Seminar Motivated Skepticism Microeconomics Seminar Add to calendar 2023-01-31 14:00 2023-01-31 15:15 Europe/Rome Motivated Skepticism Seminar Room 3rd Floor Villa La Fonte YYYY-MM-DD Print Share on Facebook Share on X Share on LinkedIn Send by email When 31 January 2023 14:00 - 15:15 CET Where Seminar Room 3rd Floor Villa La Fonte Organised by Department of Economics In this seminar, Jeanne Hagenbach (Science Po), will present her paper "Motivated Skepticism". We experimentally study how individuals read strategically-transmitted information when they have preferences over what they will learn. Subjects play disclosure games in which Receivers should interpret messages skeptically. We vary whether the state that Senders communicate about is ego-relevant or neutral for Receivers, and whether skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with what Receivers prefer believing. Compared to neutral settings, skepticism is significantly lower when it is self-threatening, and not enhanced when it is self-serving. These results shed light on a new channel that individuals can use to protect their beliefs in communication situations: they exercise skepticism in a motivated way, that is, in a way that depends on the desirability of the conclusions that skeptical inferences lead to.Co-author: Charlotte Saucet, University Paris 1 Contact(s): Martina Zucca (European University Institute) Scientific Organiser(s): Prof. Laurent Mathevet (EUI - Department of Economics) Prof. Zeinab Aboutalebi (EUI - Department of Economics) Speaker(s): Prof. Jeanne Hagenbach (Ecole Polytechnique)