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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Before the institutions, the believers: rebuilding Europe from its people

In "A Europe of the People," Erik Jones argues that Europe cannot be rebuilt by redesigning its institutions, only by persuading Europeans to believe in them - and that belonging comes with rules.

16 November 2026 | Research

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In the 1770s, asked how Poland should govern itself, Jean-Jacques Rousseau warned that the best institutions ever imagined make little difference if the people who use them do not believe in them. Erik Jones, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre, opens his essay A Europe of the People with that warning and argues that the United States has spent the past few years proving Rousseau's point. “The quality of the US Constitution as a constitution is not the issue in American politics right now,” he says. “The willingness of America’s political leadership to use the US Constitution as a framework for making effective decisions, for ensuring the rule of law - that is the issue.”

Europe’s version of the problem is different, and in one sense simpler. “The issue is that people do not even understand how the European Union works,” Jones says. “The US Constitution is a 7,000-word document, give or take. The treaties that establish the functioning of the European Union are measured in the hundreds of thousands of words. So, I am not surprised that people do not understand.” What does surprise him is the assumption that another round of institutional design would fix this. “That anybody, anywhere imagines we can get European citizens to align themselves with these institutions by changing the institutional design strikes me as absurd.”

Europe, he argues, is not a design problem: It is a people one. Belief has to come first, which is why the essay starts with Europeans rather than with Europe’s institutions. “The first thing we need to do is to get people to believe that there’s a thing called Europe, that this thing called Europe has a specific function and a specific ambition, and that we can measure its progress in achieving the goals set out for it,” he enumerates. Only then can people be expected to understand why that thing needs an institutional frame, he argues, and why the frame requires a measure of both self-discipline and multilateral surveillance.

Emptying the back pocket

The trouble is that the process of making a people has rarely been gentle. “Creating a people is a dangerous and often violent process,” Jones writes, and Europe cannot afford to repeat it. “Violence was not the only part of the process - it was the most familiar part of the process,” he says. Before the age of liberal nationalism, the most common way to bring peoples together was either by marriage or by force. What the liberal nationalists of the 19th century added was culture: poetry, literature, and language, used to inspire alongside the violence they were accustomed to. “The liberals had always been violent beforehand. What they brought in was this notion of culture. The competition was always based on ideas, but it always had a recourse to violence kept in the back pocket.”

So, the question for Europe is whether the back pocket can be emptied. “Do we still need that recourse to violence? I do not believe so,” he states. “I think we can inspire people and not resort to violence.” The condition he attaches is the one the old elites never met. “We have to accept that whatever initial plans we may have, we’re going to have to articulate and rearticulate and be adaptive to what the people have as their own plans. And that is not something that either communism or fascism - or liberalism, if we are honest - was ever very good at doing,” he concedes. “So, we have to be better than those traditional elites of the past. Whether Europeans can do that, that is the open question.”

If inspiration is the method, the essay’s proposals are small ones: Erasmus-like exchanges made widely available to secondary-school students, with the destinations randomised; a map embedded in European firms’ corporate identity showing where in Europe they source and invest, and his chosen example of roaming charges as the illustration of what a small win can do to how people see Europe. Asked for a case where one small success visibly led to the next, he reaches for the 1979 Cassis de Dijon ruling, which established the principle of mutual recognition. “What is good enough to circulate in one part of the common market should be good enough to circulate in another,” he summarises.

That principle was adapted in the 1980s and 1990s into a new approach to technical harmonisation and standards, and from there into a much broader internal market. “That tiny tweak in the way we frame these issues about technical harmonisation and standards was transformative,” he says, although he does not claim the ruling itself completed the internal market, and the new approach was later lost under more detailed and more controversial rules. “But the principle of mutual recognition, the idea that we should respect diversity and pursue economic integration on top of that respect, still plays an important role,” he notes. “So, that would be a point of success.”

It was also the high point of the project’s popularity. Here Jones follows the political scientist Nicolas Jabko. “You may not fall in love with it,” he paraphrases, “but you can appreciate the internal market as a goal and you can appreciate it as a symbol. And if you understand what the internal market is saying about this idea of unity with diversity, then there is something compelling about it.” That, he says, is the vision Europe needs to recapture: “One that appeals to values but also to function, that assigns roles but also leaves some degree of freedom, and yet achieves a common objective.”

Out of the defensive crouch

Much of this is an argument about communication, and Jones does not mind the label. “Can you do politics without communication?” he asks. “If you think about Thomas Paine and his Common Sense pamphlet, what is that if not a mass communications exercise? And the idea that it is framed as common sense is already genius.” The pattern repeats with every change in technology. “What we often talk about as populism is not populism per se. It is the entrepreneurial exploitation of new mechanisms for communication in order to reach and influence a different audience,” he says. Nobody stands outside this, whether they know it or not. “We are all engaged in these framings,” he adds. “The trick is to get people to repeat the frame, and to embrace it.”

Which raises the question of what frame Europe is offering. “Are we framing it in a defensive crouch - ‘we are going to create Europe because otherwise we’re all going to die?’” he asks. “Or are we framing it in something much more positive and inspirational - we are going to create Europe because that is the best way we can ensure the prosperity of our children?” The thought does not stop there. “We wonder why people are not having children,” he says, “but how much hope are we giving them that their children are not going to be born into misery, or adversity, or conflict?”

And when those opposed to European action answer with national and local identities instead? Jones turns the objection around. “There is not a single national identity in Europe that does not compete with regional and local identities. Not a single one,” he emphasises. In many countries the regional identities have their own dialects or languages. National identities survive that competition, he argues, and in most countries they do so through accommodation. The exceptions are not encouraging. “Take Spain, for example. It has tried very hard to push back against Catalonia and the Basque region,” he explains. “And that is not a great strategy. The more you push back, the more you end up generating tension. So, let us take that lesson from the national level and elevate it to the European level.”

The frame he has in mind is one that lets Europe be better while making its member states better at the same time, and he thinks it has already proved persuasive enough that formerly eurosceptic parties across the Union have softened their rhetoric and, in power, found ways to accommodate. “It is only in the United Kingdom where an extreme succeeded in pulling the country out, and you can see that many Brits regret that decision. They regret that framing,” he says. But he does not deny the tension between national and European identity. “It is not that there is no tension between national identity and European identity, but that it could be made into a productive tension as opposed to a destructive one,” he explains.

Belonging comes with rules

The last part of the essay is the least comfortable. Europeans, Jones writes, need self-discipline to act as Europeans, and they must also accept the need to impose discipline on those who choose not to cooperate - if necessary, by excluding them from shared institutions. “This mix of self-discipline and collective discipline is unfamiliar to students of European integration,” he writes. “The EU only rarely works that way.” The logic comes from From Club to Commons, his recent book with Veronica Anghel, which applies Elinor Ostrom’s work on how communities manage shared resources to the Union itself. Treat the single market, the euro and security as common-pool resources that can be exhausted, and the case for discipline looks different.

He makes that case with an example from Francesco Giumelli's (Jean Monnet Fellow, 2010-11) work on money laundering. “The research question he had was: how many money-laundering operations in a particular sector - say, garbage collection - does it take for the profit-making firms in the same sector to collapse?” Jones recalls. “And the empirical answer was that it takes a relatively small number, because these money-laundering operations never need to make a profit. All they need to do is show expense.” Nor is it only organised crime. “Cross-border dumping is no different from money laundering. The whole point is not to make a profit. The whole point is to show expense, to gain market share, and to destroy profit-making firms.” The example is deliberate: Keeping malicious actors out takes rules. “And yet, when you hear all the complaining about European single market regulation, you have to ask yourself: What is the alternative?” he goes on. “Do you think we would have an internal market if we didn’t have the same market rules?”

It is in security that the discipline becomes personal. People who share disinformation, he says, are often not ill-intentioned: they have seen a viewpoint they had not heard before and want others to help them judge it. “But they need to exercise self-discipline,” he says. “The free marketplace of ideas works when each person exercises judgement, rather than when each person shares in order to get some kind of wisdom out of the herd.”

Which is where the argument returns to Rousseau, and back to the people. The institutions can be as well designed as anyone likes; what Jones asks of Europeans is to believe in the thing the institutions serve and to accept the small disciplines that belonging requires, and to watch one another. Whether Europeans can do what he asks is, in his own words, the open question.

Erik Jones is Director of the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute. His essay ‘A Europe of the People’ appears in Europe from Scratch: Visions for a New European Order. From Club to Commons: Enlargement, Reform and Sustainability in European Integration, co-written with Veronica Anghel, Part-time Assistant Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre, is also available in open access on Cadmus. For more on Europe and its governance, visit the European Governance and Politics Programme page and follow it on LinkedIn.

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