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SoU Side-Event: Non-Majoritarian Institutions under Political Pressure

Dates:
  • Thu 02 May 2019 14.45 - 16.15
  Add to Calendar 2019-05-02 14:45 2019-05-02 16:15 Europe/Paris SoU Side-Event: Non-Majoritarian Institutions under Political Pressure

Since the 1980s, within and beyond Europe we have witnessed widespread delegation of powers from governments directly elected by citizens to Non-Majoritarian Institutions (NMIs) that are neither directly elected nor directly managed by elected politicians (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002: 2). The institutional forms taken by NMIs include independent regulatory agencies tasked to oversee and facilitate competition (Thatcher 2002a; Coen and Thatcher 2005), central banks charged to conduct monetary policy (McNamara 2002), specialized constitutional courts (Stone Sweet 1989, 1992, 2000, 2002), and supranational bodies such as the European Commission (Wilks and Bartle 2002; Pollack 1997, 2003) and other international organizations (Nielson and Tierney 2003). Functional rationales for explaining delegation centered on the outcomes that these unelected bodies were expected to deliver better than elected politicians, and which included providing long-term commitments credible to investors, enhancing the efficiency of policymaking, and better dealing with highly technical areas (Levy and Spiller 1994; Majone 1996, 1997; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). However, rather than technical, Pareto-efficient decisions (where some benefit and no one is made worse off), NMIs have increasingly taken political decisions with clearly distributive implications and both winners and losers. Furthermore, today, NMIs are commonly accused of having failed to deliver on their promises, having frequently led to rather unpopular outcomes (e.g., price rises, fiscal costs due to supervisory failures).

List of confirmed speakers:
- Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt (Technical University of Munich)
- Erik Jones (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies)
- Bernardo Rangoni (European University Insitute)
- Mark Tatcher (LUISS Guido Carli and London School of Economics)
- Anna Tzanaki (European University Institute)
- Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)

Chair: David Coen (University College London)

Seminar Room 2, Badia Fiesolana DD/MM/YYYY
  Seminar Room 2, Badia Fiesolana

Since the 1980s, within and beyond Europe we have witnessed widespread delegation of powers from governments directly elected by citizens to Non-Majoritarian Institutions (NMIs) that are neither directly elected nor directly managed by elected politicians (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002: 2). The institutional forms taken by NMIs include independent regulatory agencies tasked to oversee and facilitate competition (Thatcher 2002a; Coen and Thatcher 2005), central banks charged to conduct monetary policy (McNamara 2002), specialized constitutional courts (Stone Sweet 1989, 1992, 2000, 2002), and supranational bodies such as the European Commission (Wilks and Bartle 2002; Pollack 1997, 2003) and other international organizations (Nielson and Tierney 2003). Functional rationales for explaining delegation centered on the outcomes that these unelected bodies were expected to deliver better than elected politicians, and which included providing long-term commitments credible to investors, enhancing the efficiency of policymaking, and better dealing with highly technical areas (Levy and Spiller 1994; Majone 1996, 1997; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). However, rather than technical, Pareto-efficient decisions (where some benefit and no one is made worse off), NMIs have increasingly taken political decisions with clearly distributive implications and both winners and losers. Furthermore, today, NMIs are commonly accused of having failed to deliver on their promises, having frequently led to rather unpopular outcomes (e.g., price rises, fiscal costs due to supervisory failures).

List of confirmed speakers:
- Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt (Technical University of Munich)
- Erik Jones (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies)
- Bernardo Rangoni (European University Insitute)
- Mark Tatcher (LUISS Guido Carli and London School of Economics)
- Anna Tzanaki (European University Institute)
- Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)

Chair: David Coen (University College London)


Location:
Seminar Room 2, Badia Fiesolana

Affiliation:
Max Weber Programme
Communications Service

Type:
Workshop

Contact:
Francesca Grassini (EUI - Max Weber Programme) - Send a mail

Organiser:
Bernardo Rangoni (Max Weber Fellow, Department of Law, EUI)
Anna Tzanaki (EUI - Department of Law)

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