Sanction regimes as global governance complexes

• Department of Political and Social Sciences

This International Relations Working Group session features a presentation by Ihor Moshenets (Central European University).

Why did the European Union impose an embargo on certain Russian energy industries - such as coal and crude oil with petroleum products—following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, while others were restricted only later (as in the case of LNG) or remain outside the scope of sanctions (such as the civil nuclear sector)?

This study contributes to the literature by offering a theoretical synthesis that conceptualizes sanctions regimes as Global Governance Complexes (GGCs). In doing so, it adapts analytical insights from research on regime complexity to the study of economic statecraft, aiming to explain the internal differentiation of multi-sectoral sanctions regimes.

Exploring this internal differentiation sheds light on the link between the geoeconomic competition that drives the establishment of sanctions regimes and the institutional limits of cooperation within them.

Finally, the proposed analytical framework demonstrates how economic restrictions can be understood not as temporary anomalies, but as enduring features of an increasingly conflictual and competitive international order in formation.