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This article examines institutional bias in the selection of arbitrators in investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) through an empirical study of the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Using an original dataset covering all ICSID appointments between 2000 and 2023, the article compares arbitrators appointed by the institution with those appointed by the parties.
The analysis shows that ICSID has used its appointment authority to respond to critiques of arbitrator homogeneity by modestly rebalancing the pool: institution-appointed arbitrators have fewer prior ICSID appointments (but at least one) and are significantly less likely to be nationals of high-income states. At the same time, the effects of institutional intervention are tightly constrained. ICSID-appointed arbitrators do not differ from party appointees in age, gender, or professional background and institutional appointments have no observable impact on dispute outcomes.
These findings support a theory of bounded correction of bias, in which arbitral institutions can partially offset structural biases generated by party-driven selection, but lack the capacity to introduce new adjudicators, alter cognitive or professional orientations, or reshape decisional patterns. The article argues that institutional appointments function less as engines of reform than as mechanisms of limited adjustment, illuminating both the possibilities and the limits of appointment-based reforms in ISDS.
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