The European Union is in the throes of negotiating the sixth multiannual financial framework (MFF) since the breakthrough with the Delors 1 in 1987.
The MFF model was formalised and constitutionalised when made part of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Although the EU budget is extremely limited in size, budgetary politics in the EU have always been conflictual and controversial, riven by several structural cleavages.
This lecture analyses the current negotiations in the MFF cycle to assess the likely Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) given the preferences of key institutional actors and member states. All member states prefer a multiannual framework over a return to an annual framework, which is suboptimal for all. That said, preferences on budgetary resources, funding the EU, how it is spent and on what it is spent differ greatly.
In addition to the budgetary process, which is conducted above the radar in well-established institutional and decision routines, the fiscal power of the EU has expanded under the radar, with lending and borrowing becoming a central element of the fiscal and financial tool kit of the Union. The paper sets out to analyse why this is the case and asks which decision rules are applied and what consequences follow. The EU has strengthened its fiscal leverage through borrowing but is also building up a debt stock without much political scrutiny.
Due to limited seating, online attendance is encouraged.
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