Seminar Investment timing and reputation Microeconomics seminar Add to calendar 2025-11-11 14:15 2025-11-11 15:30 Europe/Rome Investment timing and reputation Conference Room Villa La Fonte YYYY-MM-DD Print Share: Share on Facebook Share on BlueSky Share on X Share on LinkedIn Send by email Scheduled dates Nov 11 2025 14:15 - 15:30 CET Conference Room, Villa La Fonte Organised by Department of Economics This event features a discussion with Professor Sara Shahanaghi (Toulouse School of Economics). An agent learns dynamically about the profitability of a project and decides when to make an irreversible investment. The agent seeks to maximise his reputation for learning. Equilibrium investment is dictated by the prior about the project: the agent can be more willing to invest in projects that are ex-ante less likely to succeed. Reputation induces distortions in investment timing: investment is premature for projects that are unlikely to succeed and delayed for projects that are unlikely to fail. When reputational motives are sufficiently strong, these distortions can be dynamic in nature, leading to premature investment at the beginning of the research process and under-investment towards its end. Register