The Legal and Political Theory Working Group hosts a session featuring a presentation by Jelena Belic, Leiden University.
Abstract
Withdrawals from international treaties and organizations are a pervasive feature of the international system; just as states create international treaties and organizations, they also, although to a lesser extent, either individually withdraw or dismantle organizations altogether. While many would agree that such trends are regrettable as they destabilize international cooperation, there are not that many voices arguing that withdrawals should not take place. On the contrary, it is taken for granted that the right to exit is one of the prerogatives of sovereign states. States, so the dominant view goes, have the right to decide on their external commitments that is derivative of their more fundamental right to self-determination. Just as they voluntarily create new treaties and international organizations, or join the existing ones, states are also free to leave these as long as they comply with withdrawal procedures set forth by the treaty itself or international law more generally.
While legal scholars have been examining the existence and scope of a legal right to exit, philosophers have paid far less attention to this right. Such neglect is unwarranted for both practical and theoretical reasons. Practically speaking, the state withdrawals from international organizations are becoming more salient, thus jeopardizing collective efforts to tackle global challenges, most notably the challenge of climate change. From a theoretical point of view, the nature and the justification of the putative right are far from obvious. In this paper, I examine the normative foundations of the state’s right to withdraw from multilateral treaties and organizations as well as possible grounds for its restrictions. The main (and tentative) thesis is that the moral right to withdraw from international treaties and organizations is more restricted than it is standardly assumed.