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Europe in the World Research Seminar - Uncertainty, Network Change and Costly Signaling: How the Network of Diplomatic Visits Affects the Initiation of International Conflict

Dates:
  • Wed 07 Nov 2018 16.00 - 18.00
  Add to Calendar 2018-11-07 16:00 2018-11-07 18:00 Europe/Paris Europe in the World Research Seminar - Uncertainty, Network Change and Costly Signaling: How the Network of Diplomatic Visits Affects the Initiation of International Conflict

Bargaining theories of war emphasize private information as a cause of conflict. Leaders are uncertain about one another's military strength, preferences, and trustworthiness, which may lead to the outbreak of conflict. Thus, a critical step in the onset of conflict is determining what leaders know and where they get their information from. I argue that what state leaders know is the result of their embeddedness in international networks. These networks can serve as an infrastructure for information exchange and as a costly signaling device. Leaders may communicate with other leaders to obtain strategic information about potential opponents. They may also use the pattern of their interactions to disseminate costly signals about their preferences and demonstrate trustworthiness and alliances. Using data on diplomatic visits from 1990 to 2004 and employing inferential network analysis, I show that states' positions in the diplomatic visits network are a powerful predictor of conflict initiation.

Sala Belvedere, Villa Schifanoia DD/MM/YYYY
  Sala Belvedere, Villa Schifanoia

Bargaining theories of war emphasize private information as a cause of conflict. Leaders are uncertain about one another's military strength, preferences, and trustworthiness, which may lead to the outbreak of conflict. Thus, a critical step in the onset of conflict is determining what leaders know and where they get their information from. I argue that what state leaders know is the result of their embeddedness in international networks. These networks can serve as an infrastructure for information exchange and as a costly signaling device. Leaders may communicate with other leaders to obtain strategic information about potential opponents. They may also use the pattern of their interactions to disseminate costly signals about their preferences and demonstrate trustworthiness and alliances. Using data on diplomatic visits from 1990 to 2004 and employing inferential network analysis, I show that states' positions in the diplomatic visits network are a powerful predictor of conflict initiation.


Location:
Sala Belvedere, Villa Schifanoia

Affiliation:
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Department of Political and Social Sciences
Department of History and Civilization
Max Weber Programme

Type:
Research seminar

Organiser:
Professor Ulrich Krotz (EUI - RSCAS and SPS)
Richard Maher (EUI - RSCAS)
Corinna Unger (EUI - HEC)

Speaker:
Oliver Westerwinter ( EUI - RSCAS)

Contact:
Naïs Ralaison - Send a mail

Discussant:
Grace Ballor (EUI - HEC)

Links:
Europe in the World Research Area
 
 

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