Seminar Matching through Search Channels Departmental Seminar Add to calendar 2024-10-15 11:00 2024-10-15 12:15 Europe/Rome Matching through Search Channels Seminar Room 3rd Floor Villa La Fonte YYYY-MM-DD Print Share: Share on Facebook Share on BlueSky Share on X Share on LinkedIn Send by email Scheduled dates Oct 15 2024 11:00 - 12:15 CEST Seminar Room 3rd Floor, Villa La Fonte Organised by Department of Economics In this seminar, Carlos Carrillo-Tudela (University of Esssex), will present the paper 'Matching through Search Channels.' Firms and workers predominately match via job postings, networks of personal contacts or the public employment agency, all of which help to ameliorate labour market frictions. In this paper we investigate the extent to which these search channels have differential effects on labour market outcomes. Using novel linked survey-administrative data we document that (i) low-wage firms and low-wage workers are more likely to match via networks or the public agency, while high-wage firms and high-wage workers succeed more often via job postings; (ii) job postings help firms the most in poaching and attracting high-wage workers and help workers the most in climbing the job ladder. To evaluate the implications of these findings for employment, wages and labour market sorting, we structurally estimate an equilibrium job ladder model featuring two-sided heterogeneity, multiple search channels and endogenous recruitment effort. The estimation reveals that networks are the most cost-effective channel, allowing firms to hire quickly, yet attracting workers of lower average ability. Job postings are the most costly channel, facilitate hiring workers of higher ability, and matter most for worker-firm sorting. Although the public employment agency provides the lowest hiring probability, its removal has sizeable consequences, with aggregate employment declining by at least 1.4 percent and rising bottom wage inequality.