



“Democratic systems are not what the literal meaning of the words suggests, but something different and variable in time and space”

Searching and Researching Democracy

EUI President | **Yves Mény**

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A good and provocative starting point when working on democracy is the well-known quotation by Sartori 'Democracy is the pompous name for something which does not exist'. It is certainly not Sartori's intention to deny the existence and reality of democracy, a social and political construction to which he has dedicated his entire academic life, but rather to invite us to go beyond the immediate perception.

Democratic systems are not what the literal meaning of the words suggests, but something different and variable in time and space. This realistic approach has a long tradition and is an invitation to continuously reconsider and challenge the *idées reçues* on the matter.

Since its inception, the EUI has tackled all the variegated dimensions of the demo-

cratic issue. We cannot cite all the contributions made by the researchers, fellows and professors at the EUI, but mention must be made of the work of lawyers such as Cappelletti on the constitutional dimension of democracy, the considerable and collective effort of political scientists under the direction of Hans Daalder and Rudolf Wildermann, the exploration of its social dimension through the work of Esping-Andersen and Colin Crouch, the comparative dimension of Philippe Schmitter and Jean Blondel, and more recently by Peter Mair and Stefano Bartolini. The more theoretical questions have also been explored, and I am thinking here of the works by Maurice Cranston and later those by Sandro Pizzorno and Steven Lukes.

This domain of research has been extremely prolific and fecund and all ►►

► disciplines represented at the EUI have made their contribution to a field characterised both by continuity (the search for less imperfect political systems) and the profound changes which have affected both the concept and reality of democracy. Democracies have apparently triumphed over authoritarian or despotic regimes, but at the same time their defects and weaknesses seem more acute when they are no longer faced with other regime types. If it is true that 'Democracy is the worst system with the exception of all the others', what happens when the 'others' start to disappear from the map? The fact that 'there is no alternative' is meagre consolation, as is shown by the recent difficulties faced by democracies: cartelisation of political parties, electoral abstention, corruption, the crisis of the welfare state, shrinking of some civil liberties, etc. There are also even bigger questions: can democracy, which has developed within the nation state, survive the formidable transformation induced by globalisation—or at the regional level by the European integration process? In other words, does democracy still have a meaning when the political framework (the nation) is largely disconnected from more pressing problems? Another tension that is certainly not new is the potential contradiction between the freedom that markets require and the equality which is at the root of the democratic principle. The relationship between


this 'unhappy couple', to use Robert Dahl's words, is a source of permanent conflict and transformation. The borderlines are in constant flux and change not only from one polity to another, but also according to ideological, economic and social transformations.

The longstanding EUI tradition mentioned above continues more actively than ever. The contributions offered by this special issue give only a partial overview of the ongoing research, be it by young researchers and fellows, or by senior professors.

Let me refer in particular to a few recent developments: the creation of the European Union Democracy Observatory (EUODO) under the direction of Alexander Trechsel (holder of the Swiss Chair on Federalism and Democracy), and the launch (with the support of DG Research at the European Commission) of the European Election Study (EES), an ambitious enterprise of comparison of European elections, views of élites and public opinion, and election manifestos in the twenty-seven Member States of the European Union. And last but not least, the studies on the democratisation of (and in) the European Union in relation to the (failed) constitutionalisation of Europe to which the names of Christian Joerges, Jacques Ziller, Bruno de Witte and, last but not least, Giuliano Amato, are associated. ■

In ricordo di Elvio Bellotto

Un anno fa, il nostro amico Elvio Bellotto ci ha lasciati all'età di 80 anni. Per 12 anni, dal 1977 al 1989, è stato l'autista dei Presidenti Werner Maihofer e Emile Noël.



Elvio aveva vissuto a lungo in Francia come tanti italiani che emigrarono alla ricerca di un lavoro in Europa, e aveva conservato un'identità fatta di un misto di cultura francese e italiana. Era a suo agio in entrambi i mondi cugini e me lo ricordo nel suo ruolo di mentore quando cercava di introdurre il Presidente Maihofer ai piaceri dell'Italia: il vino, la cucina, la canzone napoletana, il tutto in francese che era la loro lingua franca.

Venuto il momento della pensione, Elvio Bellotto si dedicò a quei piaceri semplici come la cultura della vigna e la produzione del vino per sé e per gli amici. Era l'espressione della gioia di vivere e tutti coloro che lo hanno conosciuto ne conservano un'immagine di grande cordialità e simpatia.

Nella ricorrenza della sua scomparsa gli amici dell'Istituto avranno un pensiero per lui e per la sua famiglia.

Y. Mény

The Democratic Dilemma

Professor of Public Policy & Political Economy | **Sven Steinmo**

Successful democracies have to strike a difficult balance between the desire to make political élites responsive to citizens and the need to give these same élites enough autonomy to make decisions in the interests of their citizens. The American constitutional democracy on the one hand and European parliamentary democracies on the other, have historically addressed this dilemma in quite different ways, but in recent years the differences seem to be fading.

Let me begin with a brief introduction to what I mean by the term, 'democracy'. It is of course naïve to think of democracy as a political system in which governments simply act according to the demands of their citizens. The reality is that citizens are generally ignorant of, and apathetic towards, much of what governments actually do. Moreover, no citizen can be expected to be informed on the range of decisions that their government's routinely take—from the specific structure of international trade agreements, to the precise level of milk price supports, to the particular tax rate paid at different income levels. Finally, citizen's preferences are often inconsistent and even incompatible. We want lower taxes and increases in public spending on all the good things that government does. We want less government regulation *and* we want the government to punish polluters, protect us against dangerous consumer products and encourage certain types of economic growth and development. We want fewer cars on the road and cheap petrol.

Thus, given the complexity of governance on the one hand and the nature of public preferences on the other, *the reality is that we elect or appoint élites to make these decisions for us*. How we constrain these élites so that they are more likely to do what citizens want (and not what we don't want) is extremely important and also quite varied.

There are two basic and obvious mechanisms by which élites can be controlled. The first is through elections, where politicians have strong incentives to promise to do what citizens want in order to attract their votes. The second mechanism is through constitutional rules. Basic rules can be established as the foundation upon which political decisions are made. All real world democracies combine electoral incentives and constitutional constraints, but a basic difference between American democracy and European parliamentary democracy is that the US system relies



heavily on constitutional rules, while parliamentary democracy relies heavily on electoral incentives.

Limited vs. purposive government

American democratic institutions were founded on a very different set of principles to those of the democratic systems established in Europe many decades later. In the late 1700s the American revolutionary war unleashed a surge of egalitarian and democratic passions in society that brought the average man into the political sphere. Much to the consternation of most élites in the new America, the State governments across ►►

“Successful democracies have to strike a difficult balance between the desire to make political élites responsive to citizens and the need to give these same élites enough autonomy to make decisions in the interests of their citizens”

► this fledgling union were soon dominated by farmers, shopkeepers and ordinary folk. Slogans such as ‘All men are created equal’ and ‘No taxation without representation’ were extremely powerful and useful in mobilizing the nation to revolt, but very few American élites seriously considered that they would be taken as literally as they were by average Americans. The response to this predicament was the US Constitution which was specifically created to allow for democratically elected government while at the same time limiting the power of that government. In the words of the great American historian Gordon Wood, the US Constitution was an ‘anti-democratic revolution’. By enlarging the nation, creating a system of ‘checks and balances,’ and constitutionally establishing a set of rules prescribing the responsibilities and powers of different institutions of government, they hoped America would be protected against the pernicious power of majority rule. The new American nation, after all, sat at the edge of a massive and rich continent. Government should be kept out of the way to allow the people to exploit the continent’s natural resources. To achieve this end, political power itself should be constrained and limited. Government should simply get out of the way.

“I argue that as we enter the 21st century, both Europe and America are becoming *less democratic*”

European parliamentary democracies were established at different times with radically different goals. In most European states, already established élites held power when these nations democratized. Thus unions, worker’s parties and even middle-class movements set their sights on seizing power from the established élite. The basic idea was to take power, not to diffuse it. Thus parliamentary democracies evolved into systems where those that won elected office should *not* be constrained by pre-established rules, but should instead be constrained by the will of the voting electorate. While many different institutional forms developed, the basic idea here was to build polities where governments could be authoritative and powerful, rather than checked, balanced and limited. The key constraint on elected élites should be, and was, the ballot box. Political parties organized election campaigns and fought for elected office. If the governments so elected did not achieve their promises or otherwise displeased the voters, they could be thrown out of office and new élites could take their place. Certainly, these systems did not always work perfectly, especially when too many parties fought for power and the responsibility or accountability was undermined, still the basic principles were quite different from those found in the USA.

The most obvious consequence of these different institutional systems was that the state grew larger in European democracies. The American system of ‘checks and balances’ did exactly what its framers hoped it would do. It constrained government. Even when large majorities of American voters wished for the extension or expansion of public programmes (as with National Health Insurance in 1948, 1973 and 1993), the USA’s fragmented political institutions prevented the growth of government. European democracies were not so constrained and as a consequence their states and their tax burdens grew. By 2005 public spending in the average Western European democracy was over 45% of GDP whereas in the US it was only slightly over 30%.

Democracy’s demise?

I argue that as we enter the 21st century, *both* Europe and America are becoming *less democratic*. There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, because modern media and communication technologies are becoming ever more sophisticated, political élites are becoming ever better at presenting themselves as champions of what citizens want. Focus groups, marketing specialists and public opinion pollsters are now common features of all advanced democracies. In reality this means that politicians are increasingly able to package their image as what citizens want. Remembering that what citizens actually want is often inconsistent or incoherent, this allows political leaders to advance what citizens want to hear and to downplay what is uncomfortable. While this development has been more obvious in the US, in my view the implications are more severe for Europe. Precisely because European democracies are based on the principle of accountability, it is even more dangerous when élites become sophisticated in ‘spinning’ their messages and shaping public opinion.

Secondly, the ability to ‘throw the bums out’ is declining in both Europe and America. Interestingly, while this outcome is apparent on both sides of the Atlantic, its sources are quite different. It is a well known fact that in the USA elections are about money. The sad reality is that the best way to get money—lots of money—is to be in office already. In the last elections over 96% of members of Congress who ran for re-election were re-elected. Indeed, it was often noted that members of the US Congress were more likely to be re-elected than members of the Supreme Soviet. One can also scarcely avoid noticing that just two families (Bush and Clinton) will soon have held the US Presidency for twenty years. If Hillary Clinton does indeed win the next election (remember she has the most money) that reign will be extended to over a quarter of a century. Why do the same people get re-elected year after year in the United States? Is it because citizens are so content with their political system and the decisions made by their elected officials that they want them to stay in office virtually in perpetuity? Obviously, not. ►►

- Today approximately 7 out of 10 Americans believe that they cannot trust the government to do the right thing most of the time.

In some ways it may appear that democracy in Europe is stronger and healthier than in America in this regard. Elections are far more regulated and controlled on this side of the Atlantic. The pernicious influence of money does not appear to corrupt these systems nearly to the extent that it does in the US. Moreover, as elections in France, Sweden and even Italy have recently demonstrated, citizens can and do use their electoral power and evict those in power and replace them with a new élite.

But before we open the champagne, congratulating ourselves over the vibrancy of European democracies, it is worth remembering that an ever increasing number of decisions are now made in Brussels by a technocratic élite which is neither elected nor recallable by the European electorate. The phrase 'democratic deficit' is perhaps less popular in the media today than a few years ago, but it is still a very real thing.

It is also worth considering *why* European élites expanded the European Union in the first place. Why wasn't an extended free trade zone enough, leaving the real business of politics and policy in the hands of local/national governments? In my view, the historical comparison with the US constitution is striking and recalls the 'democratic dilemma' noted early in this essay. Bluntly, the significant extension of power and authority of EU institutions is seen as necessary because political élites believe they need more autonomy.

Even the recent versions of the EU Constitution, much like the US constitution, can be understood as an attempt on the part of the political and economic élite to insulate decision-makers from the popular will. Certainly, the recent Constitution gives European citizens more power *vis-à-vis* European institutions, but it would be very difficult to argue that the EU institutions are more democratic than European parliamentary democracies.

Over two hundred years ago American élites were frightened of democracy precisely because average citizens increasingly took control of their state governments and passed laws that the élite believed were against their best interests. In much the same way, the EU came about in large part because élites feared that citizens would not, or could not, support the tough political choices 'necessary' in a globalizing world economy. Too often those with power at the national level (especially trade unions, public employees, and farmers) used that power to protect themselves against the forces of economic change. In short, because national politicians were increasingly responsive to the demands of their voters, they could not



make the kinds of political choices that were required by the modern world economy. Government, in other words, should 'get out of the way'. Whether the élite's vision of the future for Europe was correct or not, there seems little doubt that a key part of the problem was the fact that national political élites were too closely bound to the demands and desires of their voters.

It is significant to note that the writers and designers of the new European institutions appear to be, at least implicitly, aware of these issues. Thus, the same document that clearly intends to expand the scope and authority of the European Union concomitantly specifies a series of constitutional constraints and limitations on the autonomy of precisely those élites whose power is enhanced with this document. I do not want to exactly argue that this document represents an 'Americanization' of European democracy, but it is curious to consider the implications of the shift from a system where élites are mostly constrained by voters to a system where they are mostly constrained by rules. ■

Jeffrey Kopstein / Sven Steinmo (eds), *Growing Apart? America and Europe in the 21st Century*. Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2008
www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521879316

The *Prima Facie* of Democracy

Fernand Braudel Fellow | Lucia Avelar

When people ask me ‘Why democracy?’ I respond with another question. What kind of democracy is it when a few rich people live alongside so many poor and there is no prospect of change? How can we agree with hegemonic theories of democracy if the reality is so very different from its theoretical claims? The minimalist approach to democracy, for example, considers it to be a method to choose rulers, and puts no emphasis on the social aspects of democracy. It is no coincidence that many political scientists from developing countries have therefore adopted the European historical experience of social democracy as a reference point and count social goals of wealth redistribution as the core of democracy. In this view, people cannot enjoy political and civil rights without social rights. Nor can they participate meaningfully in politics and generate the knowledge, leaders, political parties, and social movements necessary to extend political and social rights to the people as a whole.

After much research and reflection on the prospects for democracy in my country, Brazil, I consider democracy to be a continuous process of institution-building, and am happy to share some of my ideas about key aspects of democracy in Brazil—including its social aspects—with the EUI community.

Political evolution

Democracy is still relatively young in Brazil. After the end of the Portuguese empire and the proclamation of the Republic in 1889, agrarian élites, supporting orthodox liberal principles, organized political power under regional oligarchies and remained in power with a local (state) base of electoral support (*os coronéis*). The Revolution in 1930 brought Getúlio Vargas to power as a dictator and was an axis of transformation. The Brazilian state embarked on state-led industrialization (state capitalism) and made investments in productive infrastructure. Re-democratization began in 1946, when the first national political parties were organized. The charismatic Vargas was re-elected in 1950, and until his suicide in 1954, continued the post-war project of creating big state-owned companies. Political conflict took place between the traditional élites, the new middle class and urban populist groups. There was a new institutional breakdown in 1964, and until 1985 Brazil was once again under a military dictatorship. In this period, the deeper industrialization promoted by the state led the rural population to migrate to urban areas. Today, Brazil's rate of urbanization is over 80%, one of the highest in the world. The structural changes in Brazilian society are accompanied by high rates of social inequality.

Roots of inequality

The roots of Brazilian social inequality can be found in the linkages between political power, on the one hand, and the concentration of land ownership (*latifúndios*), the slavery regime and patriarchy, on the other. The Portuguese Crown granted large amounts of property to colonizers in a regime of *merces*, that gave these property owners immense local power that was close to sacred. The control over jobs of these local landowners meant that local workers often depended for their survival and security on a single person. To this day the concentration of economic and political power is expressed in the intimate relationship between politicians and all parts of state, including the public bureaucracy and the judiciary. Clientelism and state corporatism persist as the principal forms of relations between state and society.

Slavery existed in Brazil between 1550 and 1850 when around five million Africans were imported into the country to work in the plantations, constituting the biggest contingent of slaves in the Americas. Slavery was abolished in 1888, but its abolition left former slaves without health care, excluded from better-paying jobs, and often discriminated against by the police and the judiciary. The heritage of slavery is the biggest source of Brazilian social debt. The rate of illiteracy among former slaves' descendants is 21% as compared to 8.5% among the white population. The Human Developing Index records the per capita income of black Brazilians as 0,602 (in real currency) as compared to 0,746 for white Brazilians. In the words of F.W. Reis, Brazilian society resembles a caste society.¹

Under the patriarchal regime, not only slaves but also Brazilian women were excluded from society and politics. After the industrialization of the 1950s, women progressively won the right to work and to be employed in the professions, as well as the right to express themselves in literature and culture. Without social and professional status, however, women still account for under 10% of Brazil's political office-holders. One of the biggest obstacles to women's political representation is the élitist character of political parties which are an ‘élite club’ where women are still second-class members.

Growing participation

The increase in political participation among Brazilians is a new phenomenon and is related to an increased consciousness of human rights among a great part of the population. One example of a rights-based



► movement is the *Sem Terra*, but these movements, however, are overwhelmed by the representation of big property-owners in the Federal Chamber. Since 1967, there has been no significant land reform. Families farm about 30% of agricultural land, receive 10% of government payments and produce 50% of the annual harvest, while the large property owners control 70% of agricultural land, receive 70% of government payments and produce the other 50% of crops. Conflict over land occupation is intense and often ends in the murder of small farmers. In most cases, the crime is not investigated or the murderer punished.

Lula and social politics

The election of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva as President of the Republic in 2002, and his re-election in 2006, were a response to structural and institutional changes taking place in Brazil. Lula was a trade union leader in the 1970s, and one of the founders in 1980 of the Workers Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*). Lula's personal charisma, and his role in the Workers Party for over twenty-five years, allowed him and the party to bring together associations, social movements, non-governmental organizations, urban and rural unions, cooperatives and universities within a single political party. Since the election of Lula and the Workers

Party there have been changes in financing municipal administrations, and an increase in the level of formal education of Brazilians. In 1989, about 60% of Brazilians had a very low level of formal education, but by 2006, this figure had dropped to 33%. In 1989, only 18 million Brazilians had access to a high school education or more, but by 2006, at least 50 million were entering secondary or further education.

Lula's government has introduced other social policies including direct payments to families to help cover the cost of raising children. The programme transfers money directly to parents, and undermines the basis of traditional clientelism which enabled politicians to offer financial favours in exchange for votes. Lula's government has also increased the minimum wage. ►►

“The increase in political participation among Brazilians is a new phenomenon and is related to an increased consciousness of human rights among a great part of the population”

► Challenges

There are challenges to be met before political and social democracy can be achieved in Brazil. While political power remains concentrated in the hands of traditional élites the relationship between voter and politician will be clientelistic, and the system will not redress the entrenched inequalities of Brazilian society. Rural workers who migrated to the cities in search of work are still unemployed, urban poverty is a major problem, and the social and economic disparities highlight the heritage of slavery and racial discrimination. The lack of respect for civil rights is evident in the daily violence in the country's largest cities, in attacks by bandits, and massacres in the prisons. Finally, political parties have not accepted the new social movements as legitimate vehicles of political participation and have failed to assimilate their leaders and to respond to their interests and platforms. Instead, they see them simply and solely as competitors.

The debate on the social dimension of democracy in Brazil invites comparison with other Latin-American countries. Progress has been made in promoting social and economic rights in countries such as Chile and Uruguay, whereas other countries such as Argentina have witnessed a contraction of democracy. Persistent social and economic inequality are a major cause of institutional instability. The democratization of opportunities is essential for the creation of political stability and social and economic justice. Legislative reforms to introduce public financing of electoral campaigns, a freer media, and a more equitable redistribution of wealth are among the changes that are necessary to bring democracy to a country like Brazil. ■

¹ F.W. Reis, 'Dilemas da democracia no Brasil' in L. Avelar and A.O. Cintra, *Sistema Político Brasileiro-Uma Introdução*, Rio de Janeiro/São Paulo, Editoras Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung & UNESP, 2006.

EUI Library news

On-site and off-site storage. New storage space has been found to accommodate the growing Library collections. This extra space means that the current collections can be developed, and brings together all off-site and dispersed collections into two large storage areas: on-site in the Upper Cloister of the Badia, and off-site at Villa La Fonte.

Upper Cloister storage. All Ph.D. and LL.M. theses are now stored here together with the collection of precious books and special bibliographical collections.

Refurbished main Library corridor. The corridor on the first floor of the Library, which houses reference collections and current periodicals, has been completely refurbished. Higher shelves have been installed thus providing more space for books. The number of work tables and public access PCs for catalogue consultation have been doubled.

Villa La Fonte storage. The Limonaia at Villa La Fonte has been restored and equipped with state-of-the-art technology to preserve part of the Library's paper collection.



The Promotion of Democracy in the EU's External Relations

Professor of Law | **Marise Cremona**

Democracy as a Union value

According to the Treaty on European Union democracy is one of the principles on which the Union is founded, as well as being among the values of the Union listed in the Treaty of Lisbon, and a condition of membership. It is not surprising, then, to find that stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy is one of the criteria for membership of the Union set out by the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993, and that the development of democracy in candidate States has formed part of the Union's pre-accession strategy. However the promotion of democracy is not only a matter of preparing future Member States; the Union's values are not only constitutive of its own identity, they are also part of its 'mission statement' as regards its relations with third countries. In the current Treaties the consolidation and development of democracy appears as an objective of the common foreign and security policy,¹ as well as of development policy,² and economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries.³ In practice, this covers the full range of third country relations for the Union. Although the Treaty provisions on trade policy do not yet provide for any explicit link with the promotion of democracy, the granting or withdrawal of trade benefits may flow from the Union's assessment of democratic conditions in a particular trading partner.

The Treaty of Lisbon takes this link between the Union's values and its external policy even further: candidate States would be expected to commit themselves not only to respecting, but also to promoting, democracy; the Union itself is then expressly mandated to uphold and promote its values in its relations with the wider world; and one of the specific objectives of its external relations—applying across all external policies—is to consolidate and support democracy. In these commitments democracy is promoted not only as a universal value, but as 'European', or, we might say, 'EU-ropean'. In speaking of the EU's relations with its neighbours in 2002, the then President of the Commission, Prodi, declared that '[t]he aim is to extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union.'⁴ The Treaty of Lisbon upholds this aim, extending it beyond our neighbours to the whole of EU external policy, requiring the Union to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries and international organisations which share 'the principles which have guided its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance



in the wider world', including democracy and the rule of law. It is a distinctive feature of the Union as an international actor that it seeks to promote its own values as well as its interests; hence its characterisation as a 'normative power'.⁵ Of course, value-promotion and ►►

“In the current Treaties the consolidation and development of democracy appears as an objective of the common foreign and security policy, as well as of development policy, and economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries”

- ▶ the Union interests often appear to coincide, especially in the Union's own neighbourhood. The European Security Strategy, for example, asserts that 'Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU.'⁶

“What instruments does the EU have at its disposal for this task of promoting democracy?”

Instruments for promoting democracy

What instruments does the EU have at its disposal for this task of promoting democracy? We can broadly distinguish four types of action. First, the EU will generally use statements claiming a joint commitment to key values as the foundation of a relationship. The Council Conclusions which are the policy basis for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), for example, as well as the Action Plans agreed with individual neighbouring countries, refer to 'shared values' as the basis of the development of relations between the neighbours and Union.⁷ All cooperation and association agreements since the early 1990s contain a clause proclaiming the values and principles which form 'essential elements' of the agreement.⁸ These statements are not purely rhetorical: a substantial breach of an 'essential elements' clause may lead to suspension of the agreement.

Second, the EU has instruments which offer positive incentives for democratic reform and institution-building. All three major financial assistance regulations, the Pre-accession, Development Cooperation and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, include support for democratization as an objective of assistance.⁹ Special trade incentives for developing countries under the Generalized System of Preferences are linked to the ratification and implementation of international conventions protecting core human and labour rights, sustainable development and good governance. More generally, so-called 'positive conditionality' links progress in relations with the EU to progress in meeting targets, typically including democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Within EU policy on the Western Balkans, for example, this strategy has played an important role since 1997, with conditions attached to degrees of *rapprochement* with the EU: trade benefits, financial and technical assistance, contractual relations, association agreements, and now candidacy status and the opening of accession negotiations. The ENP adopts a similar approach, with targets for each partner country in the Action Plans. As the Commission has said, 'The level of the

EU's ambition in developing links with each partner through the ENP will take into account the extent to which common values are effectively shared.'¹⁰ Indeed, the opening in February 2007 of negotiations for an enhanced agreement with Ukraine was linked to progress in meeting the targets for democratization set out in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan.¹¹

A third type of action covers direct interventions, typically under the EU's security and defence policy, designed to support or build democracy within a third country. These include, for example, election monitoring missions, rule of law missions such as the EUJUST THEMIS mission in Georgia, and police missions such as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Finally, since the early 1990s the Union has increasingly used the instrument of 'negative conditionality' in a variety of forms, all involving the threat of withdrawal of benefits or freezing the development of relations with the EU where democracy is threatened. The financial assistance instruments mentioned all include clauses allowing the EU to take measures including the suspension of assistance where a partner fails to observe the values of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Given that support for democratization is itself an objective of assistance there is a risk that suspension of assistance will be counter-productive. The ENPI Regulation addresses this by providing that assistance 'shall primarily be used to support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratization process in partner countries.' This is the case for Belarus at present, and in addition the EU has refused to bring the partnership and cooperation agreement negotiated with Belarus in 1995 into force, as a result of the state of democracy in that country. As we have seen, the 'essential elements' clauses allow for consultation on, and ultimately the suspension of, EU agreements with third countries in case of breach. Somewhat ironically, although the consultation process has been initiated several times under the Cotonou Convention (the EU's agreement with the ACP, a group of 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific states), the only time that an agreement has actually been suspended it did not contain an essential elements clause. This was the 1980 cooperation agreement with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was suspended and then denounced by the EU in November 1991 following the start of the civil war. A stage beyond the suspension of a preferential agreement in the implementation of negative conditionality is the imposition of economic sanctions (bans on arms sales, trade bans, investment bans) and other restrictive measures, such as visa bans. Current examples include sanctions adopted against Burma/Myanmar¹² and Belarus.¹³ ▶▶



► Defining democracy

Although the promotion of democracy is embedded in EU policy, this dimension of Union external relations is, not surprisingly, controversial, both as a matter of principle and in terms of effectiveness as a policy instrument in specific cases. Critics refer to double standards, moving targets, selective application, lack of accountability, unfounded presumptions of shared values, the imposition of EU values, the contradiction between justifications based on universality and the claim to distinctively ‘European’ values.¹⁴ At a practical level, we may ask how the EU defines the democracy it is promoting? Although there are overlaps, there is no single definition or list of components of democracy used in EU policy instruments. In many cases, it is simply left undefined. In others an indication is given; in a Council Common Position on human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance in Africa, for example, reference is made to ‘basic democratic principles’ including the right to choose and change leaders in free and fair elections; separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers; and guarantees of freedom of expression, information, association and political organisation. In the 1997 Council Conclusions on conditionality in relation to the Western Balkans, which are still regularly referred to, the elements listed for examining compliance with respect to democratic principles are: representative government, accountable executive; government and

public authorities acting in a manner consistent with the constitution and the law; separation of powers (government, administration, judiciary); and free and fair elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot. The ENP Action Plans, rather than providing an overall list of principles, set specific targets, such as (in the case of Ukraine) the democratic conduct of presidential and parliamentary elections, and a long list of

“We may ask how the EU defines the democracy it is promoting?”

other targets including administrative and judicial reform and guaranteeing effective respect for freedom of the media. Democracy frequently features alongside the rule of law and fundamental human rights, and the distinction between them is often unclear. There is no single notion of what ‘promoting democracy’ means in practice in EU external policy, any more than the literature can offer a single definition of democracy; it is a fundamentally contested concept. As a result, del Sarto argues,¹⁵ there is a lack of clarity, conceptual confusion and inconsistency surrounding the references to democracy and democratic reform in the ENP Action Plans, one of the most recent attempts to apply new methodologies such as benchmarking to the promotion of democracy. This conceptual vagueness is most noticeable when democracy is used in the ►►

- ▶ context of positive conditionality, in terms of goals or targets to be achieved. Where the EU decides on measures of negative conditionality, such as sanctions, it is generally explicit as to the breaches of democratic principles which have provoked EU action. After all, it is important that the target of the measures knows why they have been adopted and what needs to be done to get them lifted.

Democracy and effective conditionality

The effectiveness of positive and negative conditionality as a policy instrument (including the promotion of democracy) and the principles on which it is based were examined in the light of ENP objectives at a workshop on the European Neighbourhood Policy held within the framework of the Academy of European Law at the EUI. The ENP is designed, as the European Council has recently confirmed, as a 'single and coherent policy framework',¹⁶ but its inclusiveness as a policy, and the resulting multi-dimensional nature of its objectives creates problems at the methodological level. A variety of instruments is to be expected, but different goals suggest different methodologies and these may compete, even if they are not actually contradictory. Tocci identifies a 'fundamental contradiction inherent in the EU's [ENP] goals', in their combination of cooperation and conditionality.¹⁷ The ENP emphasises shared values and joint ownership, but it is clear that in speaking of shared values the Union has in mind sharing its own values with others rather than looking for a set of values that are shared, and the concept of joint ownership sits uneasily with the use of conditionality, especially where there is no real agreement on shared objectives. What we see, then, is a fundamental commitment to the promotion of democracy at the heart of EU external policy and a wide range of possible instruments. At the same time we can identify a lack of clarity as to what exactly is entailed in improving or promoting democracy and the limits of conditionality as a methodology where the EU's relations with the country concerned are complex and multi-dimensional, with competing interests and priorities. This suggests that both the promotion of democracy and policy coherence would be best served by well-defined and limited initiatives with perhaps modest-seeming but clear objectives, recognizing the limits and the strengths of conditionality. ■

¹ Art. 11 TEU. See Common Position 98/350/CFSP concerning human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance in Africa, 25 May 1998 OJ 1998 L 158/1.

² Art. 177(2) EC. See an early document to 'endorse the promotion of democracy', the Resolution of the Council and of the Member States meeting in the Council of 28 Nov. 1991 on human rights, democracy and development.

³ Article 181a EC.

⁴ R. Prodi, 'A Wider Europe: A Proximity Policy as the Key

to Stability', Brussels, SPEECH/02/619.

⁵ On the EU as a normative power, see I. Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?' (2002) 40 *Journal of Common Market Studies* 235; H. Sjørnsen, 'The EU as a 'normative' power: how can this be?' (2006) 13 *Journal of European Public Policy* 235.

⁶ 'A Secure Europe in A Better World', European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 6.

⁷ See also M. Cremona 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: More than a Partnership?' in Cremona (ed.), *New Developments in EU External Relations Law*, OUP, forthcoming.

⁸ Commission Communication on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries COM(95)216 of 23 May 1995.

⁹ The ENPI includes 'supporting democratisation, *inter alia*, by enhancing the role of civil society organisations and promoting media pluralism, and through electoral observation and assistance'.

¹⁰ Commission Communication of 12 May 2004, 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper' COM(2004)373 final, p. 13.

¹¹ Joint Statement following EU-Ukraine Summit, Kyiv, 1 December 2005, 15222/05 (Presse 337).

¹² These include a ban on arms sales, technical assistance, financing and financial assistance related to military activities, a ban on the export of equipment which may be used for internal repression, the freezing of funds and economic resources of members of the Government of Myanmar and any persons or entities associated with them, a prohibition on financial loans to, and investing in, Burmese state-owned enterprises. Tariff preferences under the GSP were also withdrawn and in October 2007 other restrictions were agreed on the import and investment of timber, metals, minerals, precious and semi-precious stones.

¹³ Restrictive measures apply against named officials regarded as responsible for violations of international elections standards and the 'fraudulent elections and referendum' held in October 2004: Council Common Position 2006/276/CFSP of 10 April 2006 concerning restrictive measures against certain officials of Belarus, OJ 2006 L 101/5. Tariff preferences under GSP were also withdrawn.

¹⁴ See P. Leino 'The journey towards all that is good and beautiful: Human rights and "common values" as guiding principles of EU foreign relations law' in M. Cremona and B. de Witte (eds.), *EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals*, Oxford: Hart, forthcoming.

¹⁵ R. del Sarto, 'Benchmarking in the field of human rights and democratization', Workshop on 'The ENP: A Framework for Modernisation?' 1-2 Dec. 2006, EUI.

¹⁶ Conclusions of the European Council, 21 June 2007.

¹⁷ N. Tocci, 'Can the EU Promote Democracy and Human Rights Through the ENP?' in Cremona and Meloni (eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Modernisation?* EUI Working Papers, LAW 2007/21, p. 23 at 30.

Post-communism—Heaven, Hell and Purgatory


Researcher, SPS Dept. | **Jørgen Møller**

Less than two decades ago, we witnessed the sudden collapse of Soviet communism. Few scholars had anticipated this momentous event, and the existing literature became obsolete virtually overnight. The perceived need to break new ground was expressed in a number of stark predictions. Optimists pointed to the advent of a glorious democratic future based on liberal principles; pessimists foresaw a turbulent era of political and economic populism, if not outright dictatorship.

Both the descriptions and the prescriptions differed widely. Yet one thing was common to almost all of these analyses: the dominant tendency was to stress the uniformity of, first, the point of departure and, second, the probable destination. This was because the communist past was construed as the great unifier of the area between Stettin and Trieste, Prague and Vladivostok. By implication, the daunting challenge facing the would-be reformers was that of completing a dual transition, that is, of democratizing politically whilst creating a market economy. Some saw this as a manageable task, others as an insurmountable obstacle. But, according to the literature of the early 1990s, the basic problem was no different in East Central Europe than in the Soviet Union, and one would thus expect the outcomes to be of the same ilk.

One-and-a half decades down the road, the reality of post-communism has begged to differ. Rather than uniformity, the setting has been characterized by diversity. At one extreme, East Central Europe embraced democracy and the market, and did so very rapidly. At the other extreme, Central Asia and parts of the Caucasus never really abandoned autocracy, and the economies of these countries have, at best, been characterized by partial reforms. Caught midstream, the old Soviet heartlands have lingered in a hybrid state, both politically and economically. In other words, the post-communist world has turned out to be a tripartite one, and the differences between the three clusters are, if not set in stone, at least very clear-cut.

How do we explain the advent of this political trichotomy? Presently, actor-centred approaches dominate the literature. They apparently do so with good reason, for it turns out that actor-centred attributes such as the outcome of the initial elections and the choice of constitutional system do in fact explain the described post-communist tripartition. We can go one step further. Where the democratic oppositions defeated the communist incumbents during the tran-



sitional ‘window of opportunity’, they also opted for parliamentarism, and the outcome turned out to be democracy. On the contrary, where the communist incumbents won the day, they normally placed their bets with some variant of superpresidentialism, and autocracy was never really removed. ▶▶

“Less than two decades ago, we witnessed the sudden collapse of Soviet communism. Optimists pointed to the advent of a glorious democratic future based on liberal principles; pessimists foresaw a turbulent era of political and economic populism, if not outright dictatorship”

- ▶ Yet the actor-based explanations are encumbered with one very important logical problem. They all assume that there is ample room for action; they are, so to say, in voluntaristic mode. And with good reason, if the choices of the actors merely reflect anterior (structural) factors or regional effects such as diffusion, then, at the end of the day, they are spurious. This is exactly where we encounter the great challenge to these explanations. The political tripartition is characterised by, and indeed mirrors, the above-mentioned combination of intra-subregional similarities (within subregions such as East Central Europe and Central Asia, respectively), and inter-subregional differences (between these subregions).

“Point predictions is a game we are ill-equipped to play, and the world of man is seldom uniform”

This points back to less voluntaristic, and more distant, lines of demarcation. The fact of the matter is that a structural corrective also delivers. Attributes such as the level of modernization at the breakdown of communism, the character and form of the prior regime and the prospects of EU membership elucidate the three political pathways of post-communism. Furthermore, the ordering on these structural attributes correlate strongly with the ordering on their actor-centred equivalents. In brief, more affluent countries geographically situated in Europe with a pre-communist experience of constitutionalism were those boasting incumbent defeats at the initial elections and choosing parliamentarism over presidentialism. On the contrary, more destitute post-Soviet countries with no real legacy of state formation prior to communism managed neither, and the countries in-between have a mixed performance on both structural and actor-centred score-cards.

Where does this leave us? In answering the question, temporal concerns take centre-stage. Critically, the structural constraints predate the actor-centred choices. Furthermore, we can establish a convincing theoretical link between the two ‘packages’, one positing that the structural constraints shaped the pattern of ‘open’ (or ‘closed’) politics at the time of the transitional upheavals. The theoretical claim is thus one of ‘increasing’ and ‘decreasing returns’. It should be noted that such path dependency characterises not only the relationship *among* the actor-centred and structural variables, respectively, but *between* them as well—what is best conveyed by the metaphors of ‘virtuous’ and ‘vicious’ circles.

Yet the circles rotate in a certain direction, in turn reflecting the temporal premise. In a nutshell, the actor-

centred attributes should be construed as intervening links in a causal chain that leads from the structural attributes to the political outcome. Structures do not create democracy (or autocracy for that matter), but actors do. However, the systematic combination of intra-subregional similarities and inter-subregional differences found within the post-communist setting can only be explained with reference to the structural attributes as these are the ulterior attributes of the edifice. As such, the structural factors are the only genuinely independent variables, but they kick in via the causal mechanisms laid bare by the actor-centred explanations.

In other words, the post-communist world is one of differences in kind rather than differences in degree. There are two relatively stable equilibria, namely democracy in the Western part of the former communist bloc and autocracy in the South Eastern territories. These outcomes are stable because they reflect the combined presence of either auspicious or inauspicious structural and actor-centred attributes. As such, they can be understood as systemic lock-ins. Systemic differences are, by definition, differences of kind. Moving to the higher ground, then, the setting is characterised by form rather than formlessness, and it is more interesting to identify the clear differences in kind within the post-communist setting than the differences in degree for one very simple reason: this macro-region is indeed characterised by systematic, rather than random, diversity.

It should be noted, however, that the hybrid regimes situated in the old Soviet heartlands are much less stable, something that the so-called ‘colour revolutions’ of the preceding years testify to, and something that is reflected in their mixed score on the structural and actor-centred ‘packages’. This cluster, i.e. countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia, are those most open to change. But this implies a long-term prediction only, namely, that these regimes will at some point break down and become something else (which is the same as saying that they may move in the direction of autocracy, the direction of democracy, or the direction of another sub-species of hybrid regime).

This process is already visible on the ground. Since the early 1990s, the post-communist countries have been moving toward the ‘extremes’ of democracy and autocracy; and at present the category of hybrid regimes is on the verge of running dry. But—to reiterate, and in stark contradiction to the forebodings of the optimists and pessimists—the movement has not been synchronised. Instead of a ‘catholic’ future of either doom or deliverance, the post-communist reality appears to be one of heaven, hell and purgatory. As such, the post-communist reality affirms two basic lessons of social science: that point predictions is a game we are ill-equipped to play, and that the world of man is seldom uniform. ■

Decision-making Efficiency or Legislative Transparency?

Researcher, LAW Dept. | **Daniela Corona**

The codecision procedure constitutes the central part of my doctoral research on the bargaining process among the Member States in the EC decision-making system. The codecision procedure is where we can best observe how different national positions take shape, how Member States negotiate in the Council of Ministers, and how the latter interacts with the European Parliament and the Commission. After a short introduction on the role of the codecision procedure in the Community system and some empirical data on the way it functions, this article deals with the extent to which the evolution of the procedure in practice is justified by the need for efficiency.

In tackling the democratic deficit of the Community system and in an attempt to bring the European Union closer to its citizens, the Member States have made important modifications to the original EC Treaty in the course of successive Treaty reforms. In particular, the introduction by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) of the codecision procedure in Art. 189B TCE, now Art. 251 TCE, responded to precisely these demands for a stronger role of the directly elected European Parliament in the EC decision-making system and more transparency for the legislative process as a whole.

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), and the Treaty of Nice (2001) completed the picture: the codecision procedure applies to most Community policy areas; consequently, the European Parliament is on an equal footing in the adoption of legislative acts with the Council of Ministers, and the latter has been compelled to negotiate its position openly with the Parliament.

Codecision is clearly at the core of the 'Community method' and the project of the Constitutional Treaty has confirmed this fact, baptizing codecision as the 'ordinary legislative procedure'. Notwithstanding the complexity of the codecision's structure as per the EC Treaty (three readings with the *navette* between the two co-legislators, opinions given by the Commission for each of these steps, and possible convocation of a Conciliation Committee at the end of the procedure), both the European Parliament and the Council have repeatedly expressed their satisfaction with the way the procedure functions.

Empirical data relating to the acts adopted according to the codecision procedure are clear evidence of this success (all data are available on the Commission's web site and at www.codecisione.unimc.it). The



trend is to conclude the legislative process at an early stage of the procedure: in particular, the adoption of acts at first reading has leapt from 28% in the period 1999–2004 to the current 63%. The practice of daily contacts among the three Institutions involved has helped generate a culture of openness, dialogue and compromise testified by a number of Inter-Institutional Agreements devoted to strengthening the efficiency of the procedure (like the new *Joint Declaration on practical arrangements for the codecision procedure*, 2007), and to involving the European Parliament in ►►

- ▶ the implementation phase of the legislative acts (see *Comitology Decision*, 2006).

The result is that since the codecision procedure was introduced in the EC decision-making system the Institutions only failed to reach agreement in six cases, and this was due to the opposition of the European Parliament (lastly the controversial proposal of Software Patentability in 2005).

The EP takes its role of co-legislator seriously. It has shown more awareness on themes such as the environment and consumer affairs giving an important contribution to the development of such policies (see for example, Directive 2004/35/EC on the Environmental Liability and Regulation (EC) 717/2007 on Mobile Roaming). It has also been involved in public debate on decisive acts relating to harmonization such as the so-called Bolkestein Directive (Directive 2006/123/EC).

“Codecision is clearly at the core of the ‘Community method’ and the project of the Constitutional Treaty has confirmed this fact, baptizing codecision as the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’”

These results are even more surprising given the enlargement of the European Union and the increasing number of players in the codecision decision-making system. In this respect the data show that in the period May 2002–May 2004, prior to the accession of ten new Member States, the Council of Ministers adopted legislative acts by unanimity in 84% of cases, while in the period May 2004–May 2006, after the enlargement, the level of unanimity had risen to 89%.

Neither the complexity of the codecision mechanism, nor the number of the parties involved in the approval process seem to have affected the procedure’s efficiency. It is not surprising therefore that the working group on the Constitutional Convention that dealt with legislative procedures concluded that ‘codecision works well’.

But the discussion on the *efficiency* of codecision begs the question of the *transparency* of the legislative process. The need to reach an agreement as early as possible and the difficulty of carrying out the negotiation process with such a high number of participants in the Parliament and in the Council (evident in the conciliation phase when the Conciliation Committee, required to find a compromise solution *in extremis*, is made up of 54 members!) have pushed for the development of a practice of contacts not provided by the

Treaty but only by agreement among the Institutions. In this sense the ‘trialogue system’ (informal meeting of a few representatives for each Institution bargaining openly on the content of the legislative act) has proved vitally important for the good performance of the codecision procedure.

The main actors in this system are the *rapporteur* and/or the *shadow rapporteur* (from the major political groups of the Assembly) on behalf of the Parliament and a representative of the Presidency of the Council in charge at a given time (in practice, the Permanent Representative of the country holding the Presidency). In these meetings they agree on the text behind closed doors, so that when the issue comes to the Plenary of the European Parliament, and is on the table of the session of the Council’s meeting, the decision has already been taken. The two official co-legislators only have the power to respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the adoption of the legislative act as a whole (see for example the case of Directive 2006/24/EC on data retention adopted as previously agreed by the representatives of the Presidency and those of PPE and PSE even before the presentation of the proposal by the Commission!).

In short, the official steps of the codecision procedure, as laid down by the Treaty, have been supplemented—and almost substituted—by an informal level of decision-taking where it is often not possible to trace the real process of bargaining that takes place between the representatives of the European Parliament and of the Council.

As stressed in the second paragraph of the Preamble of the Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 on Transparency of access to Institution documents, ‘Openness enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system.’

In this sense, if the codecision procedure fully responds to the demand for efficiency in the EC decision-making system, it is questionable whether it corresponds, in practice, to the original *ratio* for which the procedure was introduced in the EC Treaty, that is, transparency and openness of the legislative process. ■

Patterns of Political Participation

Researcher, SPS Dept. | **Yvette Peters**

Researcher, SPS Dept. | **Kaat Smets**

A couple of years ago political scientist Russell J. Dalton observed that ‘Democracy is not just a spectator sport—it requires the active involvement of its citizens.’¹ Indeed, the way in which people participate in politics shapes the way in which a political system functions. In classical and contemporary theories of democracy, political participation is a way of protecting private interests whilst ensuring the practice of good government. It is not difficult to guess why academics continue to have such a great interest in the question of how and why people participate in politics.

Although there has been a marked increase in the number of democracies in the world in the twentieth century and alternatives to democratic systems are no longer normally considered as serious options, not all scholars are optimistic about the future of representative democracy. The shifting attitudes and changing behaviour of citizens in established democracies are a cause for growing concern regarding democracy and its state of health.

The problem is that over the past two decades citizens in many Western democracies have increasingly with-

“A couple of years ago political scientist Russell J. Dalton observed that ‘Democracy is not just a spectator sport—it requires the active involvement of its citizens’”

drawn from traditional forms of political participation. Voter turnout is declining, party membership is at an all-time low, and people are generally more disengaged from traditional, electoral politics as citizen’s confidence in key political institutions of democracy (e.g. elected leaders, parliaments and political parties) diminishes rapidly.

Political inactivity may be a consequence of both discontent about the way the political system functions, or a sign of aversion and apathy *vis-à-vis* politics in general. In any case, low levels of participation are generally seen as a problem for democracy. Lower bases may be an indication of declining support for democracy and of a rejection of the political system; it can lead to selective turnout and representation, and is often seen as a sign of growing distrust and cynicism. ►►



Yvette Peters



Kaat Smets

- ▶ If we assume these patterns are more than a mere variation in trend, there does indeed seem to be reason for concern about the future of democracy.

There are, however, also positive signs. In Western democracies citizens appear to be abstaining more and more from participation in traditional forms of political participation, but do not appear to have completely abandoned the idea of participating in politics per se. Today, many scholars support the idea that political participation is becoming less institutional and more individual; people do not necessarily abandon politics altogether, but simply change the channels through which they participate. Citizens in Western democracies are increasingly turning to more activist forms of political participation, such as demonstrating, signing petitions, and buying or boycotting specific products. These action repertoires are often on the verge of political and social participation and, as such, often fall outside the sphere of traditional electoral behaviour/participation.

“Today, many scholars support the idea that political participation is becoming less institutional and more individual”

The trend of declining levels of traditional participation, changing political attitudes, and the increase in levels of political participation outside the electoral sphere per se, is argued to apply to most, if not all, West European countries. Moreover, these developments seem to have accelerated almost everywhere from the 1990s onwards.

We should not generalize too quickly, however, as a closer look reveals that the trend is not necessarily the same in all countries. The general pattern is similar, but participation levels by type of political participation differ significantly among different European countries and a democratic crisis does not seem to be equally apparent in all West European countries.

The new patterns set in motion are unlikely, however, to change drastically in the near future. Research shows that it is the political behaviour of young people that appears to be most affected by the new patterns of political participation that have emerged in recent decades. Young adults have long been identified as the electoral group least likely to vote, but recent election studies show that voter turnout among young people is now declining more rapidly than before. On the other hand, it is exactly this age group that participates most in more activist forms of participation such as protest activity, political consumerism and contact-

ing. The idea that political routines are established in early adulthood is entrenched in the analysis of political participation. Young people are the political participants of the future and this makes their patterns of participation crucial to the future functioning of democracy. If participation patterns of contemporary young people are indeed a blueprint of their future participatory behaviour, we can safely expect recent trends to persist rather than the reverse.

One of the crucial questions is precisely how problematic the changing patterns of political participation are for democracy. To date, it has been unclear whether traditional and other forms of political involvement weigh differently *vis-à-vis* democracy. It has been argued that participation beyond party involvement is important in order to sustain democracy, but not which forms of participation, if any, are more important for democracy. All forms of political participation, and not only its traditional and electoral forms, help sustain democracy, but since political parties and elections play such a central role in representative democracy changing patterns of political participation may nevertheless be indicative of problems.

On the positive side, research shows that in most West European countries participation generates participation. People involved in more traditional and electoral forms of political participation tend to participate through other channels as well. Thus, it appears that newer forms of political participation complement (even though turnout is declining), rather than replace, traditional electoral participation. Overall, the number of ways in which people participate in politics has increased over the past decades and it is hard to see how this simple fact poses a threat to democracy.

Are we about to witness the last days of democracy any time soon? It would be unwise to leap to this conclusion. As mentioned, there does not appear to be a serious alternative to the current political system. Moreover, countries like the USA and Switzerland, which are known for their low levels of voter turnout, are still very much in existence. In other words, it is not clear when low levels of electoral participation become ‘too’ low. Rather than asking ourselves whether the end of democracy is near, it would be more appropriate to ask how the institutional side of democracy will adapt itself to the popular side of democracy. ■

¹ Russel J. Dalton (2000), ‘The Decline of Party Identifications’, in Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.), *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Can 'Global Public Goods' be Supplied Democratically?

Professor of International Law | **Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann**

The human rights objective of protecting individual self-development in dignity can only be realized in communities and constitutionally limited democracies. Today, ever more citizens are members not only of local and national communities, but also of international communities promoting the supply of private goods as well as of 'public goods' necessary for peaceful individual self-realization. The criteria used by economists to define public goods (i.e. non-rivalry and non-excludability) also apply to international public goods (and to 'public bads' such as global pollution). The mutually beneficial character of public goods raises the question of how self-interest can be harnessed for the collective supply of public goods.

Communities may not only offer the resources necessary for self-development; they may also stifle and suppress liberties. Hence the Kantian imperative that 'all men who can at all influence one another must adhere to some kind of civil constitution' protecting constitutional rights and limiting abuses of power in national, transnational and international human interactions. Human rights law and European law reflect this political insight: that legal empowerment of individuals by equal basic freedoms and the rule of law is one of the legal preconditions for supplying public goods at national and international levels (such as the rule of law and democratic peace protected by EC law for the benefit of 480 million EC citizens in 27 countries). Yet, the universal recognition of human rights by all 192 UN member states has not prevented widespread, worldwide 'governance failures' in the protection of human rights and of other




global public goods. Paradoxically, the more the freedom and welfare of citizens depend on global institutions for the collective supply of global public goods, the more citizens fear the oppressive potential of such institutions and argue in favour of devolving decision-making powers to the lowest possible 'subsidiary' levels. How then does one avoid the collision of global economics and local politics?

World markets are the most efficient places for producing private goods. Yet, European integration confirms that—just as democracies are sustainable only as 'constitutional democracies'—efficient common markets depend on an 'economic constitution' protecting citizens against abuses of public and private economic power. The obvious lack of such an adequate constitutional framework in the ►►

▶ world economy, which private markets cannot provide themselves, has been the subject of a number of research projects coordinated by Ulrich Petersmann at the EUI. A series of conferences with academics, members of parliaments and ambassadors of the leading trading nations explored whether the inadequate control by most national parliaments of worldwide rule-making in the World Trade Organization calls for new forms of parliamentary control, and ‘deliberative’ and ‘participatory democracy’ at the global level of the WTO.¹ These initiatives were pursued in comparative studies for the European Parliament on the ‘*Role of Parliaments in Scrutinising and Influencing Trade Policy*’;² and in a joint workshop of academics and members of the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade at Brussels. The workshop reports³ were presented to the Inter-Parliamentary Union at Geneva and were discussed at the regular meetings of the ‘Parliamentary Conference on the WTO’ with WTO ambassadors and WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, at Geneva.

The success of multilevel constitutionalism in Europe prompts many Europeans to argue that multilevel economic governance may require multilevel constitutional ‘checks and balances’ also at the level of worldwide regulation of markets



and worldwide dispute settlement institutions.⁴ US Congressmen, by contrast, are afraid that their participation in inter-parliamentary meetings, in order to better control worldwide organizations, may be criticized by their local constituencies in the US. Members of parliaments in developing countries fear they may lack sufficient resources to defend the interests of less-developed countries in inter-parliamentary meetings with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The less national parliaments and citizens control the power-oriented, intergovernmental regulation of global public goods (such as an open trading system) in distant worldwide organizations, the stronger the need for constitutional safe-

guards against abuses of discretionary foreign policy powers. As parliamentary democracy cannot be replicated at global levels, alternative forms of rights-based, participatory and deliberative democracy need to be strengthened. Yet, there is no international support for transferring European rights-based approaches to protecting international market freedoms, undistorted competition and human rights in Europe to world markets. Since 2001 the failures and opportunity costs of the WTO’s consensus-based ‘Doha Round negotiations’ reflect the lack of political and conceptual agreement on how to reduce the ‘jurisdictional gap’, the ‘participation gap’ and ‘incentive gap’⁵ impeding a more effective supply of global public goods. ■

¹ See E.U. Petersmann (ed.), *Reforming the World Trading System. Legitimacy, Efficiency and Democratic Governance* (2005).

² Published as European Parliament Study in December 2005 (DV/603690.doc).

³ Published by the European Parliament, *The Parliamentary Dimension of the WTO* (2006).

⁴ See C. Joerges and E.U. Petersmann (eds.), *Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation* (2006).

⁵ See I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (eds.), *Global Public Goods* (1999).

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European Democracy in the Age of Euroscepticism

Researcher, SPS Dept. | **Theresa Kuhn**



A particular form of Euroscepticism can result from feelings of 'being abandoned' experienced by an immobile segment of the European population who feel that neither their economic needs nor their political rights are fostered by European integration.

The great majority of European decision-makers have been enthusiastic about European integration ever since the project was launched in the 1950s. The 'Uniting of Europe' was not only a means of bringing peace and stability to a crisis-ridden continent, but was also a way to improve Europe's economic situation by reducing transaction costs and creating economies of scale in the Common Market. Moreover, it gave European citizens a wide array of new economic, social and political opportunities beyond the formerly confined

national borders. Today, Europeans are free to obtain their academic degree in Italy, earn their money in Denmark, invest it in Slovakia and retire to Spain. ►►

“The economically independent, highly educated and socially adaptable members of society can exploit the opportunities generated by integration, whereas the physically, economically and socially immobile ‘losers’ are locally bound and dependent on the services provided by their national welfare states”

- Why then, in spite of these benefits, are we seeing such steady and significant levels of Euroscepticism,¹ that is, opposition to European integration? Until the Maastricht Treaty European institutions could count on the so-called ‘permissive consensus’ of the European public, whereas today they are faced with what can only be described as a ‘constraining dissensus.’ Furthermore, why is there such a striking gap between élite and public appraisals of European integration? In other words, why has the Eurosceptic phenomenon mainly been exploited by extremist or opposition parties?

Europe needs to address popular resistance to integration and the (lack of) political responses to it for at least two reasons. First, due to the transfer of decision-making competences to the European institutions and the diminishing autonomy of Member States, the EU has a substantial impact on the everyday life of Europeans and has become a central locus of political decision-making. Consequently, public opinion about the EU is becoming increasingly important, complementing the measurement and analysis of public opinion about the nation-states in Europe. Second, the crisis after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands underlined the fact that widespread public dissent may have a tremendous impact on the prospects of further integration.

“European integration has improved the life chances of many Europeans with a wide array of extra-national resources, but access to these resources is unevenly distributed across society”

When assessing the factors that determine Euroscepticism—a concept which needs to be more carefully defined—scholars have formulated a number of different theoretical approaches. Until the Maastricht Treaty, economic cost-benefit analyses dominated the scholarly literature, but as the EU has evolved from a mainly economic to a more political project, emphasis has shifted to non-economic explanations such as institutional distrust, the democratic decision-making process in the EU, and the perceived threat to national identities.

In my Ph.D. thesis I want to measure and explain a particular form of Euroscepticism by focusing on the combination of economic rationality and democratic deficit. My working hypothesis is that the unbundling of national borders and the emergence of a supranational polity has led to a new, mobility-based cleavage in Europe. European integration has improved the life chances of many Europeans with a wide array of

extra-national resources, but access to these resources is unevenly distributed across society.

The economically independent, highly-educated and socially adaptable members of society can exploit the opportunities generated by integration whereas the physically, economically and socially immobile ‘losers’ in this process are locally bound and depend on the services provided within and by their national welfare state.² In turn, European welfare systems have increasingly come under pressure, such as the proliferation of international competition or the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), and are thus constrained when responding to citizens’ needs. In addition, immobile Europeans are not only unable to exploit the new extra-national resources, but their potential to pursue their interests by means of political participation is also limited. The nation-state is no longer the sole venue for interest articulation, but at the same time the EU still lacks the sort of structure which would allow efficient political participation. Moreover, one could hypothesize that governments tend to cater to the interests of mobile citizens who may move their economic and human capital elsewhere if they are not satisfied with national policies. As a consequence, locally-bound Europeans miss out on an effective way to pursue their interests.

These shortcomings mean that the direction and pace of the integration process are being set without listening to the voice of a great many Europeans. It is these Europeans, and potential ‘Eurosceptics’, who feel ‘abandoned’, and who perceive European integration as a process which is blatantly failing to promote their economic needs and political rights. ■

¹ P. Taggart (1998), ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems’, *European Journal of Political Research* 33(3): 363–88. Taggart defined Euroscepticism as ‘contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’.

² One can argue that the phenomena ‘Polish plumbers’ and other low-skilled labour migrants contradict this, but this only seems to apply to workers moving from low-wage to high-wage countries, while the workforce in the receiving countries are exposed to higher levels of labour-market competition.

Seclusion and Inclusion in Europe

Professor of Public Policy | **Adrienne Héritier**

Professor of Comparative Politics | **Peter Mair**

Over the past few years, and in particular since the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch voters, substantial attention has been devoted to the problems of democracy in the European Union and to ways to alleviate the perceived democratic deficit. Some argue for an approximation to representative government at the national level at a time when national representative government in 'old democracies' sometimes suffers from its own democratic deficits. Others emphasize the need to open up to civil society, with improved communication as a mode to increase inclusion between the governing and the governed.

These diverging proposals take issue with two contrasting developments which lie at the core of the research project we are currently developing: seclusion and inclusion. Our research project, SIEPOL, analyses the causes, processes and impact of political seclusion and inclusion at the European level and at the national level of the old Member States, as well as the inter-relationship between these levels. We focus primarily on the role of *institutions* in the process of seclusion and inclusion, and on their relation to the democratic functioning of the European Union and its Member States. By seclusion and inclusion we refer to the following: at both the European and national levels, we appear to be witnessing two contrasting developments—on the one hand, political decision-makers appear increasingly 'sealed off' or 'secluded' from the wider constituency, and, indeed from the rank-and-file of elected politicians; on the other hand, there are multiple and diffuse attempts at a radical opening-up of democratic decision-making that invoke greater inclusion through direct-democratic procedures, greater decision-making transparency, more widespread access to information, and greater contacts with civil society. What drives these developments at the European and national levels? Are they related? And what are their implications for democratic legitimacy in Europe?

We study these processes at the level of the *European Union*, and at the *national level* of established democracies. At the European level we see an increasing shift of legislative decision-making from public and politicized forums into small-scale and sealed-off arenas in the framework of informal 'trialogues', where legislation is adopted as 'early agreements' at first reading. The development is particularly puzzling and counter-intuitive because a series of Treaty reforms has introduced and extended the co-decision procedure precisely as a means to bolster ►►



“ Our research project, SIEPOL, analyses the causes, processes and impact of political seclusion and inclusion at the European level and at the national level of the old Member States, as well as the inter-relationship between these levels ”

- ▶ procedural democracy. At the European level we can also observe increasing degrees of delegation, leaving decisions to the implementing powers of the Commission under comitology procedures. Additionally, policy-making functions have more often shifted to independent regulatory agencies. While clearly involving efficiency gains, delegating the specification of legislative decisions to executive bodies implies an increasing seclusion from democratic decision-making. In various countermeasures the European Parliament has sought to contain this development in order to secure the inclusion of more parliamentarians and a wider constituency.

At the national level it has become increasingly clear that many of the EU Member States, in common with many long-standing democracies world-wide, are facing domestic difficulties with democracy. In other words, the conventional model of representative government at the national level—which for some serves as a model for the European level—is also running into difficulties. Despite occasional surges, turnout at national elections has tended to decline, particularly since the end of the 1980s; levels of party membership have sunk to a record low; and both the stability and strength of levels of partisan identity have considerably weakened. In many of the European polities, electoral outcomes are becoming less and less predictable and, across the EU as a whole, a variety of new anti-establishment populist parties of both the right and the left prove increasingly popular at the polls. All this suggests that there is indeed a problem in the growing exclusionary gap between citizens and democratic governments. However, at the same time as citizens are withdrawing from engagement with the conventional national political institutions, the institutions themselves are being reformed in an apparently more inclusionary direction. To name just a few: within the Member States, regional levels of government are being invested with new powers and political authority; proposals for the reform of electoral systems are being discussed and sometimes implemented; referenda, citizens' juries and various forms of plebiscitary instruments are being introduced for issues that are contentious but that often cut across traditional partisan divides,

and policy-making processes increasingly take place through non-majoritarian institutions.

Studying both levels draws attention to possible links between processes of seclusion at the *European level and the national level and vice versa*, and this is also where our research project aims. The simultaneous processes of seclusion and inclusion at the European and national level may be mutually reinforcing. Thus, the more insulated decision-making at the European level, the fewer the incentives for *organized* political representation at the national level, whether this representation seeks to mould European policies as such, or to mould those national policies that are subject to European constraints. Hence, there are fewer incentives to sustain the classic models of party democracy. Using more comitology and fast-track legislation at the European level not only disempowers 'ordinary' members of the European Parliament, but also weakens national parliaments. Democracy in Europe is changing, both institutionally and behaviourally, as well as at the national and European levels, and it is towards this important theme that the SIEPOL project is directed. ■

Births

Congratulations to **Stephanie Seul** and **Christoph Ulrich Schmid** on the birth of their son, **Jakob Benjamin**, on 17 September 2007.





Degree Conferring Ceremony at the European University Institute



Friday, 5 October 2007
Badia Fiesolana

On Friday 5 October, the President of the European University Institute, Prof. Yves Mény, conferred the Institute's doctorate on the following recent graduates. The President also conferred the Institute's LL.M. on Pál Belényesi.

Doctors in History and Civilization

Ana Cecilia AVALOS FLORES
Paulina Joanna BOCHENSKA
Claus CORNELIUSSEN
John CRONIN
Jacob Marinus DE WAARD
Serena FERENTE
Clemens MAIER
Arnout MERTENS
Paul NOER
Reudiger VON KROSIGK
Vera ZIEGELDORF

Doctors in Economics

Mauro BAMBI
Andrea BARONE
Pedro Andre CERQUEIRA
Peter Gunther Antoon CLAEYS
Joao Carlos Cerejeira DA SILVA
Zeno ENDERS
Jose Aitor ERCE DOMINGUEZ
Stephan Alexander FAHR
Lapo FILISTRUCCHI
Marco GALBIATI
Andrea GALLICE
Per Martin KARLSSON
Stephan Alexander KOHLER
Tomasz KOZLUK
Lusine LUSINYAN
Alexander MURAVYEV
Aurelien Wylliam SAIDI
Guido SCHWERDT
Anzelika ZAICEVA

Doctors in Law

Mehreen AFZAL
Stine ANDERSEN
Juan Lorenzo ARPIO
SANTACRUZ
Daniel AUGENSTEIN
Hervé BRIBOSIA
Patrycja Karolina DABROWSKA
Martin John DORIS
Alexandra GATTO
Jorge Alexandre GODINHO
Paul Gerard HARVEY
Anna HEROLD
Enikő HORVATH
Assimakis KOMNINOS
Sandra MARCO COLINO

Giuseppe MAZZIOTTI
Elisa MORGERA
Thomas Andrew James ROBERTS
Orla Mary SHEEHY
Georg Sebastian SOMMEREGGER
Eva Christina STORSKRUBB
Beata ZIORKIEWICZ
Przemyslaw Dariusz ZYSK

Doctors in Political and Social Sciences

Simon O'NEILL BOUCHER
Fabian Herbert BREUER
Falk DAVITER
Rik DE RUITER
Diana DIGOL
Andrew Richard GLENCROSS
Eve Victoria HEPBURN
Simcha JONG KON CHIN
Dragana MARJANOVIC
Maria Elena MARTINEZ
BARAHONA
Anastassia OBYDENKOVA
Olaf Konrad OSICA
Giulia PAOLINI
Babak RAHIMI
Fernanda Carla SANTOS
Ursula Christina SCHROEDER
Pristina STOECKL
Tamara STUMPFLIN
Wim Frans Leonarda VAN AKEN

Master of Law

Pál BELÉNYESI



During the Ceremony, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, delivered a speech in which he discussed the importance of the role played by the European Parliament in foreign affairs.



This year's Mauro Cappelletti Prize was awarded to Eva Storskrubb for her thesis entitled "Judicial Corporation in Civil Matters—A Policy Area Uncovered" which she defended in October 2006 under the supervision of Prof. Jacques Ziller.














The Legitimacy of the EU after Enlargement

Fernand Braudel Fellow | Jacques Thomassen

Assessing the effect of the 2004 enlargement on the legitimacy of the European Union is part of an ongoing project of the European Elections Study (EES) Group, and has been my major research project during my stay at the EUI. There are two ways to assess the legitimacy of a political system: evaluating it against criteria derived from normative theory; and assessing to what extent it has legitimacy in the eyes of a particular polity. Our study does both, but this article focuses on the first. We elaborated a normative theory and developed a set of criteria for three dimensions of legitimacy: identity, representation and accountability, and performance. This article focuses on representation.

Most contemporary theories of democracy treat democracy as *electoral* democracy. The idea of electoral democracy has been developed in the context of the nation-state and whether it is applicable to the European Union is a matter of dispute, but the *Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe* (Art. I-46) explicitly recognized the principle of representative democracy at the European level, with a key role for European political parties: ‘The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy’ (46.1); ‘Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament’ (46.2); ‘Political parties at European level contribute to

forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union’ (46.4).

This article recognises two different channels of political representation: national and direct citizen representation at the EU level. In contrast to the national level the need for a full-blown system of representative democracy at EU level is still being debated and depends on how one perceives the EU as an organization, and on different normative views of democracy. If one accepts the need for electoral democracy at the EU level, one can specify criteria with which to evaluate the daily practice of EU politics.

The view on representative democracy expressed in the Treaty is consistent with the dominant model of political representation, the *model of party government*. According to this model elections function as an instrument of democracy when the following requirements are met: voters have a choice between at least two parties with different policy proposals; voters choose the party that best represents their policy preferences; there is sufficient internal cohesion of parliamentary parties to enable them to implement their policies; and the party/coalition of parties winning the elections takes over government. This is a stringent set of re- ►►



- requirements—even at the national level—but is a useful conceptual framework to evaluate the effectiveness of the process of political representation in a polity.

According to the political science literature none of these essential requirements of the process of political representation operates effectively at the European level. First, despite the increased—and perhaps underestimated—powers of the European Parliament, it does not form and control a European government, for the simple reason that there is no such thing, at least not in any traditional sense of the concept. Therefore, at least one requirement of the system of party government, formation and control of the government by a majority in Parliament, is not met.

We focus on whether the remaining requirements of the party government model are met, i.e. those referring to political parties and voters, before and after enlargement. According to the party government model, political parties should supply different policy platforms from which voters can choose. At the European level this does not occur. European political parties do not compete for the votes of a European electorate. European elections are still the arena of national political parties, fought by national parties and mainly on national issues. Moreover, voters choose on the basis of their opinions on national issues and their perception of the position of national political parties on these issues. As a consequence, European elections fail as an instrument of democracy at the European level because they fail to express the will of European citizens on European issues, i.e. the process of European integration itself.

“The more political parties base their policy appeals on cross-national cleavages rather than on national interests, the better they will ‘express the will of citizens of the Union’ ”

One remedy is for political parties to organize at the European level and fight elections on European rather than national issues. However, the idea that elections for the European Parliament should be fought on ‘European issues’ is based on a basic misunderstanding. Formal decisions on a further transfer of sovereignty, from the national to the European level, and on enlargement, are subject to the intergovernmental regime of European decision-making. They need the consent of national governments and are in principle under the control of national parliaments and national electorates.

The paradox is that what are usually called *European* issues are basically national issues. The failure of the existing party system to offer a meaningful choice to voters is a *national* rather than a European problem.

Thus, the crucial test for the effectiveness of the European system of political representation is the extent to which it is effective in more substantive policy areas where the European Parliament is competent. However, this argument hardly changes the verdict on the European system of political representation. It is still true that European political parties do not compete for the votes of a European electorate, that European elections are fought by national political parties and mainly on national issues, and that voters choose on the basis of their opinions on national issues.

This does not necessarily mean that European elections fail as an instrument to ‘express the will of the citizens of the Union’. Once we accept that the European level of governance is mainly responsible for substantive rather than constitutional issues, there is no reason why ‘European issues’ should be very different from the issues on national policy agendas. On the contrary, the effectiveness of a European system of political representation depends on its ability to aggregate and integrate national political agendas and national cleavage structures at the European level. The major challenge for an effective democratic political system at the European level is to overcome the traditional dividing lines in Europe, the national borders. The more political differences coincide with national borders, the more disruptive the politicization of these differences. But the more political parties base their policy appeals on cross-national cleavages rather than on national interests, the better they will ‘express the will of citizens of the Union’.

Although there is not much of a *process* of political representation at the European level, elections for the European Parliament—following the requirements of the party government model—may still serve this function: if political parties of the same party family across Member States develop similar party manifestos and profiles for election campaigns; if their voters across Europe have similar policy priorities and vote according to similar considerations; if membership of a particular party group rather than a particular national background defines the policy views and roll-call behaviour of MEPs.

Research shows that these requirements are remarkably well met. The compatibility of national party systems is surprisingly high due to a roughly similar cleavage structure across Western Europe. The manifestos of parties in the same party family are constrained by the same ideological dimensions, in particular by the left–right dimension. MEPs are organized in political groups rather than in national delegations, whereas ►►

- roll-call votes are to a large extent explained by their positions on the left-right dimension.

In all EU countries the left-right position is one of the most significant factors explaining party choice and the effect of left-right is about the same. In this sense one can speak of 'a single European electorate'. This makes the left-right dimension a good vehicle for meaningful mass-élite communication across the EU, and the system of political representation *at the European level* functions much better than often assumed. Despite the lack of a *process* of political representation at the European level, the aggregation of the outcomes of national processes still leads to reasonable policy congruence between party groups in the European Parliament and their electorates across Europe, at least on policy issues related to the left-right dimension.

However, most empirical evidence supporting this conclusion is based on research carried out *before* the 2004 enlargement. Are the post-communist parties and their voters sufficiently similar to their West European counterparts to fit the existing party system? If not, the national cleavage systems and national systems of political representation cannot be aggregated into an effective process of political representation at the European level. The dominance of the left-right dimension in most West-European democracies is generally attributed to historical commonalities, in particular the industrial revolution. Eastern European party systems have more recent origins and the nature of cleavages in these countries is still unclear. This caused concern that their political parties and dimensions of contestation would not fit the European party system.

The project's findings suggest that the inclusion of the post-communist countries in the European Union did not produce a fundamental change in the left-right structuring of either voting behaviour or the party system. Left-right is by far the most important factor structuring the voting behaviour of the electorate in the new Member States. Therefore, the idea of a single European electorate, primarily motivated by the same left-right dimension, can still be sustained. However, that is not to say that there are no differences. The effect of left-right orientations on party choice is significantly weaker in the new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe than in the older Member States. Furthermore, citizens in Central and Eastern Europe are more egalitarian, anti-immigrant and socially conservative than their Western European counterparts. Hence, even though the differences between the voters of different parties follow the same pattern in new and old Member States, at the electoral level the East-West differences *within* the party groups are in some cases even greater than the differences *between* them. This means that although the left-right dimension is still a

good vehicle for mass-élite communication across the EU, the issue space that needs to be represented by a single European party group has expanded.

“We can still say that the 2004 enlargement had less of an effect on the effectiveness of the European system of political representation than expected”

With regard to the development of the European party system, the 2004 enlargement hardly had any effect on it. An analysis of party manifestos and expert judgments reveals that the parties from the new Member States fit into the existing party system and do not seriously affect the cohesiveness and distinctiveness of the party groups. With or without the new members the party groups in the European Parliament look very much the same. This is confirmed by an analysis of roll calls in the Parliament since 2004. The left-right divide is still the most important dimension explaining roll-call behaviour, just as before enlargement.

However, there are indications of tensions within the major party groups. Like the voters from Central and Eastern European countries, their MEPs tend to be less libertarian and more traditional or authoritarian than their Western European colleagues. As a general conclusion we can still say that the 2004 enlargement had less of an effect on the effectiveness of the European system of political representation than expected.

This does not mean, however, that the 2004 enlargement did not have an effect on the legitimacy of the EU. Representation is only one dimension examined in our study of legitimacy. The effect of the enlargement on the dimension of identity, for example, is a totally different story. Both the development of a European identity and of a sense of a European political community suffered a serious setback as a result of enlargement. ■

¹ This article is based on J.J.A. Thomassen (ed.), *The Legitimacy of the European Union after Enlargement*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. For EES publications see www.europeanelectionstudies.net.

² See J.J.A. Thomassen, 'Empirical Research into Political Representation: Failing Democracy or Failing Models', in *Elections at Home and Abroad: Essays in Honor of Warren Miller*, M. K. Jennings and T. E. Mann (eds.), Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1994.

³ This does not solve the problem. In most countries opinions on 'Europe' are not related to the main left-right dimension, and national elections are not an instrument of linkage. As a result major political parties are taken by surprise by their own electorate in referenda on European treaties.

Democracy and the Internet: A Research Agenda

Swiss Chair | **Alexander H. Trechsel**



The European University Institute has always been a privileged place for reflecting on democracy across the disciplines of the social sciences and EUI professors, fellows, researchers and visitors have produced a large corpus of research on democracy-related issues. With the rapid development of the information society, an increasing number of EUI academics have started to focus on the linkage between new information and communication technologies (ICTs) and democracy.

In an early study on the impact of ICTs on Parliaments and Parties in Europe, Philippe C. Schmitter, Fernando Mendez, Raphaël Kies and I formulated a working definition of e-democracy as: '[a]ll electronic means of communication that enable/empower citizens in their efforts to hold rulers/politicians accountable for their actions in the public realm. Depending on the aspect of democracy being promoted, e-democracy can employ different techniques: (1) for increasing the *transparency* of the political process; (2) for enhancing the direct involvement and *participation* of citizens; and, (3) for improving the quality of opinion formation by opening new spaces of information and *deliberation*.'

E-democratic techniques have been developed to promote these three aspects of democracy. E-access techniques to improve access to official documents and political information are designed to enhance the *transparency* of the political process. This has been studied in the EUI-led research on Parliaments' and Political Parties' websites in the EU25 in 2004.

E-consultations, e-petitions and e-voting initiatives aim to foster greater citizen *participation*. This aspect of e-democracy has been widely studied by political scientists at the EUI. In particular, the experience with internet voting in Estonia has led to a research agenda of its own. Estonia was the first nation in the world where the internet revolution that started in 1995 converged most directly with the democratic revolution that began more than 2,000 years ago. The blending of these two revolutions may alter the way in which we understand elections and politics far into the future.

The key to making internet voting work in Estonia, as in other European nations that have had successful experiences with internet voting, is to have a legal structure, a technology infrastructure, and a political culture that is supportive of this voting mode. Internet voting has simple requirements that have to be met for it to be effective: clear rules for how voters will be authenticated; clear rules for when people can use the system; and clear rules for determining when and how to tabulate the ballots. It also requires that the technology of the system itself—the internet voting platform—be secure.

Most characteristics of internet voting are far from revolutionary. Take postal voting, which has become trendy in various constituencies around the globe. It has two features that pave the way for the introduction of internet voting: the introduction of a period of time during which voters can cast a ballot, and can do so *remotely*. The Estonian internet voting scheme shares these features: citizens can cast a ballot remotely, and for more than a few hours on voting day. This excludes the myriad systems of electronic voting from our focus which are based on electronic voting machines that replace the traditional ballot box. What is revolutionary with internet voting is that ballots can be cast remotely via the internet.

Over the past decade a handful of countries have successfully conducted internet voting trials, including France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. All these trials have been conducted at the local ►►

- ▶ and regional levels of government, targeting specific populations of voters. However, the nation that has advanced the farthest with internet voting is Estonia, a former Soviet republic on the Baltic Sea and now a full member of the European Union. Since 2000, Estonia has had two elections in which all voters could use internet voting. The first was for local elections in October 2005 and the second was for national parliamentary elections in March 2007.

Thanks to the support of the Council of Europe and the Estonian Electoral Commission, a team of researchers from the EUI, the California Institute of Technology and the University of Utah combined data on the legal, technological, political, and social context of internet voting in Europe.¹ Two large-n computer-assisted telephone surveys were designed and run by this team following the 2005 and 2007 elections in Estonia. The data contain information on voters who cast ballots in-person and over the internet—as well as a sample of non-voters, allowing us to compare these voters demographically and attitudinally. In our research, we focus on three models that have traditionally been used to explain the interaction of turnout and voting technology—socio-economic factors, political factors and ICT factors—and consider which best explains why voters choose using the internet as their channel for voting. In addition, the data allow us to test for the political impact of internet voting: are parties losing or winning because of, or thanks to, internet voting?

Our preliminary findings show that, in the Estonian case (as in the Swiss case), internet voting did not boost turnout as much as anticipated. However, younger voters tend to turn out much more frequently using this new channel of participation. The dimensions with the largest impact on the choice of internet voting over other forms of participation are trust-related (trust in the state, trust in the internet voting mechanism itself), as well as ICT skills. As regards the political impact, it turns out that the latter is rather absent. To date, nobody had made overwhelming gains or losses with the introduction of internet voting. However, such a finding cannot, for the moment, be generalized. As a number of liberal democracies currently envisage the introduction of internet voting, our findings have, nevertheless, attracted a lot of attention from international organisations, the media, the policy-making community and colleagues in academia.

Finally, the third element of our definition of e-democracy focuses on deliberation. Here, the development of e-forums, to enhance the process of citizen's opinion-formation through greater deliberation, is central to the aspirations of many e-democracy advocates. Currently, several research projects financed by the European Commission, in which the EUI is a part-

ner, seek among other things, to analyse the effects of e-deliberation. Once again, Estonia figures amidst this research agenda as one such project is a study of an Estonian e-participation initiative to enable citizens to become involved in the legislative decision-making process (for more details go to www.eudo.eu).

Note that these three conceptually distinct dimensions of e-democracy are not mutually exclusive, but are developed in overlapping and reinforcing combinations. Most of our research, and most of the research conducted worldwide, has concentrated on one or other aspect of e-democracy. We still lack a comprehensive theory of e-democracy, let alone a solid empirical test of the latter, but progress towards a better understanding of electronic democracy is being made—also at the EUI. Currently, several EUI researchers are focussing on one or other aspect of electronic democracy. This despite the fact that e-democracy remains a (fast-) moving target, which makes it challenging for any researcher to get a grasp on.

“E-democracy is '[a]ll electronic means of communication that enable/empower citizens in their efforts to hold rulers/politicians accountable for their actions in the public realm”

The coming together of democracy and new ICTs offers the social sciences myriad methodological innovations. Our traditional instruments for observing political phenomena in the democratic realm are producing valuable insights. However, as our societies become increasingly digitalized, as social and political interactions are increasingly penetrated—if not dominated—by ICTs, scientists are slowly but surely discovering the opportunities offered by ICT-generated data. Harvard methodologist Gary King notes that thanks to these developments 'Political science can make more dramatic progress than ever before'. Our e-democracy research agenda at the EUI is taking this claim seriously, and our research not only examines the impact of ICTs on democracy, but also uses ICTs *for our research* in novel and promising ways. Our research target therefore becomes our tool—an allegedly tricky but methodologically fascinating endeavour. ■

¹ A research monograph, *The Internet Voting Revolution*, is currently being written by Prof. R. Michael Alvarez (California Institute of Technology), Prof. Thad Hall (University of Utah), Dr. Guido Schwerdt (EUI Alumnus) and myself, and will be published in 2008.

Deliberative Opinion Polling

Researcher, SPS Dept. | **Jordanka Tomkova**

As part of my research, this October in Brussels, I had the opportunity to observe 362 citizens from 27 EU countries, speaking in 21 different languages and participating in the first ever pan-European deliberative opinion poll. The three-day initiative was organised under *Plan D for Democracy, Debate, Dialogue*, launched in 2005 by the European Commission. This comprises a series of activities to ‘inject more democracy into the Union, to stimulate a wide public debate and build a new consensus on the future direction of the European Union’.¹ As part of these activities, the deliberative poll enabled a representative random sample of European citizens to come together to engage in focus group discussions and to interact face-to-face with political representatives and policy experts. By facilitating the experience, the Commission also sought to better understand common views held by European citizens on the issues of pensions, jobs, and EU foreign policy. The event was impressive in its magnitude. The sheer logistics were mind-boggling.

“The deliberative poll exposes citizens to discursive settings where competing viewpoints are exchanged among peers, and where citizens have the opportunity to discuss and become better informed through direct and face-to-face interaction with politicians and policy experts”

The deliberative opinion polling method, developed by James Fishkin at Stanford University, goes beyond the conventional public opinion poll and other forms of public consultation. Deliberative polling addresses the fact that citizens are often misinformed about key policy issues. Secondly, it challenges the assumption that citizens are not capable of participating in constructive discussion on political and public policy matters. The deliberative poll exposes citizens to discursive settings where competing viewpoints are exchanged among peers, and where citizens have the opportunity to discuss and become better informed through direct and face-to-face interaction with politicians and policy experts. The deliberative environment, proponents argue, differs from the limited snapshot polls or mediated channels crowded with catchy sound bites, strong visual images and often simplistic ‘dummyfied’ reasoning through which citizens normally receive public information.

Deliberation as a form of civic, and indirectly, political participation, has its roots in Habermas’ theory of communicative action where peers engage in critical self-reflection, rational argumentation (and conflict resolution), reciprocal feedbacks, and thus *moral-practical* discourse, in spaces free from (political and economic) domination. Rather than being passive consumers of information from external and often vertically power-defined sources, in deliberative processes, citizens assume a more active role in expressing, listening and positioning their views *vis-à-vis* their peers as well as the collective. Consequently, they tend to overcome their initially subjectively biased views in favour of a rationally motivated agreement, or pragmatic consensus,² thereby contributing to a more democratic—people-driven—formation of collective preferences. These last aspects are particularly significant for the deliberative polling approach. As part of the process, in addition to group discussions, a series of polls using structured questionnaires are conducted before, during and after deliberations to measure the extent to which participants’ policy preferences shift in the process. The method was applied in over forty countries and has shown that participants do indeed change their views and opinions on targeted policy issues. In the United States, results from deliberative polls conducted during pre-election debates indicate that a significant number of citizens were prepared to vote differently after having participated in the deliberation process.

The recent EU deliberative poll has confirmed this finding in the European context. The poll emphasised jobs, pensions and foreign policy as its key themes. For example, there was a 10% change on the issue of enlargement, among those agreeing that ‘adding more countries to the EU would make it more difficult for the EU to make decisions’, which rose from 52% to 62%. On pensions, support for ‘raising the retirement age’ rose from 26% to 40%, and support for ‘making it attractive to work longer before retiring’ from 57% to 70%. Moreover, before deliberation, participants from the new Member States only answered 37% of the general knowledge questions about the EU correctly, whereas after deliberation, the level increased to 53%. Responses by citizens from the old Member States also rose, but from a slightly higher base of 40% before deliberation, and to a final score of 56%.

What implications does deliberative opinion polling have, if any, for contemporary democracy? Firstly, there ►►



► is increasing evidence that experimentation with methods such as participatory budgeting, referenda and ballot initiatives, public consultation forums, proposals for citizen juries, options for recall and more recently the use of new technologies to stimulate political participation, has risen since the 1990s. In order to offset, or soften, the impact of the democratic deficit(s) and to re-insert the ‘we the people’ into the democratic equation, deliberative polling adds yet another alternative to the arsenal of instruments in the toolbox of participatory democracy. But what is the *real* effect of these tools? Is the deliberative poll simply another ‘talking shop’ to pacify citizens or to auto-gratify political institutions? Or, do its outcomes really affect policy agenda-setting and decision-making processes? Here, the story is less exciting. Although inventive participatory methods are indeed being used in democratic practice, the extent of their causal impact on changes in the status quo of political behaviour, as regards citizens, political institutions or representatives, is inconclusive. On the other hand, perhaps there are no immediate, concrete or measurable macro outcomes stemming from deliberative civic participation. Instead, their value may rest on the fact that they are micro-processes and/or in their interpreted value by individual participants which in turn generate soft aggregate impacts such as informed citizenry or the experiential benefits of being ‘involved’.

The second implication is actually a challenge. One of the tenets of the classical representative model of democracy is that elections are the central defining event

“In deliberative processes, citizens assume a more active role in expressing, listening and positioning their views *vis-à-vis* their peers as well as the collective”

in the political cycle of a democratic system. Thus, it is assumed that there is little or no citizen-representative interactivity and feedback between elections. The assumption is that both political élites once elected, and citizens once they have voted, sink into cruise control mode with the former ‘representing’ and the latter ‘being represented’. If this is true, and if we accept the sceptics’ views that attempts to introduce more participation have been futile and inconclusive with no real net changes to the status quo of representative democracy, then one is prompted to ask ‘Why do political institutions and their representatives increasingly seek to use these participatory methods? And why would they do so between elections when, according to the rational vote seeker model and popular belief, politicians should care less as they are not shopping for votes? Could it then be that the political élites, consciously or unconsciously, actually do listen to the disgruntled civic pulse more than anticipated, and that they do so for reasons other than getting re-elected next time around?’

My last point refers to the costs of democracy. What price are we willing to pay as citizens, taxpayers and ►►

► Europeans to deepen, enrich or repair our democracies? How much, for example, did it cost to put on an event like *Plan D*, with 3,500 citizens across Europe surveyed by telephone, over 60 translators, 367 airline tickets, 367 people fed and housed in Brussels for three days, not to mention the administrative costs involved? How much and what forms of participation can a democracy support without being overdosed? On what grounds do we base our cost-benefit analysis of events such as deliberative polls? Do the normative and legitimating aspects of participatory politics offset the costs involved? These rather simple questions are not entirely new. They only begin to scratch the surface of a larger edifice of postulates in democratic theory which oscillate between Schumpeter's minimalist representative model, republican ideals, direct democracy and all the shades in between. Nonetheless proponents of participatory democracy ought to constructively reflect upon them when widening the parameters of participation in contemporary politics. As history has

shown, matching ideals in practice can be a perilous endeavour. On the other hand, if taking contemporary context(s) constructively into account, there is perhaps nothing wrong with equipping our policy-makers with a larger participatory toolbox offering them a wider array of tools to customise remedies, deepen, and to improve our democratic polities which are constantly challenged from within and without by multitudes of socio-economic and political realities. ■

¹ European Commission (2005), *European Commission launches Plan D for Democracy, Debate and Dialogue*, Press Release, IP/05/1272, 14 October. See also www.tomorrowseurope.eu.

² Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987). Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984-87).


European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO): an update

The Spring/Summer (2006) issue of the EUI Review contained a three-page presentation of the newly-created **European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO)**. Since its launch, EUDO has undergone a number of positive developments. First, having started life as an institutionally free-floating structure, it is now fully integrated into the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS). Second, several research projects were awarded to EUDO and numerous conferences, workshops and lectures took place within its framework over the past 18 months. Third, as of 2008, EUDO will host the following five sub-observatories:

- Sub-Observatory on Public Opinion, Political Elites and the Media, directed by Prof. Mark Franklin (SPS) and Prof. Alexander H. Trechsel (SPS)
- Sub-Observatory on Civil Society, directed by Prof. Donatella Della Porta (SPS)
- Sub-Observatory on Political Parties and Representation, directed by Prof. Luciano Bardi (University of Pisa) and Prof. Peter Mair (SPS)
- Sub-Observatory on Democratic Institutional Reform, directed by Prof. Adrienne Héritier (SPS and RSCAS) and Prof. Bruno de Witte (LAW)
- Sub-Observatory on Citizenship in Europe, directed by Prof. Rainer Bauböck (SPS).

As of the next academic year (2008/2009) EUDO will host a Jean Monnet fellowship funded by the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy.

For further information on EUDO please refer to its website: www.eudo.eu, or contact the EUDO coordinator Prof. Alexander H. Trechsel at alexander.trechsel@eui.eu.



No Passion, No Participation: The Nature of E-democracy

Researcher, SPS Dept. | **Kristjan Vassil**

When talking about e-democracy we usually apply the practices of democratic processes to the new communicational setting embedded in the larger framework of information and communication technologies (ICT). We look for convergence between (deliberative) democracy and the internet, and try to explain how one affects the other. I argue that the nature of e-democracy lies far beyond the concepts of deliberative democracy and excessive rationalism in affective and passionate political behaviour, the sort of behaviour that we have not seen for quite some time. In other words, 'No passion. No participation.'

When examining the major difficulties faced by the emerging research field of e-democracy one must take into account two fundamental approaches that frame contemporary understanding of the subject.

First, there is a considerable amount of empirical evidence of an increasing disengagement in western democracies from politics in both attitudes and behaviour. On the level of attitude we can see declining trust in political institutions, and at the behavioural level we witness falling voter turnout and people joining political parties less than ever before. Second, the rapid development of ICT is perceived as a mechanism with potential to improve political engagement, and as an important opportunity to increase democratic participation by reducing the costs of obtaining information, creating new social networks and increasing interactivity between government and citizens.

This framework allows us to make a blunt generalization: if declining political engagement is a civic disease and the development and deployment of ICT is a cure, then the political organism can be healed by matching the two. Today no serious scholar thinks so, but this was a common standpoint in the mid-1990s. Since 2000, however, there has been a marked shift towards the pessimistic outlook when describing the triangular relationship of technology, the citizen and politics.

The causes of more pessimistic views are empirical. Namely, if the initial elements of e-democracy were applied we would *not* see fundamental changes in the process of democratic participation. Indeed, even one of the most tangible applications, remote electronic voting, has only had a modest impact on electoral turnout and democratic participation. Many studies have shown that new means of communication play a marginal role in facilitating the process of political engagement.



Consequently, people are drifting away from politics despite the fact that they have more ways to communicate with each other, and with the state, than ever before. How can we explain the two intrinsically connected phenomena of decreasing interest in politics within the framework of an almost ideal communicative setting, and how can we connect the demand (decreasing interest) with the offer (technological opportunities)?

One of the reasons why expected 'killer applications' proved inefficient may lie in the concept of technological transformation. Governments have tried to adapt to the new technological environment, and have introduced a number of new digital services for citizens, but their core functions have remained the same. Governments are doing the same old things simply using new tools. How can one expect change (effect), when the foundational settings have not altered (cause)? The ►►

“‘Passion is crucial for making political choices, creating political community, and motivating political action. No passion. No participation’”

- ▶ essence of the technological development is not only to provide ‘assistantship’ to ordinary practices, but to allow the emergence of processes that were not previously possible. Furthermore, the emergence of new processes cannot be chosen or controlled, but is an inevitable logic embedded in technological development. But let us leave technology aside and examine whether and how we can benefit from the concept of democratic participation and rational deliberation.

It is often argued that one of the key elements of effective democracy is deliberation, yet it is precisely effective deliberation that is absent in most democratic societies. The reasons are associated with large-scale and serious political discussion. Technologically speaking, ICT can provide a platform to host deliberative actions, but this is evidently not enough. The Habermasian public sphere cannot simply be carried over to the new environment and expected to work properly just because it has good technological foundations.

In trying to connect deliberative democracy and technology, let me focus on one particular area of communicative participation that is often overlooked—passion and motivation in participatory behaviour. The following discussion is based on Peter Dahlgren’s chapter in *Researching Media, Democracy and Participation* and Cheryl Hall’s book *The Trouble with Passion: Political Theory Beyond the Reign of Reason*.

The major problem with the concept of deliberative democracy is that it presupposes an excessive rationalism from the actors involved and ignores some rather important trends that we can observe in our everyday practices. Let us look at engagement and participation. Dahlgren makes a distinction between the two. He argues that engagement refers generally to a subjective state, with attention focused on some object. ‘It is in a sense a prerequisite for participation: to *participate* in politics presupposes some degree of *engagement*’. If we consider engagement as a state with a potential then this potential must at some point be realized. Participation, however, is more than just a state or feeling. According to Dahlgren it is an *activity*. The absence of *activity* in democracy can be explained by indifference, because attention is not focused on the object, and consequently people become disengaged. One can place politics in the same category of leisure activities as sports, music, culture, etc. In this sense politics is the least interesting. ‘Indifference seems to be the

psychological condition that best describes most of those who are disengaged and manifest a sense of the irrelevance of democratic activities.’

The excessive rationalism of democratic theory values participation as a guiding vision, but it does not seem to recognize any motivational grounding for it, since there is not only an emphasis on rationality and formal reason, but in many cases even explicit denigration of anything that smacks of the affective, the emotional, or the passionate. To be engaged in something requires not just cognitive attention, but also an affective relation to the issue, therefore ‘engagement in politics involves some kind of passion’.

The concept of passion appears to be entirely missing in the discourse of deliberative democracy and yet it has a significant role to play. Passion is conceptualized as distinct from reason, and as functioning in opposition to self-control. Political scientists see reasoning as one of the core values of citizens, but not passion. Hall argues that passion is seen as a subverting agency and asks why feelings should be seen as an external imposition any more than rational thought. Passions, in this sense have reasons as well. They are based on: a concept and interpretation of the object’s nature and qualities; a judgment that the object is valuable in some way; and an intention to pursue the value of that object in one’s life. Dahlgren adds that passion is something in which we are willing to invest time and energy, and since political participation requires motivation it must also have an affective drive. Apathy is precisely this absence of passion, the lack of motivation to act. ‘Passion is crucial for making political choices, creating political community, and motivating political action. No passion. No participation.’

If we look at the emergence of the most significant killer applications in the private sector, we not only see that technology is doing things in a way that was not previously possible, but that passion and motivation lie behind the solutions. Is there passion in e-voting, smart voting, participatory web solutions? No, because they are simply the extensions of the ordinary processes. E-democracy only enters a playground when we can see passionate actors running and using applications that have nothing to do with indifference. Indeed, future killer applications in the democratic landscape will not come from governments or officialdom—the initiative and the passion will come from the grass-roots level. This may lead us towards greater participation, and only then can we understand the nature and potential of e-democracy. ■

Pariah Parties and Political Exclusion

Researcher, SPS Dept. | **Joost van Spanje**

‘Fellow countrymen!’ This was the way that Hans Janmaat started his political advertisements on national Dutch television. It was followed by a litany of reproaches aimed at ‘foreigners’, suggesting that he was not addressing his countrymen indiscriminately, but only an undefined yet specific section of them. During the 1980s and 1990s, Hans Janmaat (1934–2002) was the only politician in the Netherlands to address the topic of immigration. Like me, Janmaat obtained a master’s degree in political science from the University of Amsterdam. Unlike me, he was the leader of an anti-immigration party, the Centrum Democraten (CD)—and a very unsuccessful one at that.

Janmaat’s lack of electoral success is usually explained by the fact that he was systematically boycotted by all other politicians. Whenever he stepped up to the microphone in the Dutch Parliament, all the other parliamentarians left the chamber in protest. No politician wanted to be seen talking to Janmaat, unless it was to denounce his ideologies. No politician wanted to be heard talking about Janmaat, unless it was to ridicule him.

My Ph.D. dissertation on ‘pariah parties’ revolves around the question of whether or not the electoral performance of a political party can be affected by the other parties’ political responses to its existence, and, if so, to what extent. In other words, will voters refuse to vote for a specific party because the political élite tells them that it is ‘beyond the pale’? At first sight, this explanation of Janmaat’s failure would seem to make perfect sense. After all, why would anyone waste a vote on a party that will not be allowed to come to power? There are, however, other anti-immigration parties, such as the *Vlaams Belang* in Belgium, that are successful despite being ostracized by all other parties in the party system. Moreover, other kinds of parties in established democracies—for instance, communist parties during the Cold War, fascist parties in the interwar period, and socialist parties before World War I—have all been systematically boycotted, yet have nevertheless attracted a large share of the vote. The question addressed in my research is important for those concerned with defending democracy. If it is true that political parties are damaged by being ostracized, then the strategy of boycotting parties to keep them from gaining strength in the electoral arena is indeed effective. Demonstrating the effectiveness of such a strategy would make an important contribution to the debate on how to protect democracy from those parties or movements that seek to undermine it.



Most of the parties ostracized in established democracies since World War II have been either communist or anti-immigration. I selected these two markedly different types of parties, and the established democracies in which they exist, for comparative-empirical analysis. Given this way of selecting cases and given the availability of data, the democracies analyzed are mainly post-war and Western European.

“Ostracism appears to be a potentially powerful tool in the hands of the establishment, for instance, in order to combat parties that pose a threat to democracy”

In order to measure the effectiveness of the strategy of boycotting parties, the other parties’ political responses to communist and anti-immigration parties are classified as either ‘ostracism’ or ‘no ostracism’. I conducted an expert survey in order to collect data on all the countries involved and cross-validated the results with an extensive review of the literature.

In the first part of my Ph.D. project, I use this classification as the *dependent* variable in a comparative- ►►

- ▶ empirical analysis in order to explain the variation in both types of responses to both kinds of parties. In doing so, I demonstrate that parties cannot decide to ostracize just any rival. Although all parties theoretically have an interest in excluding all other parties from competition, they will only do so if they can make a convincing case that the other party is outside agreed standards of democratic decency. I empirically show that the party's ideology is a major explanatory factor for ostracism, and its association or not with extremism and/or political violence as well. This suggests that the strategy of ostracizing a party can only be used effectively if there is some kind of rationale or excuse based on its ideology or policies.

“The anti-immigration parties that are politically boycotted appear to be ideologically isolated as well.”

The ‘ostracism’/‘no ostracism’ classification is the main *independent* variable in the second part of the research, which aims at exploring the consequences of the exclusion of political parties. In a set of comparative analyses based on both qualitative and quantitative methods, I assessed the effects on both the *targeting* actor's and the *targeted* party's ideological positions, and on voting behaviour.

The preliminary findings suggest that ostracized parties remain radical, whereas parties that are treated like any other party tend to moderate their ideological stances. This was demonstrated using data on ten anti-immigration parties at four points in time. The results were published in an article in *West European Politics* published in November 2007.¹ In addition, it seems that the parties that participate in ostracism strategies against anti-immigration parties co-opt their restrictive stances on immigration to a lesser extent than other parties. In other words, the anti-immigration parties that are *politically* boycotted appear to be *ideologically* isolated as well. This is likely to have an impact on the national policy output.

When it comes to the effects of ostracism on party choice, there appear to be differences between short-term consequences and long-term impacts. In the short term, inviting a radical party to join a government coalition appears to be an effective strategy. On the basis of 786 observations on 93 parties in eight countries, both communist and anti-immigrant parties have suffered an additional cost of governing, over and above what other parties would be expected to suffer. This implies that the strategy of inviting outsider parties into government in order to keep them

from gaining electoral support is effective in practice. As shown by the cases of, for example, the French Communist Party and the FPÖ in Austria, participation in government can have a devastating electoral effect on radical parties.

In the long run, the results of both aggregate-level and individual-level analyses suggest that ostracized parties suffer from their isolation, whereas their mainstream rivals gain from it. The effects found are small, however, and seem to depend on contextual circumstances. This nonetheless suggests that established parties can force a non-level playing field of electoral competition onto new parties simply by ostracizing them. Thus, ostracism appears to be a potentially powerful tool in the hands of the establishment, for instance, in order to combat parties that pose a threat to democracy.

The strategy may be potentially powerful, but it does not always work. When an openly gay, bold and well-dressed Dutch sociology professor named Pim Fortuyn started to campaign on an anti-immigration platform in August 2001, the Pavlovian reaction of the political élite was to treat him just as they had treated Janmaat. Fortuyn, however, with great political skill, managed to turn the tables. Instead of the political establishment ridiculing him, it was he who ridiculed the political establishment. Although—or, perhaps because—he was murdered nine days earlier, Fortuyn's party gained an impressive 17% of the vote at its first ever elections. Janmaat, disillusioned because he had never managed to attract more than 2.5% of the national vote, died of heart disease one month later. Perhaps the reason for his electoral failure was political ostracism, or perhaps it was just that he didn't have Pim Fortuyn's populist charisma. ■

¹ Joost van Spanje and Wouter van der Brug, ‘The Party as Pariah. The Exclusion of Anti-Immigration Parties and its Effect on their Ideological Positions’, 30(5), *West European Politics* (2007) 1022, at 40.

We would like to point out that **Florin Bilbiie**, who was cited in the last issue of the EUI Review, is Assistant Professor in Finance and Economics at the HEC Paris Business School, and not the École Polytechnique as previously mentioned, and that he is also involved with the newly created Paris School of Economics.

How (not to) Democratize the Media

Researcher, SPS Dept. | **Chris Hanretty**



Perhaps we shouldn't democratize the media after all; perhaps attempts to do so are harmful, and perhaps those calling for a more democratic media are simply confused about what they want.

In defending what appears to be a hopelessly anti-democratic position I should note that people who talk about democratizing the media rarely say much about democracy. In their 2005 book on the subject, Robert Hackett and Yuezhi Zhao write that 'democratizing' implies 'an imperative to render media institutions themselves more representative, accessible, accountable, and/or participatory'. These properties are all very desirable, and are certainly found in established democracies, but I understand democracy as the competitive struggle for leadership under conditions of mass suffrage, and that doesn't *necessarily* have anything to do with representativeness, or even with accessibility.

Secondly, talk about democratizing the media legitimates statements which talk about the media *as if* it were subject to the competitive struggle for elected

office. In the 1950s the Italian public broadcaster, the Rai, was subject to extensive control from the main party of government, the Democrazia Cristiana (DC). Asked about a decision taken by the broadcaster, the then Minister for Posts and Telecoms, Lorenzo Spallino, gave the following response:

'Naturally, the board of Rai decides [shouts from the left]. Well, if you don't like that, then the DC decides. You don't like that either? Do you mind that Italians have given the DC a majority? It is the Italian people that decide to elect men inspired by the principles of the Christian Democracy [applause from the centre]. This is the fact of the matter, even if you don't like it'.¹

Spallino's response is a good example of something which, at a first sight, seems impeccably democratic, i.e. the competitive struggle for elected office: the DC and its allies won that struggle throughout the 1950s, and the public broadcaster was answerable to them. But this is not the kind of statement usually supported by those who talk about democratizing the media. In ►►

- ▶ fact, they usually want to outlaw this kind of political control, given the strong aversion to government controlling a large part of the media. Perhaps we should not talk about democratizing the media, and, *a fortiori*, about democratizing public service broadcasters.

The media and public broadcasters certainly need to be made accountable and/or participatory. Governments and elected representatives have a legitimate interest in holding public broadcasters accountable for the way they spend money from television licence fees, or accountable for meeting broadly defined standards of quality or quantity.

“ Attempts to increase accountability or representativeness have often overshoot the mark, and involved politicians in the workings of the broadcaster to a rather painful extent ”

There are, however, two problems. First, holding someone to account in matters of broad performance often looks like holding someone to account in matters of specific detail. Second, attempts to increase accountability or representativeness have often overshoot the mark, and involved politicians in the workings of the broadcaster to a rather painful extent.

Two examples drawn from two very different countries, Italy and Denmark, demonstrate this point. In Italy, DC control of the public broadcaster was gradually extended to include other parties in government with the DC. Finally, in the 1970s, the expiry of the Rai's broadcasting licence, several Constitutional Court rulings, and broader changes in the Italian party system opened a window for reform of the public broadcaster. The diagnosis was beguilingly simple: the Rai had been far too accountable to government, and had been compromised by it. The Rai still had to be accountable, but instead of being accountable to government, it would now be accountable to a special Parliamentary committee. Unfortunately, the members of this Parliamentary committee proved far too eager, and it began acting as a sort of 'contro-editor', to use the description of one former board member. The idea of loosening the Rai's reporting requirements was, however, too risky, because it might be lured back into its familiar and too intimate relationship with government. Thus, a well-intentioned reform effort generated undesirable consequences.

In Denmark, the concern was not with accountability, but with representativeness. The Radio Council (*radi-orådet*) which governed *Danmarks Radio* was partly

staffed by representatives of viewers' and listeners' associations. It was also vulnerable to political entrepreneurs such as parliamentarian and future minister Erhardt Jacobsen, who in the late 1970s formed *Aktiv Lyttere og Seere*, a listeners' association which militated against perceived Communist influence in the children's programming section of the broadcaster. With the mobilization of *Aktiv Lyttere og Seere*, other parties felt compelled to act, and by 1980 a quarter of the viewers' representatives were serving Members of Parliament.

It is not entirely surprising that reform efforts should overshoot. The need for reform bespeaks a lack of trust, and regulatory regimes in low-trust environments tend to be excessively detailed, sometimes to the point of compromising their own objectives. Thus, whilst my research looks extensively at the reporting and accountability mechanisms used by public broadcasters, it also examines a less concrete variable, i.e. the development of a large market for news.

We can understand the development of news markets graphically by drawing a line from the Bay of Biscay to the West, to the Black Sea in the East. All the countries below this line—Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Israel—print 100–150 newspapers daily for every 1,000 people. North of this line, the figure is between 200–300 per 1,000. Why should this situation undermine trust in the public broadcaster? The answer is that, by and large, public broadcasters have to use the journalists available in a country. If there are very few profitable newspapers, they will be owned by publishers who would rather have influence than profit, and who would rather have politically-friendly journalists than disinterested ones. If the public broadcaster has to hire from this pool of journalists, it is more difficult to claim that the work of the broadcaster is disinterested, and so politicians are much more likely to immerse themselves in the dealings of the broadcaster.

But if you are responsible for 'democratizing' a public service broadcaster, and if by 'democratize' you mean making it more representative and more accountable, what should you do? One suggestion is to stop using the concept of democratization and to start talking about representativeness and accountability, so that the trade-offs with other desirable values, such as independence, become clearer. Another suggestion is to consciously undershoot and to use reporting instruments which may be inadequate, but which leave room for overshooting. A final suggestion is to be mindful of the prevailing social conditions—only in that way can you go about (not) democratizing public media. ■

¹ Walter Veltroni, *Io e Berlusconi (e la Rai)*, Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1990, p. 99.

The Max Weber Programme Academic Careers Observatory

Research Assistant, MWP | **Arnout Mertens**

Are you thinking about applying for a post-doc or a lectureship but don't know where to start looking, or what your chances are as a foreign citizen in France, Norway or the UK? Does your academic idealism stretch to accepting a gross monthly salary of € 100 for postdoctoral research in Ukraine, or would you rather go for the € 4,560 paid for the same position in Denmark? Do you have the choice between a lectureship at a Spanish university, a *Juniorprofessur* in Germany or a tenure track Assistant Professorship in a US university in the mid-West, and do you know what the differences are in career perspectives? In a broader sense, is the European Research and Higher Education Area one of open and fair competition for the development of academic careers, and is it building up its human resources and excellence in research and academia for the 21st Century Knowledge Society?

The Max Weber Programme Academic Careers Observatory (MWP-ACO) at the European University Institute was set up in January 2007 to help answer such questions. It is an online resource for researchers and scholars at all stages of their careers, with a special focus on the social sciences and humanities. It provides reliable and comprehensive data to bridge the gap between the conviction that mobility in the academic profession is essential to attain excellence, and the fact that this same mobility is hindered by the lack of easily available information on academic careers. Remarkably, no such initiative has been made before.

The information offered by the MWP-ACO goes from career curricula, promotion requirements and salary levels to practical information on the academic profession. The Observatory also examines the degree of openness of different academic systems and functions as a tool for job search offering links to job platforms, as well as a list of available funding for scholars from the post-doc level onwards. An extensive bibliography contains references to specialised literature about academic careers. More than twenty countries are analysed at present (from Sweden to Portugal and from the USA to Japan) and the list is expanding rapidly, with the support of users giving feedback and a network of collaborators from within and outside the EUI community (Max Weber Fellows, 'national' contacts, etc.).

On 30 November 2007, the MWP-ACO organised the conference 'Academic Careers in the Social Sciences and Humanities: National Comparisons and Opportunities' at Villa La Fonte. The symposium



analysed some of the striking observations made by the Observatory:

- There are marked variations in academic careers across countries, despite the homogenisation of the higher education system
- The gap between open academic systems welcoming scholars from outside and self-protecting closed systems
- The existence of marked national variations in entry to the academic system and job security
- It is becoming increasingly normal to spend one or more years as a postdoctoral researcher before obtaining a more permanent and secure academic position.

“The information offered by the MWP-ACO goes from career curricula, promotion requirements and salary levels to practical information on the academic profession”

Variations in academic careers across countries

While the higher education system is currently undergoing wide reaching changes in most European countries due to the Bologna Process, academic careers still differ markedly. As a result, switching between academic systems is not always easy. For instance, France has two career steps (assistant professor and ►►

- professor), whereas universities in the Netherlands have three (lecturer, senior lecturer and professor), and British academia has four (lecturer, senior lecturer, reader and professor). In addition to the heterogeneity of scales, there are cumbersome barriers to entry in the form of different procedures and criteria used for hiring and promotion. For example, the German data show that the reforms introduced by some governments to make the academic workplace more attractive and to counter the brain drain from the European continent to the Anglo-Saxon countries, does not necessarily translate into an 'open and competitive European Research and Higher Education Area tenure track system'.

Open and closed academic systems

From an international perspective some countries are undoubtedly more attractive than others. For instance, even after recent reforms neither the centralised French system nor the decentralised German structure can compete with the Anglo-Saxon academic world. Yet the problem is not necessarily marked differences in salary or job security; in fact, academics in the UK do not get (much) higher salaries (in real terms), nor are their positions tenured. The success of the Anglo-Saxon system instead seems to depend on a mix of factors including a healthy competition between universities, decent career prospects in exchange for hard work, high levels of mobility and openness to non-nationals, all of which creates a more vibrant academic community. That fact that English is the *lingua franca* of academia forces the continental European countries even more onto the defensive. Only the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and some more or less isolated initiatives in other countries (e.g. some Turkish universities are fairly open) seem to understand that effective openness is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to be competitive and attract the best researchers and academics.

Entry barriers and job security

In some countries, young academics have to contend with high formal and informal barriers to obtain staff positions. Italy is often mentioned as a paradigmatic example of a closed system with low levels of mobility. Jobs can be obtained, but the official procedure is lengthy and cumbersome and the outcome of a competition is usually settled beforehand. Connections are crucial and non-Italians rarely have a chance. Moreover, whereas job security is high (as in France, appointments are for life), but salaries only become attractive towards the end of the career. As a result, a large number of young Italian academics develop their career outside Italy, deterred from becoming the generation that will replace a large generation of university professors entering retirement in the coming years. Other countries, such as Spain, have launched interesting open programmes

for young researchers and have good examples of open universities, but the system as a whole is far from being open and competitive.

The postdoctoral limbo

The postdoctoral level is increasingly becoming a proper career step, rather than merely the antechamber of a lectureship. The internationalisation of academic careers is most advanced at the postdoctoral stage and the existence of international grant programmes has significantly increased over the past decade. The Max Weber Programme at the EUI, which started in 2006, exemplifies both aspects: each year forty promising young scholars from across the world receive specialised training in research, teaching and academic advancement in an interdisciplinary environment.

Yet the rise of the post-doc carries the risk that Ph.D. holders find themselves trapped in temporary postdoctoral research or teaching positions for too many years. In several academic systems, the postdoctoral phase has become the bottleneck in the academic career. In countries like Belgium and Germany, for instance, one can hold a fairly attractive postdoctoral position for up to six years, but this is not a 'tenure track' position since even if one excels there may not be a chance of being appointed to a more stable position afterwards. To minimise frustration and a brain drain, some governments need to pursue more in-depth reforms of their higher education and research organisation systems in order not to waste valuable human resources and academic/intellectual expertise.

To conclude, a 'call for support' is in order. The MWP Academic Careers Observatory maps and analyses the national systems and compares them at the international level. Reliable 'insider information' from 'users' is essential; for example, in order to discover the informal barriers in certain countries and to keep up with legal changes in the systems, as well as to find the 'best experiences'. Therefore, the MWP-ACO deliberately operates on an interactive basis; everyone is strongly encouraged to access the website and use the comment buttons to send observations or correct and modify pages and information where needed. The interactive discussion forum, which is currently being developed, will be an excellent floor from which to present queries and to debate all aspects of academic careers with the entire scholarly community.

The MWP-ACO has been developed by Lotte Holm and Arnout Mertens as one of the initiatives of the Max Weber Programme, directed by Professor Ramon Marimon. ■

www.eui.eu/MaxWeberProgramme/AcademicCareers

SPS Summer School

Professor of Comparative Politics | **Peter Mair**

Researcher, SPS Dept. | **Alex Wilson**

In September 2007, for the first time in its 16-year history, the annual **International Summer School on Political Parties and Party Systems** was held at the EUI. The theme was 'Political Parties and Democracy'. This two-week intensive Summer School is supported by the European Commission, The European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), and by the journal *Party Politics* and is one of the most important fora for intellectual interaction between senior academics and talented doctoral students working in the field of comparative European politics. This year, the School was attended by twenty-four research students from universities in Europe, the USA and Israel, and offered a broad, comparative and European dimension to these students' own research training. This is particularly important for those whose home universities or faculties lack a comparable level of expertise in the area, and for those who need to develop a more broadly-based perspective on their research.

Themes dealt with during the two weeks of lectures and seminars included political parties and models of democracy (Richard S. Katz), parties and social movements (Donatella della Porta), parties as public utilities (Ingrid van Biezen), party patronage (Petr Kopecky), parties and multi-level politics (Kris Deschouwer), arguments for and against parties (Susan Scarrow), party government (Hans Keman), the Europeanisation of party organisation (Richard Luther), inter-party relations (Alan Ware), and party systems and democracy (Peter Mair).

The school was directed by Peter Mair and Hans Keman, with Alex Wilson, a researcher at the EUI, serving as local organiser. The 17th Summer School will also be held at the EUI, in September 2008, and will be organised around the theme of 'Political Parties, Democracy and the European Union'. Inquiries to peter.mair@eui.eu or alex.wilson@eui.eu. ■



Alumni News

Alumni Association

Another Chianti walk took place during the Alumni Weekend 2007. Fifteen participants visited Greve and its monuments and enjoyed the explanations given by Marco Antonio Pacenti on nature and vineyards and by Valérie Hayaert on art history. A Career Event was organized and there was a presentation for the Festschrift in honour of Prof. Mario Nuti.

AA chapters

Tokyo: EUI Alumni based at universities in Tokyo met in July to help develop Europe-Japan/Asian studies and research. There was an informal luncheon in the best Italian trattoria in Tokyo.

London: alumna Simona Talani organised a conference on the Future of EMU at the European Institute at the LSE on 12 October, with the participation of EUI alumni and former professors. Other London-based alumni joined the group for dinner.

Rome: alumni Federiga Bindi and Giovanni Guzzetta are organising a conference on the State of the Union at the University of Rome–Tor Vergata (School of Law and School of Economics) on 13–14 December with the participation of EUI President Yves Mény, Professors Giuliano Amato, Jean-Paul Fitoussi and Juergen Schwartz as well as alumni Simon Hix, Miguel Maduro and Francisco Torres. Other alumni will join the group for dinner.

Forthcoming AA activities

Following the success of the first edition in 2005, the Economics and the Law Departments, with the support of the EUI President and the Director of the Robert Schuman Centre, are organising a 2nd **EUI Competition Day** in conjunction with the Alumni Association. The event will take place at the EUI on 3–4 April 2008 to bring together alumni, mainly economists or lawyers, who have worked or are working (the event is open to current EUI members) on competition law/policy at the EUI. Please contact Lucia Vigna (lucia.vigna@eui.eu) for details.

In June 2008, at the time of the June Ball, there will be a conference on **'EU Governance and Environmental Policy'**. There will be a visit to the Corridoio Vasariano, with the help of EUI General Secretary, Marco Del Punta, and an art history visit to Florence and surroundings organised by Valérie Hayaert. The EUI Alumni Association Prize for the best interdisciplinary Ph.D. thesis (Alumni Prize) will be announced.

History of the Alumni Association. If you did not receive your copy of the AA booklet, which was sent with the EUI Review last December, please check whether your address is up to date with Judith

Przyrowski (alumni@eui.eu). Stories, photos or suggestions are welcome as we are preparing a second edition.

Please keep an eye on our web page www.eui.eu/Alumni and get in touch with us and with Judith Przyrowski, EUI Alumni Officer, for information. You can register with the Alumni Association and get your Electronic Alumni card (giving access to several facilities and a permanent EUI e-mail address) and thereby become a donor to the EUI since all revenues are devoted to the Alumni Research Grant. The Executive Committee is examining the possibility of using AA membership cards to vote electronically.

Annette Bongardt, AA Vice President

Festschrift in honour of Domenico Mario Nuti

Professor Mario Nuti from the University of Rome La Sapienza was guest speaker at the EUI Alumni Association weekend. His lecture on 'The European Social Model and its Dilution as a Result of EU Enlargement' illustrated how the European Social Model, already controversial before 2004, became even more controversial after the entry of the post-socialist countries from Central East Europe. Most of the new Member States have adopted a hyper-liberal socio-economic model which has greatly diluted the European Social Model in the new EU and, by imitation, competition and active promotion of hyper-liberalism, in some of the older Member States.

The lecture was followed by a Round Table, where a Festschrift was presented to mark Mario Nuti's 70th birthday. The volume, **Transition and Beyond. Essays in Honor of Mario Nuti** edited by Saul Estrin, Grzegorz Kolodko, and Milica Uvalic (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), is a collection of essays mainly on the economics of transition and post-transition in Central East Europe and the CIS. Contributors are distinguished economists who have collaborated with Nuti, including Marcello de Cecco, Michael Ellman, Gur Ofer, Michael Keren, Jan Svejnar, Jo Stiglitz, Padma Desai, Simon Commander, John Eatwell, Vito Tanzi, Vladimir Popov, Janez Prasnikar, and Laszlo Csaba, in addition to the three editors. Mario Nuti was Professor at the EUI Department of Economics (1983-1989) and the event was attended by his Ph.D. students, other Alumni, former EUI colleagues, and some of his closest collaborators from that period.

Some of the most important features of Mario Nuti's professional life were recalled, from his early contribution to the Cambridge capital theory controversy

Alumni News

and more recent work on socialist and post-socialist transition countries, to his role in policy-making as economic advisor to the European Commission, to the Polish First Deputy Premier and Minister of Finance G. Kolodko, to the World Bank. The gathering was also an occasion to recall more personal memories of Mario Nuti as professor, supervisor, colleague, and friend during his time at the Badia.

Milica Uvalic, Alumna

EUI Career Event

The first EUI Career Event was held on 4 October 2007 with alumni from organizations in different countries. The aim was to promote the alumni network as a unique source of information and advice on careers for EUI researchers.

Francisco Torres, President of the Alumni Association, introduced the speakers and each alumnus spoke about a specific career issue. Wim Van Aken (SPS, Ph.D. 2007), is one of the many non-economists working at the European Central Bank and discussed application requirements. Ingmar Von Homeyer (SPS, Ph.D. 2002), represented Ecologic, a private not-for-profit think tank for applied environmental research. Two alumni working for the European Commission, Robert Pochmarski (LL.M. 1994) and Roman Arjona-Gracia (ECO, Ph.D. 2000) concentrated on the functions the EC offers and the chance for its staff to change their field of activity. Herman Zaaiman (LAW 1983–1992), a representative of the European Patent Office in Munich and of an older alumni generation focused on salaries and pensions. As a regular member of recruitment juries, he gave examples of common 'deadly' errors committed by candidates when writing their CV or covering letter and provided tips to avoid them. He attached great importance

to seemingly simple formal application requirements which are frequently not complied with. Thomas Kennedy (LAW, 1976–1978) is Head of the Legal Service at the European Court of Auditors in Luxembourg, where he is also responsible for recruitment. His tip for job candidates was 'Read the instructions!' in the job announcement.


All speakers agreed that the intellectual potential and qualifications of doctoral students had high value outside academia and that researchers should stress this background. They also recommended informative websites and books, and encouraged students to create their own personal webpage providing potential recruiters with all relevant personal information.

The afternoon session dealt with law firms with speakers from international law firms: Alexandra McConnell from Clifford Chance London (LAW, Ph.D. 2000), Assimakis Komninou from White & Case Brussels (LAW, Ph.D. 2006), Jan Willem Bitter from Simmons & Simmons Rotterdam (LAW, Ph.D. 1989), and Fabrizio Arossa from Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer Rome, replacing Massimo Benedetti (LAW, Ph.D. 1987), who was unable to attend. Pompeo Della Posta, of the Alumni Association Executive Committee, introduced the speakers. It was interesting to note the significant differences between large law firms in recruitment procedures and application requirements. The speakers agreed that lawyers with an academic background stood out from the crowd of non-academic lawyers and judged academic and student experience as a significant advantage.

Both sessions led to lively discussion where many interesting issues were raised and the event was a great success.

Judith Przyrowski, EUI Alumni Officer






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


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




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
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
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


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In Memoriam -Véronique Pujas



Véronique Pujas, an SPS researcher from the 1994–1998 cohort, passed away this October. She was in her thirties and lost her battle against cancer in spite of her fighting spirit and her willingness to give friends and family the impression that life was continuing as usual. I have a vivid memory of the four years she spent at the EUI. I was her supervisor and Martin Rhodes her co-supervisor. She came with a firm view about the topic she wanted to research—corruption in a comparative perspective—and worked hard to produce an excellent piece of research. She was soon appointed at the CNRS, a testimony of her academic qualities. But if we appreciated Véronique for her intellectual achievements, we remember her for her personal qualities. Everybody will recall her smile, her kindness and her openness when people were in need.

A few days after her funeral, I received a letter from a friend and former researcher, Lionel Thelen, which with his permission, I quote below, as his words are telling about Véronique's personality:

'C'est encore ému et révolté de perdre, aussi tôt, une amie si chère à mes yeux que je vous écris mais c'est aussi pour lui rendre hommage car elle a tout fait cette dernière année pour préparer ses proches à un possible départ : réaliser le rêve de son papa de visiter les ruines d'Herculanum et Pompei, planifié une croisière pour les 60 ans de sa maman (que sa mort aura empêché de concrétiser), suivre des stages d'aide aux malades en phase terminale (!) afin de pouvoir leur venir en aide, etc.

Jusqu'au bout elle aura lutté, non pas tant contre la mort que contre l'idée que l'on a d'une mourante : elle se battait moins pour elle que pour lutter contre l'injustice qui est faite par notre société à ceux qui savent devoir s'éteindre à court terme. Un jour discutant avec elle du fait qu'elle ne recevait plus aucun appel d'un certain nombre d'amis, ce n'est pas tant l'idée que certains de ses amis la délaissaient qui l'agitait que l'idée que beaucoup de gens sont à ce point mal à l'aise vis-à-vis de malades tels ceux souffrant d'un cancer en phase terminale ►►

► qu'ils préfèrent ne plus les contacter. C'est contre ça qu'elle désirait se battre : elle n'en voulait pas à ces "amis", elle préférerait tout faire pour montrer à tous ceux souffrant de ce mal-être qu'ils étaient dans le faux...'

Our sympathy goes to her friends and family and in particular to her parents. Nothing is more ir-

rational and terrible than having to bury one's own children. On behalf of the entire Institute community, I would like to express my condolences and deepest sympathy. ■

Yves Mény

It is with enormous sadness that I write this short obituary for Véronique Pujas, a student at the EUI in 1994–1999. Véronique was my research assistant, my co-author of numerous articles on party financing and political corruption in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and a close friend.

Véronique came to the EUI to continue work begun on her masters' thesis in France on political corruption in southern Europe. She also worked as an assistant to the European Forum that I directed in 1998–1999. Her deep knowledge of political scandals in Italy, Spain and France complemented my own interest in corruption and party finance in these countries. Together we produced around a dozen journal articles, book chapters and working papers on these and related topics, one of which ('Party Finance and Political Scandal in Italy, Spain and France', *West European Politics*, 22:3, 1999), has become a standard reference for scholars in the field. Neither this nor any of our other publications could have appeared without Véronique's considerable energy, language skills, knowledge and insights. I was extremely privileged to know her and work with her during those years.

Véronique successfully defended her thesis on *Les scandales politiques en France, Italie et Espagne* in January 1999. After leaving the EUI, Véronique enjoyed a highly successful career. She was a Visit-

ing Fellow at the London School of Economics in 2000–2001, and subsequently a Research Fellow at the CNRS (Centre national de la recherche scientifique), teaching European and Comparative Politics at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Grenoble. In 2003 she was also a Visiting Fellow at the Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the University of Melbourne and the Australian National University in Canberra, and for a short period she was detached to Interpol to work on financial crime. From her early work on political scandals, she extended her research to party funding in Europe, anti-corruption policy in the European Commission, trans-border financial crime and the role of the judiciary in fighting political corruption. Apart from her scholarly publications, she was also a regular contributor to Transparency International's 'Global Corruption Report'.

Showing extraordinary fortitude, Véronique continued to publish and teach during her illness and up until her untimely death in October this year. She is sorely missed by her friends and colleagues across the world. ■

Martin Rhodes, Research Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre, 1996–1999 and Professor in SPS, 1999–2006.

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EUI News

Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa visits the EUI

On 11 October 2007, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Italian Minister of Economy and Finance, visited the Institute. He delivered a speech entitled 'The European economic policy: between Brussels and Nation-States'.



Ségolène Royal visits the EUI

Ségolène Royal, candidate for the 2007 French presidential election, visited the EUI on Wednesday 17 October. A lunch was organized with the EUI researchers, during which a debate on European questions took place.

Honorary Degree

On 7 December, Yves Mény, President of the EUI, was awarded an honorary degree from Panteion University, Athens, for his contribution to the field of Political Science, and in particular European Politics.



Villa Raimondi

The latest addition to the EUI campus is Villa Raimondi. Since June 2007, this enchanting villa which is located near Villa Schifanoia houses the Institute's Computing Service.

EUIreview

Via dei Roccettini, 9
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www.eui.eu/PUB/EUIReview.shtml

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Publisher

European University Institute
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Editors' Note

Views expressed in articles published reflect the opinions of individual authors and not those of the Institute.



The European Commission supports the EUI through the European Union budget. This publication reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

Printed in Italy
by Tipografia Giuntina – Firenze
December 2007