I am a microeconomic theorist with interests in game-theory, mechanism design and information economics. My studies towards a PhD degree were conducted in the Department of Economics at Tel-Aviv University.
My current research is mainly in the field of mechanism design. In one of my research papers I have studied the problem of bilateral trade with asymmetric information in multidimensional environments. The paper characterizes the optimal trading mechanisms that span the Pareto-frontier of the problem, and shows that they all share a very simple structure. In another research project I study the institution of conflict resolution called mediation. In particular the research focuses on the role of mediators in situations of two-sided asymmetric information, and studies whether, and to what extent, they can help the parties to overcome the gap in information and barriers to finding acceptable settlements.
In the field of decision theory, I have studied the question of why decision makers sometimes succeed, but sometimes fail, to recognize regularities in datasets they possess. One possible explanation might be that the problem is just too complex. The paper adopts standard measures of complexity from computer science and characterizes the circumstances under which the problem is indeed hard (NP-Hard) and those under which it is easy.
My teaching experience consists of 2.5 years of teaching the first course of intermediate microeconomics for B.A. (consumer theory) in the Department of Economics at Tel-Aviv University.