Nicola Mastrorocco (Trinity College, Dublin), gives a talk on "Organised Crime, Captured Politicians and the Allocation of Public Resources"
Dates:
- Wed 07 Nov 2018 11.30 - 13.00
Add to Calendar
2018-11-07 11:30
2018-11-07 13:00
Europe/Paris
Nicola Mastrorocco (Trinity College, Dublin), gives a talk on "Organised Crime, Captured Politicians and the Allocation of Public Resources"
SPS Departmental Seminar Series
Abstract: What is the impact of organised crime on the allocation of public resources and on tax collection? This paper studies the consequences of collusion between members of criminal organisations and politicians in Italian local governments. In order to capture the presence of organised crime, we exploit the staggered enforcement of a national law allowing for dissolution of a municipal government upon evidence of collusion between elected
officials and the mafia. We measure the consequences of this collusion by using newly collected data on public spending, local taxes and elected politicians at the local level. Differences-in-differences estimates reveal that infiltrated local governments not only spend more on average on construction and waste management and less on police enforcement, but also collect fewer fiscal revenues. In addition, we uncover key elements of local elections
associated with mafia-government collusion. In particular, Regression Discontinuity estimates show that infiltration is more likely to occur when right-wing parties win local elections.
Refectory, Badia Fiesolana
DD/MM/YYYY
Refectory, Badia Fiesolana
SPS Departmental Seminar Series
Abstract: What is the impact of organised crime on the allocation of public resources and on tax collection? This paper studies the consequences of collusion between members of criminal organisations and politicians in Italian local governments. In order to capture the presence of organised crime, we exploit the staggered enforcement of a national law allowing for dissolution of a municipal government upon evidence of collusion between elected
officials and the mafia. We measure the consequences of this collusion by using newly collected data on public spending, local taxes and elected politicians at the local level. Differences-in-differences estimates reveal that infiltrated local governments not only spend more on average on construction and waste management and less on police enforcement, but also collect fewer fiscal revenues. In addition, we uncover key elements of local elections
associated with mafia-government collusion. In particular, Regression Discontinuity estimates show that infiltration is more likely to occur when right-wing parties win local elections.
- Location:
- Refectory, Badia Fiesolana
- Affiliation:
- Department of Political and Social Sciences
- Type:
- Seminar series
- Discussant:
-
Assistant Professor of Economics Nicola Mastrorocco (Trinity College, Dublin)
- Organiser:
-
Professor Elias Dinas (EUI - Department of Political and Social Sciences)
- Contact:
-
Jennifer Rose Dari (EUI - Department of Political and Social Sciences)
-
Send a mail