The financial crisis has led to numerous political and institutional changes in the European Union. A whole new institutional setting has developed in consequence that shows a number of legitimatory and democratic flaws. While the financial crisis as such has been discussed in a number of contributions, the democratic dilemmata it brought about have been less in the focus. The talk will discuss the setting of the monetary and fiscal governance structures that developed in the crisis, the dilemmata regarding democracy and legitimacy they brought about, and possible paths to solving these. It is argued that, even if largely unintended,
a) crisis governance entailed a crisis mode of steering austerity in debtor countries that contradicts standards and principles of parliamentary governance in representative democracies,
b) the ECB, even if it did whatever it takes to save the euro, attracted considerable popular dissatisfaction and criticism during the crisis, while public support for the EU and integration plunged in general
c) and thus, on the whole, the outcome is dissatisfying both in terms of legitimacy and accountability and the rise of populist support, and regarding the institutional and political sustainability of EMU
On this basis the talk ends with a discussion of possible paths to resolving the dilemmata, arguing that the situation calls for a (re)politicisation, democratisation and thick legitimation of EMU.
On premise spots are limited and on a first come, first serve basis.