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Comparative Constitutional Design

Dates:
  • Mon 14 Jan 2019 15.00 - 17.00
  Add to Calendar 2019-01-14 15:00 2019-01-14 17:00 Europe/Paris Comparative Constitutional Design

Since ever, a large and core area of political science concerned the configuration, the functioning and the outcomes of top political institutions. A large literature has accumulated about the different political components of a constitutional scheme. The seminar aims at reviewing its main contributions linking the constitutional choices on the key elements to the arguments about the negative and positives behavioural incentives they are theoretically associated with and to the outcomes they actually seem to foster. Key topics will include:
Components of the Constitutional design
The electoral laws and the ‘selectorates’ (though usually not constitutional choices);
Executive structures (mono and dual executives)
Mono and bicameralism
Parliamentary key proceedings (investiture, confidence, censure)
Centre-periphery links
Accountability mechanisms and constitutional amendments rules
Combining the components into general Institutional designs
The veto-players structure
The power sharing principle
The logics of Parliamentarism, Presidentialism, semi-Parliamentarism/ Semi-Presidentialism, and Iper/Presidentialism)

Seminar Room 3, Badia Fiesolana DD/MM/YYYY
  Seminar Room 3, Badia Fiesolana

Since ever, a large and core area of political science concerned the configuration, the functioning and the outcomes of top political institutions. A large literature has accumulated about the different political components of a constitutional scheme. The seminar aims at reviewing its main contributions linking the constitutional choices on the key elements to the arguments about the negative and positives behavioural incentives they are theoretically associated with and to the outcomes they actually seem to foster. Key topics will include:
Components of the Constitutional design
The electoral laws and the ‘selectorates’ (though usually not constitutional choices);
Executive structures (mono and dual executives)
Mono and bicameralism
Parliamentary key proceedings (investiture, confidence, censure)
Centre-periphery links
Accountability mechanisms and constitutional amendments rules
Combining the components into general Institutional designs
The veto-players structure
The power sharing principle
The logics of Parliamentarism, Presidentialism, semi-Parliamentarism/ Semi-Presidentialism, and Iper/Presidentialism)


Location:
Seminar Room 3, Badia Fiesolana

Affiliation:
Department of Political and Social Sciences

Type:
Seminar

Organiser:
Prof. Stefano Bartolini (EUI)

Attachment:
Syllabus
 
 

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