Seminar Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Patient Players Microeconomics Seminar Add to calendar 2022-12-06 14:00 2022-12-06 15:15 Europe/Rome Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Patient Players Seminar Room 3rd Floor Villa La Fonte YYYY-MM-DD Print Share on Facebook Share on X Share on LinkedIn Send by email When 06 December 2022 14:00 - 15:15 CET Where Seminar Room 3rd Floor Villa La Fonte Organised by Department of Economics In this seminar, David Pearce (NYU) will present his paper "Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Patient Players." What determines the path of play in an infinitely repeated game? Typically the players' interests are not perfectly aligned but there is scope for cooperation. Potential surplus could be shared in different ways. The folk theorems of repeated games provide no guidance about the outcome. In the more tractable setting where players can sign binding contracts after any history of play, Abreu and Pearce (2007) show that slight reputational perturbations of the game lead to predictions consistent with Nash bargaining with threats (Nash, 1953). In many settings of interest, such contracts are not available. Nonetheless, combining reputational perturbations with modest continuity and renegotiation conditions in two-person repeated games with patient players again isolates play that is consistent with Nash bargaining with threats.Co-author: Dilip Abreu Contact(s): Martina Zucca (European University Institute) Speaker(s): Prof David Pearce (New York University) Scientific Organiser(s): Prof. Laurent Mathevet (EUI - Department of Economics)