Your expertise is in the international politics of the Asia-Pacific region, with a focus on Japan, China, and the United States. A few months after the new Trump administration has entered office, what are the short- and long-term implications that you see for the Asia-Pacific? And what are the implications for EU-Asia relationships?
I guess this is going to be a very long process of thinking ahead about the ripple effects of what is essentially a new America — an America that combines its instincts of primacy, of keeping its own hegemonic power intact, but that is more fatigued about foreign and security policy interventions, and operate on a downright protectionist or predatory logic. There is a strong longing for retrenchment that goes hand-in-hand with an aspiration for a secure sphere of influence, maybe even new territories, but also ongoing hegemonic contestation with China.
This is already having ripple effects in Europe and NATO countries, first and foremost, who are clearly preparing for a potential withdrawal of the US from guaranteeing European security. This is happening clearly in Ukraine. I start with security guarantees because it is the first clear impact of the second Trump administration, and it is impacting the thinking of US allies across the world, including in the Asia-Pacific.
So, will Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia take US security guarantees for granted? What about non-treaty allies such as Taiwan? Taiwan has often been associated with Ukraine, to the point that there is this narrative, in many ways also a strategic narrative, that has pointed at a, I would argue, false analogy between Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine with China's irredentism vis-à-vis Taiwan. The narrative sounds like: “Ukraine today, East Asia tomorrow”. But with Trump’s advent, “Ukraine today, East Asia tomorrow” might not refer to Russia and China, but rather to US disengagement.
There are growing fears in Taiwan that the US will not provide security guarantees. This might push Taiwan towards a more sustained re-armament, as the best security guarantee is the one that you can provide yourself by building up your military. The moves of the US implicitly aim at eliciting such behaviour, but there may be unintended consequences. Going nuclear is something that South Korea is already considering. We are potentially at the tipping point of nuclear proliferation that will also happen in East Asia. Conversely, US moves might lead to accommodation vis-à-vis China.
What are the implications of Trump 2.0 for EU-Asia relations? Under the Biden administration and following Russia’s war in Ukraine, momentum for an alignment became evident as European views on China soured, US leverage grew and reciprocity between European and Asia’s ‘like-minded partners’ (all of them from the Pacific side, rather than the Indian Ocean side) blossomed. States such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Australia supported Ukraine financially and diplomatically, if not militarily. The advent of the Trump administration may put that Europe-Asia link into greater strain, since the focus may be on our respective theatres. In short, the US retains a lot of structural power.
You are here as the host of the EU-Asia Project Annual Conference. This project, based in the Global Governance Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre, started back in 2020. Could you tell us more about what has happened in the last five years?
I have had the good fortune of being the director of this five-year project, which sits in the Global Governance Programme, specifically in the Europe in the World research strand. It’s an ambitious initiative with multiple components.
During these five years, we’ve tackled policy-relevant and academic research on topics such as the 21st-century political economy of EU-Asia relations and collaboration on emerging and disruptive technologies.
A major theme we explore is the ongoing transformation in the relationship between states and markets—marked by more state intervention, protectionism, and industrial policies. How do you regulate or invest in new technology? East Asian states, starting with China but also South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, have been leading this trend, and we're all taking notes.
There is a strong educational component. I teach a class on Asia-Pacific international relations at the School of Transnational Governance and provide seminars and teach Strategic Communications in the Asia-Pacific to EUI researchers and Ca’ Foscari University students. Strategic communications include public diplomacy, psychological operations, strategic narratives, influence operations, and military signalling and is what I teach at King’s College London.
Beyond teaching and research, I invite policy-relevant academic researchers for seminars and lectures. We’ve hosted guests from Japan, Korea, China, Europe, and the United States. Since my main expertise is in security studies and international affairs, broadly defined, our work covers Europe-Asia affairs, particularly EU-Asia relations, from those lenses. The programme is funded by the Japan Foundation, an academic and cultural diplomacy organisation.
Along with Ken Endo, I have organised these annual conferences, which are highly policy-oriented, focused on topical issues, and bring together practitioners, academic researchers, and think tankers—not just to analyse, but to address real-world problems and issues, and provide actionable solutions, in line with the Robert Schuman Centre’s mission.
Could you give us an overview of the current research in this area, related to Asia-Pacific and done as part of the EU-Asia project? How relevant is this research for policy?
In terms of research, I have engaged in both academic work and policy-relevant research. One of my co-authored books (Sino-Japanese Power Politics: Might, Money and Minds) was translated into Korean. Aside from academic writing on foreign and security policy of Japan, I have broadened my research horizons to include writings on the EU security interventions in the Indo-Pacific. For instance, how have the EU and its member states raised their political and security profile all the way to Japan and Australia, by sending military assets and providing capacity-building support, by empowering them at a time of geopolitical contestation?
Conversely, through collaboration with great colleagues I’ve also explored Italy–China relations in the context of political communication, namely the political and marketing aspects of the symbolic 2019memorandum of understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative. During my time here, I have participated in Track 1.5 dialogues, where I was able to provide a European perspective on Europe-China and Europe-Asia relations, specifically on cooperation with South Korea, Japan, and India. This has been a very engaging and stimulating experience, and I’m very thankful to the Schuman Centre for giving me the opportunity to combine my academic and policy research seamlessly.
Finally, what I do is often invite experts who are particularly eloquent in their research, to learn from them and give them a platform by commissioning policy papers that I edit. They are later published through the Robert Schuman Centre’s series of policy papers and policy briefs. Over the past five years, we’ve had more than 80 policy briefs and papers published, all publicly available and open access on Cadmus. Ten more papers will be published this year. Topics range widely, as do vantage points, because there is strength in diversity of views, ut the focus remains on Asia and Europe-Asia relations.
Are European scholars interested in the Asia-Pacific? How does this initiative fit into the European academic environment?
The interest in Asia is growing, as it is the engine of the world’s growth. Many European states have reframed their foreign and security policies to engage more with what we now refer to as the Indo-Pacific, driven largely by economic considerations, although (geo)political ones lurk behind such overtures.
Much of the world’s economic expansion is happening in the Asia-Pacific and South Asia. India, for instance, is growing at around 6.5–7% GDP annually, and so is Southeast Asia. At the same time, the region is militarising, making it a hotbed for geopolitical contestation.
So, there is active interest in preserving peace and prosperity while benefiting from the region’s economic growth and rich procurement markets. Thus, economic considerations are still the substructure of Europe’s growing ties with the Asia-Pacific and with South Asia, allowing for a corresponding rise in academic research on its contemporary politics and economics. This is an area to be understood on its own merits, which is the traditional remit of Area Studies.
Of course, these themes—economic, political, and security—are also taken up by political scientists, security specialists, and economists aiming to understand the factors behind the deepening Europe–Asia relationship and the broader dynamics within Asia. Through co-financing, the EUI has allowed me to bring in Jean Monnet and Max Weber fellows to help build the next generation of Asia-Europe experts. We have had scholars working on China, Taiwan, as well as Italy’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific, many of whom are now thriving in academic and policy circles. Again, that interest is pre-existent, but apart from demand, we need to nurture opportunities, and this is what the EU-Asia project has been able to do, and I'm very glad that I've been instrumental to that effect.
This year’s EU-Asia Annual conference, titled ‘2024: The year of elections and their impact on world (dis)order’ took place on 13-14 March in Florence. Watch the recording of the first panel featuring Watanabe Tsuneo, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Veronica Anghel, European University Institute and Bonnie Glaser, The German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Giulio Pugliese is Part-time Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre and Director of the EU-Asia Project at the Global Governance Programme. He specialises in the international politics of the Asia-Pacific with a focus on Japan, China and the United States.