‘Instead of attempting to exterminate all political forms, organizations, and alignments that do not qualify as pressure groups, would it not be better to attempt to make a synthesis, covering the whole political system and finding a place for all kind of political life’ (E.E. Schattschneider 1960[1988]. The Semi-sovereign People, London: Wadsworth, p. 38)

The Schattschneider quote I use as an introduction here was directed against the American group theorists who saw pressure groups everywhere, but did not have the parties on their conceptual screen. When reading this quote, I was reminded of social movement scholars who tend to see movements everywhere, but do not connect them to political parties. In the political process approach, of course, political parties enter the fray as part of the political environment of social movements. That is, political parties are part of the alliance and conflict structure in which social movements are embedded. The party system, in turn, is seen as shaped by the institutional structure, most importantly, by the electoral system, which determines to a large extent the number and orientation of the parties available as possible allies of the social movements. What the social movement literature has tended to overlook is that political parties are linked to social movements not only as possible allies, but in more fundamental ways as well. This does not necessarily mean that we should put aside Tilly’s enormously influential polity model, which has introduced a separation of movement politics from institutionalized politics by distinguishing between social movements as ‘challengers’ seeking access to the institutionalized realm of politics and ‘polity members’ who already have such routinized access. It means, however, that the two worlds of inside (institutionalized, conventional) and outside (protest, unconventional) politics are not as neatly
separated as this model suggests to the non-attentive reader. Following Goldstone’s (2003: 2) lead, we should start from the assumption that ‘social movements constitute an essential element of normal politics in modern societies, and that there is only a fuzzy and permeable boundary between institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics’.

On the one hand, in a ‘movement society’, some forms of moderate protest have become part of the conventional repertoire that is, from time to time, they are also adopted by polity insiders. With respect to political parties, this means that certain established parties tend to expand the scope of contest beyond the narrow boundaries of the polity in order to strengthen their hand inside of the polity. On the other hand, some types of outsiders prefer to articulate their protest inside of the polity and tend to refrain from mobilizing protest in the streets. With respect to political parties, this means that some social movements prefer to organize in the form of political parties, or their cause is coopted and integrated into the program of established political parties. My discussion of the relationship between political parties and social movements starts out with the conventional view of the political process approach by conceptualizing the parties as part of the political context the configuration of which is determined by the institutional structure. It then moves on to consider parties as social movement organizations. Finally, it goes one step further by also taking into account the effect of social movements on party systems. As I shall argue, some social movements have the capacity to fundamentally transform individual parties and entire party systems.

**Institutional contexts**

There are different types of democracies, even if we are only considering established democracies as I am going to do here, and different typologies to distinguish between these types. Among comparative political scientists, Lijphart’s (1999) distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracies has become prevalent, and it is useful to put the
present discussion in the context of this distinction. Lijphart’s criterion for classifying democracies is the concentration of political power. Majoritarian democracies concentrate political power, while consensus democracies divide it. Lijphart’s scheme uses two dimensions for summarizing how power is divided – the ‘executive-parties’ dimension and the ‘federalism-centralism’ dimension. For our purposes, his ‘executive-parties’ dimension is more important. It is characterized by five aspects: the number of parties (two-party systems vs multiparty systems), the electoral system (majority and plurality methods vs proportional representation), the concentration of power in the cabinet (single party vs coalition governments), the executive-legislative relations (dominance by the executive vs balance between the two), and interest group arrangements (pluralism vs corporatism). The dimension mixes formal, institutional and informal power arrangements, but the resulting pattern in a given country is ultimately driven by the electoral system. This means that majoritarian electoral systems tend to produce two-party systems with single party governments, executive dominance and interest group pluralism, while proportional systems tend to lead to multiparty systems with coalition governments, more balanced executive-legislative relations and interest group coordination (corporatism). The paradigmatic cases are the UK for majoritarian systems, and Belgium or the Netherlands for consensus systems. Lijphart’s typology is well suited for parliamentary systems, while presidential systems are more difficult to accommodate within this framework. On the one hand, presidentialism is an extreme form of majoritarianism. The classic presidential system of the US is also characterized by a majoritarian electoral system for the election of Congress, a two-party system, and single party governments (under the leadership of the President). On the other hand, the American presidential system divides power between the President and Congress (and a powerful Judiciary). Moreover, Congress is divided into two equally powerful chambers and the federalist division of power between the federal government and the state governments, divides power even more. In other words, the system of checks and balances brings this
system closer to the consensus system, which is taken into account by Lijphart’s second dimension.

For our purposes, two aspects of Lijphart’s distinction are crucial: a) in majoritarian systems, it is much more difficult to successfully create new parties, i.e. access to the political system via the creation of new parties is rather more closed than in consensual systems. This means that b), in majoritarian systems, instead of creating his own party, a challenger has a strong incentive to introduce his demands into the program of one of the existing parties. That is the capture of existing parties by new challengers is much more likely in majoritarian systems than in consensus systems, as is the cooptation of such challengers by existing parties.

There is one important exception to this generalization: regional concentration of challenging minorities and of the corresponding ethnic and nationalist movements. If a challenging group is regionally concentrated, it can gain political representation by creating its own party even in a majoritarian system. The reason is that electoral constituencies are territorially defined, which means that in a given region, a regionally concentrated minority may constitute the majority and get its representatives elected to the national parliament. In the case of federalist systems, the party of a national minority may even become the governing party at the regional level. An example that illustrates this point is the Scottish National Party (SNP), which won a plurality of seats in the Scottish Parliament for the first time in the 2007 elections, and formed a minority government with party leader Alex Salmond elected First Minister of Scotland. In the 2011 general election, the SNP won a landslide victory and was able to form a majority government in Scotland. Other illustrations include the Catalonian or Basque minorities in Spain (whose proportional system is rather restrictive due to the small size of the electoral districts), as well as the many ethnic minorities in India, which are able to rule in their own state within the Indian federalist system.
Parties as allies

Within this general context, parties can become important allies of social movements, and, as already pointed out in the introduction, it is this aspect that has above all been on the mind of scholars adopting the political process approach. According to their line of argument, social movements expand a given issue-specific conflict in the general public, i.e. they create public controversy where there was none before, they draw the public’s attention to the issue in question and frame it in line with their own demands, and, by doing so, they strengthen the hand of allies of their cause – political parties within the parliamentary arena, interest groups and public officials within the administrative arena. Protesters on their own, Tarrow (1994: 98) explains, seldom have the power to affect policy priorities of elites. The goal of challengers is, as Wolfsfeld (1997: 29) points out, ‘to generate dissensus among the powerful. Challengers attempt to make inroads among elites, who represent more legitimate sources for providing alternative frames’. The expansion of conflict in the public sphere is the general ‘weapon of the weak’ that allows social movements to create political opportunities for elites – as Tarrow (1994: 98) has observed, not only in the negative sense of repression, but also in the positive sense when politicians seize the opportunity created by the challengers and defend their cause within the political system. Parties and their representatives may pick up the cause of the challengers for opportunistic reasons, as is the case when political entrepreneurs seize the opportunity created by the challengers to proclaim themselves tribunes of the people. They may also do so for more substantive or ideological reasons. Viewed from the party’s perspective, the challenger’s outside mobilization may be a welcome support for the party’s long-term agenda in a given policy subsystem, which may help the party to undermine the established policy monopoly in the subsystem in question.

To discuss the possible alliances between parties and social movements more systematically, I propose two distinctions: we should distinguish between mainstream parties and peripheral
parties, as well as between government and opposition. Mainstream parties are parties that habitually govern, and that, even if they are in the opposition, are part of the ‘cartel’ in the sense of Katz and Mair (1995). These parties are, as Mair (2009) has observed, exposed to an increasing tension between their role as representatives of the national citizen public, and their role as responsible governments. As representatives of the national citizen public, they are expected to be responsive and accountable to their voters; as responsible governments, they are expected to take into account the increasing number of principals constituted by the many veto players who now surround the government in its multilevel institutional setting. This extension of the scope of accountability not only implies that the governing parties’ manoeuvring space is reduced, but also and most importantly that their accountability to the national constituency of voters, i.e. their representative function, is diminished. Peripheral parties, whose chances to participate in government are slim, are less exposed to such pressures. This is why, Mair (2011) suggested that we might observe a division of labor between the two types of parties: on the one side, we have the mainstream parties or the core of the party system who fulfil the task of responsible government, on the other side, the peripheral parties which give voice to the people, i.e. which fulfil the representation function and which often adopt a rather populists style. In other words, Peter Mair (2011: 14) thought that ‘it is possible to speak of a growing divide in the European party system between parties which claim to represent, but don’t deliver, and those which deliver, but are no longer seen to represent’. In other words, Mair suggested that, while mainstream parties may generally be non-accessible for social movements, the peripheral parties constitute a conduit for popular challenges within the party system.

Mair’s point applies, of course, only to multiparty systems, and even for these systems, it may be somewhat overdrawn. On the one hand, even some of the peripheral parties have taken up government responsibilities and influenced government policy accordingly. This is illustrated by the fact that some of the challengers from the new populist right have, indeed, participated
in government (e.g. the SVP in Switzerland, the FPÖ in Austria, the Lega and the PdL in Italy) or supported minority governments without becoming formal members of governing coalitions (e.g. the Danish People’s Party, and the Dutch PVV). On the other hand, mainstream opposition parties are more accessible to outside challengers than members of government. This has been one of my arguments for explaining the differential accessibility of the mainstream left (social democrats) for new social movements in the seventies and eighties of the last century (Kriesi 1995). More recently, this is also shown by Green-Pedersen and Mortensen’s (2009) study of agenda-setting by parties in the Danish parliament. As this study indicates, opposition parties exert greater influence on the party-system agenda than governing parties, while governing parties are more responsive to the party-system agenda than opposition parties. Governing parties also directly pick up some of the issues (although not issues related to the economy) raised by the opposition. That is, indirectly, via the opposition parties’ influence on the party-system agenda and on the governing parties’ agenda, challengers may have an influence on the government’s agenda. At least, this applies to a multiparty system in a consensus democracy like Denmark.

**Parties as social movement organizations: the difference between the new left and the new right**

As suggested in the introduction, parties may not only serve as allies of social movements, social movements may choose to organize themselves in the form of parties in the first place. That is, social movements may create their own parties (in consensus systems), or they may try to capture mainstream parties (in majoritarian systems). When it comes to parties as social movement organizations (SMOs), it is crucial to distinguish between movements from the (new) left and movements from the (new) right. To be sure, some social movements of both sides have created their own parties, but the left is more likely to rely on public protest outside
of the party system than the right, and the mobilization of protest outside of the established channels is considered much more legitimate on the new left than on the new right in particular.

The classic movement of the left, the labour movement has, of course, not only created its own interest organizations (trade unions), but also its own social-democratic and communist parties. At the same time, the established organizations of the old left have not given up mobilizing protest outside of the political system. Moreover, the more recent left-libertarian new social movements which were responsible for the wave of protest that swept across Western Europe and North America from the late sixties to the eighties of the last century were highly critical of representative democracy and of parliamentary procedures in particular. They sought more participatory modes of mobilization, and engaged heavily in protest activities to push their claims onto the agenda (Kitschelt 1993, Nedelmann 1984).

By contrast, the new populist right, which arguably has been the driving force behind a second wave of protest that has been following upon the new left’s wave during the nineties and two-thousands, has mainly mobilized in the channels of electoral politics and (if available) more institutionalized direct democratic channels, even if it has also been highly critical of the mainstream parties and of representative democracy. Moreover, it has mainly relied on populist mobilization strategies. Contrary to the ‘bottom up’ strategy of the new left, the new right’s populist strategy is a ‘top down’ strategy that establishes a direct link between the monolithically conceived people and those who govern by a personalistic leader who ‘seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, non-institutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers’ (Weyland 2001: 14). In contrast to Weyland’s definition that draws on the Latin American experience, several populist parties in Western Europe (e.g. the Lega or the SVP) are probably better organized at the grassroots level than most of their competitors. But the element of the personalistic leadership is not
necessarily incompatible with the existence of more formal organizations. In some cases, the personalistic mobilization strategy may be the only one available for a political leader, in other cases (such as the Lega or the SVP) it may coexist with more organized forms of mobilization. Thus, even if we allow for less than pure cases of populist strategies, we can still define them in terms of personalistic leadership. Typically, the personalistic leader does not belong to the established political elites, but is an outsider (a new challenger), who incarnates the demands of ‘the people’. This leader has direct, unmediated access to the people’s grievances, and acts as the spokesperson of the vox populi (Abts 2011: 930).

This key strategic difference between the new left and the new right is linked to the basic value-orientations characterizing the left and the right, respectively. Rebels on the right tend to have authoritarian and materialist values, and prefer (orderly) conventional political action over (disorderly) protest politics, while rebels on the left tend to share libertarian and post-materialist values, which predispose them for unconventional protest politics. For both the challengers on the left and on the right, the ‘medium is the message’, i.e. the choice of the channel in which they express themselves is at the same time an expression of their underlying message. Thus, Flanagan and Lee (2003, 260ff.), in their comparative analysis of authoritarian-libertarian value change in the twelve largest and most affluent Western nations, find differing orientations toward political involvement between authoritarians (who tend to be closer to the right) and libertarians (who tend to be closer to the left). Authoritarians are joiners of conventional groups in essentially equal proportions with libertarians. However, they are not as likely to join political action-oriented groups. Authoritarians have a more parochial and less cosmopolitan outlook on politics, and, above all, they have a much lower protest potential than libertarians. Finally, libertarians seem to prefer less continuous, more task-specific, more individualistic forms of political involvement – such as those provided by public protesting, while the more traditional forms of political involvement provided by party politics seem to correspond more to the world views of the authoritarians.
Similarly, Gundelach (1998) explains the individuals’ involvement in four types of protest activities (signing a petition, attending lawful demonstrations, boycotts, and occupying buildings), what he calls ‘grass-roots activity’, mainly with value orientations characteristic of the left. In the twelve West European countries he analyzed, he found that social or political libertarianism and post-materialism were all associated with grass-roots activity, and post-materialism turned out to be most important in stimulating such activity. More recently, Inglehart (2008) has confirmed the positive relation between post-materialist values and protest activities, and van der Meer et al. (2009: 15) have shown that left-wing citizens are more likely to turn to protest activities than their counterparts on the right in all twenty Western democracies that they studied during the early 2000s. Finally, Dalton et al. (2010) confirm the significant effect of post-materialism and left ideology on protest behavior in their eighty-seven nations study based on World Value Survey (WVS) (wave 1999-2002). Moreover, using multi-level models, they show that both the effects of left-right self-placement and post-materialist attitudes are magnified in democratic and economically developed countries – that is in the countries which I am focusing on here.

It is, of course, true that, in multiparty systems, the new left has also created its own parties, above all the Green parties. However, these parties have some characteristics which correspond to the values of their partisans and which distinguish them from the personalistic strategies of the parties of the new right: they are parties of ‘individual participation’ which attribute great importance to their grassroots, and which have continued to mobilize outside of the party system to a much greater extent than the new populist right (Poguntke 1993). For the new left, mobilization outside of the party system is part of its standard repertoire, while for the new populist right, such mobilization is a second best solution when it turns out to be unsuccessful within the partisan channel of mobilization. This is confirmed by Hutter and Kriesi’s (2013) analyses, which show that the success of the radical right in electoral terms leads it to abstain from protest activities, while electoral success incites the radical left to
engage more intensively in protest politics. More specifically, their analysis of six West European countries – Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK – documents the dominance in terms of public protest of both left over right, and of radical parties over moderate ones. In the protest arena, the left is more present than the right and the radical left dominates over the moderate left in five out of the six countries; only Great Britain deviates in this respect because of the protest activities of the National Front in the seventies and of the BNP later on. The two most successful right-populist challengers – the Austrian and the Swiss parties from the populist right – have been particularly protest averse.

The transformation of the party system by social movements

Some social movements not only organize as parties, but the parties of these movements transform the party system. That is, the party system is not only a crucial context condition shaping the emergence, mobilization and eventual success or failure of social movements, some powerful movements may, in turn, also be capable of transforming the entire party system. This has, of course, been the case of the labour movement: all the West European party systems have been similarly transformed by the rise of its parties, and they have been differentially shaped by whether or not the parties of this movement subsequently split into a social-democratic and a communist branch (Bartolini 2000).

More recently, the rise of the Green parties and of the parties of the new populist right has similarly been driving the transformation of the party systems in Western democracies. The two types of parties that have emerged out of the last two great waves of protest in these countries have both contributed to the reinterpretation and reinforcement of the competition on the cultural dimension of the party space. The Green parties have become the most clear-cut defenders of a universalistic-multicultural, libertarian position that is opposed by the particularistic-nationalistic, authoritarian position of the new populist right. As a study of the
impact of cultural (universalistic vs particularistic) and economic (state vs market) preferences on the electoral choices of European citizens reveals, the cultural preferences are crucial with respect to the vote for these two types of parties, while the economic preferences are more discriminating between mainstream parties (Häusermann and Kriesi, forthcoming). Moreover, the impact of the preferences on the cultural dimension on the vote choice has generally become greater than the impact of the economic preferences. For the case of France in particular, this overall finding based on a cross-sectional study is confirmed by a longitudinal analysis (Tiberj 2013). According to the argument I have advanced together with my colleagues (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012), the new populist right, rather than simply articulating a populist challenge to the mainstream parties which habitually govern, has instead given voice to a new structural conflict that opposes globalization ‘losers’ to globalization ‘winners’. At this point, I might add that the Green parties constitute their most clear-cut opponents on this new structural conflict.

In consensus democracies, the Green and right-wing populist challengers have partly given rise to new parties, partly they have been co-opted by mainstream parties that have been transformed in due course. Thus, some social-democratic parties – the French socialists being an example – have been co-opting the multi-cultural program of the Greens, thereby almost entirely closing off their electoral niche. On the other hand, some conservative or liberal-conservative parties, such as the Swiss people’s party (SVP) and the Austrian Liberal Party (FPÖ), have transformed themselves under the impact of the new structural conflict to become the key parties of the new populist right in their respective countries.

As already pointed out, in majoritarian democracies, the rise of new parties coming out of social movements is much more difficult, which means that the transformation of existing parties by social movements is more likely. This is illustrated by the US case, where third parties have a very difficult time and where cooperation with major parties or capture of
major parties is a promising alternative for social movements. Thus, after having built its own People’s Party and having experienced the only limited success of this party, the American populist movement of the late 19th century made a compromise with the Democrats and, in the presidential elections of 1896, supported William Jennings Bryan, the democratic candidate who was close to its own cause – with fatal consequences for both the Democratic party and the populists. Bryan lost the race and went down to the first of three national defeats, and ‘the People’s Party rapidly shrank from the spearhead of a social movement into an insignificant sect (before expiring in 1908)’ (Kazan 1995: 45). More recent attempts of presidential candidates close to social movements met with similar fates – either as third party candidates (Ralph Nader, Ross Perrot or George Wallace) or as candidates of one of the major parties (George McGovern for the Democrats in 1972 and Barry Goldwater for the Republicans in 1964).

The most recent transformative force in the US party system has been the Tea Party – a variant of long-standing forms of conservative populism in America and, arguably, the equivalent of the new populist right in West European party systems. It is worth having a closer look at the fate of this movement for an appreciation of the effect social movements may have in a two party system. As is explained by Skocpol and Williamson (2012), Tea Party efforts moved forward within and across the edges of the GOP, but not under party control. The Tea Party had its greatest effect on the party system in the mid-term elections 2010, when it contributed (in addition to the economic crisis conditions) to the victory of many very conservative Republican candidates, and allowed the Republicans to take control of the House, and of both the governorships and the legislatures in twelve states (Drew 2013). The Republican Party had been moving toward the right for some time, and the movement only quickened after the advent of the Tea Party. The Tea Party activists fulfilled ‘watchdog functions’, barking at the GOP heels. According to Skocpol and Williamson (2012: 183), the bottom line for the Tea Party’s impact on Congress – and on state legislatures – lies in its
capacity to coordinate national pressures from wealthy funders and ideological advocates with contacts from grassroots Tea Partyers who have a reputation for clout in local districts. When coordinated pressure can be mounted – as it did in budget battles – the Tea Party delivers a loud and clear absolutist message to legislators, a message that comes both from advocates in Washington DC and from local districts. In spite of the fading popularity of the symbolism of the ‘Tea Party’, the power of hard-right ideologues consolidated during the first years of the Obama Administration has continued to drive Republican politics, crowding Republicans into an ultra-right corner and contributing to the paralysis of the American political system (Drew 2013).

The transformation processes I have discussed so far are part of long-term trends that are enhanced by social movement actors. Party systems may, however, also be transformed as a result of short-term exogenous shocks. Such shocks may give rise to mobilization processes which result in a political crisis with profound consequences for the national party system. In the context of the Great Recession, we have witnessed such transformation processes in several countries. More specifically, against the background of the crisis, we have seen the rise of an entirely new phenomenon – the ‘anti-party’, which is a contradiction in terms, but nevertheless an empirical reality: it is a political organization that mobilizes against the established party system as a whole by competing with the established parties in the electoral channel. In other words, this is a protest movement that participates in elections in order to defeat the established parties with their own weapons. The most successful case in point so far has been the Italian ‘Five star movement’ (‘M5S’) of the comic Beppe Grillo, but the ‘Grillini’ have by no means been the only movement of this kind. For example, in the 2010 local elections in Iceland, a country that was immediately and very heavily struck by the Great Recession in late 2008, the voters of the country’s capital Reykjavik turned to the ‘best party’ of the comic Jon Gunnar Kristinsson, which became the largest party with 35 percent of the vote. ‘Jon Gnarr’ had founded the ‘best party’ at the end of 2009 – as a parody of
established party politics – asking, among other things, for a ‘transparent’ handling of corruption. Similarly, the Italian Five-star movement has set out to fight against ‘la casta’, the political establishment of the country, its privileges and immoral behaviour: although it also has some environmental goals in its program, the Five-star movement above all seeks to change the political process, to introduce more direct forms of participation, to reduce the costs of politics and to limit the power of individual politicians by forbidding the cumulation of roles, introducing term limits, and cutting their expenditures and personal allowances (Biorcio and Natale 2013: 49). In the 2013 Italian national elections, the movement obtained 25.6 percent of the vote and became the largest party of the country. Given that it subsequently refused to enter into any coalition and to participate constructively in the legislative process, its success led to a stalemate in Italian politics (De Sio et al. 2013: 12). The impasse created by the movement’s policy of non-cooperation could only be overcome by forcing the two major adversaries in the party system into an oversized coalition government, which, predictably, has not been able to solve any of Italy’s pressing economic and institutional problems so far.

Although the outcome of the political crisis in which the rise of the new movement has precipitated Italian politics is still open, it may very well result in a profound transformation of the Italian party system.

Such a transformation has already taken place in Greece, arguably the country that was hardest hit by the Great Recession. For more than three years, Greece saw an enormous, sustained mobilization against the government’s austerity policies, which were imposed by the international ‘Troika’ (composed of the EZB, the European Commission and the IMF), with far-reaching consequences for electoral politics. The party system reconfigured under the impact of a new political conflict opposing the partisans and foes of the bailout agreement that imposed this very harsh policy (Dinar and Rori 2013: 274-6). The new political conflict dimension of the bailout issue, which could be regarded as the Greek version of the ‘integration-demarcation’ cleavage that we have identified in North-West European countries
(Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008), confronted the two pro-European mainstream parties with the peripheral parties from the left (the Communist KKE and the more left-libertarian Syriza) and the right (LAOS). The specifically Greek aspect is that this conflict has predominantly been articulated by the old and new left (KKE and Syriza) and not by the new populist right. Eventually, Greece experienced a deep political crisis that culminated in the collapse of its party system during the consecutive parliamentary elections of May and June 2012. In these elections, the punishment meted out to the two major parties was exemplary: together they lost no less than 45 per cent of total vote, jointly obtaining no more than 32 per cent. The socialist PASOK was literally destructed losing more than 30 per cent, but its traditional conservative opponent, the ND, was not able to benefit from this collapse and also lost 15 per cent. The May election resulted in a deadlock, which led to the organization of a second election in June and a limited comeback of ND to become the largest party with 29.7 percent. The big winner of the elections was Syriza, which saw its vote shares sky-rocket, placing it in second place, only three percentage points below the leading party (Dinar and Rori 2013: 279). Joining forces the two traditional major parties only barely succeeded in excluding the new forces from the government.

**Conclusion**

In my discussion of the relationship between political parties and social movements, I have tried to argue that the borderline between insiders (political parties) and outsiders (social movements) in politics is not as clear-cut as is often assumed by social movement scholars. More specifically, I have tried to show that, in addition to the conventional political process view of this relationship that conceives of political parties mainly in terms of allies of social movements, social movements may, in turn, also create or reshape individual parties and transform entire party systems. Let me conclude by stating the obvious: this kind of impact is,
of course, not given to any kind of movement, but only to important movements capable of expanding the scope of conflict society-wide. The impact of such movements on the party system is likely to be particularly profound, when they operate in times of crisis, where they may serve as the catalyst of a political crisis leading to a realignment of political forces and to profound institutional reforms.
References


