Seminar Information Design in Smooth Games Microeconomics seminar Add to calendar 2024-02-20 14:00 2024-02-20 15:15 Europe/Rome Information Design in Smooth Games Conference Room Villa La Fonte YYYY-MM-DD Print Share on Facebook Share on X Share on LinkedIn Send by email When 20 February 2024 14:00 - 15:15 CET Where Conference Room Villa La Fonte Organised by Department of Economics In this seminar, Alex Smolin (Toulouse School of Economics) will present the paper "Information Design in Smooth Games." We study information design in games in which each player has a continuum of actions. We show that an information structure is designer-optimal whenever the equilibrium play it induces can also be implemented in a principal-agent contracting problem. We use this observation to solve three novel applications. In an investment game, the optimal structure fully informs a single investor while providing no information to others. In an expectation polarisation game, the optimal structure fully informs half of the players while providing no information to the other half. In a price competition game, the optimal structure is noise-free Gaussian and recommends prices linearly in the states. Our analysis further informs on the robustness and uniqueness of the optimal information structures.Co-author: Takuro Yamashita, Osaka University Contact(s): Chiara Masini (EUI - Department of Economics) Scientific Organiser(s): Prof. Özlem Bedre-Defolie (EUI) Speaker(s): Prof. Alex Smolin (Toulouse School of Economics)