two cultures, then this dialogue should be conducted with the true representatives of the Islamic culture and thought. Otherwise, what good will it do for the West to talk with a few westoxicated types who are themselves no more than inferior and deformed images of the West. This would not be a dialogue; it would not even amount to a monologue. A profound, thoughtful and precise dialogue with the Islamic civilization would be helpful in finding fair and practical solutions to some of the grave problems that beset the world today. The family crisis, the crisis in the relationship of Man and nature, the ethical crisis that has developed in scientific research, and many more problems of this nature should be among the items on the agenda of an Islamic-European dialogue.

Dialogue is such a desirable thing, because it is based on freedom and free will. In a dialogue no idea can be imposed on the other side. In a dialogue one should respect the independent identity of the other side and his or her independent ideological and cultural integrity. Only in such a case, the dialogue can be a preliminary step leading to peace, security and justice.

And in the meanwhile, conducting a dialogue with Iran has its own advantages. Iran is a door-to-door neighbour with Europe on one side, and with Asia on the other. Thus Iran is the meeting point of the Eastern and Western cultures, just as Man is the meeting point of the soul's East and the reason's West. The Persian heart and the Persian mind are brimful with a sense of balance, affection and tolerance, and for this reason the Iranians are the advocates of dialogue and adherent to justice and peace.

A change of programme made it impossible to hold the debate scheduled to follow President KHATAMI'S speech. This greatly disappointed researchers present, who would have very much appreciated an exchange of views on a number of topical issues. The speech, which was very widely reported in the European and North American press, is none the less bound to remain a major milestone in relations between Europe and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Launch of new research programme

The Finance and Consumption in the EU Chair

As announced in the Autumn issue of *EUI Review*, the second EUI research programme entirely funded by private funds will focus on empirical trends and economic policy issues in the fast-evolving consumer credit industry. The four-year project, financed by FINDOMESTIC S.p.A and CETELEM, is intended to provide a focal point for interactions among academic researchers, industry experts, and policy makers. Like the Mediterranean programme, it will be structured in a number of medium-term projects carried out by international research teams in consultation with members of the EUI Economics Department.

Issues

The structure of financial markets has broad and important effects on economic development, macroeconomic trends and fluctuations, and individual access to economic opportunities. In Continental Europe, financial markets are currently less developed than those of otherwise similar countries. Housing mortgages and hire-purchase contracts are more expensive and much less common in Italy, France, and Germany than in the United States, and credit cards are fewer in Italy as a whole than in London alone. More generally, many European families hold poorly diversified portfolios, and find it difficult to shelter their consumption patterns from income fluctuations and to distribute resources optimally over their lifecycle. In the context of the European economic and monetary union process, however, the member countries, economies will unavoidably become increasingly similar to each other as they integrate in a single financial market. This market's development might evolve along lines previously followed in the United States and more recently the United Kingdom, and should be closely monitored by policymaking authorities.

Structure and personnel

The initiative will be organized around a number of specific research programmes, workshops, and conferences. It will employ several Research Fellows on a part- or full-time basis over 1999-2002. Fellows will perform independent research, as is appropriate at their career stage, and will collect and organize background information in support of the Programme. A wide range of relevant factual and institutional information will become available on the Programme's web pages: <http://www.iue.it/General/F.htm>.

Senior research collaboration will be configured as Part-time Professorships in the Economics Department. During their time in residence, Part-time Professors may contribute to the Department's teaching programme and should stimulate and supervise research by



Professors Martin Browning and Giuseppe Bertola

the EUI's doctoral students. Part-time Professors should also act as co-directors of specific projects within the Research Programme, in co-operation with external collaborators. Each project will organize workshops, research meetings, and conferences so as to pursue the Programme's aim of co-ordinating and stimulating high-quality research of pan-European scope, and to maximize its visibility to academic, business, and policy audiences. Projects will be approved and co-ordinated by the Scientific Committee, and should enjoy privileged access to subsets of the sponsoring institutions, data and information.

Start-up Phase

In early 1999 the Programme's Scientific and Steering Committees were formed, and calls were issued for Research Fellowship applications and expressions of interest by senior researchers.

Scientific and Steering Committees

RICHARD BLUNDELL (University College London), MARTIN BROWNING (University of Copenhagen), ONORATO CASTELLINO (Università di Torino), FUMIO HAYASHI (University of Tokyo), ARIE KAPTEYN (Tilburg University), FRANÇOIS JULIEN-LABRUYÈRE (Cetelem), and JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET (Université des Sciences Sociales, Toulouse) kindly accepted invitations to be members of the Scientific Committee. The Steering Committee members are ROSAMARIA GELPI (Cetelem), UMBERTO FILOTTO (Assofin), GREGORIO D'OTTAVIANO CHIARAMONTI (Findomestic). Interest in active participation has been expressed by leading international researchers on a variety of relevant topics.

Inauguration of the Programme

The Programme's Convention was signed on 11 March 1999, when the first meeting of the Scientific

Committee also took place. On the same day, the Programme's activity were formally inaugurated at the Badia Fiesolana by ENRICO LETTA, Italian Minister for Community Policies, and by a round-table discussion of the research programme with MARTIN BROWNING, ONORATO CASTELLINO, UMBERTO FILOTTO, FUMIO HAYASHI, ARIE KAPTEYN, FRANÇOIS JULIEN-LABRUYÈRE, and JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET.

Members of the Scientific Committee praised the quality of the applications and expressions of interest received, and agreed that the programme should produce research of the highest possible standard in two areas:

- International and cross-national analysis of consumer behaviour, with particular attention to consumer debt.
- Competitive, institutional, and contractual design issues in formal and informal credit provision, with particular attention to the supply of credit to consumers.

The programme can build on an established body of theoretical and empirical work in each of the two areas. Its focus on consumer-credit issues, however, offers a novel perspective on both consumers' and banks' problems. On the one hand, the programme will study how availability or lack of credit may influence broader aspects of consumers' problems, including household portfolio management strategies and consumption patterns over individual lifecycles. On the other hand, the programme will explore differences and similarities between the industrial organisation of credit supply to firms for investment purposes, and credit supply to families for consumption-smoothing purposes. In both lines of research, particular attention will be paid to institutional aspects of the relevant markets, exploiting the rich diversity of European experiences and identifying possible paths for the development of a common institutional framework and market structure at EU level. Development of new information and data sources was also identified as a priority aim of the Programme. In cooperation with specialist banks, the Finance and Consumption in the European Union Chair will endeavour to collect and make available the relevant institutional information and to prepare suitable data sets for academic research.

Activities

The Chair's first Fellows will begin to work at the Institute in the Fall of 1999. The Department of Economics will be happy to welcome PIERFEDERICO ASDRUBALI from Michigan State University, STEFAN HOCHGUERTEL from Uppsala University, GIULIANA PALUMBO from the European Center for Advanced Research in Economics (ULB, Bruxelles), and ALESSANDRO SBUEZ from the London Business School. Professor CHRISTIAN GOLLIER (Université des Sciences Sociales, Toulouse) is slated to be the Chair's first part-time Professor in September, 1999, pending approval by the Institute's Academic

Council. Other junior and senior researchers will also join the Chair's research programme in 1999-2000 and subsequent academic years.

A major conference on Family Portfolio Choices will be held at the Institute in December 1999. It is being organized by Professors LUIGI GUIZO (Università di Sassari and Ente Einaudi, Roma), MICHAEL HALIASSOS (University of Cyprus), and TULLIO JAPPELLI (Università di Salerno and CSEF). The conference will consolidate the first of the Chair's two research directions by providing a comprehensive account of the status of theo-



Eduardo Speranza, President of Findomestic Banca and Enrico Letta, Italian Minister for Community Policies

retical knowledge and methodological achievements in the analysis of family portfolios. Methodological papers will focus on how use of household-level data may offer deep insights into issues of particular interest for policy design. Empirical papers will offer an original comparative analysis of the structure of household portfolios in a set of countries which are representative of a wide spectrum of financial development, with particular attention to consumer-credit issues. The project will provide a stimulus for the development of new papers that will follow a common set of guidelines provided by the coordinators but will also allow considerable scope for author originality and discretion. Contributors and discussants include many of the leading researchers on the economics of consumption choices. MIT Press has recently agreed to publish the conference's proceedings.

As the Chair's programme of research develops fully, further academic activities are planned. Conferences will be convened on other theoretical and empirical issues of interest, and more frequent informal workshop will feature presentation and discussion of papers at the work-in-progress stage.

GIUSEPPE BERTOLA



Survey by the Robert Schuman Centre shows:

Rise in Cross-Border Tourism seen as Biggest Impact of the Euro for Citizens in a Border Region

Results of survey carried out in neighbouring EU border regions of Baden/Freiburg (Germany) and Alsace/Colmar (France)

A significant rise in cross-border tourism appears to be the most important result from the complete introduction of the euro, Europe's new currency, for citizens in a border region. This is the upshot of a survey conducted among 431 citizens in Baden and Alsace along the French-German border in March/April 1998. This study was carried out by the Robert Schuman Centre and was co-financed by the European Commission in co-operation with the European Parliament, Brussels. A full report was published in September 1998 and is available at the RSC.

More than twenty per cent of the respondents in the survey said that they would visit the neighbouring region across the border more often if the euro was already in their pockets today. This rise in tourism contrasts with an increase of only half that size in the cross-border consumption of goods, and marginal or no increase at all in the use of services and in the search for jobs or housing across the border, information based on the questioned citizens own assessment.

Price differences less important – small group of new cross-border consumers

At first glance, it seems surprising that, with the euro, no more than 12 per cent of respondents expect to consume more durable goods, and 9 per cent more perishable goods. As the euro eases the comparison of prices, it helps consumers to reap the benefits of potentially cheaper prices across the nearby border. The study shows, however, that only 15 per cent of the people in the sample see price differences as an incentive to go shopping across the border. Nearly double (29 per cent) name specialities of the cross-border region, and 20 per cent a better selection of goods as incentives. Here, the euro makes no difference.

In contrast, for the group expecting to do more cross-border shopping, the euro does count: roughly ninety per cent of the respondents in this small group think that the effect of removing the obstacle of having to

use another currency is quite or very important, compared to only 56 per cent of the general sample. The citizens expecting to consume more across the border with the euro are largely new to cross-border shopping. Between 70 and 80 per cent have not or have hardly ever consumed goods across the border thus far. The citizens of this group are slightly younger and slightly better educated than the average sampled citizen.

For a huge majority, the border remains a strong dividing line in their daily lives

A huge majority of questioned citizens, 70 per cent, sees the euro as having no effect on their travelling across the border more often. For many citizens, language appears to be a considerable obstacle (21 per cent), despite a considerable knowledge of German in Alsace and of French in Baden. Mostly, however, respondents did not affirm one or more specific obstacles, but simply answered that "it never really came into the question" to go across the border. Despite currency differences vanishing, the border, for a majority, seems to remain a strong mental dividing line, leaving the neighbouring region across the border outside the scope of their daily lives. Correspondingly, the present level of cross-border activity – from visiting and shopping, to searching for a home – has equally proved to be rather low. More than half of the respondents said they even hardly ever go across the border.

Distance to the border larger for those who declare that they hardly ever cross it

In line with these findings, the respondents also showed a remarkable difference in how they assess the distance from their city of residence to the nearby border. The actual distance to the border is about 20 km from Colmar and about 25 km from Freiburg (road distance). Those respondents who say they hardly ever or never cross the border assume the border to be, on average, 18 km further away than it is according to the distance given above. In contrast, those who do cross the border at least several times a year are much more accurate in their estimate – although they still assume the border to be further away than the road distance



mentioned. Their answers range, on average, nine km higher than the given distance value.

Little labour mobility - passive approach of small and medium-sized enterprises

Hardly any respondent (3 per cent) said that he or she would personally fear for his or her job with the introduction of the euro. On the other hand, more than 19 per cent – mostly Germans – of respondents thought that the euro was ‘bad for jobs’. Presently, only 13 per cent of respondents said that they have ever thought about searching for a job across the border. Despite the fear of the euro being ‘bad for jobs’, most questioned citizens do not expect that they would look for jobs across the border more if the euro was in operation today – only less than 7 per cent said so. This expected absence of a direct effect from the introduction of the euro on labour mobility in the European Union (EU) might well be seen as a problem for increasingly integrated European economies. The passive attitude of respondents towards cross-border job-searches is in line with local small and medium-sized enterprises’ (SMEs) limited preparations for the challenge of the euro. Lots of SMEs, as regional business organizations deplore, see for themselves the advent of the euro as an issue of adapting bookkeeping practices and computer systems rather than one of preparing for a more competitive marketplace.

Switzerland may well be a ‘money haven’ for some citizens

Contrary to expectations, the results of the survey do not show that neighbouring Switzerland will be left behind in a new cross-border dynamic between Alsace and Baden. Additionally, Switzerland, as a non-EU

member not introducing the euro, emerges as a potential “money haven” for some respondents: 15 per cent of the sample consider it an option to put their money into a Swiss bank account once the euro is introduced. The results of this survey do not lend themselves to the view that this is only a sign of political protest against the new currency: Among this group, 30 per cent favour the introduction of the euro.

Study not directly generalizable - support for the assumption of a small but significant impact of the euro on citizen’s daily life

It is important to state that the study cannot claim representativity, and that its results cannot directly be generalized. The survey was limited to citizens in border regions. These citizens live geographically close to another country and can, therefore, visit or consume across the border more easily than citizens living farther away from borders. Equally, the survey was limited to the regions of Baden and Alsace. Furthermore, it has to be underlined that the survey is based on citizens’ assumptions regarding their respective behaviour with the euro. This behaviour might well look different once the single currency is fully introduced in reality. Nevertheless, the results of this survey offer a unique view on the expectations of citizens in selected border regions in relation to their lives with the euro. The findings support the assumption that the introduction of the euro will, in the short run, increase citizen’s overall cross-border activity to a small extent. The euro, thus, promises not to massively change citizens’ daily life but to exert a small, yet significant, impact upon it.

MARC R. GRAMBERGER
Project Director

Forthcoming Competition Policy Events at the Robert Schuman Centre

The Robert Schuman Centre of the EUI has become internationally recognised as a forum for research and policy debate on competition and market regulation. In 1999, the RSC hosts another four important events in this domain.

The second session of the European Electricity Regulation Forum, jointly organised by the RSC and the European Commission (DG XVII), will be held on 20 and 21 May.

The fourth EUI Annual Competition Workshop will take place on the 4 and 5 June. Organised by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, this year’s edition will focus on State Aid control, a unique feature of EU competition policy.

On the 10 and 11 September, a Workshop on The Anticompetitive Impact of Regulation is organised by Giuliano Amato and Laraine Laudati.

The International Bar Association, on 29 October, will for the third time hold its annual competition policy meeting at the RSC.

14-16 December 1998

The Institutionalization of European Space

Workshop Organized by ALEC STONE SWEET

In 1950, a European political space existed in roughly the same sense as any other international political space, namely, as an arena in which sovereign States interacted to forward their interests. This arena was only a very primitive site of collective governance. It was also a space that organized a disastrous inter-governmental politics, producing two devastating wars in less than 30 years. European States could have reproduced this system. Instead, they negotiated the Communities, beginning a process of building a different kind of European space.

Now at the close of the century, the European Union governs in an expanding number of policy domains, producing rules that are authoritative for both States and persons. Increasingly dense networks of transnational actors made up of representatives of Member State governments, firms, lobbying groups, and members of the EU's organizations, such as the Commission, the Court of Justice, and the Parliament, operate in political spaces that are best described as supranational in character. Various actors work to attain their goals, and vie with each other to influence policy outcomes that apply to all of Europe.

European organizations and rules both enable and constrain these actors, providing opportunities for purposive action, and shaping goals and strategies. As jurisdiction has migrated from the national to the EC-EU level, complex, often unintended, linkages and tensions between modes of supranational and national governance have developed. The myriad processes through which these tensions are revealed, exploited, exacerbated or resolved are today at the core of European politics. In a phrase, we have witnessed the emergence and institutionalization of European space.

In December 1998 the Robert Schuman Centre, with the support of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, brought together the members of a collaborative research group for a workshop that focused on the processes through which EU policy spaces – supranational sites of governance, structured by EU law, procedures and organizations – are evolving and with what effects, now and for the future.

The Group has sought to adapt and refine those elements of contemporary theories of institutions (ranging from game theoretic to social constructivist) that are best suited to help explain the conditions under which new political spaces are organized, when such spaces will not be organized, and how and under what conditions such arenas interact with others. Its members will pay particular attention to three factors, or units of analysis, which it believes comprise the constituent components of any dynamic theory of institutions: actors, individuals who act purposefully; organizations, groups of individuals who pursue collective purposes; and institutions, normative structures or rule systems.

The Group believes that an adequate account of institutional change must confront the question of how new policy arenas arise from different combinations of these elements, and how, under different conditions, existing arenas evolve over time. One of the tasks the Group has set for itself is to develop such a theory. The project's empirical focus is the European Union.

Europe provides a politically-important and intellectually-challenging setting for engaging the topic, since the development of European policy arenas has been dramatic, and the construction of the EU's capacity to govern has

taken diverse trajectories, with varied consequences. Further, the integration 'project' has clearly moved from market-building to polity-building. Today, legitimacy issues claim as much attention as efficiency issues, and at times more.

Participants have chosen to focus on problems associated with the construction of supranational policy arenas, and the interaction of these arenas with other political spaces, national or supranational. Members and their projects include:

MICHAEL SMITH (University of California-Irvine), on the future prospects for the EU to act externally, as a coherent actor, given institutional changes introduced by the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam.

PENELOPE TURNBULL (University of Birmingham) and WAYNE SANDHOLTZ (University of California-Irvine), on the likely future of migration and policing in the EU, given the incorporation of these policy domains within the Third Pillar.

KATHLEEN MCNAMARA (Princeton University), on the ongoing process of constructing a European space for governing monetary union.

PATRICK LE GALÈS (Institut d'études politiques, Paris), on the interaction between supranational and national authorities in the construction of new regional policies.

SONIA MAZEY (Cambridge University) and JEREMY RICHARDSON (Oxford University), on the European Commission's work to establish general procedures to facilitate, by institutionalizing, policy consultation with interest groups located in Brussels.

MARTIN RHODES (EUI), on the extent to which a Europeanized 'corporate space' is emerging, and

Globalisation, European Economic Integration and Social Protection

On 11-12 March 1999, the European Forum on 'Recasting the Welfare State', directed by MARTIN RHODES and MAURIZIO FERRERA, held a conference on Globalisation, European Economic Integration and Social Protection, in collaboration with the European Commission, DG5. In addition to a dozen expert speakers, the conference was attended by some 30 policy makers from the European Commission and Member State governments, including Mr. JUHANI LÖNNROTH, Director of DG5 Division A (Employment and the Labour Market).

In Europe, Member States and the European Union are now embarked upon the two parallel processes of the realisation of EMU and the globalisation of their economies. The aims of this conference were:

- to give a clear and comprehensive picture of the phenomenon;
- to take stock of the latest analyses on the various impacts of globalisation on employment, welfare states and other social aspects of economies;
- to identify the false and correct questions related to this issue;
- to identify and comment on the different policy aspects related to this issue: social standards, institutional building, handling of shocks and adjustment programmes.

Despite much pessimism as to the consequences of the twin processes of European economic integration and globalization, many of the speakers at this conference argued that there may be no good reason for believing that their overall impact have, or will have, adverse social consequences regarding employment and social standards. As discussed by NEIL FLIGSTEIN (Berkeley

and Visiting Fellow, EUI) and PAUL PIERSON (Harvard University and Forum Fellow), unemployment problems and the need for the modernisation of our social protection systems may be wrongly attributed to globalisation. EMU, on the other hand, may have more direct implications but thus far, as discussed by MIKE ARTIS (EUI), DAVID CAMERON (Yale University) and ERIK JONES (University of Nottingham), these are poorly understood and difficult to predict.

Actually, the European Union may be well placed to seize the opportunities and benefits from the contemporary process of economic change. On the other hand, as discussed by GEOFFREY UNDERHILL (University of Amsterdam), ANTON HEMERIKJ (University of Rotterdam and Forum Fellow) and MARTIN SCHLUDI and STEFFEN GANGHOF (Max Planck Institute, Köln) serious attention should be paid to the argument according to which the globalisation of financial markets does place limits on governments' policy-making autonomy, impacts on tax structures and reduces the capacity of states to use taxation for redistributive ends. Nevertheless, it was argued that Europe needs a pro-active rather than a defensive approach to globalization. As discussed by STEPHEN NICKELL (University of Oxford), GIUSEPPE BERTOLA (EUI) – both focusing on social and labour market policy alternatives – and BERNARD CASEY (LSE), in an analysis of social partnership as the basis for new policy solutions, national and supranational policies must focus on the opportunities offered by economic and technological integration and ask what needs to be done to transform globalization and economic integration into progress towards higher levels of employment and social protection.

MARTIN RHODES

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with what consequences for national models of capitalism.

ADRIENNE HÉRITIER (EUI), on why supranational competences to govern have expanded despite forces that favour policy deadlock and institutional inertia.

RACHEL CICHOWSKI (University of California-Irvine, Visiting Researcher, RSC), on how women's groups have used the EU's organizations to redress discriminatory national rules and practices in the workplace.

NEIL FLIGSTEIN (University of California-Irvine and Visiting Professor, RSC) and ALEC STONE SWEET (Oxford University and Jean Monnet Fellow, RSC) on the institutionalization of the Treaty of Rome, focusing on the linked developments of transnational society, the European Commission's organizational capacity to govern, and EC law.

In July 1999, the Group will meet again in Laguna Beach, California, to present drafts of papers, and to

prepare for their publication by Oxford University Press.

The directors of the project, ALEC STONE SWEET, NEIL FLIGSTEIN, and WAYNE SANDHOLTZ, are grateful to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Robert Schuman Centre for their generous support of the workshop, and to MONIQUE CAVALLARI for providing logistical expertise.

ALEC STONE SWEET

London: From Welfare to 'Workfare'

Maurizio Ferrera

In Spring last year the Labour Government published a Green Paper on Welfare State reform that gives perhaps the most explicit formulation of the so-called third way: 'the welfare state now faces a choice of futures. A privatised future, with the welfare state becoming a residual safety net for the poorest and most marginalised; the status quo, but with more generous benefits; or the government's third way – promoting opportunity instead of dependence, with a welfare state providing for the mass of the people, but in new ways to fit the modern world'. Generic as it is, this formulation sets the main posts between which Tony Blair is *de facto* moving on the delicate ground of welfare reforms.

The first post is rejection of a 'twin-track' system of protection; the public track only for the poor, with relatively modest benefits, and the private track (perhaps with public incentives and subsidies) for the middle classes. To a large extent that had been the Thatcherite project (a project which, though softened along the way, doubled the weight of means-tested benefits (those reserved for the poor) in the period from 1980 to 1995.

The second post is unwillingness simply to put back the way it was what the Conservatives had abolished or radically transformed: no continuationist patching-up operation, no return to tax-and-spend policies, no substantive retreat from the organizational innovations aimed at efficiency introduced by the Conservatives in the public administration, health and social services. The third post is what we might call the modernization of universalism: that is, the idea that while continuing to be aimed at the majority of the population, welfare has to change many of its objectives and instruments in order to restore harmony with the background economic and social context.

This third post is, of course, the most important one, but in the formulation given above, also the most generic. The legislative innovations already taken by the Labour Government and the welfare reform project presented to Parliament this very week let us understand better, though, what the ingredients of this modernization are. First and foremost, 'education, education, education', the three great national priorities indicated by Blair immediately after his installation in Downing Street. This means improving not just traditional educational services, but also, and perhaps especially, vocational-training and further-education programmes, as well as reforming funding mechanisms in university education. Second, better-quality health services. While the Conservatives' slogan in this area was 'efficiency through competition', New Labour's objective is to improve effectiveness and fairness, without losses of efficiency. But perhaps the most important ingredient in Labour's new strategy concerns the sector of cash benefits: here the objective is to reform all the benefit and funding formulas so as to maximize incentives to work. In the preamble to the Green Paper Blair says: 'we want to re-build the system around work and security. Work for those who can; security for those who cannot.'

This rebuilding is already well under way: the government has in fact made far-reaching innovations in unemployment benefit, in the system of benefits to low-pay workers, in benefits for single mothers, in incentives to firms, in accident and disability payments. The red thread running through all these reforms is the maxim 'making work pay', that is, making it more attractive to work than merely to take benefit. It should be added that alongside the changes to the traditional passive shock-absorbers, New Labour has launched a number of active programmes to promote employment,

concentrated in the most-disadvantaged regions (Education Action Zones, Employment Zones etc.). The bill now being presented to the Commons by Alastair Darling is a further step forward in all these directions.

Will the 'third way' succeed? It is, of course, too early to say. To be sure, the whole workfare strategy rests on very optimistic assumptions as to the State's capacity to guide economic and social behaviour in a virtuous direction. But it is comforting to know that we shall soon be able to make fairly exact efficiency estimates: one of the most meritorious features of the Labour reforms is the fact that they set clear, measurable objectives. When Blair's men explain that 'the third way is whatever works', they are not acting from cynical opportunism, but suggesting a method: a public policy succeeds if it attains its own objectives, on the basis of empirically verifiable standards. If it does not work, it should be changed. Pending data and assessments, however, one thing can already be said: the modernization project launched by New Labour is the most important challenge to the Welfare State since Beveridge's times. This is true not just for Britain. The third way may become an important reference point for other countries too, starting of course with our country, Italy. It may, first and foremost, be a benchmark in the method: a method of reformism that is both decisive and pragmatic. But it is a benchmark in the substance too. Our labour-market, welfare and education policies need urgent, incisive reforms. Italy's starting points are very far from Britain's. But if Blair's way works, we shall have many more ideas to ponder, and fewer excuses for our inertia.

Translated by Iain L. Fraser

Published in:
Il Sole 24 Ore, 12 February 1999

When Immobilism Gets in the Way

Maurizio Ferrera

The nineties showed a marked wave of reforms in European unemployment protection systems. Everywhere the slogan was 'activation, meaning the move from the traditional passive shock-absorbers (cash benefits, with no quid pro quo) to new forms of conditional protection aimed at providing incentives for the beneficiaries to return to the labour market. Access



Maurizio Ferrera, co-director of the Welfare State Forum

requirements, duration and amounts of benefit have been retouched in more or less all the countries, and thorough structural reforms adopted in France, Britain, Germany, Holland and Denmark. In this process of change, significant efforts have been made to strengthen protection (albeit in 'active' form) for the weakest segments: young people, women, less-skilled workers.

By comparison with the European trends, our country stands out for its immobilism. It is true that active policies are on the agenda here too, and in the last two or three years a large number of initiatives have been taken along this front. But nothing has been done to change the conditional system of passive shock-absorbers. Indeed, this is the only major welfare sector that has remained exactly as it was at the start of the decade. This is particularly serious because the Italian unemployment protection system has always been anomalous in relation to Europe. It is a system that grants too much and for too long to the workers insured, who are not, however, asked for anything serious in return; but it is also a system that provides little or nothing for those outside the regular market, the growing host of outsiders. The Eurostat figures, moreover, speak clearly. Unemployment benefits in Italy

reach only a small proportion of the unemployed: about one third of the males between 25 and 64, as against a European average of over two thirds, and less than 20% of males under 25, as against a European average of about 50% (for women the position is even worse). Moreover, some 29% of benefits are 'captured' by the 17% of families with incomes above 150% of the national average: a percentage almost 3 times higher than the European average. The Eurostat picture dates from 1995: the situation has probably worsened since. While other countries were reforming, we wasted resources keeping alive an institutional fossil, unbalanced and inefficient.

Will reform finally come? That is what the social package signed at the end of December provides, and what the government continues to assure us. A serious reform of the social shock-absorbers would not only enhance the efficiency and fairness of labour policy, but also contribute to resolving some open questions in other welfare sectors: e.g. the question of early retirement, or the reform of social security. The coalition defending the status quo is robust and well organized. But as surveys show, the demand for change is very widespread. If well managed and well explained to public opinion, a European-style reform might be beneficial not just in economic terms but also in terms of consensus: the 'broad' consensus of citizens, instead of the narrow one of the old corporations

Translated by IAIN L. FRASER

Published in: *Il Sole 24 Ore*, 5 February 1999



Martin Rhodes, co-director of the Welfare State Forum

Verso una politica migratoria Europea

Ministri e responsabili europei a confronto in un convegno all'Istituto Universitario Europeo

Le sfide legate all'aumento della pressione migratoria hanno sorpassato drammaticamente, negli ultimi anni, la capacità di risposta dei singoli stati membri dell'Unione Europea. La necessità di intensificare la cooperazione internazionale in materia di immigrazione sia tra gli stati di destinazione, sia tra questi e i principali stati di origine e di transito dei flussi, è ormai ampiamente riconosciuta non solo dagli studiosi ma anche da responsabili politici e dall'opinione pubblica.

E' con l'intento di attirare l'attenzione dell'opinione pubblica e di ampliare la riflessione su questo tema, che il Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (Cespi) ha organizzato, sotto il patrocinio del Ministero dell'Interno italiano, un convegno di studio.

Al convegno, dal titolo 'Verso una politica migratoria europea', che si è tenuto alla Badia Fiesolana lunedì 15 marzo, hanno partecipato tra gli altri il Ministro dell'Interno francese JEAN-PIERRE CHEVÈNEMENT e il suo omologo italiano ROSA RUSSO JERVOLINO, il Ministro per le Riforme Istituzionali e professore dell'IUE GIU-



I Ministri Jean-Pierre Chevènement e Rosa Russo Jervolino

LIANO AMATO, l'onorevole GIORGIO NAPOLITANO e il Sottosegretario agli Affari Esteri UMBERTO RANIERI. Il panel di discussione era presieduto dal direttore del Centro Robert Schuman professor YVES MÉNY.

Nel quadro della prossima entrata in vigore del trattato di Amsterdam che fissa l'obiettivo di una politica europea in materia di immigrazione, particolare attenzione è stata dedicata nel corso dell'incontro alle forti specificità nazionali che contrassegnano gli Stati membri dell'Unione nella gestione dei flussi migratori. La dialettica tra interessi nazionali e un interesse europeo nel perseguimento di una politica comune in materia di immigrazione è stata al centro del dibattito.

'Ci sono dei fattori oggettivi che devono essere considerati - ha osservato a tale proposito il Ministro dell'interno francese CHEVÈNEMENT - Il principale è l'asimmetria democratica che esiste attualmente tra cittadini comunitari ed extra-comunitari'. Il Ministro ha sottolin-

eato che né l'allarmismo, né il fatalismo, 'due griglie tra le quali sembriamo essere inesorabilmente imprigionati', possono essere di aiuto nella costruzione di una politica migratoria comune. 'Sarà necessaria una stretta regolamentazione dei permessi di soggiorno per controllare l'immigrazione clandestina - ha proseguito - ma tenendo ben presente che più una società si barriera, meno tesori ha da nascondere'.

E in materia di immigrazione clandestina, un problema che ha particolarmente animato la discussione dei partecipanti al convegno, particolare interesse nonché larga eco su tutta la stampa nazionale, ha riscosso la proposta lanciata dal professor GIULIANO AMATO. Anticipando quello che è l'oggetto di studio di un 'reflection group' che presenterà il 22 aprile i suoi lavori con un incontro dal titolo 'Long term implications of Eu: the nature of the new border', il professore ha delineato una potenziale soluzione all'immigrazione clandestina: affidare a una polizia dell'Unione Europea la vigilanza delle frontiere esterne, soprattutto di quei paesi che sono particolarmente difficili da vigilare. Il professor AMATO ha specificato che la sua era 'l'idea non di un ministro del governo italiano ma di un docente' e ha aggiunto che simile organismo sarebbe un qualcosa che andrebbe evidentemente molto al di là di Europol: 'E' un'idea che merita riflessione - ha aggiunto - al momento più in un luogo come questo dell'Istituto che in sede di Governo'. Questo organismo servirebbe a rendere più solidale la politica comune in quanto, secondo l'opinione condivisa dal Ministro dell'interno francese CHEVÈNEMENT e dal Ministro italiano JERVOLINO, uno dei principali problemi oggi in questa materia è che ci sono paesi che non si fidano degli stati confinanti per quanto riguarda la sorveglianza delle frontiere e che anche per questa ragione sono indotti a considerare come politica nazionale quella dell'immigrazione.

ROSA RUSSO JERVOLINO ha lanciato in conclusione un monito a combattere l'intolleranza nei confronti degli immigrati extra-comunitari. In particolare, il Ministro JERVOLINO ha fatto appello agli organi di stampa e televisione affinché essi non strumentalizzino la questione dell'immigrazione clandestina: 'La strumentalizzazione politica del problema immigrazione - ha affermato - avviene spesso in Italia con l'aiuto dei mezzi di comunicazione'. Secondo il Ministro, contrariamente alla maggior parte delle questioni attualmente affrontate in Parlamento, esiste per l'immigrazione un approccio fortemente ideologico e contraddittorio: 'Viene troppo spesso dipinta da l'immagine dell'immigrato che toglie lavoro agli italiani, che ruba e che ha una responsabilità quasi totale nell'alimentare la malavita'. Un'immagine che deve essere combattuta lungo la strada che porterà l'Europa ad una politica migratoria comune.

Le Monde

Quel futur pour l'Europe?

SERGIO ROMANO
Editorialiste, Milano

Peut-on encore parler de la Méditerranée comme d'une zone autonome? Dès la fin de la guerre froide elle appartient désormais à une plus vaste zone géopolitique. L'Italie, la France et l'Espagne font partie de la Méditerranée atlantique, c'est à dire d'une région qui entretient des rapports privilégiés avec les Etats Unis, et sont en même temps la frontière méditerranéenne de l'Union européenne. L'Adriatique fait partie de la Méditerranée, mais elle est en même temps une mer intérieure de la région danubienne et balkanique. La guerre de Bosnie a été la 'guerre d'Espagne' de l'islamisme radical et a relié Sarayévo à Kaboul. Israël est le centre d'une crise qui frappe le Maghreb, le Golfe Persique et l'ensemble des rapports de l'Ouest avec l'Islam. Beyrouth est la tête de ligne méditerranéenne d'une crise qui a ses quartiers généraux à Jérusalem, Téhéran, Damas. La Turquie est un pont entre la Méditerranée atlantique et la nouvelle zone créée par la désagrégation de l'Union Soviétique.

Dans cette Méditerranée élargie se situent quelques unes parmi les typologies les plus inquiétantes du monde contemporain: guerres civiles, guerres de sécession, terrorisme, intégrisme religieux, transmigrations, commerce d'armes et de drogue. Le danger, depuis la fin de la guerre froide, a glissé vers le sud et lèche les frontières de l'Europe.

Il existe, certes, une grande organisation militaire, l'Otan, capable d'opérations musclées, comme en Bosnie en 1995 et comme peut-être au Kosovo dans les prochaines semaines. Mais l'Otan n'agit que

lorsque ses interventions sont utiles à la grande puissance qui en assure la direction politique. Sommes-nous certains que les intérêts de l'Amérique dans la région coïncident toujours avec ceux des pays européens? Dans de nombreuses questions – l'affaire palestinienne, les rapports avec la Libye, l'Irak, l'Iran – les divergences sont évidentes.

Placée à la frontière d'une zone à haute turbulence et défendue par une organisation qui doit obéir d'abord aux intérêts d'une puissance extra-européenne, l'Europe, néanmoins, a fait des pas décisifs vers son intégration. Elle a un marché unique, une monnaie unique et, après l'application du traité de Schengen, une frontière unique. Mais elle n'a ni un ministre des Affaires Etrangères, ni un ministre de la Défense, ni un ministre du Trésor, ni un ministre de l'Intérieur. Les négociations, les armes, l'argent et la police sont, surtout dans la Méditerranée, les instruments d'une même politique. Pour compter dans la région une puissance doit pouvoir soutenir économiquement les pays amis, fournir des armes aux Etats qui lui sont utiles, intervenir dans les crises, garantir l'application des compromis atteints sous sa médiation, menacer le recours à la force, couper les liens de la politique avec le crime.

L'Europe possède l'argent et donne une contribution essentielle à la naissance d'un Etat palestinien, mais n'a ni un outil politique ni un outil militaire. Les différentes tables à plusieurs jambes construites au cours des années quatre-vingt-dix – dont une, Eurofor, a son siège à Florence – ne sont

What Future for Europe?

On the initiative of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in co-operation with Le Monde, La Stampa, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and El Pais, the Robert Schuman Centre is organizing a series of lectures around the general question 'What Future for Europe?'

The speakers (in chronological order) who have so far agreed to contribute are: JOSEPH H. H. WEILER, Harvard, GIULIANO AMATO, EUI, SERGIO ROMANO, Milano, DAVID MARQUAND, Oxford, Mme. DELMAS-MARTY, Paris, STANLEY HOFFMANN, Harvard, WOLFGANG STREECK, Köln.

A final conference will be organized by Prof. PASSERINI in June 1999.

que des clubs militaires où les généraux se réunissent pour faire ensemble avec leurs troupes quelques 'parties de chasse'. L'Union de l'Europe occidentale n'est qu'une boîte vide, destinée, dans la meilleure des hypothèses, à jouer le rôle d'adjudicataire de l'Otan pour les opérations régionales auxquelles les Etats Unis sont indifférents. Avec un décision qui renverse un principe fondamentale de la doctrine gaullienne, la France même semble s'accommoder de cette perspective. Le Premier ministre britannique a fait il y a quelques mois des suggestions intéressantes pour l'avenir de l'UEO. Mais dans les semaines suivantes il a assuré la participation de son pays aux opérations militaires contre l'Irak

et a confirmé de cette façon que la Grande Bretagne ne peut concevoir la défense européenne que dans un contexte atlantique, c'est-à-dire contrôlé par les Etats Unis. Les bombardements anglo-américains sur l'Irak présentent néanmoins un avantage : ils ont dissipé plusieurs illusions et prouvé que toute discussion sur l'intégration politique et militaire de l'Union est destinée à se heurter contre le noeud des rapports euro-américains.

La participation anglaise aux bombardements américains sur l'Irak a eu une autre conséquence. Elle a prouvé que l' 'Europe rose' ne sera pas nécessairement plus unie, dans sa projection extérieure, de l'Europe conservatrice ou démocrate-chrétienne de la première moitié des années quatre-vingt-dix. Les gauches, lors des campagne électorales, avaient un intérêt évident à se présenter comme les expressions nationales d'une tendance européenne. Mais les sociaux-démocrates au pouvoir sont plus nationaux, à plusieurs égards, que leurs prédécesseurs. Ils n'ont pas participé à la conception des traités de Maastricht et ont fait preuve, dans quelques circonstances, d'une certaine méfiance à l'égard de la monnaie unique. Ils représentent des forces et des groupes sociaux repliés sur eux-mêmes, effrayés par la modernité, pour lesquels le problème majeur aujourd'hui est la défense nationale de l'emploi et de l'Etat-assistance. Ils gouvernent, dans les principaux pays de l'Union, à la tête de coalitions composés de partis concurrentiels dont ils subissent un certain chantage: les communistes, les verts en France et en Italie, les catholiques de gauche en Italie, les verts en Allemagne. La première victime de ces contradictions est la politique étrangère. Le cas Öcalan suggère à ce propos quelques réflexions.

Nous revenons ainsi à la Méditerranée et aux crises éclatées après la fin de la guerre froide. L'intégrisme islamique n'est pas le 'grand ennemi' dont certains politologues américains aiment nous représenter la menace. Il est le résultat de l'échec de la modernisation dans certains pays musulmans et de la politique du gouvernement israélien au Liban et dans les territoires occupés, mais il représente, avec d'autres facteurs, une menace pour la stabilité de la région. L'Europe, dans ces circonstances, a un intérêt évident à renforcer la Turquie et à faire de ce pays son partenaire privilégiée dans la Méditerranée et au Proche Orient. La Turquie est une cinquième colonne laïque dans le monde musulman, a une économie dynamique et une structure militaire fort respectable, est le rempart le plus efficace contre les crises réelles et virtuelles de la mer Noire, du Caucase et de la mer Caspienne. Elle est donc un allié naturel et précieux. Quand l'Allemagne de Kohl, pour des considérations électorales, lui ferma la porte d l'Union européenne, le ministre italien des Affaires Etrangères, LAMBERTO DINI, eut le mérite de recueillir le témoin tombé et de faire, à partir de ce moment, une politique turque clairvoyante à laquelle l'Europe aurait pu se rallier. Mais l'affaire Öcalan prouve qu'une Europe de

gauche éprouve beaucoup de difficultés à traiter les problèmes de la Méditerranée avec les deux critères – l'intérêt et la sécurité – qui devraient l'inspirer dans cette zone. Le gouvernement italien a cédé, surtout au début de l'affaire, aux séductions idéologiques de sa vieille culture politique et a placé la perspective d'une improbable 'paix kurde' avant les intérêts d'un pays, la Turquie, dont dépend finalement sa sécurité dans la région. Le gouvernement allemand a refusé de juger Öcalan et a également blessé la sensibilité turque. Deux importants pays européens ont ainsi trahi leur meilleur allié méditerranéen.

L'affaire Öcalan a eu une autre retombée négative: il a mis en évidence la faiblesse de l'Union de Schengen. Le traité a créé une frontière unique: chaque pays garde la responsabilité de son ancienne frontière nationale, mais il exerce cette responsabilité au nom et dans l'intérêt de ses partenaires. Le gouvernement italien n'a pas tort donc lorsqu'il rappelle qu'il a retenu Öcalan pour se conformer aux obligations du traité. Et l'Allemagne ne respecte pas le traité si elle refuse de réclamer l'extradition du leader kurde après avoir lancé contre lui un mandat d'arrêt. Le régime de Schengen reste donc incomplet et imparfait. Il existe une frontière européenne dans la Méditerranée et cette frontière est la plus difficile de l'Union. Mais l'Europe ne dispose pas des instruments législatifs et administratifs nécessaires pour la contrôler.

C'est d'ici qu'il faudrait repartir. Si l'Europe n'est pas à même de faire dans la Méditerranée une politique étrangère et militaire active et dynamique, peut-être devrait elle se concentrer sur la politique de sa frontière. Elle a besoin d'un certain nombre d'outils : une loi européenne sur l'immigration, un tribunal européen pour les questions concernant les immigrés et les réfugiés, un code pénal européen pour les crimes transnationaux, un corps de policiers européens, un négociateur unique pour les quotas d'immigration et les accords de coopération avec les pays de la région. Il n'est pas facile de comprendre pourquoi les pays européens puissent déléguer à un tribunal international la poursuite des crimes commis dans l'ancienne Yougoslavie, mais ne puissent créer ensemble une cour européenne pour les crimes – immigration clandestine, commerce d'émigrants, crime organisé à une échelle européenne – dont ils sont menacés. Il n'est pas facile de comprendre pourquoi ils aient créé Europol, mais pas encore une 'coast guard' européen.

Sur le chemin de l'intégration politique et militaire il y a pour l'instant l'obstacle, difficile à franchir, des rapports avec les Etats Unis. Mais rien, à part la jalousie corporatiste de ses polices et de ses ordres judiciaires, n'empêche à l'Europe de marcher plus rapidement sur la route de son intégration policière et judiciaire. Elle aurait ainsi un outil essentiel pour sa politique méditerranéenne.

What Future for Europe?

European Integration: The Second French Revolution

Prof. JOSEPH H.H. WEILER
Harvard Law School

'Looking forward', indeed marching forward, is part of the very ethos of European Integration – encapsulated in its defining rhetorical aspiration: Determined to lay the Foundations for An Ever Closer Union among the peoples of Europe. Ever Closer? – What a breathtaking belief in the idea of progress, in the idea of a future which is ever shining so long as we move towards it, ever closer.

For a long time now it has ceased to be intellectually chic to lavish praise on the European Union. Not only is the Union technocratic and bureaucratic but its officials are overpaid and over-satisfied; not only is it big, messy and slippery, but its cancer-like spread into ever-growing dimensions of national autonomy seems to proceed unchecked. Most annoying, defying the skeptical chorus which has accompanied it from its inception, the European construct, in large measure the product of French imagination and statecraft, has proved resilient and successful.

But what should be our overall judgment? At least some perspective exists: After all, a half-century has passed since Schuman's Declaration of 1950 and the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951 which set the ball rolling. And we are approaching the end of the decade, and the century and millennium and all that. Shocking or laughable, then, as it may seem to some, my own judgment is unequivocal: The advent of European integration in the second half of the 20th Century – a veritable revolution – is as important to the organization of life among nations and States as the French Revolution

was to the organization of life within nations and States.

In making this comparison we import, of course, the rich ambiguity with which we understand the French Revolution. To many, its rhetoric of social justice and its dream of human equality and fraternity were just that, rhetoric. But even those Gattopardi to whom it is no more than the most exquisite of proofs that to preserve all that which exists — privilege, status, power – everything must change, will not deny its consequentiality.

From the perspective of the lawyer, the French Revolution constitutes a major landmark in three related respects:

It is, along with other events, a milestone in the re-definition of the internal notion of sovereignty and legitimacy-of-power, henceforth to be linked inextricably to the people of the polity;

it is, likewise, a milestone in the emergence of the rule of law – at least as an ideal – as an indispensable component in what much later we would come to call the liberal democratic State;

finally, the French Revolution was part of what we have often come to think of later as the Kantian and Neo-Kantian repositioning of the individual qua human being as a subject and not merely an object of the State and the political process.

It is from this perspective that I see the link between the two Revolutions. For though driven as much by self-interest as by any idealistic rhetoric, as much by accident as by design (there is much of the story of the Golem in the history of European integration) the European con-

struct has in some fundamental respects reshaped those very same elements, albeit in the international sphere:

It has reshaped the notion of sovereignty and the legitimacy-of-power in transnational relations;

it has radically recast the rule of law in transnational relations (I would argue it made the term Rule-of-Law meaningful for the first time in transnational relations);

and it is in the Community legal order more than any other transnational legal order that the individual has emerged as a subject, the holder of enforceable rights and duties even, primarily, against his or her own government, and not merely an object, like ships.

One cannot overestimate the importance of these changes to the conduct of what we once called international life and for which now we have not yet found an adequate term.

I would further argue that just as the French Revolution and the ethos associated with it had a certain, visible and invisible, spill-over effect beyond French borders, the European experience has had a widespread spill-over effect into multiple other international and transnational regimes. The decline, in international relations, of the old *raison d'état*, and the ability of individuals using domestic courts to force their governments to take their international legal obligations seriously even when inconvenient, is spreading widely and in no small measure because of a habit, a socialization process, introduced by the European experience and the experience

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of Europe. The current Pinochet saga is, on my view, a sharp example of this spill-over.

We must, thus, examine not merely structure and process but also content.

In examining the substantive record of the recent European experience ambiguities abound. The record here is far more ambivalent, interpretations far more tenuous; it is in these camps that the battle for the founding European myths is shaping up, myths to which we will reach back to sustain alternative visions of the future.

European originality was and is partly in its political organization: setting a vision and realizing an unprecedented objective of an ever closer union among its peoples whilst rejecting the American model of One Nation and the familiar structure of a federal State. (Arguably, the European Union is the truest of federalisms!). The success of Europe is tangible and, here too, beyond serious dispute – a level of integration hitherto seen only in federal States coupled, it is argued, with vibrant Member States. That European integration was not a Zero Sum game is a thesis developed independently by historians, political scientists, and even us, lawyers. But what in my field at least was considered once a radical thesis turns out to be in no small measure a self-satisfying and self-satisfied picture of Europe having, unlike all other experiences of integration, the best of both worlds: the benefits of high levels of integration without the cost of loss of autonomy, identity and power by the constituent Member States.

What was most original in the original European construct in my understanding of it was not, however, in the sphere of the economic nor even the political – but in Europe's vision of human relations expressed

in its attempt to preserve the identity of its founding peoples and States.

There are, it seems to me, two basic human strategies for dealing with the alien, and these two strategies have played a decisive role in Western civilization. One strategy is to remove the boundaries. It is the charitable spirit of 'come, be one of us.' It is noble since it involves, of course, elimination of prejudice, of the notion that there are boundaries that cannot be eradicated. But the 'be one of us,' however well intentioned, is often an invitation to the alien to be one of us, by being us. Vis-à-vis the alien, it risks robbing him of his identity. Vis-à-vis one's self, it may be a subtle manifesta-



Prof. Joseph H.H. Weiler

tion of intolerance. If I cannot tolerate the alien, one way of resolving the dilemma is to make him like me, no longer an alien. This is, of course, infinitely better than physical annihilation. But it is still a form of dangerous internal and external intolerance. (The recent conceit by some post-modernists to remove boundaries by regarding us all as 'others' is but the other, more arrogant, side of the same coin: typically from the position of privilege and self-satisfaction, robbing the real others even of their otherness.)

The alternative strategy – which is how I invite you to read the recent European past and to be the foundation for its future – is to acknowledge the validity of certain forms of bounded identities (even if the identity is socially constructed and the

boundaries are porous), but simultaneously to reach across boundaries.

I do not tire of citing Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), the great neo-Kantian philosopher of religion, who in an exquisite modern interpretation of the Mosaic law on this subject captures its deep meaning in a way which retains its vitality even in today's Ever Closer Union. It has been usefully summarized as follows: '[T]his law of shielding the alien from all wrong is of vital significance.... The alien was to be protected, not because he was a member of one's family, clan, religious community or people; but because he was a human being. In the alien, therefore, man discovered the idea of humanity.' What are significant in

this are the two elements I have mentioned: on the one hand, the identity of the alien, as such, is maintained. One is not invited to go out and, say, 'save him' by inviting him to be one of you. One is not invited to recast the boundary. On the other hand, despite the boundaries which are maintained, and constitute the I and the Alien, one is commanded to reach over the boundary and love him, in his alienness, as

oneself. The alien is accorded human dignity. The soul of the I is tended to not by eliminating the temptation to oppress but by maintaining it and overcoming it. The very existence of a Europe of individuals with individual identities, a Europe of nations with the boundaries created by distinct national identities and a Europe of States with the differently distinct State boundaries, which forces one both to acknowledge difference and to reach across in the deeply committed way which membership of the Community entails, is what makes the European post-war experiment so special and, arguably, worth preserving even if it does not have quite the power and quite the constitu-

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Quel futur pour l'Europe?

La Commission est morte... Vive l'Europe!

YVES MÉNY

Directeur du Centre Robert Schuman

Beaucoup d'européens sincères sont altruistes par le lugubre naufrage d'un navire surchargé, mal contrôlé et sans véritable capitaine. Les anti-européens de tout poil vont faire leurs choux gras du scandale, en essayant de mobiliser les sentiments tièdes ou hostiles d'une partie de l'opinion européenne qui comprend mal ou ne comprend pas l'Europe des gouvernants. Eh! bien, profitons de l'occasion qui manque un tournant historique dans l'histoire mouvementée de la construction européenne.

Avant hier, l'Europe des peuples, de l'opinion est née. Certes on aurait préféré que l'Europe politique et démocratique naisse dans d'autres conditions, plus pacifiques et plus positives. Mais souvent ce sont les crises qui font accoucher des évolutions et des révolutions nécessaires et cette crise majeure, la première de ce type depuis 1959, constitue une opportunité fantastique si on veut bien l'utiliser.

Résumons la situation: la Commission, un organe de réflexion, d'impulsion et de contrôle est devenu de plus en plus une institution de ges-

tion mal adaptée à la multiplicité des tâches dont les gouvernements l'ont chargé au fil des ans en dépit des discours électoraux sur la subsidiarité. De technocratie qu'elle était, elle est devenue de plus en plus politique au sommet: la plupart des commissaires ont exercé des fonctions politiques de premier plan au niveau national, l'Europe devenant l'étage ultime du cursus politique. Le Parlement, organe démocratique mais encore faiblement légitime, a renforcé progressivement ses pouvoirs et ses capacités de contrôle, poussant la Commission dans ses retranchements. Sa victoire n'est pas totale puisque la Commission n'a pas été formellement renversée par les Parlementaires. Mais ce sont eux qui l'ont acculé à la démission.

Voilà donc que se réalisent les conditions souhaitées par tant d'observateurs et d'acteurs:

- pour la première fois la responsabilité de la Commission est mise en jeu dans des conditions proches des systèmes parlementaires classiques. Citons les derniers mots du rapport du comité

d'experts indépendants qui a provoqué la crise: la responsabilité, 'constitue la manifestation ultime de la démocratie';

- pour la première fois, les institutions européennes sont au centre de l'attention de tous les médias européens: un débat public européen voit le jour à la même heure dans tous les Etats-membres;
- pour la première fois une campagne électorale a quelque chance d'être centrée sur les questions européennes et non pas sur les problèmes de clocher des quinze Etats-membres.

C'est donc une occasion unique à saisir pour soumettre aux citoyens européens les problèmes que nous avons à affronter en commun, pour dépasser le poujadisme anti-européen et imaginer ensemble la communauté que nous voulons construire.

Parmi toutes les questions qui assaillent l'Europe et les nations qui la composent, je vois au moins quatre défis majeurs auxquels nous sommes d'ores et déjà confrontés:

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What Future for Europe?

tional clarity a European State, say, would have, and even if it has been accompanied, since inception, by a very healthy dose of brash self-interest by its partners.

But as in the case of the economic and the political, this construct too is far from being consensus, and one can doubt its sustainability. Indeed, in listening to this construct, did it strike you that I was describing a reality? Hardly. Or was it more like the description of an *amore mancato*, a Paradise Lost before it was even lived in? Note, too, that this is not only an issue for theorists of European identity. It is the backdrop to much policy

making. Europe talks the language of 'differently', but is consistently deepening the boundaries between those in and those out, between being European and being non-European. Can one arrest a growing sentiment of European chauvinism, most noticeable in the discourse of the Euro? And what does one do if the only antidote to European chauvinism seems to be a regression to Member State nationalism? This too is not a debate about the future. It is the current debate about the content we should give, and the vision we should proffer to the Maastricht-invented European Citizenship.

1.

Le premier est celui de l'emploi et plus particulièrement celui des jeunes. Il est heureux que l'Europe et surtout les nations qui la composent se préoccupent de filtrer, canaliser, adoucir les pressions qui résultent de la compétition mondiale et du changement technologique. Mais derrière cette apparente bienveillance sociale des gouvernants se cache la plus formidable hypocrisie et l'égoïsme le plus entier des générations qui détiennent le pouvoir, le travail et l'influence. Le chômage des jeunes n'est pas dû au manque d'offre de travail. Il est le produit de sociétés vieillissantes qui refusent le changement, qui privilégient les avantages acquis et les positions consolidées, qui s'accrochent aux structures institutionnelles, réglementaires et fiscales garantissant la perpétuation des petits et grands privilèges. Le chômage en général et celui des jeunes en particulier est le prix que nos générations acceptent de (faire) payer pour le maintien de leur confort. Nous achetons le silence et le désespoir à coups de stages et de petites indemnités, de contrats-solidarité (sic) et d'intérim qui dure. Ce n'est pas l'Europe qui est principalement la cause de ce gâchis, mais elle pourrait bien en être le bouc émissaire. Pourquoi les jeunes générations se mobiliseraient-elles en faveur d'un projet qui ne leur offre ni perspective, ni espoir?

2.

Le second défi est celui de la solidarité qui a joué un rôle si crucial dans la construction et la consolidation des systèmes démocratiques. Aujourd'hui la solidarité est en question d'un triple point de vue:

- au niveau national, les mécanismes de redistribution de l'Etat-providence doivent faire face tout à la fois à une crise financière, idéologique et structurelle. Contesté dans ses finalités, inadapte face aux nouvelles formes de pauvreté et de précarité, capté principalement par les classes moyennes, l'Etat-

providence n'arrive plus à assumer correctement sa fonction de protection et de redistribution entre riches et pauvres, jeunes et vieux, etc.

- au niveau infra-national, les premières fissures du consensus sur le Welfare State apparaissent: les régions les plus dynamiques qui profitent de l'espace et de la protection de l'Union européenne n'ont plus envie de 'payer' pour les régions les moins favorisées. La Flandre veut autonomiser son système de sécurité sociale. Pays Basque et Catalogne, prompts à revendiquer la manne européenne rechignent à se solidariser des autres communautés autonomes du Royaume. L'Italie du Nord, notamment à travers la Lega, proteste avec vigueur contre les transferts au profit du Mezzogiorno perçu comme le tonneau des Danaïdes.

- au niveau européen, les transferts sociaux sont quantité marginale. Ils n'existent, sous des formes souvent caricaturales, qu'à travers les mécanismes de la politique agricole commune ou des Fonds Structurels. Ces rééquilibres au profit de secteurs ou de territoires en difficulté n'ont pas été inutiles. Mais, outre qu'ils ont besoin d'être corrigés et révisés, ils ne peuvent être considérés comme l'embryon d'un Etat-providence européen. Deux questions fondamentales se posent pour l'avenir en matière de politiques sociales européennes: est-ce souhaitable? est-ce possible? La possibilité défend bien entendu de la volonté politique et des ressources mobilisées mais aussi du caractère substitutif des politiques européennes. Leur mise en oeuvre prudente et progressive n'en serait pas moins souhaitable, non seulement parce que les crises économiques et sociales au sein de la zone Euro auront vraisemblablement des impacts différenciés, mais aussi parce qu'il est difficile d'imaginer une 'Union'

qui ne soit pas basée sur un socle minimal de solidarité. L'Europe n'a pas d'avenir si la perspective n'est que comptable. Cette architecture complexe et relativement coûteuse n'a pas de sens si chacun espère retrouver à la sortie la mise déposée à l'entrée. Il est donc fondamental de rappeler d'abord que l'Europe n'est pas qu'une affaire budgétaire et ensuite que même dans une optique financière bornée, le jeu n'est pas à somme nulle.

3.

Pas moins difficile est la question de l'identité. Qu'est-ce que l'Europe? La citoyenneté européenne signifie-t-elle ou peut-elle signifier quelque chose pour les membres de l'Union? Qu'implique-t-elle pour la citoyenneté nationale? Pour beaucoup l'apprentissage de l'Europe sera difficile. Depuis des siècles on a enseigné que 'la religion du Prince est celle du peuple', qu'il ne peut n'y avoir qu'une allégeance unique et exclusive à la nation, que l'identité passe par l'opposition à 'l'étranger'. Et voilà que l'Europe suggère que ce lien peut être plus flexible ou plus divers, que le sentiment d'appartenance est moins assuré et plus ouvert. Bref, pour le dire comme Derek Urwin à propos de la coexistence d'un sentiment régional et d'un sentiment national, que les citoyens disposent de deux types de droits 'Right to roots, right to options', le droit à l'enracinement, le droit aux choix, aux options. L'Europe de demain ne peut être qu'une Europe des identités à la fois complémentaires et diverses, non seulement parce que les identités française et allemande ou italienne sont différentes mais parce que chaque individu est porteur de multiples identités: locales, régionales, familiales, professionnelles, religieuses mais aussi européennes. L'identité européenne ne peut être comprise que comme un enrichissement et pas une soustraction. Mais encore faut-il que les hommes politiques cessent de faire comme si l'adhésion à l'une (par exemple l'identité européenne) impliquait le

renoncement aux autres. Sans cette base d'identité commune fondée sur un projet collectif, sur le développement et la garantie des droits, sur un minimum de solidarité, sur le dialogue et l'échange, la construction européenne se réduirait à un simple marché. Le jeu en vaudrait-il la chandelle?

4.

Cette question nous amène au quatrième défi, celui du gouvernement de l'Europe. Deux critiques fondamentales lui sont adressées: celle d'un fonctionnement bureaucratique et excessivement interventionniste, celle d'une absence de responsabilité vis à vis des citoyens, le fameux 'déficit démocratique'. Le défi de l'Europe du futur est d'y remédier, d'autant plus que le processus d'élargissement ne pourra qu'accroître la malaise au lieu de le réduire. L'Europe des 20 ou 25 n'existera qu'en 2005, 2010, voire plus tard pour des raisons techniques, juridiques et financières. Mais l'élargissement est déjà dans les têtes. La question n'est plus celle du principe, mais celle des modalités. Pour l'instant, l'Union s'est préparée à cet élargissement en mettant sur les candidats la charge principale du fardeau. Il s'appelle «acquis communautaire», véritable cran d'arrêt juridique en même temps qu'idéologique pour éviter de toucher à l'édifice existant. D'un côté les pays candidats sont priés de négocier en avalant le tout. De l'autre les pays membres ne s'imposent pas à eux-mêmes toute la vertu politique, économique et démocratique qu'ils exigent des nouveaux venus. Pourtant l'élargissement est autant un défi pour nous-mêmes que pour eux. Quelle Europe leur proposons-

nous? Quel projet avons-nous ensemble? Quelle forme prendra cette fédération sans précédent?

L'avenir du gouvernement de l'Europe ne peut passer que par une limitation des compétences de l'Union qui se disperse actuellement dans la gestion de multiples programmes secondaires capturés par les groupes d'intérêt avec la complicité et la participation des consultants qui vivent de la bête. L'administration européenne qui tend à se balkaniser en coteries, clientèles et camarillas doit se ressaisir et restaurer son éthique première de fonction publique, de Civil Service au service de l'Europe. L'opération doit commencer par la tête, c'est à dire par les cabinets des commissaires qui, trop souvent, ne sont constitués que de fidèles de la



Le professeur Yves Mény

même nationalité que le commissaire qu'ils servent. Comment peut-on construire l'Europe si les commissaires ne sont pas capables de s'entourer d'une équipe multinationale? L'avenir institutionnel de l'Europe, aussi la démocratisation, qui passe par le renforcement du Parlement, mais pas seulement. Passons par pertes et profits de fausses bonnes idées comme la transparence qui n'a trop souvent servi qu'à rendre

les processus de décision plus obscurs, plus contournés et moins démocratiques. Passons sur la participation de milliers d'experts nationaux: les technocrates parlent aux technocrates. Il est urgent au contraire de créer des mécanismes populaires transnationaux qui permettent à la fois une mobilisation de l'opinion et des débats et mouvements transeuropéens: initiatives populaires, référendums abrogatifs par exemple, pourvu qu'ils soient ciblés sur des objets spécifiques, pourraient contribuer à sortir les questions européennes du cénacle fermé où elles sont trop souvent enfermées.

Ces défis ne constituent pas une liste exhaustive et bien d'autres problèmes pourraient s'y ajouter: la question de l'Euro, les relations avec le Sud de la Méditerranée, la politique de défense. Mais les quatre défis que j'ai cherché à mettre en relief me semblent les plus cruciaux. Ils déterminent et détermineront pour le futur la légitimité de l'Union, sa stabilité et sa capacité à survivre. Oui, c'est vrai, il n'y a pas d'alternative si ce n'est un vaste marché fragmenté en petites unités politiques et dominés par les seuls agents économiques multinationaux, ce qui n'exclut pas, bien au contraire, les tensions ou même les conflits. Si l'on ne veut pas faire de l'Europe un simple supermarché, si l'on croit que le message des Pères fondateurs (assurer la paix) est encore valide, alors il est urgent de préparer l'Europe du futur, celle d'une jeunesse à laquelle nous n'avons offert jusqu'ici que le plus indigne des programmes: attendre.

Le Monde

States, Markets, Families:

Gender, Liberalism and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the United States

This book written by European Forum Fellow ANN SHOLA ORLOFF, JULIA S. O'CONNOR and SHEILA SHAVER, has just been published by Cambridge University Press.

It is a systematic comparative analysis of cross-national and historical variation in the gendered effects of social policies in contemporary Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the United States, and how these are being transformed in the course of restructuring and retrenchment. This project grew out of two concerns: first, theorizing gender interests in and out of states, and the role of states and the political in constituting gendered interests and identities; second, specifying the dimensions of gendered variation across systems of social provision, and mapping out the range of variation in political effects on gender relations in four liberal countries. The choice of countries reflects the authors' interests in the gender dimensions of liberalism (as political theory and as a set of institutional arrangements).

The work investigates the policy legacies and contemporary restructurings of social policy across three key policy areas — labor market, income maintenance, and reproductive rights, in the contest of social policy liberalism. The authors use the concept of social policy regimes — patterns across a number of areas of policy. These regimes are to be found in both individual institutions of the welfare state and in common patterns cutting across domains of social provision, such as health, education, income maintenance, or housing. The concept of policy regimes indicates patterns of public-private divisions of responsibility or oversight for various areas and connotes the full range of domestic policy interventions as well as broader patterns of provisioning and regulation, thus indicating something broader than the “welfare state.” They argue that broad institutional patterns are consequential for gender relations; in particular, the more limited role of the state vis-a-vis families and markets characteristic of the liberal regimes (relative to those of the other western countries) has helped to produce distinctive gender effects. For example, women's disproportionate vulnerability to poverty, present throughout the west given their labor market disadvantages and care responsibilities, is less buffered than in other regimes; poverty rates for women-maintained families and single women are relatively high in the four. Because of the strong emphasis on the market, both women's and men's positions in the labor market are most consequential for standards of living and access to welfare goods and services, and

economic inequalities are not mitigated by citizenship-based protections to the same extent as in other western democracies. Yet women's opportunities to compete for privileged positions in the job market have also been greater than elsewhere.

ORLOFF, O'CONNOR and SHAVER also argue that states affect gender in important ways that are not entirely determined by overall institutional characteristics but rather reflect aspects of gender relations such as the gender division of labor. There are differing patterns across the four relative to women's access to paid work and the organization of caring labor, with the United States and Canada emphasizing women's roles as paid workers and Britain and Australia emphasizing women's roles as care givers. These differences are reflected across the social policies of the four, for example in the organization of state support to child care services and in work requirements (and exemptions to them) in income maintenance programs. In the U.S. and Canada, the liberal model has incorporated women's paid work, especially via the tax-encouraged market provision of services and employment equity policies.

Welfare reforms underway are aimed at moving women as well as men into employment. In contrast, in Britain, high proportions of women are part-time workers in very precarious positions or housewives; in Australia, as in Britain, fewer married women and mothers are working full-time than in North America, but women's work conditions (including part-time) are more advantaged. In Britain, welfare reform under the Conservatives encouraged women to depend economically on families, but did not target them for work requirements; Blair's reforms clearly differ from those of his predecessors in many ways, but as yet welfare reform will not force solo mothers into paid employment as in the U.S. version. In Australia, women's economic independence is better secured, but, as in Britain, their caregiving work is also supported. They find that while liberalism has shaped institutional arrangements, undercutting universal state provision of services, gender relations have also affected income maintenance, labor market and reproductive rights policies. More traditional gender relations, reflected in a more pronounced division of labor and in greater institutional support for male breadwinners, have influenced policy developments in Britain and Australia. The gender division of labor has been undermined to a greater extent in the United States and Canada, thereby creating more space for mobilizing women's labor power.

Heureux qui comme Ulysse

Le pionnier du fédéralisme anglais JOHN PINDER écrivait à propos d'ALTIERO SPINELLI: «On ne peut programmer un génie politique, mais on peut tenter de le comprendre afin de mieux poursuivre son oeuvre.» Que les 375 dossiers d'archives déposés à l'Institut par la famille et les proches collaborateurs d'ALTIERO SPINELLI permettent jamais aux érudits de résoudre l'énigme que pose une personnalité aussi séduisante que contestée, rien n'est moins sûr. Démiurge et prophète à la fois, cet 'Européen subversif' n'aimait-il pas se comparer à Ulysse (il adopta ce pseudonyme dans la clandestinité) pour avoir, tel le héros d'Homère, longtemps erré sur le chemin semé d'embûches menant aux portes de la Fédération européenne? Le fonds documentaire déposé aux Archives historiques permet toutefois de retracer les vicissitudes du combat politique que mena le grand fédéraliste italien hors des sentiers battus, pour atteindre ce qui fut son Ithaque: une Europe délivrée des préjugés nationaux et assise sur des institutions démocratiques.

Né en 1907 dans une famille de la moyenne bourgeoisie romaine, ALTIERO SPINELLI fut, dès sa prime jeunesse, le témoin de l'Europe des antagonismes et des déchirures. Il vécut la crise des partis politiques traditionnels, saisit leur incapacité de lutter contre le fascisme et assista à la défaite de la démocratie. C'est cette prise de conscience précoce qui l'amena, à 17 ans, à adhérer au Parti communiste. De 1924 à 1927, Spinelli mena la vie mouvementée d'un 'révolutionnaire professionnel' comme responsable de l'organisation de jeunesse du parti clandestin, avant d'être arrêté à Milan le 3 juin 1927.

Condamné à 16 ans et 8 mois de prison par le tribunal spécial de Défense de l'Etat pour activités subversives, le jeune SPINELLI subit alors une longue suite de péregrinations carcérales qui le conduisirent de Rome à Lucques, Viterbe, Civitavecchia et enfin Ventotene. Ces seize années de relégation lui permirent d'approfondir sa réflexion politico-philosophique. Elles se soldèrent par une totale remise en question de ses idéaux et de ses attaches sentimentales. Ce fut à cette époque que SPINELLI abandonna le Parti communiste et qu'il découvrit le fédéralisme. Ce fut également à Ventotene qu'ALTIERO rencontra celle qui devait devenir à la fois sa compagne et sa collaboratrice la plus fervente, URSULA HIRSCHMANN.

Durant l'hiver 1941-1942, le fruit de ses réflexions fut consigné dans le Manifeste pour une Europe libre et unie que SPINELLI co-rédigea avec un petit groupe de confinés d'où émergèrent les personnalités d'EUGENIO COLORNI et d'ERNESTO ROSSI. Ouvrage précurseur, diffusé sous le manteau, le Manifeste souhaitait offrir une

solution à la crise des Etats-Nations qui affectait le vieux continent en proposant de leur substituer la Fédération européenne.

Libéré en août 1943, SPINELLI engagea l'action dans deux directions indissociables à ses yeux: le combat pour le rétablissement de la démocratie politique en Italie et celui pour la fédération européenne. Dès le 27 août il fonda le Mouvement fédéraliste européen (MFE) à Milan. C'est dans la résistance qu'il trouva ses premiers adeptes, en Italie avec LEO VALIANI, GUGLIELMO USELLINI, GIORGIO BRACCIALARGHE, MARIO ALBERTO ROLLIER et LUCIANO BOLIS, mais aussi en Allemagne, en Suisse, en France. Le 8 septembre, SPINELLI se réfugia en Suisse où il organisa (à Genève) les premières réunions fédéralistes dont les résolutions constituèrent la base de plusieurs programmes de la Résistance



européenne, principalement en France. Appelé par VALIANI au secrétariat politique du Parti d'action pour la Haute Italie (Milan) il offrit ensuite sa plume durant quelques mois à la résistance. En mars 1945, le conflit finissant, il devait être le maître d'oeuvre de la première conférence fédéraliste internationale réunie à Paris. Y participèrent, entre autres intellectuels illustres, ALBERT CAMUS, GEORGES ORWELL, EMMANUEL MOUNIER et ANDRÉ PHILIP.

Si les années 1946-1948 constituèrent une parenthèse dans l'engagement fédéraliste de SPINELLI (il fit alors scission du Parti d'Action pour créer avec La Malfa et Parri l'éphémère Mouvement pour la démocratie répub-

licaine qu'il devait d'ailleurs abandonner à la veille des élections pour la Constituante pour assumer la direction de l'ARAR) celle-ci devait être de courte durée. Dès août 1947 on le retrouvait au congrès de l'Union européenne des fédéralistes à Montreux, où il encouragea le Mouvement naissant à saisir l'occasion offerte par la vague portante du Plan Marshall pour jeter les fondements de l'unification européenne. A l'occasion du congrès européen de La Haye (mai 1948), il exhortait déjà les fédéralistes de tous bords à transformer ce forum en une Assemblée constituante.

Si la déclaration de SPINELLI à l'égard de la déclaration SCHUMAN (9 mai 1950) resta empreinte d'un optimisme modéré, ce fut avec enthousiasme que le secrétaire du MFE accueillit le plan Plevén en faveur d'une Communauté européenne de Défense. L'invasion communiste



Ernesto Rossi, Altiero Spinelli e Luigi Einaudi en 1948

en Corée, la montée des périls de la Guerre froide l'avaient convaincu de l'intérêt d'adhérer à un projet visant à créer une armée européenne, pourvu que celle-ci fut accompagnée de la mise en place d'un véritable pouvoir politique européen. Cette intuition prit corps avec la pétition en faveur de la convocation d'une Assemblée constituante européenne chargée de renforcer les futures structures de la CECA et de la CED; la pétition recueillit l'adhésion du président du Conseil des ministres italien ALCIDE DE GASPERI, lequel fit insérer dans le traité CED le fameux article 38 prévoyant: «La création d'une Assemblée de la Communauté européenne de Défense, élue sur des bases démocratiques ayant pour mandat d'étudier et de projeter une autorité politique européenne.» On connaît le sort qui fut réservé au projet de traité instituant la communauté politique par l'Assemblée nationale française: elle le torpilla en même temps qu'elle rejetait le traité CED le 30 août 1954. SPINELLI, bien que déçu par les résultats de la négociation CED, se replongea aussitôt dans la bataille pour l'Europe fédérée. Multipliant les contacts avec MONNET et SPAAK le secrétaire du MFE prépara l'une des provocations dont il avait le secret. Alors que se déroulaient les négociations de Messine et de Venise, il lança la campagne du 'Congrès du peuple européen'. L'action visait à mobiliser, à la base, les institutions locales, les personnalités influentes du monde culturel et politique et les simples citoyens en vue de l'élection de délégués à un Congrès constituant européen. Si le

CPE enregistra quelques succès en Italie où il parvint à impliquer des personnalités telles que NORBERTO BOBBIO, MARIO ALBERTINI et ADRIANO OLIVETTI, l'initiative perdit rapidement le caractère attractif et spontané qui avait amené plus de 500 000 personnes à voter en faveur de la Constituante à Ostende en décembre 1960.

Après cet échec, SPINELLI médita longuement sur la ligne à suivre pour persévérer dans son rêve de condottiere solitaire. Au début des années soixante, mesurant le chemin parcouru, il prit du recul, abandonnant pour un temps l'action militante pour fourbir d'autres armes et emprunter d'autres tribunes, telles que la Johns Hopkins University de Bologne, le Comité italien pour la Démocratie européenne (CIDE) ou l'Institut des Affaires internationales (IAI) où il dirigea des études sur le rôle de l'Italie dans la Communauté. Ce fut également à cette époque qu'il offrit sa collaboration et son expertise au ministre des Affaires étrangères PIETRO NENNI en qualité de conseiller aux Affaires européennes.

En juillet 1970, une nouvelle phase des pérégrinations d'Ulysse s'ouvrit lorsqu'il débarqua à Bruxelles pour assumer la charge de Commissaire européen. SPINELLI avait été de longue date impressionné par la théorie du spill over que les institutions communautaires représentaient, selon laquelle toute avancée dans le processus d'intégration paraissait rendre l'étape suivante inéluctable; il voyait également en la Commission un podium d'où il pourrait diffuser ses idées sans se confiner dans le rôle frustrant de simple 'conseiller du prince'. Mais si le grand fédéraliste italien admirait l'imagination et la capacité de conviction de JEAN MONNET, son tempérament le portait à rejeter le modèle 'fonctionnaliste' cher à 'l'Inspirateur'. SPINELLI partageait la vision critique gaullienne du modèle monnettiste, qu'il jugeait privé de légitimité politique et démocratique. Il n'adhérait donc aux mécanismes communautaires que pour y introduire des 'réformes incompatibles'. SPINELLI n'entra dans la Commission que pour mieux la subvertir. C'est pourquoi il ne tarda pas à être perçu par ses collègues, membres du Collège, comme un Commissario scomodo.

En charge de la politique industrielle, le nouveau commissaire ne convainquit guère. Les industriels se méfiaient de lui, soit parce qu'ils le considéraient comme un homme de gauche, soit parce qu'ils lui reprochaient la franchise et la brutalité avec laquelle il rejetait leurs demandes de protection ou de traitements spéciaux. Les Français le trouvaient trop libéral, les Allemands le suspectaient d'être dirigiste. En fait, la notion même de politique industrielle était étrangère à sa culture économique. Ne disposant que d'une connaissance théorique du monde des affaires, le système complexe d'interventions indirectes, de dialogue permanent qui représente une grande part de l'action des gouvernements en matière industrielle lui répugnait. Sa méfiance envers le corporatisme, forte à l'égard des industriels, devint vite obsessionnelle dans les rencontres souvent con-

flictuelles, que SPINELLI eut à cette époque avec les organisations syndicales.

Parmi les responsabilités confiées à son portefeuille SPINELLI s'intéressa davantage à la recherche et à la technologie. Fondamentalement positiviste, il croyait au progrès et en l'importance de la science. Il consacra une part importante de son énergie à faire en sorte que la Communauté sorte, dans le domaine scientifique, des limites imposées par le Traité de l'Euratom. Sa présence à ce poste clé ne fut pas étrangère à la relance des négociations qui devaient aboutir à la convention de 1972 portant création de l'Institut universitaire de Florence. Mais c'est sans doute hors de la sphère de ses compétences propres qu'il laissa l'empreinte la plus durable. Son action fut déterminante pour empêcher que la Commission ne mit un terme à la politique d'ostracisme envers les colonels grecs. Il fut le premier commissaire à critiquer ouvertement les excès de la politique agricole commune. En dépit de ces résultats, SPINELLI n'était guère à son aise à la Commission, il était difficile pour le visionnaire de s'insérer dans le lent processus législatif de la Communauté. Il aurait souhaité voir la Commission mener bataille en faveur d'une grande réforme institutionnelle. Il voulait qu'elle forgeât une grande alliance avec le faible Parlement européen. Bien résolu à aller de l'avant sur la voie de l'Union européenne il jugeait sur ce point ses collègues pusillanimes et timorés: «Nous devrions chasser les lions alors qu'ils cherchent des alouettes.»

Aussi lorsqu'en 1976, l'occasion s'offrit à SPINELLI de quitter la Commission pour entrer au Parlement européen, c'est avec un soulagement non dissimulé qu'il se fit élire comme apparenté au groupe communiste italien. Le grand fédéraliste livra alors sa dernière bataille, cherchant à transformer l'Assemblée de Strasbourg en une machine de guerre pour un bouleversement radical des institutions européennes grâce notamment à ce qui allait constituer le point d'orgue de son action: le projet d'Union européenne, adopté en 1984.

Ce projet de 'Traité-Constitution' devait être, grâce à la détermination et au sens du compromis d'ALTIERO, le fruit de l'initiative collective du club intergroupes du Crocodile d'abord, du travail d'élaboration de la commission Institutionnelle ensuite avant d'être adopté par le Parlement tout entier. Grâce à l'étendue et à la qualité de ce consensus parlementaire, ALTIERO SPINELLI, de concert avec le Président PFLIMLIN, put intervenir auprès des représentants des gouvernements siégeant au sein du Comité Dooge et plus tard auprès de la conférence intergouvernementale pour la révision des traités européens.

Les résultats ne furent pas ce que SPINELLI et le Parlement avaient souhaité : Ulysse était battu mais sa défaite était glorieuse. Certes, comme il le pressentait dans l'une de ses interventions les plus célèbres à l'Assemblée de Strasbourg le 14 septembre 1983, du grand poisson qu'il avait - comme le vieux pêcheur

d'HEMINGWAY - capturé, les myopies nationales n'avaient laissé rentrer au port qu'une misérable arête. Il n'empêche que sans son initiative, ce qu'il appelait 'la souris ridicule' : l'Acte unique, n'aurait peut-être jamais vu le jour. La conclusion décevante et réductrice donnée par la conférence intergouvernementale appelée à réformer les traités de Rome avait de quoi décourager. Le vieil homme, fatigué, n'avait pourtant pas désarmé. Déjà touché par la maladie qui n'allait pas tarder à l'emporter, il avait recommencé à tisser les fils de son action. Il avait repris la lutte au sein du Parlement européen. Il nouait la trame d'une nouvelle initiative fondée sur la conviction que le développement de la construction européenne ne pouvait être confiée aux gouvernements, que la voie démocratique de l'union européenne devait



Altiero Spinelli e Ursula Hirschmann à Berlin en 1963

se fonder sur le rôle constituant du Parlement européen et sur la création d'un puissant mouvement d'opinion. Il comptait pour cela sur la mobilisation des forces fédéralistes et démocratiques qui devraient organiser des référendums consultatifs pour que la prochaine élection européenne fut celle d'un parlement investi d'un mandat constituant.

SPINELLI s'éteignit le 23 mai 1986 à Rome. Ulysse avait rejoint Ithaque. Anticonformiste et rebelle, le grand fédéraliste européen avait mené sa militia super terram comme le héros individualiste et solitaire pour tenter d'infléchir le cours des choses. Sans doute l'Europe, telle qu'elle est aujourd'hui gouvernée, apparaît-elle encore trop souvent aux antipodes de celle qu'il prônait; il n'en a pas moins laissé à tous les partisans de la cause européenne un admirable exemple et un formidable message d'espoir. A l'idée d'une Europe fédérée et démocratique, ALTIERO SPINELLI est resté fidèle toute sa vie. Il savait que l'objectif final, les Etats-Unis d'Europe, ne pourrait pas être atteint à bref délai, mais il a lutté avec opiniâtreté pour que des progrès dans cette direction soient réalisés. Il nous a appris que la force d'une idée réside en sa capacité de resurgir - plus forte - après chaque défaite.

ANDREA BECHERUCCI et JEAN-MARIE PALAYRET

How did Former Students Appreciate the Institute? An Exit Survey

In this second article in the series on the recent developments of the European University Institute I will deal with some of the preliminary results of the exit survey which the Academic Service organized last year. I am sure that our readers, many of whom are alumni, are curious to know what the outcome is of the forms they filled in at that time.

This is not the first exit survey about the Institute. Earlier surveys were done concerning employment orientations, and the DAAD did a very extensive survey the year before last about their assessment of the Institute. The recent exit survey by the Institute was organized from a different perspective. The basic question we wanted to address was why people did not complete their Ph.D. At present the overall completion rate at the Institute over the latest annual cohorts is 75% of the intake. The median time to degree has now been reduced to 4.2 years. When we organized the survey we did not limit ourselves to the question of non-completion but also introduced a series of questions addressing evaluation of the Institute as regards supervision, infrastructure, and so on. In this article we shall concentrate first on how former researchers assessed the Institute.

As you will have read in the report on the German exit survey published in an earlier issue of the EUI Review, there was already an indication that a large percentage of former researchers were very happy about their stay in Florence. Over 80% of the grant programme participants replied that they were satisfied, or very satisfied. In our survey of a larger sample of (former) researchers from different countries we come to similar conclusions. On the question whether it was the right decision to attend the Institute 98% of researchers in our sample who obtained their Ph.D.s agreed, as did up to 91% of those who did not complete it. Among the reasons why they liked it was the stimulating environment both for Ph.D.s (95%) and non-Ph.D.s (93%), close to 94% agreeing to strongly agreeing with this statement.

Recent events have triggered a whole discussion about social integration. On the question whether they were well integrated into social life, close to 80% for Ph.D.s, and 75% for non-completers replied that they agreed/ strongly agreed about social integration. But from the comments for which there was room at the end of the questionnaire it was clear that although some considered themselves well integrated into the Institute, they did not have the feeling of being well integrated into the Florentine social surroundings. 'I agree strongly with the statement concerning the EUI

but not as to the social life in Florence.' Some recent initiatives were taken in order to reinforce cooperation with sports activities of the University of Florence in order to facilitate contacts with other student environments in Florence.

Supervision is always regarded as a crucial element in the whole process of obtaining the Ph.D. So we asked whether people thought they had had the right supervisor. Among those who obtained the Ph.D. 80% were happy about their choice of supervisor; among those who didn't, still 61% considered that they had made the right choice of supervisor. We also looked into the various services at the European University Institute and how these were appreciated by former researchers. First we looked at logistical academic support, like the library, the computing service and the language service. To start with the library, we observed very high satisfaction with the service offered: 93% of all respondents called the service normal to very good. For the computing service this was



In the Library

significantly lower, at a positive assessment of 68%. As regards the language service we have an 80% positive score.

We also looked at other logistical support services such as the Academic Service, the Operational Service and the financial services. We have to observe that the rate of abstention from expressing an opinion is much higher in this sector, probably also due to the fact that many researchers had very little direct contact with many of these services, which clearly affects the fact of non-response. Only 10% did not express an opinion on the Academic Service, showing it is virtually impossible to be at the Institute without having to deal

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The Body and Brain Boosting Board (4B)

The Body and Brain Boosting Board, known as 4B, is an informal committee which was set up in March 1998. The aims of this committee, which has its secretariat in the Academic Service, are to stimulate the practice of extra-curricular social activities, such as various forms of sport, musical and theatrical initiatives, and in general any socially oriented pursuits; to encourage the realization of EUI members' suggestions in this field; and to provide, where necessary, a certain amount of financial support for their achievement.

4B meetings, chaired by the President, are held about three times a year, and all members of the Institute are free to participate, in order to propose their ideas and offer their active collaboration. At one year from its creation, many activities are already well under way, which indicates the importance of this informal structure within the Institute.

Basketball, volleyball and football can now be played on Institute grounds. The EUI football team will be playing against other European Universities in Antwerp in May 1999.

There is a dancing group, a skiclub, a capoeira group and the EUI tennis friends. Many researchers have become members of the Sports Centre of the University of Florence (CUS), and through this centre can swim or do gymnastics at a very low cost. Hikes and excursions are organized, and there are plans for a cycling group this Spring. Yoga classes are a regular

feature at the Institute, and quite a few people have taken up horseriding.

A series of concerts at the Badia has been organized by two of our researchers. At the moment of writing the first four have already successfully taken place. A

chess simultaneous display at the Institute provided a great deal of fun, and resulted in two of our researchers being invited to become members of the Florentine Chess Group. There are plans for an EUI choir and we have a theatre group, currently working on body language.

For each activity there is a contact person, usually a researcher but not necessarily, and these contact persons report to the 4B secretariat.

In order to publicize the various initiatives, and keep people up to date with the growing possibilities, a bulletin is issued about once every 6 weeks, which is known as 5B (Bulletin of the Body and Brain Boosting Board). This bulletin is produced as a hardcopy, distributed to all EUI members, and is also available, in an entertaining form, complete with illustrations, on the EUI web pages.

In conclusion, the Body and Brain Boosting Board and its Bulletin appear to have answered a need for more structured social activities for EUI members.

CATHERINE DEELY

Louise de Valois e Dietrich von Biber Presentano

I concerti del giovedì sera alla Badia

18 febbraio 1999
Ore 21 - Teatro della Badia Fiesolana

«MUSICISTI FRANCESI 1»

Patrick Gabard, violoncello
Suzy Bossard, pianoforte

in programma:
L. Vieme, G. Gastinel
(in presenza del compositore),
G. Faure

Ingresso L. 10.000
(ridotto 8.000)

Programma & informazioni:
<http://www.iue.it/Concerts.html>

Badia Fiesolana - Istituto Universitario Europeo - Via del Roccellini, 9 - San Domenico di Fiesole

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with this service. But this goes up to 35% for the financial services and even 40% for the Operational Service. So figures in this section have to be taken and interpreted carefully.

As an overall conclusion of this exit survey I think that one can safely state without exaggerating that the Institute does well in the eyes of its former clients. Of course here the Institute has to be aware that service should continue to improve; but it is obviously clear that after they have left the Institute people realize

how well off they were. This leaves us with a job to do, namely also to convince those who are here of the valuable experience that they are living.

It should therefore be a stimulant for the Institute: this exit survey should not make us rest on our laurels, but continue to respond to the needs of our researchers (*altius, citius, fortius*). At the same time, it confirms that the Institutes' efforts have been rewarded by this positive appreciation.

ANDREAS FRIJDAL

The Academy of European Law

The summer courses of the Academy of European Law are now a notable and familiar item on the annual calendar of the European University Institute. In the short space of a decade since it was set up by the Institute, the Academy has become a prestigious name in the field for its high-level courses given by leading authorities, both from the world of academia and practice.

The Academy offers two intensive teaching programmes each summer: one dealing with European Union Law and the other with Human Rights Law. Each programme features a General Course and a set of Specialized Courses focusing on a topical theme. The General Courses are given by distinguished scholars who are invited to present a course of lectures which either examines the field as a whole through a particular thematic, conceptual or philosophical lens, or else looks at a particular theme in the context of the overall body of law in the field.

Past General Course lecturers have included YASH GHAI (Hong Kong), STEFAN GRILLER (Vienna), STEFAN TRECHSEL (St. Gallen), WALTER VAN GERVEN (Leuven and Maastricht), HENRY SCHERMERS (Leiden), RICARDO ALONSO GARCÍA (Madrid), PIETER VAN DIJK (The Hague) and FRANCIS SNYDER (Florence).

In addition, a number of eminent personalities are invited each year to deliver Distinguished Lectures. These have included such renowned figures as CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY (Vice-President, ICJ), WILLIAM DAVEY (WTO), JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS (Council of the European Union), GIULIANO AMATO (President, Italian Antitrust Authority), GIL CARLOS RODRIGUEZ IGLESIAS (President, ECJ), KLAUS HÄNSCH (President, European Parliament) and TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA (Deputy-Director General, Banca d'Italia).

The programme, reproduced on p.35 for this year's Tenth Anniversary Session of the Academy features an exceptional line-up of lecturers, notable not only for their professional standing but also for their broad-ranging cultural and intellectual backgrounds. Contact addresses are given below for those interested in receiving further information and application forms.

The Academy in Print

The Academy has recently embarked upon an expanded publications programme. Starting in 1999, the Collected Courses of the Academy, which originate in the summer programmes, will be published by Oxford University Press in a series produced under the editorial auspices of the Academy. Four volumes will be published annually: the 'General Course' and a volume of collected essays on a specific theme relating to each of the two fields covered by the Academy.

The European Journal of International Law, also published by Oxford University Press, is now recognized as the leading journal in its field in Europe, possibly the world. It was founded at the same time as the Academy and provides a forum for debate on both the theoretical and conceptual dimensions of international law as well as for incisive analyses of the most topical issues.

The Academy Online

The Academy is in the process of developing a website, in close collaboration with Harvard Law School, which will provide a wide variety of services to those interested in the fields of human rights law and European Union law. The Academy also produces the European Foreign Policy Bulletin online, which provides a comprehensive and systematic online database of official documents issued in the framework of the European Union common foreign and security policy (CFSP).

Applying for the Academy's Summer Courses

Applications are still open for the 1999 summer courses on human rights law and European Union law. Students of law and related fields and lawyers and practitioners of all nationalities can apply. Enrolment numbers are limited and admission is based on merit. Applicants may opt to attend one course or both. Courses are held in English and French and, as participants must be able to follow courses in both of these languages, a prerequisite for admission is a strong command of one language and at least a passive knowledge of the other.

How much does it cost?

The enrolment fee for each course is EUR 250, payable on acceptance of admission. For applicants who choose to attend both sessions, the fee is EUR 400. A limited number of scholarships are generally awarded to participants from Eastern and Central Europe. In exceptional cases, fee-waivers may also be granted.

How to apply?

Applicants should use the Academy's application form for the current year and write in English or French directly to:

European University Institute
Academy of European Law
Villa Schifanoia
Via Boccaccio, 121
I-50133 Firenze
ITALY

For up-to-date information and on-line publications consult our web pages at:
<http://www.iue.it/AEL>

The Academy of European Law

1999 Programme

Human Rights Law (21 June – 2 July)

General Course

A Comprehensive Human Rights System, David J. Harris (Nottingham)

Distinguished Lecture

Is the Human Rights Regime Special in International Law?

PIETER VAN DIJK (The Hague)

Specialized Courses: The International Law Framework of Human Rights
What Have We Learned, Where Are We Going?, Richard B. Bilder (Wisconsin)
The Role of Private International Law, Andrew Byrnes (Hong Kong)
International Peace and Security, Olivier Corten (Brussels)
Judicial Activism/Restraint, Craig Scott (Toronto)
The Private-Public Divide, Henry Steiner (Harvard)
State Sovereignty, Hélène Ruiz Fabri (Paris)

Law of The European Union (5 July – 16 July)

General Course

Rethinking the Foundations of European Law, J. H. H. Weiler (Harvard)

Distinguished Lectures

JACQUES DELORS (Paris); JEAN-VICTOR LOUIS (Brussels)

Specialized Courses: The European Court of Justice

ECJ Jurisdiction Reconsidered, Paul P. Craig (Oxford)

Adjudicating European Integration: National Courts and the ECJ,
Mattias Kumm (Fletcher School)

Interpretation, Integrity and Integration in ECJ Jurisprudence,
Neil MacCormick (Edinburgh), Joxerramon Bengoetxea

(University of the Basque Country) & Leonor Moral (Edinburgh)

The Community of Judges: A Socio-Legal Perspective, Harm Schepel (Brussels) &
Erhard Blankenburg (Amsterdam)

Gendering the Court of Justice, Jo Shaw (Leeds)

For further information and application forms:

Telephone +39-055-4685 523

Fax +39-055-4685 517

E-mail: ciomei@datacomm.iue.it

<http://www.iue.it/AEL>

Law Professor Turns to Literature

The discussion of Professor JOSEPH WEILER'S novella 'Removed', which took place within the framework of the seminar on The Heritage of National-Socialist and Fascist Legal Thought in Europe (Professors JOERGES and LA TORRE), began with a short and fascinating introduction given by the author on the process of writing this work. Even though JOSEPH WEILER had for five years regularly dedicated three nightly hours to writing his first literary work he denied to know any more about its characters than any (other) reader. It was therefore up to the participants to speculate on their motivations – but also on the author's intentions to ,organize their appearances before they began a life of their own (or before they chose to die at a particular date – October 3rd?, November 9th?...). The participants, however, seemed to be more interested in WEILER'S motivation to write a novella rather than in the credibility of his charac-

Der Fall Steinmann (Removed)

Theodor Steinmann, renowned and beloved professor of public law in one of our distinguished faculties takes early retirement. There is hushed talk of scandal. A young colleague, former assistant and star student, slowly unravels the mystery on a journey which takes him to Bremen and Oxford, Frankfurt and London. Beneath the unfolding drama there is another Odyssey which gently and sympathetically uncovers some of the darker corners of our university life, of friendship and marriage, of authority and moral choice all under the shadow of that past which never passes.

JOSEPH H.H. WEILER
Der Fall Steinmann
 (Removed)
 Aus dem Englischen von Michael Cochu
 Verlag Bettina Wassmann, Bremen 1998; geb. DM 39,—

ters or also the question, if and how any specific historical context can be used within the writing of a literary text.

Such and other questions or comments are still welcome and will be answered by the author at: weiler@law.harvard.edu.

NIKOLAUS URBAN

JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, former EUI Professor is Manley Hudson Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Co-Director of the Harvard European Law Research Center. He also serves as Director of the Academy of European Law at the European University Institute and is a member of the faculty at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium. During autumn 1998 Prof. WEILER was Visiting Professor in the EUI Law Department

Publications of the EUI

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- Please send me *EUI Review*
- Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
- Please send me The President's Annual Report

DateSignature

New Appointments

PETER WAGNER joined the Department of Social and Political Sciences in January 1999 as a Professor of Social and Political Theory. He comes to Florence from the University of Warwick (UK), where he was Professor of Sociology and Co-Director of the Social Theory Centre since 1996.

PETER WAGNER grew up in Northern Germany and studied in Hamburg and London before moving to Berlin where he received his degrees in political science and in sociology from the Free University.

Between 1983 and 1995 his main position was at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, but he also taught at the Free University and the Humboldt University of Berlin and held visiting positions or fellowships at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton; the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala; the Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris; the University of California, Berkeley; the University of Oxford; and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris.

The comparative history of the social sciences was the starting-point for PETER WAGNER'S research. His interest was in understanding the current disciplinary and theoretical shape of the social sciences through a political sociology of their historical development.



Professor Peter Wagner

This perspective broadened later into comparative institutional studies that related the social sciences as means of societal self-understanding to the institutional structures of Western societies. One of the results of this work was a historical 'sociology of modernity'; another, more specific one an insti-

tutional comparison of the regulation of work in France and Germany over the past century.

During his first few months at the institute, PETER WAGNER works at summarising the main lines of this earlier work in one book publication on contemporary issues in social and political theorising and another one on the history of social and political thought. Similar questions are also being dealt with in the section on the history of the social and sciences, which PETER WAGNER edits for a new edition of the International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences.

While completing this work, he is developing further the research programme that will be in the centre of his activities in Florence. They will focus on understanding the contemporary restructuring of Europe in terms of social and political theory; and in comparative terms they will aim at analysing Europe as one of several 'varieties of modernity'.

Austrian Donation to the EUI Library

It has been a good tradition that new Member States, upon their accession to the EUI, provide special library funds to update and expand the pertinent holdings. After joining the Institute in 1998, the Republic of Austria has followed this custom and granted a generous contribution to the library's development. To be sure, basic reference material, data, and literature regarding Austria have always been available at the Institute. The additional funds, however, permit the acquisition of such documents, which could not be purchased out of the ordinary budget.

Librarian MICHAEL TEGELAARS and Professor PETER BECKER of the History Department cooperated in planning the expansion of the Austriaca holdings. The proposal, to which many Institute members contributed their own suggestions, has been recently approved by the Austrian government. It reflects the library's commitment to provide to its users, for each of the Member States, an excellent reference collection as well as the most important sources and data sets. A large part of the donation is earmarked for the purchase of microfilm collections. The library promised to actively pursue the further development of its Austrian holdings.

Where are they now?

Carl Glatt

I probably landed in a pharmaceutical advertising company because its owner turned out to be a keen follower of the Opera. Thus the years misspent in the Gallery of La Scala Milan might not have helped me complete my thesis within the time allocated by the EUI, but they did help in getting a job.

Pharmaceutical advertising might seem a strange world for someone who was about to complete a history thesis and who had been hankering for an ill-paid lectureship in a British university. (I have since calculated that on a British lecturer's salary scale it would have taken me 19 years to pay off the bank loan with which I had been saddled by the time I left Florence). Yet all those years of experience of historical research in archives also has its practical uses. Our clients

included Bayer, Boehringer, Glaxo-Wellcome, Hoechst, Merckle, Smith-Kline-Beecham and for reasons I won't go into – the airline Lufthansa. All had enormous demands for information. Probably the best training for the 'Information Age' is that provided to the Historian, concerned as he is with ferreting out, assembling, and analysing information and events and providing a coherent or plausible interpretation of them.

Creativity and mad ideas are often at a premium in advertising. However, what might appear to outsiders as Bedlam is often a controlled madness constrained by strict deadlines, budgets and tempered by a hard-nosed business sense. Supplying more than my share of crazy ideas I was soon threatened with promotion. But before I was to formally take charge of the finance and cost control side of the house there was a change of job direction. At the end of 1995 my employers had taken over an old Swabian office products company, a family concern with a swathe of bluechip clients, including IBM and a firm with a deep identity problem, Mercedes (-Benz, Daimler-Benz, Daimler-Chrysler, etc.). The new subsidiary consisted of a 4,500 square metre production facility with a brand new printing works attached. It was located on the edge of an attractive, half-timbered, picture-book village about 20 miles north-west of Stuttgart. The firm was in deep trouble. Its owner and founder had died in 1991. Thereafter it had fallen on hard times and in the period 1993-1996 was operating with increasing losses.

I took over responsibility for the newly acquired subsidiary in November/December 1996. Unkind people said they'd given this task (or better the poisoned chalice) to a naïve historian only because any serious business person would have spotted a hopeless cause and turned tail. Yet on the experience of the past two years I have become convinced that a good historical education (which is what you got under Alan Milward at the EUI) is the ideal training ground for a career in commerce or

industry. The particular ability of the historian at the end of long training to weigh evidence, to take events apart, to analyse in detail the complex matrix of economic, cultural, social, political, demographic and other factors which feed the chains of historical causation while at the same time keeping the

wider picture in sight, makes a historical educa-

tion absolutely relevant to the fast-moving business environment of today.

Apply the skills of a historian in a micro-context, at a factory level, to the interrelationship of people, (their development, experiences and training) to machinery, product-development, rigorous cost-control, sales, marketing & organizational structures and you very quickly realise what a practical set of tools historical method provides you with. Taking a leaf directly out of the thesis written for the EUI, I dismantled forty per cent of the factory's machinery during my first three months there. Unlike the case of the British attempt after World War II, the strategy paid off. Over 1997 we raised turnover by 43% and the firm posted its first profit in five years. Forty-five jobs were saved in the process.

Now that we make profits we have other problems. The deviousness and rapacious greed of the German 'Finanzamt' is one. In trying to contain their nefarious schemes of plunder I shall not be turning to modern management 'science' textbooks but instead to the History of the Middle Ages, refreshing my knowledge & understanding of the psychology of robber barons. History after all provides a far more relevant preparation to a career in industry or business today than anything so obviously and grippingly boring as economics, law or – god forbid – accountancy.

Dr CARL GLATT obtained a doctorate in the History Department in December 1994.



Carl Glatt with members of his staff

EUI Alumni Association

The Washington Chapter



We are all fine and occasionally organize a pasta and red wine dinner to recreate the Badia Fiesolana spirit.

Standing (from the left): Dorothea Herreiner (University of Bonn, visiting), Stefania Fabrizio, Kristina Kostial, Valeria Fichera, and Annalisa Fedelino (all International Monetary Fund)

Sitting (from the left): HERMAN CÉSAR, HUMBERTO LÓPEZ (both World Bank) and TILMAN EHRBECK (McKinsey&Co.).

Missing: ANGEL UBIDE and LUISA ZANFORLIN (both IMF).

The Institute is proud to record the following achievements of EUI alumni



Giuseppe Rao

Giuseppe Rao (Law 1986-89) was appointed Vice-Chairman of the Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy (ICCP) of the OECD in March. GIUSEPPE RAO, Director General and Counsellor to the Minister in the Italian Ministry for Post and Telecommunications had previously acted as Co-

ordinator of the Forum for the Information Society and of the Interministerial Task Force on Information Society of the Italian Prime Minister's Office.

Dr Massimiano Bucchi (PHD SPS) has been awarded the Lelli Prize of the Istituto Sturzo for the best thesis in sociology in 1997 for his thesis *When Scientists Turn to the Public*. Dr BUCCHI had already received the 1997 Nicholas Mullins Award given by the Society for the Social Study of Science and by the International Sociological Association.

Tom Kennedy (LAW 1976-78) until recently Head of the Information Office of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg has taken up a new appointment as Head of the Press and Information Division of the International Criminal Court for Rwanda in Arusha in April.

Ef시오 Espa (ECO 1982-85) has recently been appointed Head of the Economics Department of the Italian Prime Minister's Office. He had previously been Economic Adviser to the Vice President of the Council of Ministers, WALTER VELTRONI.

11 June The June Ball

No June (and end of the Academic Year) at the Institute would be complete without it: The Summer Ball. It will be held at the Badia Fiesolana on Friday 11 June.

Alumni Weekend in Berlin, 1-3 October

Alumni and friends of the Institute be informed that the next Alumni Weekend will take place in Berlin from Friday 1 to Sunday 3 October 1999. We are preparing an exciting programme. So come and join us in the (new) German capital. More details to follow.

European Investment Bank to Finance New Chair

Florence, 10 March 1999

Press release

On the occasion of the lecture given today at the European University Institute by the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mohammed Khatami, in presence of the Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini and the Vice-President of the European Investment Bank, Dr Massimo Ponzellini, the President of the European University Institute, Dr Patrick Masterson, announced the awarding of major funding from the EIB to set up a Chair for study and research on the major questions concerning the finance, economy and development economics of the Mediterranean Region and the economic and financial relations between Europe and the countries on the South Shore and in the Near and Middle East.

The new Chair, to be named after the European Investment Bank, will also receive financial support from the 'Compagnia San Paolo di Torino' and a number of other Italian bank foundations.

It is being created alongside the first 'Mediterranean Chair', devoted to the study of law and political science, set up last autumn thanks to funding granted by ENI, Mediocredito Centrale and the Ente Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze. The first 'Mediterranean Chair' was inaugurated by Foreign Minister Dini himself on 15 January this year.

The Mediterranean Project of which both Chairs form part will be carried out at the Robert Schuman Centre for applied research directed by Professor Yves Mény. It has the objective of making the European University Institute a focal point for research done anywhere in Europe on topics relating to the Mediterranean area. Medium- and long-term stays in Fiesole by academics from universities and research centres in the South Shore countries are also planned, with the aim of creating solid links between the European University Institute and many of the most prestigious institutions of higher education and research in countries in the Mediterranean Basin.

That this initiative, aimed at opening up new channels for dialogue with the Islamic countries, is coming into being in Florence emphasizes the role that in previous centuries made the city an important point of contact between the civilizations on each shore of the Mediterranean.

The European University Institute wishes to stress that the decision by the EIB, like the other funders, to support a project with great cultural significance, destined to bear fruit in the medium and long term, shows a farsighted approach by the sponsors, particularly attentive to the great themes that will condition Europe's development in the decades to come.

EUI Review Seeks Diversification

Eui Review has so far mainly published articles in English or French with the occasional item in Italian. We would, however, welcome contributions in some other of our many official languages. Such articles will then be published in the original and as a translation into English or French. Please contact us at: publish@datacomm.iue.it

EUI Review

An initiative of the
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Printed at the EUI
in April 1999

Editors' Note

EUI Review, the newsletter of the European University Institute, is published regularly three times a year: in the autumn, winter and spring/summer.

The Editors are grateful for comments, suggestions and new ideas and they are inviting present and former Institute members to contribute to EUI Review with their news on projects, books published and appointments/new positions.

Views expressed in articles published reflect the opinions of individual authors and not those of the Institute.