

4,4	0,6
6,0	1,1

Basic Graduate Game Theory Syllabus

by David K. Levine

Requirements

The course is graded based on the final exam. There will be four problem sets that are not for credit, but several will be graded to provide feedback, and the answers will be reviewed in the TA sessions. The questions on the final exam will be chosen from the problem sets (although the numbers may be changed).

Topics

1. [Static Games: dominance, Nash equilibrium](#)
2. Static Games: coordination, refinements
3. [Auctions and Political Economy](#)
 - a. [Problem set on static games; answer key](#)
4. [Dynamic Games: extensive form, subgame perfection](#)
5. Dynamic Games: refinements, robustness, learning
6. Dynamic Games: self-confirming equilibrium, experiments
7. [Repeated Games: long-run versus short-run](#)
8. [Repeated Games: the folk theorem](#)
 - b. [Problem set on dynamic games](#)
9. [Uncertainty: expected utility, risk](#)
10. [Uncertainty: behavioral critiques](#)
11. [Uncertainty: dynamic programming](#)
 - c. [Problem set on uncertainty](#)
12. [Bayesian Games](#)
13. Mechanism Design
14. Dynamic Moral Hazard: Peer versus Collective Punishment
 - d. [Problem set on mechanism design](#)

Books

- Osborn and Rubinstein *A Course in Game Theory*
- Fudenberg and Tirole *Game Theory*

Old Exams

[2013 answers](#) [2019](#) [2020](#)