Thesis defence by Carolina Paulesu
Production and consumption processes under capitalism are structurally unjust. Through their operation, large groups of people are systematically oppressed and dominated, while other groups benefit from this injustice. Those who are oppressed and dominated are at the intersection of multiple oppressions, including sexism, racism, and colonialism. Structural injustice results from the uncoordinated actions of many individuals who act in ways considered largely morally acceptable and, fundamentally, are legal. When people in the European Union act in their capacity as consumers, through what is considered normal conduct, they exacerbate the injustices faced by others who are placed at a disadvantage in production processes.
Drawing on Iris Young’s theory of structural injustice and political responsibility, this thesis explores the role of private law in this injustice. In particular, it explores how the regulation of consumer transactions by European private law entrenches the structural injustice of the export of textile waste and of sweatshop labour. The thesis proposes a novel theoretical framework, the Youngian theory of private law. The theory’s core contribution is that private law has the normative and operational power to entrench structural injustice. On one hand, it normalises consumer practices which contribute to structural injustice. On the other hand, it equips people with the tools to participate in structurally unjust production and consumption, namely the consumer contract. The thesis demonstrates which characteristics and legal tools of European private law ultimately exacerbate structural injustice.
The thesis also investigates the question of responsibility for challenging the structural injustice of production and consumption. Building on Young’s argument that responsibility for structural injustice must be discharged through collective action, the thesis critiques EU legal reforms on sustainable consumption, because they centre on individual consumer responsibility. Relying on individual action, this notion of responsibility is misguided because it depicts people as abstract beings, obscuring their material conditions and the impact that these conditions have on their lives. Further, this notion of responsibility depoliticises social change by framing it as achievable through individual action.
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