Biography

I am a microeconomic theorist with an interest in mechanism design, contracts and insurance economics. I completed my PhD in Economics at Yale University in May 2014.

I am currently studying contract design in competitive settings, a topic I intend to keep researching in the near future. My last two projects have focused on the effects of private information in competitive insurance markets.

In the main chapter of my PhD dissertation, I consider the structure of optimal contracts in repeated interactions between customer and insurance companies. The analysis presents new testable implications of repeated adverse selection in insurance markets and extends the literature on dynamic mechanism design. In the second chapter, I characterize equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with stochastic contract offers. The consideration of stochastic offers is important to explain the dispersion of contract terms in competitive insurance markets and resolves some old issues related to equilibrium existence. In the final chapter, I extend the classical auction design results in the literature to situations in which agents observe information that is richer than their own valuation for the auctioned good.

During my time as a graduate student, I have worked as a teaching assistant for a variety of microeconomics courses, both at the graduate and undergraduate level, as well as macroeconomics. My teaching expertise is in game theory and mechanism design.