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Selcen Çakir (Bogaziçi University), gives a talk on 'Chosing Your Pond: A Structural Model of Power Sharing', in The Political Behaviour Colloquium

Dates:
  • Tue 20 Oct 2020 17.15 - 18.30
  Add to Calendar 2020-10-20 17:15 2020-10-20 18:30 Europe/Paris Selcen Çakir (Bogaziçi University), gives a talk on 'Chosing Your Pond: A Structural Model of Power Sharing', in The Political Behaviour Colloquium

Online via Zoom

Political Behaviour Colloquium

Abstract: Although political parties are central to democratic functioning, the internal struc- ture of party organizations is still a black box. I build a model of party formation that explains the within-party power sharing, party stability, and party-size distributions across different electoral systems. In the model, party control over government func- tions generates club goods. Politicians share their political rents with party leaders in exchange for accessing parties’ club goods. I estimate my model for Turkey with a dataset of all listed politicians between 1995 and 2014. My model matches the high party-switching rate (28.5%) in the Turkish parliament. I find that the right-wing parties accumulate club goods more easily then they produce rents, which leads to strong party control. The counterfactual exercises suggest that the possibility of a coup d’état (granting more bargaining power to politicians) lowers (improves) the average quality of the political class.

via Zoom - DD/MM/YYYY
  via Zoom -

Online via Zoom

Political Behaviour Colloquium

Abstract: Although political parties are central to democratic functioning, the internal struc- ture of party organizations is still a black box. I build a model of party formation that explains the within-party power sharing, party stability, and party-size distributions across different electoral systems. In the model, party control over government func- tions generates club goods. Politicians share their political rents with party leaders in exchange for accessing parties’ club goods. I estimate my model for Turkey with a dataset of all listed politicians between 1995 and 2014. My model matches the high party-switching rate (28.5%) in the Turkish parliament. I find that the right-wing parties accumulate club goods more easily then they produce rents, which leads to strong party control. The counterfactual exercises suggest that the possibility of a coup d’état (granting more bargaining power to politicians) lowers (improves) the average quality of the political class.


Location:
via Zoom -

Affiliation:
Department of Political and Social Sciences

Type:
Working group

Contact:
Political Behaviour Colloquium - Send a mail

Organiser:
Prof. Elias Dinas (EUI - Department of Political and Social Sciences)
Nerea Gándara Guerra (EUI - Department of Political and Social Sciences)
Álvaro Canalejo Molero (EUI - Department of Political and Social Sciences)

Speaker:
Selcen Çakir (Bogaziçi University)
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