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On Authoritarian Power Sharing. Conceptual and empirical debates in the study of authoritarian rulers sharing power

Dates:
  • Thu 17 May 2018 10.00 - 17.00
  • Fri 18 May 2018 10.00 - 17.00
  Add to Calendar 2018-05-17 10:00 2018-05-18 17:00 Europe/Paris On Authoritarian Power Sharing. Conceptual and empirical debates in the study of authoritarian rulers sharing power

This workshop aims at addressing this gap through three related questions. First, if the distribution of spoils from joint rule is ultimately at the leadership’s discretion, how and why do the key elite groups bargain with authoritarian rulers? Moreover, if institutions can be made and unmade by rulers at any point, how can these institutions provide credible commitments for power elites? Secondly, the literature suggests that elites participate in power-sharing bargains in order to obtain regime spoils, but it remains unclear which benefits they receive from cooperation and through which channels they reap such spoils, given that they cooperate under highly constrained institutions. Finally, although quasi-democratic‘power sharing’ institutions are supposedly mutually beneficial for leaders and coalition members, dissent within rulers’ inner circle is one of the primary causes of regime breakdown. Hence, under what circumstances and mechanisms do coalition members cease to coalesce with the rulers? If rulers cannot be held accountable for their decisions in authoritarian systems, how can coalition members’ pose a credible threat to the regime stability?

Theatre, Badia Fiesolana DD/MM/YYYY
  Theatre, Badia Fiesolana

This workshop aims at addressing this gap through three related questions. First, if the distribution of spoils from joint rule is ultimately at the leadership’s discretion, how and why do the key elite groups bargain with authoritarian rulers? Moreover, if institutions can be made and unmade by rulers at any point, how can these institutions provide credible commitments for power elites? Secondly, the literature suggests that elites participate in power-sharing bargains in order to obtain regime spoils, but it remains unclear which benefits they receive from cooperation and through which channels they reap such spoils, given that they cooperate under highly constrained institutions. Finally, although quasi-democratic‘power sharing’ institutions are supposedly mutually beneficial for leaders and coalition members, dissent within rulers’ inner circle is one of the primary causes of regime breakdown. Hence, under what circumstances and mechanisms do coalition members cease to coalesce with the rulers? If rulers cannot be held accountable for their decisions in authoritarian systems, how can coalition members’ pose a credible threat to the regime stability?


Location:
Theatre, Badia Fiesolana

Affiliation:
Department of Political and Social Sciences

Type:
Workshop

Organiser:
Prof. Stefano Bartolini (EUI)
Adrián Del Río Rodríguez (EUI - Department of Political and Social Sciences)
Leendert Jan Gerrit Krol (EUI - Department of Political and Social Sciences)

Contact:
Adele Ines Battistini (EUI - Department of Political and Social Sciences) - Send a mail

Speaker:
Prof. Jennifer Gandhi (Emory University)
Prof Ora John Reuter (University of Wisconsin)

Attachment:
Program
 
 

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