The impact of the DMA on the antitrust enforcement of unilateral practices

• Department of Law

The EUI Competition Law Working Group hosts a session with Jan Blockx (University of Antwerp).

Killer acquisitions occupy the center stage in merger policy discussions. The concept refers to acquisitions where the sole intention of the buyer is to terminate the operations of the seller post-transaction. Although the concept originally addressed pharmaceuticals markets, scholars claim that killer acquisitions occur in digital markets as well. This paper attempts to develop a three-pronged method to test that proposition. We look at post-transaction output levels, competitor perception, and industry events in 11 European Commission merger decisions in the ICT sector. Our analysis yields little to no support for the assertion that killer acquisitions take place in digital markets. We outline policy implications based on our results.

The DMA is unlikely to significantly change abuse of dominance enforcement by the European Commission and by NCAs since the vast majority of abuse of dominance cases do not concern gatekeepers of core platform services and, even some cases that do, do not concern the obligations and prohibitions of the Articles 5 to 7 of the DMA. Tensions between the DMA and certain new national prohibitions of uniliteral practices are more likely, however, with their resolution depending on the interpretation of Articles 1(5) and 1(6) of the DMA. In addition, for gatekeepers, the existence of regulatory obligations under the DMA may have an interpretative effect when assessing the existence of an abuse of dominance. However, spillovers to non-gatekeepers are unlikely.