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Topics in Political Economy (ECO-AD-TOPPOLECO)

ECO-AD-TOPPOLECO

Description

The aim of this course is to introduce you to theoretical and applied research in political economy. We will formally study the strategic interaction between voters, political institutions and economic outcomes. Topics that will be covered include theory of voting, direct democracy, representative democracy and electoral competition, political economy of redistribution, comparative political institutions, campaign spending, attention in politics. 

Learning outcomes:
At the end of the course the student will have acquired knowledge of specific advanced topics in political economy and the ability to develop critical and original views on the issues covered in the course.

Assessment    
Project and presentation.

Attendance is Compulsory.
    

Module structure - The following structure should be regarded as tentative and subject to revision

WEEK 1

Learning Unit #1
    Participation and Information Aggregation

WEEK 2

Learning Unit #2

    Models of Direct and Representative Democracies
WEEK 3

Learning Unit #3
    Dynamic Models
WEEK 4

Learning Unit #4
    Comparing Political Institutions and Campaign Spending
WEEK 5

Learning Unit #5
    Politics of Attention and Lies in Politics

Assessment grid

ACTIVITY    CRITERIA    FEEDBACK
Research Project        
In Class Presentation        
        

Bibliography and further readings: The following reading list should be regarded as tentative and subject to revision.


Gans, J. and M. Smart (1996), “Majority Voting with Single-Crossing Preferences,” Journal of Public Economics 59, 219-237.

Feddersen, T. and W. Pesendorfer (1996), “The Swing Voter’s Curse,” American Economic Review 86, 408-424.

Feddersen, T. and A. Sandroni (2006), “A Theory of Participation in Election,” American Economic Review 96, 1271-1282.

Mattozzi, A. and M. Nakaguma (2023), “Public versus Secret Voting in Committees,” Journal of the European Economic Association 21, 907-940.

Coate, S and M. Conlin (2004), “A Group Rule-utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout”, American Economic Review 94, 1476-1504.

Levine, D. and A. Mattozzi (2020), “Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment,” American Economic Review 110, 3298-3314.

Meltzer, A. and S. Richard (1981), “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,” Journal of Political Economy 89, 914-927.

Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1979), “Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 93, 563-587.

Herrera, H. and A. Mattozzi (2008), “Quorum and Turnout in Referenda,” Journal of the European Economic Association 8, 838-871.

Lindbeck, A. and J. Weibull (1987), “Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition,” Public Choice 52, 273-297.

Osborne, M. and A. Slivinski (1996), “A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 65-96.

Besley, T. and S. Coate (1997), “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 85-114.

Mattozzi, A. and E. Snowberg (2018), “The Right Type of Legislator: A Theory of Taxation and Representation,” Journal of Public Economic 159, 54-65.

Ferejohn, J. (1986), “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,” Public Choice 50, 5-25.

Banks, J. and R. Sundaram (1998), “Optimal Retention in Agency Problems,” Journal of Economic Theory 82, 293-323.

Mattozzi, A. and A. Merlo (2008), “Political Careers or Career Politicians?” Journal of Public Economics 92, 597-608.

Myerson, R. (1993), “Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems,” American Political Science Review 87, 856-869.

Persson, T., Roland, G. and G. Tabellini (1997), “Separation of Powers and Political Accountability,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1163-1202.

Lizzeri, A. and N. Persico (2001), “The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives,” American Economic Review 91, 225-239.

Iaryczower, M. and A. Mattozzi (2013), “On the Nature of Competition in Alternative Electoral Systems,” Journal of Politics 75, 743-756.

Merlo, A. and A. Mattozzi (2015), “Mediocracy,” Journal of Public Economics 130, 32-44.

Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1996), “Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics,” Review of Economic Studies 63(2), 265–286. 

Coate, S. (2004), “Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising” Journal of the European Economic Association 2(5), 772-804. 

Prat, A. (2002), “Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare,” Review of Economic Studies 69(4), 999–1017.

Persico, N. and N. Saughuet (2006), “Campaign Spending Regulation in a Model of Redistributive Politics,” Economic Theory 1(5), 95-124.

Galeotti, A. and A. Mattozzi (2011), “Personal Influence:  Social Context and Political Competition,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3, 307-327.

Mattozzi A. and P. Ortoleva (2025), “Politics of Attention,” WP

Montiel Olea J.L and A. Prat (2025), “ Competing Ideologies: Fit, Simplicity, and Fear” WP





 

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